
Class 



Kr,z' 



BookA^ 



\%1>S 



THE 



ELEMENTS 



MORAL SCIENCE 



BY FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D. 

PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, AND PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



NEW YORK: 
PRINTED FOR COOKE AND CO. 

GOULD, KENDALL & LINCOLN, BOSTON; LEAVITT, LORD & CO., NEW YORK: 

HOGAN & THOMPSON, PHILADELPHIA; MARSHALL & BROWN, 

PROVIDENCE; BELKNAP & HAMERSLEY, HARTFORD; 

JOSEPH JEWETT, BALTIMORE; ENSIGN & CO., 

CINCINNATI. 

1835 






Entered according- to the act of Congress, in the year 1835, by 

FRANCIS WAYLAND, 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the District of 

Rhode Island. 



TYPE — CONNER AND COOKE. 



PLAN OF THE WORK. 



*» 



BOOK FIRST. 

THEORETICAL ETHICS. 

CHAPTER I. 

Of the Origin op our Notion of the Moral Qua- 
lity of Actions. 

Section 1. Of moral law- - - -- 3 

2. What is a moral action 6 

3. In what part of an action do we discover its moral quality 1 1 

4. Whence do we derive our notion of the moral quality of actions 14 

CHAPTER II. 



Conscience, or the Moral Sense. 



Section 1. Is there a conscience 33 

2. Of the manner in which the decision of conscience is expressed 38 

3. The authority of conscience 45 

4. Law by which conscience is governed 59 

5. Rules for moral conduct 68 

CHAPTER III. 

The Nature op Virtue. 

Section 1. Of virtue in general - - - .75 

2. Of virtue in imperfect beings ... 79 



iv PLAN OF THE WORK. 

CHAPTER IV. 
Of Human Happiness. 93 

CHAPTER V. 
Of Self-love. - - - - - 99 

CHAPTER VI. 
Imperfection of Conscience - - 107 

CHAPTER VII. 
Of Natural Religion. - - - 115 

Section 1. Of the manner in which we may learn our duty by the light 

of nature, - - - - 116 

2. How far we may discover our duty by the light of nature 124 

3. Defects of the system of natural religion - - 127 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Relation between Natural and Revealed 

Religion. - 133 

CHAPTER IX. 

The Holy Scriptures. 

Section 1. A view of the Holy Scriptures - - - 139 

2, In what manner are we to ascertain our duty from the Holy 

Scriptures - 142 



PLAN OF THE WORK. 

BOOK SECOND. 
PRACTICAL ETHICS. 

PART FIRST. 

Love to God, or Piety. 

CHAPTER I. 

The general obligation to supreme Love to God. 154 

CHAPTER II. 
The Cultivation of a Devotional Spirit. 169 

CHAPTER III. 
Of Prayer. - - - - - 175 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Observance of the Sabbath. - - 185 



PART SECOND. 

Duties to Man, Reciprocity and Benevolence. 

DIVISION FIRST. 

The Duty of Reciprocity. 

General principle illustrated and the duties of reciprocity classified 201 



ri PLAN OF THE WORK. 

CLASS FIRST. 

JUSTICE AND VERACITY. 

OF JUSTICE. - - - - 211 

CHAPTER I. 

Of Justice as it regards Personal Liberty. 

Section 1. Nature of personal liberty - - - 213 

2. Modes in which personal liberty may be violated - 219 

1. By the individual, or in domestic slavery - 220 

2. By society ... - 230 

CHAPTER II. 

Justice as it respects Property. 

Section 1. The right of property - 245 

Definition of this right - 245 

On what the right of property is founded - - 246 

Modes in which the right of property is acquired - 248 

2. Modes in which the right of property may be violated by the 

individual - 254 

Law of buyer and seller - 256 

Of temporary exchanges and interest - - 262 

Of master and servant - 269 

Of principal and agent - . - - 270 

3. Modes in which the right of property may be violated by 

society - - - - 274 

CHAPTER III. 

Justice as it respects Character. - - 279 

CHAPTER IV. 

Justice as it respects Reputation. - - 287 



PLAN OF THE WORK. vii 

OF VERACITY. - - 299 

CHAPTER I. 
Veracity of the Past and Present. - 301 

CHAPTER II. 
Veracity op the Future. - - - 309 

Promises - ..." 

Contracts - 312 

CHAPTER III. 

Of Oaths. ---.-.....- 317 

CLASS SECOND. 

Duties which arise from the Constitution of 

the Sexes ----- 323 

CHAPTER I. 
General Duty of Chastity. - - 325 

CHAPTER II. 
The Law of Marriage. ... 335 

CHAPTER III. 

The Law of Parents. - 345 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Law of Children. - 361 

CLASS THIRD. 
Duties of Man as a Member of Civil Society 369 



viii PLAN OF THE WORK. 

CHAPTER I. 

Of Civil Society. 

Section 1. Of a simple society ----- 371 

2. Of civil society - - - - 377 

3. Of the mode in which the objects of society are accomplished 392 

CHAPTER II. 

Duty of the Officers of a Government. - 399 

Section 1. Of legislative officers ----- 399 

2. Of judicial officers ----- 401 

3. Of executive officers - - - - 403 

CHAPTER III. 

The Duties of Citizens. - 405 

Section 1. As individuals - - - - - - 405 

2. As constituent members of society - 406 

DIVISION SECOND. 

The Law of Benevolence. 

CHAPTER I. 

General Obligation, and Division of the 

Subject. -;•-•.-"-'- 413 

CHAPTER II. 

Of Benevolence to the Unhappy. 

Section 1. Unhappiness from physical condition - - 421 

2. Unhappiness from intellectual condition - - 428 

CHAPTER III. 

Of Benevolence to the Wicked. - - 433 

CHAPTER IV. 

Of Benevolence toward the Injurious - 437 



PREFACE 



In presenting to the public a new treatise upon Moral 
Science, it may not be improper to state the circumstances 
which led to the undertaking, and the design which it is 
intended to accomplish. 

When it became my duty to instruct in Moral Philosophy 
in Brown University, the text book in use was the work of 
Dr. Paley. From many of his principles I found myself 
compelled to dissent, and at first contented myself with 
stating to my classes my objections to the author, and offer- 
ing my views, in the form of familiar conversations, upon 
several of the topics which he discusses. These views, for my 
own convenience, I soon committed to paper, and delivered 
in the form of lectures. In a few years, these lectures had 
become so far extended, that, to my surprise, they contained 
by themselves, the elements of a different system from that 
of the text-book which I was teaching. To avoid the in- 
convenience of teaching two different systems, I undertook 
to reduce them to order, and make such additions as would 
render the work in some measure complete within itself I 



x PREFACE. 

thus relinquished the work of Dr. Paley, and for some time 
have been in the habit of instructing solely by lecture. The 
success of the attempt exceeded my expectations, and en- 
couraged me to hope, that the publication of what I had 
delivered to my classes, might in some small degree facilitate 
the study of moral science. 



From these circumstances the work has derived its 
character. Being designed for the purposes of instruction, 
its aim is. to be simple, clear, and purely didactic. I have 
rarely gone into extended discussion, but have contented 
myself with the attempt to state the rnagil law, and the 
reason of it, in as few and as comprehensive terms as pos- 
sible. The illustration of the principles, and the application 
of them to the cases of ordinary life, I have generally left to 
be performed by the instructer, or by the student himself. 
Hence, also, I have omitted every thing which relates to the 
history of opinions, and have made but little allusion even 
to the opinions themselves, of those from whom I dissent 1 
To have acted otherwise, would have extended the under- 
taking greatly beyond the limits which I had assigned to 
myself; and it seemed to me not to belong to the design 
which I had in view. A work which should attempt to 
exhibit what was true, appeared to me more desirable than 
one which should point out what was exploded, discuss what 
was doubtful, or disprove what was false. 

In the course of the work, I have quoted but few author- 
ities, as, in preparing it, I have referred to but few books. 
I make this remark in no manner for the sake of laying 



PREFACE. xi 

claim to originality, but to avoid the imputation of using the 
labors of others without acknowledgment. When I com- 
menced the undertaking I attempted to read extensively, 
but soon found it so difficult to arrive at any definite results 
in this manner, that the necessities of my situation obliged 
me to rely upon my own reflection. That I have thus 
come to the same conclusions with many others, I should 
be unwilling to doubt. When this coincidence of opinion 
has come to my knowledge, I have mentioned it. When it 
is not mentioned, it is because I have not known it. 

The author to whom I am under the greatest obligations 
is Bishop Butler. The chapter on conscience is, as I sup- 
pose, but little more than a development of his ideas on the 
same subject. How much more I owe to this incomparable 
writer, I know not. As it was the study of his sermons on 
human nature that first turned my attention to this subject, 
there are, doubtless, many trains of thought which I have 
derived from him, which I have not been able to trace back 
to their source, as they have long since become incorporated 
with my own reflections. The article on the Sabbath, as is 
stated in the text, is derived chiefly from the tract of Mr. J. 
J. Gurney, on the same subject. Entertaining those views 
of the Sacred Scriptures, which I have expressed in the 
work itself, it is scarcely necessary to add here, that I con- 
sider them the great source of moral truth ; and that a sys- 
tem of ethics will be true just in proportion as it develops 
their meaning. To do this, has been my object; and to 
have, in ever so humble a manner, accomplished it, I shall 
consider as the greatest possible success. 

It is not without much diffidence that I have ventured to 



xii PREFACE. 

lay before the public a work on this important subject. 
That something of this sort was needed, had long been 
universally confessed. My professional duty led me to 
undertake it ; and I trust that the hope of usefulness has 
induced me to prepare it for publication. If I have not 
been so happy as to elucidate truth, I have endeavored to 
express myself in such a manner, that the reader shall have 
as little trouble as possible in detecting my errors. And if it 
shall be found that I have thrown any light whatever upon 
the science of human duty, I shall have unspeakable cause for 
gratitude to that Spirit whose inspiration alone teacheth man 
understanding. And my cause for gratitude will scarcely 
be less, should my failure incite some one better able than 
myself to do justice to the subject, to a more successful un- 
dertaking. 

Brown University, April, 1835. 



BOOK I. 



THEORETICAL ETHICS. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR NOTION OF THE MORAL 
QUALITY OF ACTIONS. 

SECTION I. 

OF MORAL LAW. 

Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, is the Science of Moral 
Law. 

The first question which presents itself is, what is moral 
law? Let us inquire, first, what is law, and secondly, what 
is moral law. 

By the term Law, I think we generally mean, a form of 
expression, denoting either a mode of existence, or an order 
of sequence. 

Thus, the first of Sir Isaac Newton's laws, namely, that 
every body will continue in a state of rest, or of uniform 
motion in a right line, unless compelled by some force to 
change its state, denotes a mode of existence. 

The third law of motion, that, to every action of one body 
upon another, there is an equal and contrary re-action, 
denotes an order of sequence; that is, it declares the gene- 
ral fact, that, if one event occurs, the constitution of things 
under which we exist, is such, that the other event will also 
occur. 



4 OF MORAL LAW. 

The axioms in mathematics are laws of the same kind 
Thus, the axiom, if equals be added to equals, the wholes 
will be equal, denotes an order of sequence, in respect to 
quantity. 

Of the same nature are the laws of chemistry. Such, for 
instance, is the law that, if soda be saturated with muriatic 
acid, the result will be common salt. 

Thus in intellectual philosophy. If a picture of a visible 
object be formed upon the retina, and the impression com- 
municated, by the nerves, to the brain, the result will be an 
act of perception. 

The meaning of law, when referring to civil society, is 
substantially the same. It expresses an established order of 
sequence between a specified action, and a particular mode 
of reward or of punishment. Such, in general, is the mean- 
ing of law. 

Moral philosophy takes it for granted that there is in a 
human action a moral quality; that is, that a human action 
may be right or wrong. Every one knows that we may 
contemplate the same action as wise or unwise ; as courteous 
or impolite; as graceful or awkward; and, also, as right or 
wrong. It can have escaped the observation of no one, that 
there are consequences distinct from each other, which fol- 
low an action, and which are connected, respectively, with 
each of its attributes. To take, for instance, a moral qual- 
ity. Two men may both utter what is false ; the one intend- 
ing to speak the truth, the other intending to deceive. Now, 
some of the consequences of this act are common to both 
cases, namely, that the hearers may, in both cases, be de- 
ceived. But it is equally manifest, that there are also con- 
sequences peculiar to the case in which the speaker in- 
tended to deceive; as, for example, the effects upon his own 
moral character, and the estimation in which he is held by 



OF MORAL LAW. 5 

the community. And thus, in general, moral philosophy 
proceeds upon the supposition that there may exist in the 
actions of men a moral quality, and that there are certain 
sequences connected by our Creator with the exhibition of 
that quality. 

A moral law is therefore a form of expression denoting an 
order of sequence established, between the moral quality of 
actions, and their results. 

Moral philosophy, 01 Ethics, is the science which classi- 
fies and illustrates moral law, 

Here it may be worth while to remark, that an order of 
sequence established, of necessity supposes an Establisher. 
Hence moral philosophy, as well as every other science, 
proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of an uni- 
versal cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every 
thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the rela- 
tions which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, 
whether moral or physical, are the result of His enactment, 
an order of sequence, once discovered in morals, is just as 
invariable as an order of sequence in physics. 

Such being the fact, it is evident, that the moral laws of 
God, can never be varied by the institutions of man, any 
more than the physical laws. The results which God has 
connected with actions, will inevitably occur ; all the created 
power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding. Nor 
can these consequences be eluded or averted any more than 
the sequences which follow by the laws of gravitation. 
What should we think of a man who expected to leap off 
from a precipice, and, by some act of sagacity, elude the 
effect of the accelerating power of gravity ; or, of another, 
who, by the exercise of his own will, determined to render 
himself imponderable. Every one who believes God to 
have established an order of sequences in morals, must see 

2* 



6 OF MORAL ACTION. 

that it is equally absurd, to expect to violate, with impunity, 
any moral law of the Creator. 

Yet men have always flattered themselves with the hope 
that they could violate moral law and escape the conse- 
quences which God has established. The reason is obvious. 
In physics, the consequent follows the antecedent, frequent- 
ly, immediately, and, most commonly, after a stated interval. 
In morals, the result is frequently long delayed; and the 
time of its occurrence is always uncertain. Hence, because 
sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, there- 
fore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to 
do evil. But time, whether long or short, has neither power 
nor tendency to change the order of an established sequence. 
The time required for vegetation in different orders of 
plants, may vary, but yet wheat will always produce wheat, 
and an acorn will always produce an oak. That such is 
the case in morals, a heathen poet has taught us. 

Raro, antecfldentem scelestum 
Deseruit, pede poena claudo. 

A higher authority has admonished us, Be not deceived, 
God is not mocked; whatsoever & man soweth, that, shall he 
also reap. It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as 
well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than 
the seed from which it springs. 



SECTION II. 

WHAT IS A MORAL ACTION? 

Action, from actum, the supine of the Latin verb ago, I do, 
signifies something done ; the putting forth of some power. 

But under what circumstances must power be put forth, 
in order to render it amoral action? 



OF MORAL ACTION. 7 

1. A machine is, in common conversation, said to be pow- 
erful. A vegetable is said to put forth its leaves, a tree to 
bend its branches, or a vine to run towards a prop; but we 
never speak of these instances of power, as actions. 

2. Action is never affirmed, but of beings possessed of a 
will ; that is, of those in whom the putting forth of power is 
immediately consequent upon their determination to put it 
forth. Could we conceive of animate beings, whose exer- 
tions had no connection with their will, we should not speak 
of such exertions as actions. 

3. Action, so far as we know, is only affirmed of beings 
possessed of intelligence ; that is, who are capable of com- 
prehending a particular end, and of adopting the means 
necessary to accomplish it. An action is something done ; 
that is, some change effected. But man effects change only 
by means of stated antecedents. An action, therefore, in 
such a being, supposes some change in view, and some 
means employed for the purpose of effecting it. 

We do not however affirm this as essential. Suppose a 
being so constituted as to be able to effect changes without 
the use of means ; action then would not involve the neces- 
sity of intelligence, in the sense in which it is here ex- 
plained. All that would be necessary would be the pre- 
vious conception of the change which he intended to effect. 

4. All this exists in man. He is voluntary and intelli- 
gent, capable of foreseeing the result of an exertion of power, 
and that exertion of power is subject to his will. This is 
sufficient to render man, the subject of government. He can 
foresee the results of a particular action, and can will, or not 
will, to accomplish it. And other results can be connected 
with the action, of such a nature, as to influence his 
will in one direction or another. Thus a man may know 
that stabbing another will produce death. He has it in his 
power to will or not to will it. But such other consequences 



8 OF MORAL ACTION. 

may be, by society connected with the act, that, though on 
many accounts he would desire to do it, yet, on other and 
graver accounts, he would prefer not to do it. This is suf- 
ficient to render man a subject of government. But is this 
all that is necessary to constitute man a moral agent; that 
is, to render him a subject of moral government? 

May not all this be affirmed of brutes? Are they not vol- 
untary, and even, to some extent, intelligent agents? Do 
they not, frequently, at least, comprehend the relation of 
means to an end, and voluntarily put forth the power neces- 
sary for the accomplishment of that end? Do they not 
manifestly design to injure us, and select the most appro- 
priate means for effecting their purpose? And can we not 
connect such results with their actions, as shall influence 
their will, and prevent, or excite the exercise of their power. 
We do this, whenever we caress or intimidate them, to pre- 
vent them from injuring us, or to excite them to labor. 
They are then subjects of government, as truly as man. 

Is there, then, no difference between the intelligent and 
voluntary action of a brute, and the moral action of a man? 
Suppose a brute and a man both to perform the same action ; 
as, for instance, suppose the brute to kill its offspring, and 
the man to murder his child. Are these actions of the same 
character? Do we entertain the same feelings towards the 
authors of them? Do we treat the authors in the same man- 
ner, and with the design of producing in them the same re- 
sult? 

I think no one can answer these questions in the affirma- 
tive. We pity the brute, but we are filled with indignation 
against the man. In the one case, we say there has been 
harm done, in the other, injury committed. We feel that 
the man deserves punishment', we have no such feeling to 
the brute. We say that the man has done wrong; but we 
never affirm this of the other. We may attempt to produce 



OF MORAL ACTION. 9 

in the brute such a recollection of the offence, as may deter 
him from the act in future ; but we can do no more. We 
attempt, in the other case, to make the man sensible of the 
act as wrong, and to produce in him a radical change of 
character, so that he not only would not commit the crime 
again, but would be inherently averse to the commission 
of it. 

These considerations are, I think, sufficient to render it 
evident, that we perceive an element in the actions of men, 
which does not exist in the actions of brutes. What is this 
element ? 

If we should ask a child, he would tell us that the man 
knows better. This would be his mode of explaining it. 

But what is meant by knowing better? Did not the brute 
and the man both know that the result of their action would 
be harm? Did not both intend that it should be harm? In 
what respect, then, did the one know better than the other? 

I think that a plain man or a child would answer, the man 
knew that he ought not to do it, and that the brute did not 
know that he ought not to do it; or he might say, the man 
knew, and the brute did not know, that it was wrong; but 
whatever terms he might employ, they would involve the 
same idea. I do not know that a philosopher could give a 
more satisfactory answer. 

If the question then be asked, what is a moral action? we 
may answer, it is the voluntary action of an intelligent 
agent, who is capable of distinguishing between right and 
wrong, or of distinguishing what he ought, from what he 
ought not to do. 

It is, however, to be remarked, that, although action is de- 
fined to be the putting forth of power, it is not intended to be 



10 OF MORAL ACTION. 

asserted, that the moral quality exists only where power is 
actually exerted. It is manifest, that our thoughts and reso- 
lutions may be deserving of praise or blame ; that is, may be 
right or wrong, where they do not appear in action. When 
the will consents to the performance of an action, though the 
act be not done, the omniscient Deity justly considers us 
either as virtuous or vicious. 

From what has been said, it may be seen that there exists, 
in the actions of men, an element which does not exist in 
the actions of brutes. Hence, though both are subjects of 
government, the government of the one should be construct- 
ed upon principles different from that of the other. We can 
operate upon brutes only by fear of punishment, and hope of 
reward. We can operate upon man, not only in this man- 
ner, but, also, by an appeal to his consciousness of right and 
wrong ; and by the use of such means as may improve his 
moral nature. Hence, all modes of punishment, which treat 
men as we treat brutes, are as unphilosophical as they are 
thoughtless, cruel, and vindictive. Such are, systems of 
criminal jurisprudence, which have in view nothing more 
than the infliction of pain upon the offender. The leading 
object of all such systems should be to reclaim the vicious. 
Such was the result, to which alHhe investigations of How- 
ard, led. Such is the improvement, which Prison Disci- 
pline societies are laboring to effect. 

And it is worthy of remark, that the Christian precept re- 
specting the treatment of injuries, proceeds precisely upon 
this principle. The New Testament teaches us to love our 
enemies, to do good to those that hate us, to overcome evil 
by good ; that is, to set before a man who does wrong, the 
strongest possible exemplification of the opposite moral 
quality, right. Now, it is manifest, that nothing would be 
so likely to show to an injurious person the turpitude of his 
own conduct, and to produce in him self-reproach and re- 
pentance, as precisely this sort of moral exhibition. Revenge 



IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION, &c. 11 

and retaliation might, or might not, prevent a repetition of 
the injury to a particular individual. The requiting good 
for evil, in addition to this effect, has an inherent tendency 
to produce sorrow for the act, and dislike to its moral quali- 
ty; and thus, by producing a change of character, to pre- 
vent the repetition of the offence under all circumstances 
hereafter. 

SECTION III. 

IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION DO WE DISCOVER ITS 
MORAL QUALITY? 

In a deliberate action, four distinct elements may be com- 
monly observed. These are — 

1. The outward act, as when I put money into the hands 
of another. 

2. The conception of this act, of which, the external per- 
formance, is the mere bodying forth. 

3. The resolution to carry that conception into effect. 

4. The intention, or design with which all this is done. 

Now, the moral quality does not belong to the external act, 
for the same external act may be performed by two men, 
while its moral character is, in the two cases, entirely dis- 
similar. 

Nor does it belong to the conception, nor to the resolution 
to carry that resolution into effect ; for the resolution to per- 
form an action can have no other character, than that of the 
action itself. It must, then, reside in the intention. 

That such is the fact, may be illustrated by an example. 
A and B both give to C a piece of money. They both con- 



12 IN WHAT PART OF AN 

ceived of this action before they performed it. They both 
resolved to do precisely what they did. In all this, both ac- 
tions coincide. A, however, gave it to C, with the intention 
of procuring the murder of a friend, B, with the intention 
relieving a family in distress. It is evident, that, in this case, 
the intention gives to the action its character as right or 
wrong. 

That the moral quality of the action resides in the inten- 
tion, may be evideut from various other considerations. 

1. By reference to the intention, we inculpate or excul- 
pate others, or ourselves, without any respect to the happi- 
ness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an ac- 
tion be what it may, we hold a man guilty, simply on the 
ground of intention, or, on the same ground, we hold him 
innocent. Thus of ourselves. We are conscious of guilt 
or of innocence, not from the result of an action, but from 
the intention by which we were actuated. 

2. We always distinguish between being the instrument 
of good, and intending it. We are grateful to one who is 
the cause of good, not in the proportion of the amount ef- 
fected, but of the amount intended. 

Intention may be wrong in various ways. 

As, for instance, first, where we intend to injure another, 
as in cruelty, malice, revenge, deliberate slander. 

Here, however, it may be remarked, that we may intend 
to inflict pain, without intending wrong, for we may be guilty 
of the violation of no right. Such is the case, when pain is 
inflicted for the purposes of justice; for it is manifest, that, 
if a man deserves pain, it is no violation of right to inflict it 
Hence we see the difference between harm, injury, and pun- 
ishment. We harm another when we actually inflict pain; 
we injure him when we inflict pain in violation of his 



ACTION DO WE DISCOVER, &c 13 

rights ; we punish him when we inflict pain which he de- 
serves, and in so doing, there is therefore, a violation of no right. 

2. Intention is wrong, where we act for the gratification 
of our own passions, without any respect to the happiness 
of others. Such is the case of seduction, ambition, and, in 
nations, commonly, of war. Every man is bound to re- 
strain the indulgence of his passions, within such limits, 
that they will work no ill to his neighbor. If they actu- 
ally inflict injury, it is no excuse to say, that he had no 
ill-will to the individual injured. The Creator never con- 
ferred on him the right to destroy another's happiness for 
his own gratification. 

3. As the right and wrong of an action resides in the in- 
tention, it is evident, that, where an action is intended, 
though it be not actually performed, that intention is 
worthy of praise or blame, as much as the action itself, pro- 
vided, the action itself be wholly out of our power. Thus 
God rewarded David for intending to build the temple, 
though he did not permit him actually to build it. 

4. As the right or wrong exists in the intention, wher- 
ever a particular intention is essential to virtuous action, 
the performance of the external act, without that intention, 
is destitute of the element of virtue. Thus, a child is 
bound to obey his parents, with the intention of thus mani- 
festing his love and gratitude. If he do it from fear, or 
hope of gain, the act is destitute of the virtue of filial obe- 
dience, and becomes merely the result of passion or self- 
interest. And thus our Saviour charges upon the Jews the 
want of the proper intention, in all their dealings with God. 
" I know you, said he, that ye have not the love of God in 
you." 

And again, it is manifest, that our moral feelings, like 
our taste, may be excited by the conceptions of our own 

3 



14 WHENCE DO WE 

imagination, scarcely less than by the reality. These, there- 
fore, may develope moral character. He who meditates, 
with pleasure, upon fictions of pollution and crime, whether 
originating with himself or with others, renders it evident, 
that nothing but opposing circumstances prevents him from 
being himself an actor in the crime which he loves. And 
still more, as the moral character of an action resides in the 
intention; and as whatever tends to corrupt the intention 
must be wrong, so the meditating with pleasure upon vice, 
which has manifestly this tendency, must be wrong also. 

And here let me add, that the imagination of man is the 
great parent both of virtue and vice. Thus saith the wise 
man, "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the 
issues of life." No man becomes openly a villain, until his 
imagination has become familiar with conceptions of vil- 
lany. The crimes which astonish us by their atrocity, 
were first arranged and acted and re-acted, in the recesses 
of the criminal's own mind. Let the imagination, then, be 
most carefully guarded, if we wish to escape from tempta- 
tion, and make progress in virtue. Let no one flatter him- 
self that he is innocent, if he loves to meditate upon any 
thing which he would blush to avow before men, or fear 
to unveil before God. 



SECTION IV. 

WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION OF THE MORAL 
QUALITY OF ACTIONS? 

To this question several answers have been given. Some 
of them we shall proceed to consider. 

1. Is our notion of right and wrong a modification of 
any other idea? 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 15 

The only modifications of which an idea is susceptible, 
are, first, that of greater or less vividness of impression, or, 
secondly, that of simplicity or composition. Thus the quality 
of beauty may impress us more or less forcibly ; in the con- 
templation of different objects; or, on the other hand, the 
idea of beauty may be simple, or else combined, in our con- 
ceptions, with the idea of utility. 

Now, if our notion of right and wrong, be a ?nodification 
of some other idea, in the first sense, then one degree of the 
original quality will be destitute of any moral element, and 
another degree of it will possess a moral element, and, by 
ascending higher in the scale, it will at last lose all its ori- 
ginal character, and possess another, having no remains of 
resemblance to itself. This would be to say, that a quality, 
by becoming more intense, ceased to be itself; or, as if a 
triangle, by becoming more perfect as a triangle, at last be- 
came a square. Thus, if it be said, that the idea of right 
and wrong is a modification of the idea of beauty, then the 
same object, if beautiful in one degree, would have no 
moral quality ; if beautiful in another degree, would begin 
to be virtuous; and, if beautiful in the highest degree, 
would cease to be beautiful, and be purely virtuous or holy. 
What meaning could be attached to such an affirmative, I 
am not able to discover. 

The other meaning of a modification, of an idea, is, that it 
is compounded with some other idea. Now, suppose our 
notion of right and wrong to be a modification in this lat- 
ter sense. Then this notion either enters into the original 
elements of the compound idea, or it does not. If it does, 
then it is already present; and this supposition does not 
account for its existence. If it does not enter into the ele- 
ments of the compound idea, then, these elements must 
exist merely combined, but each possessing its original 
character, in which combination, the moral idea is not 
involved, or else they lose their original character, and are 



16 . WHENCE DO WE 

merely the stated antecedents to another idea, which is an 
idea like neither of them separately, nor combined. In this 
latter case, it is manifest, that the consequent of an antece- 
dent is no modification of the antecedent, but an entirely 
different subject, coming into existence under these particu- 
lar circumstances, in obedience to the laws of its own or- 
ganization. Do we ever term a salt a modification of an 
acid, or of an alkali, or of an acid and alkali united. Is the 
explosive power of gun-powder, a modification of the spark 
and the gun-powder? We think, then, it may be safely 
concluded, that the notion of right and wrong, is not a 
modification of any other idea. 

If any one assert, that it universally ensues upon the 
combination of two other ideas, it will become him to show 
what two ideas they are, neither of which involves the 
notion of right and wrong, but upon the combination of 
which, this notion always arises, while the original ele- 
ments which precede it, entirely disappear. 

2. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived 
from an exercise of the judgment? 

Judgment is that act of the mind, by which, a subject 
and a predicate being known, we affirm, that the predicate 
belongs to the subject. Thus, he who knows what grass 
is, and what green is, affirms that grass is green. But, in 
this act of the mind, the notion of the two things of which 
the affirmation is made, must exist before the act of judg- 
ment can be exerted. A man who had no notion of grass, 
nor of green, could never affirm the one of the other. And 
so of any other instances of this act. A man who had no 
notion of right or wrong, could never affirm this quality of 
any subject; much less could he, by this faculty, acquire 
the original idea. And thus, in general, the judgment only 
affirms a relation to exist between two notions which pre- 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 17 

viously existed in the mind ; but it can give us no original 
notions of quality, either in morals or in any thing else. 

3. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived 
from association ? 

The term association, is used to designate two habits of 
mind, considerably alike. The first is that, by which the 
sight or recollection of one object, calls to recollection some 
other object, to which it stands in some particular relation. 
Thus, the sight of a hearse may recal to recollection the 
death of a friend ; or the sound of his native language, in a 
foreign country, may awaken in the breast of an exile all 
the recollections of home. The second case is, where 
a particular emotion, belonging to one train of circum- 
stances, is awakened by another, with which it has no ne- 
cessary connection; and this first emotion comes at last to be 
awakened by the accidental, instead of, by the necessary 
antecedent. Thus, the countenance of a person may be 
suited to awaken no emotion of pleasure in itself; but, if I 
become acquainted with him, and am pleased with his 
moral and intellectual character, a degree of pleasure is, at 
last, excited by his countenance, which, in the end, ap- 
pears to me agreeable, or, it may be, beautiful. 

Now, in both these cases, it is evident that no new idea 
is gained. In the one case a well known idea is revived ; 
in the other, two known ideas are connected in a new rela- 
tion; but this is all. Association is the faculty by which 
we transfer; but we can transfer nothing which did not pre- 
viously exist. We could never use the idea of right and 
wrong by association, unless we had already acquired 
it. In the acts of judgment and association, therefore, 
as the existence of the notion must be presupposed, nei- 
ther of these acts will account for the origin of the notion 
itself, 

3* 



fid 



18 WHENCE DO WE 

4. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived 
from the idea of the greatest amount of happiness? 

Thus, it is said that our notion of right and wrong is de- 
rived from our idea of productiveness of happiness, or in 
other words, that an action is right or wrong because it is 
productive of the greatest amount of happiness. 

When the affirmative of this question is asserted, it is, I 
presume, taken for granted, that the idea of right and wrong, 
and of productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness, 
are two distinct ideas. If they be not, then one cannot be 
derived from the other, for nothing can correctly be said to 
be a cause of itself. We shall, therefore, consider them as 
different ideas, and inquire, in what sense it is true that one 
is the cause of the other? 

When we speak of two events in nature, of which one is 
the cause of the other, we use the word in one of the fol- 
lowing senses, first : we use it to denote stated antecedency 
merely, as, when we say that sensation is the cause of per- 
ception, or, that a man perceives an external object, because 
an impression is made upon an organ of sense. 

2. We use it to signify the fact, that the event or change 
of which we speak, may be referred to some law or fact, 
more general than itself. We say in other words, that the 
fact in question is a species under some genus, with which 
it agrees as to generic qualities ; and from which it is distin- 
guished by its specific differences. Thus, when asked why 
a stone falls to the earth, we reply, because all matter, is re- 
ciprocally attractive to all other matter. This is the generic 
fact, under which, the fact in question is to be compre- 
hended ; and its specific difference is, that it is a particular 
form of matter, attracted by a particular form of matter, and 
probably unlike the matter of the planets, the comets, or 
the sun, 



DERIVE OUR NOTIONS, &c. 19 

When it is said that an action is right, because it is pro- 
ductive of the greatest amount of happiness, suppose be- 
cause used in the first of these senses. It will then mean, 
that we are so constituted, that the idea of the greatest 
amount of happiness, is always the stated antecedent to the 
idea of right, or moral obligation. Now, this a question 
purely of fact, It does not admit of a reason a priori. And, 
if it be the fact, it must be the universal fact, that is to say, 
this consequent must always, under similar conditions, be 
preceded by this antecedent, and this antecedent followed 
by this consequent. 

To facts, then let us appeal. Is it a fact that we are con- 
scious of the existence of this connexion? When we are 
conscious that an act is right, is this consciousness preceded 
by a conviction that this action will be productive of the 
greatest amount of happiness? When we say it is wrong 
to lie or to steal, do we find this consciousness preceded by 
the notion, that lying or stealing will not produce the 
greatest amount of happiness ? When we say a murderer 
deserves death, do we find this notion preceded by the other, 
that murder will not produce the greatest amount of happi- 
ness, and that putting a murderer to death, will produce it? 
When we say that a man ought to obey God, his Creator and 
Preserver, do we find this conviction preceded by the other ; 
that the exercise of this affection will produce the greatest 
amount of happiness? Now, I may have greatly mistaken 
the nature of moral affections, but I am much deceived, if 
many persons will not be found, who will declare, that often 
as they have formed these judgments, the idea of the greatest 
amount of happiness, never actually entered into their con- 
ception. 

Or take the case of children. When you would impress 
upon a child the duty of obeying its parents, or of loving 
God, do you begin by explaining to it the idea of the greatest 
amount of happiness? Are we obliged to make use of this 



20 WHENCE DO WE 

antecedent, in order to produce this consequent? If so it 
surely would take a much longer time than is actually re- 
quired, to produce in a child any moral sensibility. Do we 
not find children well instructed into the consciousness of 
right and wrong, who could not be made to comprehend the 
notion of the greatest amount of happiness. 

How do we attempt to arouse the consciences of the hea- 
then? When we tell them that they ought to obey God, and 
believe on Jesus Christ, do we begin by explaining to them 
that this course of life will produce the greatest amount of 
happiness. Suppose we could never arouse them to duty, 
until we had produced a conviction of the greatest amount 
of happiness which would result from piety, would a single 
one of them ever listen to us long enough, to understand our 
doctrine ? 

Does the bible any where assert, that the conviction of 
the greatest amount of happiness is necessary to the ex- 
istence of moral obligation? If I mistake not, it presents a 
very different view of the subject. It declares that the hea- 
then are without excuse ! But why? Because disobedience 
to God, interferes with the greatest amount of happiness? 
No, but for a very different reason. " Because that which 
may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath 
showed it unto them, so that they are without excuse? Rom. 
i. 19, 20. St. Paul here seems to assume, that the revelation 
of God's eternal power and divinity, and the manifestation 
of his will, is sufficient, of itself, without any other conside- 
ration, to make whatever he shall command obligatory upon 
his creatures. 

It seems then to me, by no means proved, that an action is 
right because it is productive of the greatest amount of hap- 
piness, if we mean by it, that the one idea is the stated 
antecedent to the other, in our conceptions. 



DERIVE OUR NOTIONS, &c. 21 

But let us take the other meaning of because. Sup- 
pose it said, that the idea of moral obligation is an idea 
comprehended under and to be referred to, a more general 
idea, namely, that of the productiveness of the greatest 
amount of happiness. Now, if this be the case, then, mani- 
festly, the notion of the greatest amount of happiness, and 
the notion of right must be equally extensive ; that is, must 
extend precisely to the same number of individual instances, 
or else their extent must be different; that is, the generic 
notion of the greatest amount of happiness, must compre 
hend cases, which are excluded from its species, the idea of 
right. If the latter be the case, then, there will be some 
cases, in which an action would produce the greatest 
amount of happiness, which would not contain the moral 
element; and besides, if this were the case, it would become 
those who make this assertion, to show what is that other 
element, which, combining with the idea of the greatest 
amount of happiness, designates the subordinate and dif- 
ferent idea, the idea of moral obligation. This, however, 
would not be attempted, and it will be at once admitted, 
that these two ideas arc. in their nature, coextensive, that 
is, that whatever is productive of the greatest amount of 
happiness, is right; and that whatever is right, is productive 
of the greatest amount of happiness. 

Let us suppose it then to be assumed, that the terms are 
precisely co-extensive, viz., that they apply exactly to the 
same actions and in the same degrees. It would then be dif- 
ficult to assign a meaning to the word because, correspond- 
ing with either of the senses above stated. Nor, if two terms 
are precisely co-extensive, do I see how it is possible to dis- 
cover which of the two is to be referred to the other, or, 
whether either is to be referred to either. If A and B are 
equally extensive, I do not see how we can determine, 
whether A is to be referred to B, or B to be referred to A. 

The only meaning which I can conceive as capable of 



22 WHENCE DO WE 

being attached to the assertion, is this ; that we would not 
be under moral obligation to perform any action, unless it 
were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, thus 
making moral obligation rest upon this other idea, that 
of the greatest amount of happiness. 

Now, if this be asserted, it is, surely, from what has been 
said above, not self evident; for we manifestly do not in- 
stinctively and universally, as soon as this connexion is 
asserted, yield our assent to it, nor is it absurd to deny it; 
and, therefore, the assertion capable of proof, and we may 
justly demand the proof before we believe it. Let us then 
examine the proof on which it rests. 

It is, however, to be remarked, that, if the assertion be 
true, that we are under obligation to perform an action only 
on the ground, that it is productive of the greatest good, 
the assertion must be taken in its widest sense. It must 
apply to actions affecting our relations, not only to man, 
but, also, to God, for these are equally comprehended within 
the notion of moral obligation. And thus, the assertion is, 
that we are not under obligation to perform any action 
whatever, under any circumstances, unless it be productive 
of the greatest happiness. 

1. It is said, that these two always coincide ; that is, that 
we always are under obligation to do whatever is produc- 
tive of the greatest amount of happiness ; and that, what- 
ever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the 
greatest amount of happiness. Now, granting the premises, 
I do not see that the conclusion would follow. It is possi- 
ble to conceive, that God may have created moral agents 
under obligations to certain courses of conduct, and has so 
arranged the system of the universe, that the following 
of these courses shall be for the best, without making the 
obligation to rest at all upon the tendency to produce the 
greatest amount of happiness. 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 23 

A parent may require a child to do that which will be for 
the good of the family, and yet there may be other reasons 
besides this, which render it the duty of the child to obey 
his parent. 

2. But, second, how do we know that these premises are 
true, that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is pro- 
ductive of the greatest amount of happiness. It never can 
be known, unless we know the whole history of this uni- 
verse from everlasting to everlasting. And besides, we 
know that God always acts right, that is, deals with all 
beings according to their deserts ; but whether he always 
acts to promote the greatest happiness, I do not know that 
he has told us. His government could not be more per- 
fectly right than it is ; but whether it could have involved 
less misery, or have produced more happiness, I do not 
know that we have the means of ascertaining. As, there- 
fore, the one quantity, so to speak, is fixed, that is, is as 
great as it can be, while we do not certainly know that the 
other is as great as it can be, we cannot affirm that right 
and the greatest amount of happiness always coincide ; nor, 
that we are under obligation to do nothing, unless it would 
tend to produce the greatest amount of happiness. 

3. Besides, suppose we are under no obligation to do any 
thing unless it were productive of the greatest amount of 
happiness, it would follow that we are under no obligation 
to obey God, unless the production of the greatest amount 
of happiness were the controlling and universal principle 
of his government. That is, if his object in creating and 
governing the universe, were any other, or, if it were doubt- 
ful whether it might not be any other, our obligation to obe- 
dience would either be annihilated, or would be contin- 
gent ; that is, it would be inversely as the degree of doubt 
which might exist. Now, as I have before remarked, this 
may, or may not, be the ultimate end of God's government; 
or it may be his own pleasure, or his own glory, or some 



24 WHENCE DO WE 

other end, which he has not seen fit to reveal to us ; and, 
therefore, on the principle which we are discussing, our 
obligation to obedience, seems a matter yet open for 
discussion. Now, if I mistake not, this is wholly at va- 
riance with the whole tenor of Scripture and reason. I 
do not know that the Scriptures ever give us a reason why 
we ought to obey God, aside from his existence and attri- 
butes, or ever put this subject in a light susceptible of a 
question. 

To this view of the subject, the following remarks of 
Bishop Butler manifestly tend. " Perhaps divine goodness, 
with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our 
speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to pro- 
duce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the 
faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely per- 
fect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave 
suitably with the nature which he has given them; to the 
relations which he has placed them to each other, and to 
that in which they stand to himself; that relation to himself 
which during their existence, is ever necessary, and which 
is the most important one of all. I say, an infinitely perfect 
mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents 
in and for itself as well as upon account of its being 
essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or 
the whole end for which God made, and thus governs the 
world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties : 
there may be somewhat in it, as impossible for us to have 
any conception of, as for a blind man to have a conception 
of colors." Analogy, part 1, ch. 2. 

Again. " Some men seem to think the only character of 
the Author of nature, to be that of single, absolute benevo- 
lence. This, considered as a principle of action, and infi- 
nite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possi- 
ble happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, other- 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 25 

wise than as such regard would produce the highest degrees 
of it. And, supposing this to be the only character of God, 
veracity and justice in him, would be nothing but benevo- 
lence, conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not to 
be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak 
with cautious reverence upon such a subject. There may 
possibly be, in the creation, beings, to whom the Author of 
nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all cha- 
racters, this of infinite, absolute benevolence ; for it is the 
most amiable, supposing it is not, as perhaps it is not, in- 
compatible with justice; but he manifests himself to lis 
under the character of a righteous Governor. He may, 
consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, 
in the sense now explained ; but he is, for he has given us 
a proof, in the constitution and government of the world, 
that he is, a Governor over servants, as he rewards and pun- 
ishes us for our actions." Analogy, ch. 3. 

For these reasons, I think it is not proved, that an action 
is right, because it is productive of the greatest amount of 
happiness. It may be so, or it may not, but we ought not 
to believe it to be so, without proof; and it may even be 
doubted whether we are in possession of the media of proofj 
that is, whether it is a question fairly within the reach of 
the human faculties ; and, so far as we can learn from the 
Scriptures, I think their testimony is decidedly against the 
supposition. To me, the Scriptures seem explicitly to de- 
clare, that the will of God alone is sufficient to create the 
obligation to obedience in all his creatures; and that this 
will, of itself, precludes every other inquiry. This seems 
to be the view of St. Paul, in the passage which we have 
quoted, as well as in several other places, in his Epistle to 
the Romans. To the same import is the prayer of our Sa- 
viour, " I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and earth, 
because thou hast hid these things from the wise and pru- 
dent, and hast revealed them unto babes ; even so, Fathar , 
for so it seemed good in thy sight" 

4 



26 WHENCE DO WE 

It seems, therefore to me, that these explanations of the 
origin of our moral sentiments, are unsatisfactory. I be- 
lieve the idea of a moral quality in actions, to be ultimate, 
to arise under such circumstances as have been appointed 
by our Creator, and that we can assign for it no other 
reason, than that such is his will concerning us. 

If this be true, our only business will be, to state the cir- 
cumstances under which our moral notions arise. In doing 
this, it would be presumption in me, to expect that I shall 
be able to give an account of this subject, more satisfactory 
to others, than theirs has been to me. I merely offer it, as 
that, which seems to me, most accurately to correspond 
with the phenomena. 

The view which I take of this subject, is briefly as fol- 
lows: 

1. It is manifest to every one, that we all stand in various 
and dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created 
and uncreated, with which we are acquainted. Among 
our relations to created beings, are those of man to man, or 
that of substantial equality of parent and child, of benefac- 
tor and recipient, of husband and wife, of brother and 
brother, citizen and citizen, and citizen and magistrate, and 
a thousand others. 

2. Now, it seems to me, that, as soon as a human being 
comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand 
to each other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of 
moral obligation, connected, by our Creator, with the very 
conception of this relation. And the fact is the same, 
whether he be one of the parties, or not. The nature of this 
feeling is, that the one ought to exercise certain dispositions 
towards the others to whom he is thus related ; and to act 
towards them in a manner corresponding with those dispo- 
sitions. 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 2? 

3. The nature of these dispositions varies of course with 
the relations. Thus, those of a parent to a child are dif- 
ferent from those of a child to a parent ; of a benefactor to 
a recipient, from those of a recipient to a benefactor, and 
both of them; from .that of a brother to a brother, or of a 
master to a servant. But different as these may be from 
each other, they are all pervaded by the same generic feel- 
ing, that of moral obligation, that is, we feel that we ought 
to be thus or thus disposed, and to act in this or that 
manner. 

4. This, I suppose to be our constitution, in regard to 
created beings, and such do I suppose would be our feeling, 
irrespective of any notion of the Deity. That is, immediately 
upon the conception of these and such like relations, there 
would immediately arise, this feeling of moral obligation, 
to act towards those sustaining these relations, in a particu- 
lar manner. 

5. But there is an Uncreated Being to whom we stand in 
relations infinitely more intimate, and inconceivably more 
solemn, than any of those, of which we have spoken. It is 
that Infinite Being, who stands to us in the relation of 
Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Lawgiver, and Judge; and 
to whom we stand in the relation of dependent, helpless, 
ignorant and sinful creatures. How much this relation in- 
volves, we cannot possibly know; but so much as this we 
know, that it involves obligations greater than our intellect 
can estimate. We cannot contemplate it, without feeling, 
that, from fhe very fact of its existence, we are under obliga- 
tions to entertain the disposition of filial love and obedience 
towards God, and to act precisely as he shall condescend to 
direct. And this obligation arises, simply from the fact of 
the relation existing between the parties, and irrespective of 
any other consideration ; and if it be not felt, when the rela- 
tions are perceived, it can never be produced by any view of 
the consequences which would arise to the universe from 
exercising it. 



28 WHENCE DO WE 

6. This relation, and its consequent obligation, involves, 
comprehends, and transcends every other. Hence it places 
obligation to man, upon a new foundation. For if we be 
ourselves, thus under illimitable obligations to God, and ifj 
by virtue of the relation which he sustains to the creation, 
he is the Protector, Ruler, and Possessor of all, we are under 
obligations to obey him in every thing. And as every other 
being is also his creature, we are bound to treat that creature 
as he shall direct. Hence we are bound to perform the obli- 
gation under which we stand to his creatures, not merely on 
account of our relations to them, but also on account of the 
relations in which we and they stand to God. 

And hence, in general, our feeling of moral obligation is 
a peculiar and instinctive impulse, arising at once by the 
principles of our constitution, as soon as the relations are 
perceived, in which we stand to the beings created and un- 
created, with whom we are connected. 

The proof of this, must rest, as I am aware, with every 
man's consciousness. A few illustrative remarks may, 
however, not be altogether useless. 

I think, if we reflect upon the subject, that the manner 
in which we attempt to awaken moral feelings, confirms the 
view which we have taken. In such a case, if I mistake 
not, we always place before the mind the relation in which 
the parties stand to each other. 

If we wish to awaken in ourselves gratitude to another, 
we do not reflect that this affection will produce the great- 
est good ; but we remember the individual in the relation of 
benefactor ; and we place this relation in the strongest pos- 
sible light. If this will not produce gratitude, our effort, of 
necessity, fails. 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 29 

If we desire to inflame moral indignation against crime, 
we show the relations in which the parties stand to each 
other, and expect hence, to produce a conviction of the 
greatness of the obligation, which such turpitude violates. 

So, if we wish to overcome evil with good, we place our- 
selves in the relation of benefactor, to the injurious person ; 
and, in spite of himself, he is frequently compelled to yield 
to the law of his nature ; and gratitude for favors, and sorrow 
for injury spontaneously arise in his bosom. 

And, in the plan of man's redemption, it seems to me 
that the Deity has acted on this principle. Irrespective of 
a remedial dispensation, he is known to us only as a Crea- 
tor, all wise, and all powerful, perfect in holiness, justice, 
and truth. To our fallen nature, these attributes could 
minister nothing but terror. He, therefore, has revealed 
himself to us in the relation of a Saviour and Redeemer, a 
God forgiving transgression and iniquity; and thus, by all 
the power of this new relation, he imposes upon us new ob- 
ligations to gratitude, repentance, and love. 

And hence it is, that God always asserts, that, as from 
the fact of this new relation, our obligations to him are in- 
creased; so, he who rejects the Gospel, is, in a special man- 
ner, a sinner, and is exposed to a more terrible condemna- 
tion. The climax of all that is awful in the doom of the 
unbelieving, is expressed by the terms, " the wrath of the 
Lamb." 

Again. I am not much accustomed to such refined specu- 
lations ; but I think that obedience or love to God, from any 
more ultimate motive, than that this affection is due to him 
because he is God, and our God, is not piety. Thus, if a 
child say, I will obey my father, because it is for the happi- 
ness of the family ; what the character of this action would 
be, I am not prepared to say ; but I think the action would 

4* 



30 WHENCE DO WE 

not be filial obedience. Filial obedience is the obeying 
another, because he is my father; and it is filial obedi- 
ence only in so far as it proceeds from this motive. This 
will be evident, if we substitute for the love of the happi- 
ness of the family, the love of money, or some other such 
motive. Every one sees, that it would not be filial obedi- 
ence, for a child to obey his parent because he would be 
well paid for it. 

Now, it seems to me, that the same principle applies in 
the other case. To feel under obligation to love God, be- 
cause this affection would be productive of the greatest 
good, and not on account of what he is, and of the relations 
in which he stands to us, seems to me not to be piety ; that 
is, not to be the feeling, which a creature is bound to exercise 
to his Creator. If the obligation to the love of God, can really 
arise from any thing, more ultimate than the essential rela- 
tion which he sustains to us, why may not this more ulti- 
mate motive be something else, as well as the love of the 
greatest good. I do not say that any thing else would be 
as benevolent ; but I speak metaphysically, and say, that, if 
real piety, or love to God, may truly spring from any thing 
more ultimate than God himself, I do not see why it may 
not spring from one thing as well as another ; and thus, true 
piety might spring from various and dissimilar motives, no 
one of which has any real respect to God himself. 

My view of this subject, in few words, is as follows : 

1. We stand in relations to the several beings with which 
we are connected, such, that some of them, as soon as they 
are conceived, suggest to us the idea of moral obligation. 

2. Our relations to our fellow-men, suggest this convic- 
tion, in a limited and restricted sense, corresponding with 
the idea of general or essential equality, 



DERIVE OUR NOTION, &c. 31 

3. The relation in which we stand to Deity, suggests the 
conviction of universal and unlimited love and obedience. 
This binds us to proper dispositions to Him; and, also, to 
such dispositions towards his creatures, as he shall appoint. 

4. Hence, our duties to man are enforced by a two fold 
obligation ; first, because of our relations to man as man ; 
and, second, because of our relation to man, as being, with 
ourselves, a creature of God. 

5. And hence an act, which is performed in obedience to 
our obligations to man, may be virtuous; but it is not pious, 
unless it also be performed in obedience to our obligations to 
God. 

6. And hence we see that two things are necessary, in 
order to constitute any being a moral agent. They are, 
first, that he possess an intellectual power, by which he can 
understand the relation in which he stands to the beings by 
whom he is surrounded : secondly, that he possess a moral 
power by which the feeling of obligation is suggested to 
him, as soon as the relation in which he stands is under- 
stood. This is sufficient to render him a moral agent. He 
is accountable, just in proportion to the opportunity which 
he has enjoyed, for acquiring a knowledge of the relations 
in which he stands, and of the manner in which his obli- 
gations are to be discharged. 



CHAPTER II. 

CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL SENSE. 
SECTION I. 

IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 

By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant, that faculty, 
by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by 
which, we are capable of certain affections in respect to 
tins quality. 

By faculty, is meant any particular part of our constitu- 
tion, by which we become affected, by the various qualities 
and relations of beings around us. Thus, by taste, we are 
conscious of the existence of beauty and deformity ; by per- 
ception, we acquire a knowledge of the existence and quali- 
ties of the material world. And, in general, if we discern 
any quality in the universe, or produce, or suffer any 
change, it seems almost a truism, to say that we have a 
faculty, or power, for so doing. A man who sees, must 
have eyes, or the faculty for seeing: and, if he have not 
eyes, this is considered a sufficient reason why he should 
not see. And thus, it is universally admitted, that there 
may be a thousand qualities in nature, of which we have 
no knowledge, for the simple reason, that we have not been 
created with the faculties for discerning them. There is a 
world without us, and a world within us, which exactly 
correspond to each other. Unless both exist, we can never 
be conscious of the existence of either. 



34 IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 

Now, that we do actually observe a moral quality in the 
actions of men, must, I think, be admitted. Every human 
being is conscious, that, from childhood, he has observed 
it. We do not say, that all men discern this quality with 
equal accuracy, any more than that they all see with equal 
distinctness ; but we say, that all men perceive it in some 
actions ; and that there is a multitude of cases in which 
their perception of it, will be found universally to agree. 
And, moreover, this quality, and the feeling which accom- 
panies the perception of it, are unlike those derived from 
every other faculty. 

The question would then seem reduced to this, do we 
perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or by a 
combination of faculties. I think it must be evident, from 
what has been already stated, that this notion is, in its na- 
ture, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other 
notion. Now, if this be the case, it seems self-evident, that 
we must have a distinct and separate facidty, to make us 
acquainted with the existence of this distinct and separate 
quality. This is the case in respect to all other distinct 
qualities : it is, surely, reasonable to suppose, that it would 
be the case with this, unless some reason can be shown to 
the contrary. 

But, after all, this question is, to the moral philosopher, 
of but comparatively little importance. All that is necessa- 
ry to his investigations, is, that it be admitted, that there is 
such a quality, and that men are so constituted as to per- 
ceive it, and to be susceptible of certain affections, in conse- 
quence of that perception. Whether these facts are ac- 
counted for, on the supposition of the existence of a single 
faculty, or of a combination of faculties, will not affect the 
question of moral obligation. All that is necessary to the 
prosecution of the science, is, that it be admitted that there 
is such a quality in actions, and that man is endowed with 
a constitution capable of bringing him into relation to it. 



IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 35 

It may, however, be worth while to consider some of the 
objections, which have been urged, against the supposition 
of the existence of such a faculty. 

1. It has been said, if such a faculty has been bestowed, 
it must have been bestowed universally ; but it is not be- 
stowed universally; for what some nations consider right, 
other nations consider wrong, as infanticide, patricide, du- 
elling, &c. 

To this it may be answered, first, the objection seems to 
admit the universality of the existence of conscience, or the 
power of discerning in certain actions a moral quality. It 
admits, that, everywhere, men make this distinction, but 
affirms, that, in different countries, they refer the quality to 
different actions. Now, how this difference is to be ac- 
counted for. may be a question ; but the fact, as stated in 
the objection, shows the universality of the power of ob- 
serving such a quality in actions. 

But, second, we have said that we discover the moral 
quality of actions in the intention. Noir, it is not the fact, 
that this difference exists, as stated in the objection, if the 
intention of actions be considered. Where was it not con- 
sidered right to intend the happiness of parents? Where 
was it not considered wrong to intend their misery? Where 
was it ever considered right, to intend to requite kindness 
by injury ; and where was it ever considered wrong, to in- 
tend to requite kindness with still greater kindness. In re- 
gard to the manner in which these intentions may be ful- 
filled, there may be a difference ; but as to the moral quality 
of these intentions themselves, as well as of many others, 
there is a very universal agreement among men. 

3. And still more, it will be seen, on examination, that in 
these very cases, in which wrong actions are practiced, they 
are justified on the ground of a good intention, or of some 



36 IS THERE A CONSCIENCE % 

view of the relations between the parties, which, if true, 
would render them innocent. Thus, if infanticide is justi- 
fied, it is on the ground, that this world is a place of misery, 
and that the infant is better off not to encounter its troubles; 
that is, that the parent wishes or intends well to the child ; 
or else it is defended on the ground, that the relation be- 
tween parent and child is such as confers on the one, the 
right of life and death over the other ; and, therefore, that 
to take its life is as innocent as the slaying of a brute, or the 
destruction of a vegetable. Thus, also, are patricide and re- 
venge, and various other acts of wrong defended. Where 
can the race of men be found, be they ever so savage, who 
need to be told that ingratitude is wrong, that parents ought 
to love their children, or that man ought to be submissive 
and obedient to the Supreme Divinity. 

And still more, I think one of the strongest exemplification 
of the universality of moral distinctions, is found in the 
character of many of the ancient heathen. They perceived 
these distinctions, and felt and obeyed the impulses of con- 
science, even though at variance with all the examples of 
the deities whom they worshipped. Thus, says Rousseau, 
" Cast your eyes over all the nations of the world, and all 
the histories of nations. Amid so many inhuman and 
absurd superstitions, amid that prodigious diversity of man- 
ners and characters, you will find every where the same 
principles and distinctions of moral good and evil. The 
paganism of the ancient world, produced, indeed, abominable 
gods, who. on earth, would have been shunned or punished 
as monsters ; and, who offered, as a picture of supreme hap- 
piness, only crimes to commit, or passions to satiate. But 
vice, armed with this sacred authority, descended in vain 
from the eternal abode. She found, in the heart of man, a 
moral instinct to repel her. The continence of Xenocrates 
was admired, by those who celebrated the debaucheries of 
Jupiter. The chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste Venus, 
The most intrepid Roman sacrificed to fear. He invoked 



IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 37 

the God who dethroned his father, and died without a mur- 
mur by the hand of his own. The most contemptible divi- 
nities were served by the greatest men. The holy voice of 
nature, stronger than that of the gods, made itself heard and 
respected and obeyed on earth, and seemed to banish to the 
confines of heaven, guilt and the guilty." Quoted by Dr. 
Brown, Lecture 75. 

2. Again, the objection has been made in another form. 
It is said, that savages violate, without remorse or compunc- 
tion, the plainest principles of right. Such is the case when 
they are guilty of revenge and licentiousness. 

This objection has been partly considered before. It 
may, however, be added, 

1. No men nor any class of men violate every moral pre- 
cept without compunction ; without the feeling of guilt, and 
consciousness of desert of punishment. 

2. Hence the objection will rather prove the existence of 
a defective or imperfect conscience, than that no such faculty 
exists. The same objection would prove us destitute of 
taste or of understanding, because, these faculties exist in an 
imperfect, state, among savages and uncultivated men. 

3. It has been objected again, that if we suppose this 
faculty to exist, it is after all useless, for if a man please to 
violate it, and to suffer the pain, then this is the end of the 
question, and, as Dr. Paley says, " the moral instinct man 
has nothing more to offer." 

To this it may be answered : 

The objection proceeds upon a mistake respecting the 
function of Conscience. Its use is to teach us to discern our 
moral obligations and to impel us towards the corresponding 

5 



38 THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 

action. It is not pretended, by the believers in a moral 
sense, that man may not, after all, do as he chooses. All 
that is contended for is, that he is constituted with such a 
faculty, and that the possession of it is necessary to his moral 
accountability. It is in his power to obey it or to disobey 
it, just as he pleases. The fact that a man may obey or dis- 
obey conscience, no more proves that it does not exist, than 
the fact, that he sometimes does, and sometimes does not 
obey passion, proves that he is destitute of passion. 



SECTION II. 

OP THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE 
IS EXPRESSED. 

Who ever will attentively observe the operations of his 
own mind, when deciding upon a moral question, and when 
carrying that decision into effect, will, I think, be conscious 
of several distinct forms of moral feeling. These I suppose 
to be the following: 

I. Suppose we are deliberating, respecting an action, be- 
fore performing it. 

1. If we pause, and candidly consider the nature of an 
action, which involves, in any respect, our relations with 
others, amidst the various qualities which characterise the 
action, we shall not fail to perceive its moral quality. We 
may perceive it to be gratifying, or self-denying, courteous, 
or uncivil, in favor of, or against our interest ; but, distinct 
from all these, and differing from them all, we may always 
perceive, that it seems to us to be either right or wrong. 
Let a man recollect any of the cases in his own history, in 
which he has been called to act under important responsibili- 
ty, and he will easily remember, both the fact, and the pain 
and distress, produced by the conflict of these opposite im- 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 39 

pulsions. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that we easily, 
or, at least, with much greater ease, perceive this quality in 
the actions of others. We discern the mote in our brother's 
eye much sooner than the beam in our own eye. 

2. Besides this discriminating power, I think we may 
readily observe a distinct impulse to do that which we con- 
ceive to be right, and to leave undone that which we con- 
ceive to be wrong. This impulse we express by the words, 
ought, and ought not. Thus, we say it is right to tell the 
truth; and I ought to tell it. It is wrong to tell a lie; and 
I ought not to tell it. Ought, and ought not, seem to con- 
vey the abstract idea of right and wrong, together with the 
other notion of impulsion to do, or not to do, a particular 
action. Thus, we use it always to designate a motive to 
action, as we do passion, or self-love, or any other motive 
power. If we are asked, why we performed any action, we 
reply, we acted thus, because it gratified our desires, or be- 
cause it was for our interest upon the whole, or because 
we felt that we ought to act thus. Either of them is con- 
sidered sufficient to account of the fact; that is, either of 
them explains the motive or impulse, in obedience to which 
we acted. It is, also, manifest, that we use the term, not 
merely to designate an impulse, but, also, an obligation to 
act in conformity with it. Thus, we say we ought to do a 
tiling, meaning, that we are not only impelled towards the 
action, but that we are under an imperative obligation to act 
thus. This is still more distinctly seen, when we speak of 
another. When we say, of a friend, that he ought to do 
any thing, as we cannot judge of the impulses which move 
him, we refer, principally, to this conviction of obligation, 
which should govern him. 

The power of this impulse of conscience, is most dis- 
tinctly seen, when it comes into collision with the impulse 
of strong and vehement passion. It is then, that the hu- 
man soul is agitated to the full extent of its capacity for 



40 THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 

emotion. And this contest generally continues, specially if 
we have decided in opposition to conscience, until the ac- 
tion is commenced. The voice of conscience is then lost 
amid the whirlwind of passion ; and it is not heard until after 
the deed is done. It is on this account, that this state of mind 
is frequently selected by the poets, as a subject for delinea- 
tion. Shakspeare frequently alludes to all these offices of 
conscience with the happiest effect. 

The constant monitory power of conscience is thus illus- 
trated, by one of the murderers about to assassinate the 
Duke of Clarence: " I'll not meddle with it, (conscience,) it 
is a dangerous thing; it makes a man a coward; a man 
cannot steal, but it accuseth him; a man cannot swear, but 
it checks him. 'Tis a blushing, shame-faced spirit, that 
mutinies in a man's bosom: it fills one full of obstacles. It 
made me once restore a purse of gold, that, by chance, I 
found. It beggars any man that keeps it." Richard III,. 
Act 1, Sec. 4. The whole scene is a striking exemplifica- ; 
tion of the workings of conscience, even in the bosoms of 
the most abandoned of men. The wicked Clarence appeals 
to the consciences of his murderers; and they strengthen 
themselves against his appeals, by referring to his own 
atrocities, and thus awakening in their own bosoms the 
conviction that he ought to die. 

The state of mind of a man meditating a wicked act, and 
the temporary victory of conscience, is seen in the following 
extract from Macbeth. He recalls the relations in which 
Duncan stood to him, and these produce so strong a convic- 
tion of the wickedness of the murder, that he decides not to 
commit it. 

" If the assassination 
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch, 
With his surcease, success ; that but this blow 
Might be the be-all and the end-all here, 
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, — 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 41 

We'd jump the life to come — But, in these cases, 
"We still have judgment here ; that we but teach 
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return 
To plague the inventor. This even handed justice 
Commends the ingredients of our poison'd chalice 
To our own lips. He's here in double trust : 
First, as I am his kinsman and his subject, 
Strong both against the deed ; then, as his host, 
Who should against his murderer shut the door, 
Not bear the knife myself. Besides, this Duncan 
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been 
So clear in his great office, that his virtues 
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against 
The deep damnation of his taking off. 
****** 

I have no spur 
To prick the sides of my intent, but only 
Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself." 

Macbeth, Act i. Sc. 7. 



The anguish which attends upon an action not yet com- 
menced, but only resolved upon, while we still doubt of its 
lawfulness, is finely illustrated by the same author, in the 
case of Brutus, who, though a man of great fortitude, was, by 
the anguish of contending emotions, deprived of sleep, and 
so changed in behaviour, as to give his wife reason to sus- 
pect the cause of his disquietude. 



Since Cassius first did whet me against Caesar 
I have not slept. 

Between the acting of a dreadful thing, 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream : 
The genius, and the mortal instruments, 
Are then in council ; and the state of man, 
Like to a littjLe kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection. 

J. Casar, Act ii. Sc. 1. 



The same contest between conscience and the lower pro- 
pensities, is, as I suppose, graphically described by the 
Apostle Paul, in the 7th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. 

5* 



42 THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 

II. Suppose now an action to be done. I think that every 
one who examines his own heart, will be conscious of ano- 
ther class of feelings consequent on those to which we have 
just alluded. 

1. If he have obeyed the impulses of conscience, and re- 
sisted successfully the impulses at variance with it, he will 
be conscious of a feeling of innocence, of self-approbation, of 
desert of reward. If the action have been done by another, 
he will feel towards him a sentiment of respect, of moral ap- 
probation, and a desire to see him rewarded, and, on many 
occasions, to reward him, himself. 

2. If he have disobeyed the impulses of conscience, he 
will be conscious of guilt, of self-abasement, and self-disap- 
probation or remorse, and of desert of punishment. If it 
have been done by another, he will be conscious of a senti- 
ment of moral disapprobation, and of a desire that the of- 
fender should be punished ; and, in many cases, to punish 
him himself. Of course, I do not say that all these feelings 
can be traced, by reflection upon every action, but I think, 
that in all cases, in which our moral sensibilities are at all 
aroused, we Can trace some, and frequently all of them. 

In accordance with these remarks, several facts may be 
noticed. 

1. The boldness of innocence, and the timidity of guilt, 
so often observed by moralists and poets, may be thus easily 
accounted for. The virtuous man is conscious of deserving 
nothing but reward. Whom then should he fear ? The 
guilty man is conscious of desert of punishment, and is 
aware that every one who knows of his offence desires to 
punish him ; and as he never is certain but that every one 
knows it, whom can he trust ? And still more, there is, 
with the feeling of desert of punishment a disposition to 
submit to punishment arising from our own self-disapproba- 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 43 

tion and remorse. This depresses the spirit, and; humbles 
the courage of the offender, far more than even the external 
circumstances by which he is surrounded. 

Thus, says Solomon, "the wicked flee, when no man 
pursueth, but the righteous is bold as a lion." 

11 What stronger breastplate than a heart untainted 1 
Thrice is he armed, who hath his quarrel just ; 
And he but naked, though locked up in steel, 
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted" 

<2d Part Henry VI. Act iii. Sc. 2. 

" Suspicion always haunts the guilty mind ; 
The thief doth fear each bush an officer." 

2d Part Henry VI, Act v, Sc. vi. 

" I feel, within me, 
A peace, above all earthly dignities ; 
A still and. quiet conscience." 

Henry VIII, Act iii. Sc. 2. 

The effect of guilt, 

" No wonder why 
1 felt rebuked beneath his eye ; 
I might have known, there was but one, 
Whose look could quell Lord Marmion." 

Marmion, Cant. vi. 17. 

" Curse on yon base marauder's lance, 
And doubly curs'd my failing brand, 
A sinful heart makes feeble hand." 

Marmion, Canto vi. St. 32. 



2. It is in consequence of the same facts, that crime is, 
with so great certainty, detected. 

A man, before the commission of crime, can foresee no 
reason, why he might not commit it, with the certainty of 
escaping detection. He can perceive no reason why he 



44 THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 

should be even suspected ; and can imagine a thousand me- 
thods, in which suspicion awakened, might with perfect 
ease, be allayed. But, as soon as he becomes guilty, his re- 
lations to his fellow men are entirely changed. He becomes 
suspicious of every one, and thus, sees every occurrence 
through a false medium. Hence, he cannot act like an in- 
nocent man, and this very difference in his conduct, is very 
often the sure means of his detection. When, to this effect, 
produced upon the mind by guilt, is added the fact, that 
every action must, by the condition of our being, be attended 
by antecedents and consequents beyond our control, all of 
which lead directly to the discovery of the truth, it is not 
wonderful, that the guilty so rarely escape. Hence it has 
grown into a proverb, "murder will out," and such we 
generally find to be the fact. 

This effect of guilt upon human action has been fre- 
quently remarked. 

Thus, Macbeth, after the murder of Duncan, 

" How is it with me, when every noise appals me." 

Act ii. Sc. 2. 

" Guiltiness will speak, though tongues were out of use." 

The same fact is frequently asserted in the sacred Scrip- 
tures. Thus, « the Lord is known by the judgment that he 
executeth ; the wicked is snared in the work of his own 
hands" 

" Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go 
unpunished." 

I hope that I need not apologize for introducing into such 
a discussion so many illustrations from poetry. These are 
allowed, on all hands, to be accurate delineations of the 
workings of the human mind, and made by most accurate 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 45 

observers. They are made, also, without the possibility of 
bias from any theory, and therefore are of greater value, 
when they serve to confirm any theoretical views, with 
which they may chance to coincide. They show, at least, 
in what light poets, whose only object is to observe the hu- 
man heart, have considered conscience, and what they have 
supposed to be its functions, and its mode of operation. 



SECTION III. 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

We have thus far endeavoured to show, that there is in 
man a faculty denominated Conscience, and that it is not 
merely a discriminating, but also an impulsive faculty. The 
next question to be considered is, what is the authority of 
this impulse. 

The object of the present section is, to show that this is 
the most authoritative impulse, of which we find ourselves 
susceptible. 

The supremacy of Conscience may be illustrated in va- 
rious ways. 

I. It is involved in the very conception which men form 
of this faculty. 

The various impulses, of which we find ourselves suscep- 
tible, can differ only in two respects, that of strength and 
that of authority. 

When we believe them to differ in nothing but strength, 
we feel ourselves perfectly at liberty to obey the strongest 
Thus, if different kinds of food be set before us, all equally 
healthy, we feel entirely at liberty to partake of that which 



46 TH E AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

we prefer; that is, of that to which we are most strongly im- 
pelled. If a man is to decide between making a journey by 
land, or by water, he considers it a sufficient motive for 
choice, that the one is more pleasant to him than the other. 
But when our impulses differ, in authority, we feel obliged 
to neglect the difference in strength of impulse, and to obey 
that, be it ever so weak, which is of the higher authority. 
Thus, suppose our desire for "any particular kind of food 
be ever so strong, and we know that it would injure our 
health, self-love would admonish us to leave it alone. Now, 
self-love being a more authoritative impulse than passion, 
we should feel an obligation to obey it, be its admonition 
ever so weak, and the impulse of appetite ever so vehement 
If we yield to the impulse of appetite, be it ever so strong, 
in opposition to that of self-love, be it ever so weak, we 
feel a consciousness of self-degradation, and of acting un- 
worthily of our nature ; and, if we see another person act- 
ing in this manner, we cannot avoid feeling towards him a 
sentiment of contempt. " 'Tis not in folly not to scorn a 
fool." And, in general, whenever we act in obedience to a 
lower, and in opposition to a higher sentiment, we feel this 
consciousness of degradation, which we do not feel when 
the impulses differ only in degree. And conversely, when- 
ever we feel this consciousness of degradation, for acting in 
obedience to one instead of to another, we may know that 
we have violated that which is of the higher authority. 

If, now, we reflect upon our feelings consequent upon any 
moral action, I think we shall find, that we always are con- 
scious of a sentiment of self-degradation, whenever we dis- 
obey the monition of conscience, be that monition ever so 
weak, to gratify the impulse of appetite, or passion, or self- 
love, be that impulse ever so strong. Do we 'consider it any 
palliation of the guilt of murder, for the criminal to declare, 
that his vindictive feelings impelled him much more 
strongly, than his conscience ; whereas, if we perceived in 
these impulses no other difference than that of strength, we 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 47 

should consider this, not merely an excuse, but a justifica- 
tion. And, that the impulse of conscience is of the highest 
authority, is evident from the fact, that we cannot conceive 
of any circumstances, in which we should not feel guilty and 
degraded, from acting in obedience to any impulse whatever, 
in opposition to the impulse of Conscience. And thus, we 
cannot conceive of any more exalted character, than that of 
him, who, on all occasions, yields himself up implicitly to 
the impulses of conscience, all things else to the contrary 
notwithstanding. I think no higher evidence can be pro- 
duced, to show that we do really consider the impulse of 
conscience of higher authority, than any other of which we 
are susceptible. 

II. The same truth, may, I think, be rendered evident, by 
observing the feelings which arise within us, when we com- 
pare the actions of men with those of beings of an inferior 
order. 

Suppose a brute to act from appetite, and injure itself 
by gluttony; or from passion, and injure another brute in 
anger, we feel nothing like moral disapprobation. We pity 
it, and strive to put it out of its power to act thus in future. 
We never feel that a brute is disgraced or degraded by such 
an action. But suppose a man to act thus, and we cannot 
avoid a feeling of disapprobation, and of disgust ; a convic- 
tion that the man had done violence to his nature. Thus, 
to call a man a brute, a sensualist, a glutton, is to speak of 
him in the most insulting manner : it is to say, in the strong- 
est terms, that he has acted unworthily of himself, and of the 
nature with which his Creator has endowed him. 

Again. Let a brute act from deliberate selfishness ; that 
is, that with deliberate caution seek its own happiness upon 
the whole unmindful of the impulsions of present appetite, 
but yet wholly regardless of the happiness of any other of 
its species. In no case do we feel disgust at such a course 



48 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

of action ; and, in many cases, we, on the contrary, rather 
regard it with favor. We thus speak of the cunningness of 
animals in taking their prey, in escaping danger, and in se- 
curing for themselves all the amount of gratification that 
may be in their power. We are sensible, in these cases, 
that the animal has acted from the highest impulses of 
which his Creator has made it susceptible. But let a man 
act thus. Let him, careful merely of his own happiness 
upon the whole, be careful for nothing else, and be perfect- 
ly willing to sacrifice the happiness of others to any amount 
soever, to promote his own, to the least amount soever. 
Such has been, frequently, the character of sensual and un- 
feeling tyrants. We are conscious, in such a case, of a sen- 
timent of disgust, and deep disapprobation. We feel that 
the man has not acted in obedience to the highest impulses 
of which he was susceptible ; and poets, and satirists, and 
historians unite, in holding him up to the world, as an ob- 
ject of universal detestation and abhorrence. 

Again. Let another man, disregarding the impulses of 
passion, and appetite, and self-love, act, under, all circum- 
stances, in obedience to the monitions of conscience, un- 
moved and unallured by pleasure, and unawed by power, 
and we instinctively feel that he has attained to the highest 
eminence after which our nature can aspire ; and that he 
has acted from the highest impulse of which his nature is 
susceptible. We are conscious of a conviction of his supe- 
riority, which nothing can outweigh ; of a feeling of vene- 
ration, allied to the revilence, which is due to the Supreme 
Being. And, with this homage to virtue, all history is filled. 
The judge may condemn the innocent, but posterity will 
condemn the judge. The tyrant may murder the martyr, 
but after ages venerate the martyr and execrate the tyrant. 
And if we will look over the names of those on whom all past 
time has united in conferring the tribute of praise-worthy- 
ness, we shall find them to be the names of those, who, al- 
though they might differ, in other respects, yet were similar 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 49 

in this, that they shone resplendent in the lustre of unsul- 
lied virtue. 

Now, as our Creator has constituted us such as we are, 
and, as, by our very constitution, we do thus consider 
conscience to be the most authoritative impulse of our 
nature ; it must be the most authoritative, unless we believe 
that He has deceived us, or, which is the same thing, that 
He has so formed us, as to give credit to a lie. 

III. The supremacy of conscience, may be, also, illus- 
trated, by showing the necessity of this supremacy, to the 
accomplishment of the object for which man was created. 

When we consider any work of art, as a system com- 
posed of parts, and arranged for the accomplishment of a 
given object; there are three several views which we may 
have of it, and all of them necessary to a complete and 
perfect knowledge of the thing. 

1. We must have a knowledge of the several parts of 
which it is composed. Thus, he who would understand a 
watch, must know the various wheels and springs which 
enter into the formation of the instrument. But this alone, 
as, for instance, if they were spread separately before him, 
upon a table, would give him a very imperfect conception 
of a watch. 

2. He must, therefore, understand how these parts are 
put together. This will greatly increase his knowledge; 
but it will still be imperfect, for he may yet be ignorant of 
the relations which the parts sustain to each other. A man 
might look at a steam engine until he was familiarly ac- 
quainted with its whole machinery, and yet not know 
whether the paddles were designed to move the piston rod, 
or the piston rod to move the paddles. 

6 



50 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

3. It is necessary, therefore, that he should have a concep- 
tion of the relation, which the several parts sustain to each 
other ; that is, of the effect which every part was designed to 
produce upon every other part. When he has arrived at 
this idea, and has combined it with the other ideas just men- 
tioned, then, and not till then, is his knowledge of the instru- 
ment complete. 

It is manifest, that this last notion, that of the relations 
which the parts sustain to each other, is, frequently, of more 
importance than either of the others. He who has a con- 
ception of the cause of motion in a steam engine, and of the 
manner in which the ends are accomplished, has a more 
valuable notion of the instrument, than he who has ever so 
accurate a knowledge of the several parts, without a con- 
ception of the relation. Thus, in the history of astronomy, 
the notion of the several parts of the solar system was known 
for ages, without being productive of any valuable result. 
The progress of astronomy is to be dated from the moment, 
when the relations, which the several parts hold to each 
other, was discovered by Copernicus. 

Suppose now, we desire to ascertain what is the relation, 
which, the several parts of any system are designed, by its 
author, to sustain to each other. I know of no other way, 
than to find but that series of relations, in obedience to 
which, the system will accomplish the object, for which it 
was constructed. Thus, if we desire to ascertain the rela- 
tion which the parts of a watch are designed to sustain to 
each other ; we inquire what is that series of relations, in 
obedience to which, it will accomplish the purpose for 
which it was constructed, that is, to keep time. For in- 
stance, we should conduct the inquiry by trying each 
several part, and ascertaining by experiment, whether, on 
the supposition that it was the cause of motion, the result, 
namely, the keeping of time, could be effected. After we 
had tried them all, and had found, that under no other rela- 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 51 

tion of the parts to each other, than that which assumes the 
mainspring to be the source of motion, and the balance 
wheel to be the regulator of the motion, the result could be 
produced; we should conclude with certainty, that this was 
the relation of the parts to each other, intended to be estab- 
lished by the maker of the watch. 

And again, if an instrument were designed for several 
purposes, and if it was found, that not only a single purpose 
could not be accomplished, but that no one of them could 
be accomplished, under any other system of relations than 
that which had been at first discovered, we should arrive at 
the highest proof of which the case was susceptible, that 
such was the relation, intended to be established between 
the parts, by the inventor of the machine. 

Now, man is a system composed of parts in the manner 
above stated. He has various powers and faculties, and 
impulses, and he is manifestly designed to produce some 
result. As to the ultimate design for which man was 
created, there may be a difference of opinion. In one view, 
however, I presume there will be no difference. It will be 
allowed by all, that he was designed for the production of 
his own happiness. Look at his senses, his intellect, his 
affections, and at the external objects with which these are 
brought into relation ; and at the effects of the legitimate 
action of these powers upon their appropriate objects; and 
no one can for a moment doubt, that this was one object for 
which man was created. Thus, it is as clear that the eye 
was intended to be a source of pleasure, as that it was 
intended to be the instrument of vision. It is as clear that 
the ear was intended to be a source of pleasure, as to be the 
organ of hearing. And thus of the other faculties. 

But, when we consider man as an instrument for the pro- 
duction of happiness, it is manifest, that we must take into 
the account, man as a society, as well as man as an individual. 



52 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

The larger part of the happiness of the individual depends 
upon society, so that whatever would destroy society, or, 
what is, in fact, the same thing, destroy the happiness of 
man as a society, would destroy the happiness of man as an 
individual. And, such is the constitution under which we 
are placed, that, no benefit or injury can be in its nature 
individual. "Whoever truly promotes his own happiness, 
promotes the happiness of society; and whoever promotes 
the happiness of society, promotes his own happiness. In 
this view of the subject, it will then be proper to consider 
man as a society, as an instrument for producing the happi- 
ness of man as a society, as well as man as an individual, as 
an instrument for producing the happiness of man as an 
individual. 

Let us now consider man, as an instrument for the pro- 
duction of human happiness, in the sense here explained. 

If we examine the impulsive and restraining faculties of 
man, we shall find, that they may, generally be compre- 
hended under three classes. 

1. Passion or appetite. The object of this class of our 
faculties, is, to impel us towards certain acts, which produce 
immediate pleasure. Thus, the appetite for food, impels 
us to seek gratification by eating. The love of power, 
impels us to seek the gratification resulting from superiority; 
and so of all the rest. 

If we consider the nature of these faculties, we shall find 
that they impel us to immediate gratification, without any 
respect to the consequences, either to ourselves or to others; 
and that they know of no limit to indulgence, until, by their 
own action, they paralyze the power of enjoyment. Thus, 
the love of food would impel us to eat, until eating ceased 
to be a source of pleasure. And where, from the nature of 
the case, no such limit exists, our passions are insatiable. 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 53 

Such is the case with the love of wealth, and the love of 
power. In these instances, there being, in the constitution 
of man, no limit to the power of gratification, the appetite 
grows by what it feeds on. 

2. Interest or self-love. This faculty impels us to seek our 
own happiness, considered in reference to a longer or shorter 
period ; but always beyond the present moment. Thus, if 
appetite impelled me to eat, self-love would prompt me to 
eat such food, and in such quantity, as would produce for 
me the greatest amount of happiness, upon the whole. It 
passion prompted me to revenge, self-love would prompt me to 
seek revenge in such a manner as would not involve me in 
greater distress than that which I now suffer ; or, to control 
the passion entirely, unless I could so gratify it, as to pro- 
mote my own happiness for the future, as well as the pre- 
sent. In all cases, however, the promptings of self-love 
have respect solely to the production of our own happiness : 
they have nothing to do with the happiness of any other 
being. 

3. Conscience. The office of conscience, considered in 
relation to these other impulsive faculties, is, to restrain our 
appetites within such limits, that the gratification of them 
will injure neither ourselves nor others ; and so to govern our 
self-love, that we shall act, not solely in obedience to the law 
of our own happiness, but in obedience to that law which 
restricts the pursuit of happiness within such limits, as 
shall not interfere with the happiness of others. It is not 
here asserted, that conscience always admonishes us to this 
effect ; or, that, when it admonishes, it is always successful. 
We may, if we please, disobey its monitions ; or, from rea- 
sons hereafter to be mentioned, its monitions may have 
ceased. What we would speak of here, is, the tendency 
and object of this faculty ; and the result to which, if it were 
perfectly obeyed, it would manifestly lead. And, that such 



54 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

is its tendency, I think that no one, who reflects upon the 
operations of his own mind, can, for a moment, doubt. 

Suppose, now, man to be a system, for the promotion of 
happiness, individual and social ; and that these various im- 
pelling powers are parts of it. These powers, being, fre- 
quently, in their nature, contradictory; that is, being such, 
that one frequently impels to, and another sets from, the same 
action ; the question is, in what relation of these powers to 
each other, can the happiness of man be most successfully 
promoted. 

1. It cannot be asserted, that, when these impulsions are 
at variance, it is a matter of indifference to which of them 
we yield; that is, that a man is just as happy, and renders 
society as happy, by obeying the one as the other. For, as 
men always obey one or the other, this would be to assert that 
all men are equally happy; and that every man promoted 
his own happiness just as much, by one course of conduct, 
as by another ; than which, nothing can be more directly at 
variance with the whole experience of all men, in all ages. 
It would be to assert, that the glutton, who is racked with 
pain, is as happy as the temperate and healthy man ; and 
that Nero and Caligula were as great benefactors to man- 
kind, as Howard or Wilberforce. 

2. If, then, it be not indifferent to our happiness to which 
of them we yield the supremacy, the question returns, under 
what relation of each to the other, can the happiness of man 

.-be most successfully promoted. 

1. Can the happiness of man be promoted r by subjecting 
his other impulses to his appetites and passions? 

By referring to the nature of appetite and passion, as pre- 
viously explained, it will be seen, that the result to the indi- 
vidual, of such a course, would be sickness and death. It 



THE AUTHORTIY OF CONSCIENCE. 55 

would be a life of unrestrained gratification of every desire, 
until the power of enjoyment was exhausted, without the 
least regard to the future ; and of refusal to endure any pre- 
sent pain, no matter how great might be the subsequent ad- 
vantage. Every one must see, that, under the present con- 
stitution, such a course of life must produce nothing but in- 
dividual misery. 

The result upon society would be its utter destruction. 
It would render every man a ferocious beast, bent upon 
nothing but present gratification, utterly reckless of the con- 
sequences which gratification produced upon himself, either 
directly, or through the instrumentality of others ; and reck- 
less of the havoc which he made of the happiness of his 
neighbour. Now, it is manifest, that the result of subjecting 
man to such a principle, would be, not only the destruction 
of society, but, also, in a few years, the entire destruction of 
the human race. 

2. Can the happiness of man be best promoted by sub- 
jecting all his impulses to' self-love ? 

It may be observed, that our knowledge of the future, 
and of the results of the things around us, is manifestly in- 
sufficient to secure our own happiness, even by the most 
sagacious self-love. When we give up the present plea- 
sure, or suffer the present pain, we must, from necessity, be 
wholly ignorant whether we shall ever reap the advantage 
which we anticipate. The system, of which every indi- 
vidual forms a part, was not constructed to secure the happi- 
ness of any individual ; and he who devises his plans with 
sole reference to himself, must find them continually thwart- 
ed by that Omnipotent and Invisible Agency, which is over- 
ruling all things, upon principles directly at variance with 
those which he has adopted. In as much, then, as we can 
never certainly secure to ourselves those results which self- 
love anticipates, it seems necessary, that, in order to derive 



56 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

from our actions the happiness which they are capable of 
producing, they involve in themselves some element, irre- 
spective of future result, which shall give us pleasure, let 
the result be what it may. 

The imperfection of self-love, as a director of conduct, is 
nobly set forth in Cardinal Wolsey's advice to Cromwell. 



" Mark but my fall and that which ruin'd me. 
Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition, 
Love thyself last. Cherish the hearts that hate thee. 

Be just and fear not ; 
Let all the ends thou aim est at, be thy country's, 
Thy God's, and truth's; then, if thou fall'st/O Cromwell ! 
Thou fah'st a blessed martyr. 

Henry VIII, Act iii, Sc. 2. 

May he do justice, 
For truths' 1 sake, and his conscience ; that his bones, 
When he has run his course, and sleeps in blessings, 
May have a tomb of orphan's tears wept on them. 

Ibid. 

For care and trouble, set your thought, 
Ev'n when your end's attained ; 
And all your plans may come to nought, " 
When every nerve is strained. 

Burns'' Epistle to a Young Friend. 

But mousie! thou art not alone, 
In proving/orestg/i/ may be vain, 
The best laid schemes of mice and men 
Gang oft agley, 

And leave us nought but grief and pain 
For promised joy. 

Burns, on turning up a Mouse" s nest. 



Besides, a man acting from uncontrolled self-love, knows 
of no other object than his own happiness. He would sacri- 
fice the happiness of others, to any amount, how great soever, 
to secure his own, in any amount, how small soever. Now, 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 57 

suppose every individual to act in obedience to this princi- 
ple, it must produce universal war, and terminate in the sub- 
jection of all to the dominion of the strongest; and in sacrific- 
ing the happiness of all to that of one ; that is, produce the least 
amount of happiness of which the system was susceptible. 
And still more, since, men who have acted upon this princi- 
ple, have been proverbially unhappy ; the result of such a 
course of conduct, is, to render ourselves miserable by the 
misery of every one else; that is, its tendency is to the entire 
destruction of happiness. It is manifest, then, that the 
highest happiness of man cannot be promoted, by subject- 
ing all his impulses to the government of self-love. 

Lastly. Suppose, now, all the impulses of man to be sub- 
jected to conscience. 

The tendency of this impulse, so far as this subject is 
concerned, is, to restrain the appetites and passions of man 
within those limits, that shall conduce to his happiness, on 
the whole ; and, so to control the impulse of self-love, that 
the individual in the pursuit of his own happiness, shall 
never interfere with the rightful happiness of his neighbour. 
Each one, under such a system, and governed by such an 
impulse, would enjoy all the happiness which he could cre- 
ate by the use of the powers which God had given him. 
Every one doing thus, the whole would enjoy all the happi- 
ness of which their constitution was susceptible. The hap- 
piness of man, as an individual, and as a society, would 
thus be, in the best conceivable manner, provided for. 
And thus, under the relation which we have suggested; 
that is, conscience being supreme, and governing both self- 
love and passion ; and self-love, where no higher principle 
intervened, governing passion, man individual, and man 
universal, considered as an instrument for the production of 
happiness, would best accomplish the purpose for which he 
was created. This, then, is the relation between his powers, 
which was designed to be established by his Creator. 



58 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

It can, in the same manner, be shown, that, if man, indi- 
vidual and universal, be considered as an instrument foT 
the production of power ; this end of his creation can be 
accomplished most successfully, by' obedience to the relation 
here suggested : that is, on the principle that the authority 
of conscience is supreme.* This is conclusively shown in 
Butler's Analogy, Part i. Chapter 3. And thus, let any rea- 
sonable end be suggested, for which it may be supposed 
that man has been created ; and it will be found, that this 
end can be best attained, by the subjection of every other 
impulse to that of conscience ; nay, that it can be attained 
in no other way. And hence, the argument seems conclu- 
sive, that this was the relation intended by his Creator to 
be established between his faculties. 

If the preceding views be correct, it will follow : 

1. If God has given man an impulse for virtue, it is as 
true, that he has designed him for virtue as for any thing 
else, as, for instance, for seeing or for hearing. 

2. If this impulse be the most authoritative in his nature, 
it is equally manifest, that man is made for virtue more than 
for any thing else. 

3. And hence, he who is vicious, not only acts contrary 
to his nature, but contrary to the highest impulse of his 
nature ; that is, he acts as much in opposition to his nature, 
as it is possible for us to conceive. 

[* Vis consili expers, mole ruit sua. 
Vim temperatam, dii quoque provehunt 
In majus ; idem odere vires 
Omne nefas, animo moventes. 

Horace, Lib. iii, Can. 4. 



LAW BY WHICH, &c. 59 

SECTION IV. 

LAW BY WHICH CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 

Conscience follows the general law, by which the im- 
provement of all our other faculties is regulated. It is 
strengthened by use, it is impaired by disuse. 

Here it is necessary to remark, that, by use, we mean the 
use of the faculty itself and not of some other faculty. 
This is so plain a case, that it seems wonderful that there 
should have been any mistake concerning it. Every one 
knows, that the arms are not strengthened by using the legs, 
nor the eyes by using the ears, nor the taste by using the 
understanding. So, the conscience can be strengthened, 
not by using the memory, or the taste, or the understanding, 
but by using the conscience, and by using it precisely ac- 
cording to the laws, and under the conditions, designed by 
our Creator. The conscience is not improved by the reading 
of moral essays, nor by committing to memory moral pre- 
cepts, nor by imagining moral vicissitudes, but by hearken- 
ing to its monitions, and obeying its impulses. 

If we reflect upon the nature of the monition of con- 
science, we shall find, that its office is of a three fold charac- 
ter. 

1. It enables us to discover the moral quality of actions. 

2. It impels us to do right, and to avoid wrong. 

3. It is a source of pleasure, when we have done right, 
and of pain, when we have done wrong. 

Let us illustrate the manner in which it may be im- 
proved, and injured, in each of these respects. 



60 LAW BY WHICH 

I. Of the improvement of the discriminating power of 
conscience. 

1. The discriminating power of conscience is improved 
by reflecting upon the moral character of our actions, both 
before and after we have performed them. If, before we re- 
solve upon a course of conduct, or before we suffer our- 
selves to be committed to it, we deliberately ask, is this 
right ? ami now actuated by appetite, by self-love, or by 
conscience? Ave shall seldom mistake the path of duty. Af- 
ter an action has been performed, if we deliberately and 
impassionately examine it, we may, without difficulty, de- 
cide whether it was right or wrong. Now, with every such 
effort as this, the discriminating power of conscience is 
strengthened. We discern moral differences more dis- 
tinctly; and we distinguish between actions, that, before, 
seemed blended and similar. 

2. The discriminating power of conscience is improved, 
by meditatiug upon characters of pre-eminent excellence, 
and specially upon the character of God, our Creator, and 
Christ, our Redeemer, the Fountain of all moral excellence. 
As we cultivate taste, or our susceptibility to beauty, by 
meditating upon the most finished specimens of art, or the 
most lovely scenery in nature, so conscience, or our moral 
susceptibility, is improved, by meditating upon any thing emi- 
nent for moral goodness. It is, hence, that example produces 
so powerful a moral effect ; and, hence, that one single act of 
heroic virtue, as that of Howard, or of illustrious self-denial, 
gives a new impulse to the moral character of an age. Men 
cannot reflect upon such actions, without the production of 
a change, in their moral susceptibility. Hence, the effect of 
the Scripture representations of the character of God, and 
of the moral glory of the Heavenly state. The Apostle 
Paul, refers to this principle, when he says: "we all, with 
open face, beholding, as in a glass, the Glory of the Lord, 
are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even 
as by the Spirit of the Lord." 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 61 

On the contrary, the discriminating power of conscience 
may be injured, 

1. By neglecting to reflect upon the moral character of our 
actions ; both before and after we have performed them. As 
taste is rendered obtuse by neglect, so that we fail to distin- 
guish between elegance and vulgarity, and between beauty 
and deformity, so, if we yield to the impulses of passion, and 
turn a deaf ear to the monitions of conscience, the dividing 
line, between right and wrong, seems gradually to become 
obliterated. We pass from the confines of one, into those of 
the other, with less and less sensation, and at last neglect 
the distinction altogether. 

Horace remarks this fact : 

Fas atque nefas, exiguo fine, libidinum 
Discernunt avidi. 

This is one of the most common causes of the grievous 
moral imperfection which we, every where, behold. Men 
act without moral reflection. They will ask, respecting an 
action, every question, before that most important one, is it 
right ? and, in the great majority of cases, act, without put- 
ting to themselves this question at all : " The ox knoweth 
his owner, and the ass his master's crib ; but Israel doth not 
know, my people do not consider." If any man doubts whe- 
ther this be true, let him ask himself, how large is the portion 
of the actions which I perform upon, which I deliberately 
decide, whether they be right or wrong. And on how large 
a portion of my actions do I form such a decision, after they 
have been performed. For the want ol this reflection, the 
most pernicious habits are daily formed or strengthened ; 
and when to the power of habit is added the seductive in- 
fluence of passson, it is not wonderful that the virtue of 
man should be the victim. 

7 



62 LAW BY WHICH 

2. The discriminating power of conscience is impaired, 
by frequent meditation upon vicious character and action. 
By frequently contemplating vice, our passions become 
excited, and our moral disgust diminishes. Thus, also, 
by becoming familiar with wicked men, we learn to asso- 
ciate, whatever they may have of intellectual or social in- 
terest, with their moral character; and hence our abhorrence 
of vice is lessened. Thus, men who are accustomed to 
view, habitually, any vicious custom, cease to have their 
moral feelings excited in respect to it. All this is manifest, 
from the facts made known in the progress of every moral 
reformation. Of so delicate a texture has God made our 
moral nature, and so easily is it either improved or impaired. 
Pope says, truly, 

Vice is a monster, of so frightful mien, 
As to be dreaded, needs but to be seen ; 
But, seen too oft, familiar with her face, 
We first endure, then pity, then embrace. 

It is almost unnecessary to remark, that this fact will ena- 
ble us to estimate the value of much of our reading, and of 
much of our society. Whatever fills the memory with 
scenes of vice, or stimulates the imagination to conceptions 
of impurity, vulgarity, profanity, or thoughtlessness, must, 
by the whole of this effect, render us vicious. As a man of 
literary sensibility will avoid a badly written book, for fear 
of injuring his taste, by how much more should we dread 
the communion with any thing wrong, lest it should conta- 
minate our imagination, and thus injure our moral sense. 

II. The impulsive power of conscience is improved by 
use, and weakened by disuse. 

To illustrate this law, we need only refer to the elements 
of man's active nature. We are endowed with appetites, 
passions, and self-love, in all their various forms ; and any 
one of them, or all of them, may, at times, be found impel- 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 63 

ling us towards actions in opposition to the impulsion of 
conscience ; and, of course, one or the other impulse must 
be resisted. Now, as the law of our faculties is universal, 
that they are strengthened by use, and weakened by disuse, 
it is manifest, that, when we obey the impulse of conscience, 
and resist the impulse of passion, the power of conscience is 
strengthened ; and, on the contrary, when we obey the im- 
pulse of passion, and resist that of conscience, the power of 
passion is strengthened. And, yet more, as either of these 
is strengthened, its antagonist impulse is weakened. Thus, 
every time a man does right, he gains victory over his 
lower propensities, acquires self-control, and becomes more 
emphatically a freeman. Every time a man does wrong, 
that is, yields to his lower propensities, he loses self-control; 
he gives to his passions power over him; he weakens the 
practical supremacy of conscience, and becomes more per- 
fectly a slave. The design of the Christian religion, in this 
respect, is, to bring us under the dominion of conscience, 
enlightened by revelation, and deliver us from the slavery 
of evil propensity. Thus, our Lord declares, " If the Son 
shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." And, on the 
contrary, " Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant (the 
slave of sin." 

Again, it is to be remarked, that there exists a reciprocal 
connection between the use of the discriminating and of the 
impulsive power of conscience. The more a man reflects 
upon moral distinctions, the greater will be the practical in- 
fluence which he will find them to exert over him. And it is 
still more decidedly true, that the more implicitly we obey 
the impulsions of conscience, the more acute will be its 
power of discrimination, and the more prompt and definite 
its decisions. This connection between theoretical know- 
ledge and practical application, is frequently illustrated in 
the other faculties. He who delineates objects of loveliness, 
finds the discriminating power of taste to improve. And 



64 LAW BY WHICH 

thus, also, this effect, in morals, is frequently alluded to in 
the Scriptures. 

Our Saviour declares, " if any man will do his will, he 
shall know of the doctrine." 

Thus, also, "Unto him that hath, shall be given, and he 
shall have abundance, but from him that hath not, (that is, 
does not improve what he has,) shall be taken away, even 
that which he hath." 

Thus, also, the Apostle Paul: "I beseech you, therefore, 
brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies 
a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God, which is 
your rational service ; and be ye not conformed to this 
world, but be ye transformed, unto the renewing of your 
mind, that (so that, to the end that,) ye may know what 
is that good, and acceptable, and perfect will of the 
Lord." 

III. The sensibility of conscience, as a source of pleasure 
or of pain, is strengthened by use, and weakened by disuse. 

The more frequently a man does right, the stronger is 
his impulse to do right, and the greater is the pleasure that 
results from doing it. A liberal man derives a pleasure 
from the practice of charity, of which the covetous man 
can form no conception. A beneficent man is made happy 
by acts of self-denial and philanthropy, while a selfish man 
performs an act of goodness by painful and strenuous effort, 
and merely to escape the reproaches of conscience. By the 
habitual exercise of the benevolent affections, a man be- 
comes more and more capacious of virtue, capable of higher 
and more disinterested and more self-denying acts of mercy, 
until he becomes an enthusiast in goodness, loving to do 
good better than any thing else. And, in the same manner, 
the more our affections to God are exercised the more con- 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 65 

stant and profound is the happiness which they create, and 
the more absolutely is every other wish absorbed by the 
single desire to do the will of God. Illustrations of these re- 
marks may be found in the lives of the Apostle Paul, John 
Howard, and other philanthropists. Thus, it is said of our 
Saviour, " He went about doing good." And he says, of 
himself, " My meat and my drink, is, to do the will of Him 
that sent me, and to finish his work. 

And it deserves to be remarked, that, in our present state, 
opportunities for moral improvement and moral pleasure 
are incessantly occurring. Under the present conditions of 
our being, there are every where, and at all times, sick to be 
relieved, mourners to be comforted, ignorant to be taught, 
vicious to be reclaimed, and men, by nature, enemies to 
God, to be won back to reconciliation to Him. The sea- 
son for moral labor depends not, like that for physical labor, 
upon vicissitudes beyond our control: it depends solely 
upon our own will. This I suppose to be the general prin- 
ciple involved in our Saviour's remark to His Apostles: 
" Say ye not there are four months and then cometh the 
harvest ; lift up your eyes, and look upon the fields, for they 
are white, already to the harvest" That is, the fields are 
always waiting for the laborer in the moral harvest. 

And, on the contrary, the man who habitually violates 
his conscience, not only is more feebly impelled to do right, 
but he becomes less sensible to the pain of doing wrong. 
A child feels poignant remorse after the first act of pilfering. 
Let the habit of dishonesty be formed, and he will become 
so hacknied in sin, that he will perpetrate robbery with no 
other feeling than that of mere fear of detection. The first 
oath almost palsies the tongue of the stripling. It requires 
but a few months, however, to transform him into the bold 
and thoughtless blasphemer. The murderer, after the death 
of his first victim, is agitated with all the horrors of guilt. 
He may, however, pursue his trade of blood, until he have 

7* 



66 LAW BY WHICH 

no more feeling for man, than the butcher for the animal 
which he slaughters. Burke, who was in the habit of mur- 
dering men, for the purpose of selling their bodies to the 
surgeons for dissection, confessed this of himself. Nor is 
this true of individuals alone. Whole communities may be- 
come so accustomed to deeds of violence, as not merely to 
lose all the milder sympathies of their nature, but, also, to 
take pleasure in exhibitions of the most revolting ferocity. 
Such was the case in Rome, at the period of the gladiatorial 
contests ; and such was the fact in Paris, at the time of the 
French revolution. 

This also serves to illustrate a frequently repeated aphor- 
ism, Quern Deus vult perdere, prius dementat. As a man 
becomes more wicked, he becomes bolder in crime. Un- 
checked by conscience, he ventures upon more and more 
atrocious villany, and he does it with less and less precau- 
tion. As, in the earliest stages of guilt, he is betrayed by 
timidity, in the later stages of it, he is exposed by his reck- 
lessness. He is thus discovered, by the very effect which 
his conduct is producing upon his own mind. Thus, op- 
pressors and despots seem to rush upon their own ruin, as 
though bereft of reason. Such limits has our Creator, by the 
conditions of our being, set to the range of human atrocity. 

Thus, we see, that, by every step in our progress in vir- 
tue, the succeeding step becomes less difficult. In propor- 
tion, as we deny our passions, they become less impera- 
tive. The oftener we conquer them, the less is the moral 
effort necessary to secure the victory, and the less frequently, 
and less powerfully, do they assail us. By every act of suc- 
cessful resistance, we diminish the tremendous power of 
habit over us, and thus become more perfectly under the 
government of our own will. Thus, with every act of obe- 
dience to conscience, our character is fixed upon a more 
immoveable foundation. 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 67 

And, on the contrary, by every act of vicious indulgence, 
we give our passions more uncontrolled power over us, and 
diminish the power of reason and conscience. Thus, by 
every act of sin, we not only incur new guilt, but we 
strengthen the bias towards sin, during the whole of our 
subsequent being. Hence, every vicious act renders our re- 
turn to virtue more difficult, and more hopeless. The ten- 
dency of such a course is, to give to habit the power which 
ought to be exerted by our will. And, hence, it is not im- 
probable, that the conditions of our being may be such, as 
to allow of our arriving at such a state, that reformation 
may be actually impossible. That the Holy Scriptures al- 
lude to such a condition, during the present life, is evident. 
Such, also, is probably the condition of the wicked in ano- 
ther world. 

In stating the change thus produced upon our moral na- 
ture, it deserves to be remarked, that this loss of sensibility 
is, probably, only temporary. There is reason to believe 
that no impressions, made upon the human soul during its 
present probationary state, are ever permanently erased. 
Causes operating merely upon man's physical nature, fre- 
quently revive whole trains of thought, and even the know- 
ledge of languages, which had been totally forgotten, during 
the greater portion of a long life. This seems to show, 
that the liability to lose impressions, once made upon us, 
depends upon some condition arising from our material na- 
ture only, and that this liability will cease as soon as our 
present mode of existence terminates. That is to say, if the 
power of retaining knowledge is always the same, but our 
consciousness of knowledge is veiled by our material organs, 
when these have been laid aside, our entire consciousness 
will return. Now, indications of the same nature are to be 
found, in abundance, with respect to conscience. Wicked 
men, after having spent a life in prosperous guilt, and with- 
out being in trouble like other men, are, frequently, without 
any assignable cause, tormented with all the agonies of re- 



68 RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 

morse ; so that the mere consciousness of guilt has become 
absolutely intolerable, and they have perished by derange- 
ment, or by suicide. The horrors of a licentious sinner's 
death bed, present a striking illustration of the same solemn 
fact. A scene of this sort has been, no less vividly than 
accurately, described by Dr. Young, in the death of Alta- 
mont. All these things should be marked by us as solemn 
warnings. They show us of what the constitution, under 
which we exist, is capable ; and, it is in forms like these that 
the "coming events" of eternity "cast their shadows be- 
fore." 



In such indexes, 

There is seen, 
The baby figures of the giant mass 
Of things to corns at large. 

Shakespeare. 



SECTION V. 

RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT DERIVED FROM THE PRE- 
CEDING REMARKS. 

Several plain rules of conduct are suggested, by the above 
remarks, which may more properly be introduced here, than 
in any other place. 

I. Before you resolve upon an action, or a course of 
action. 

1. Cultivate the habit of deciding upon its moral character. 
Let the first question always be, is this action right? For 
this purpose, God gave you this faculty. If you do not use 
it, you are false to yourself, and inexcusable before God. 
We despise a man who never uses his reason, and scorn him 
as a fool. Is he not much more to be despised, who neglects 
to use a faculty of so much higher authority than reason? 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 69 

And let the question, is this right? be asked first, before ima- 
gination has set before us the seductions of pleasure, or any 
step has been taken which should pledge our consistency of 
character. If we ask this question first, it can generally be 
decided with ease. If we wait, until the mind is agitated 
and harrassed by contending emotions, it will not be easy to 
decide. 

2. Remember that your conscience has become imperfect, 
from your frequent abuse of it. Hence, in many cases, its 
discrimination will be indistinct. Instead of deciding, it will, 
frequently, only doubt. That doubt should be, generally, as 
imperative as a decision. When you, therefore, doubt, re- 
specting the virtue of an action, do not perform it, unless 
you as much doubt whether you are at liberty to refrain 
from it. Thus says President Edwards, in one of his reso- 
lutions: "Resolved, never to do any thing, of which I so 
much question the lawfulness, as, that, I intend, at the same 
time, to consider and examine afterwards, whether it be law- 
ful or not ; except I as much question the lawfulness of the 



3. Cultivate, on all occasions, in private or in public, in 
small or great, in action or in thought, the habit of obeying 
the monitions of conscience; all other things to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 

Its slightest touches, instant pause, 
Debar aside pretences ; 
And, resolutely, keep its laws, 
Uncaring consequences. 

Burns. 

The supremacy of conscience imposes upon you the obliga- 
tion to act thus. You cannot remember, in the course of 
your whole life, an instance in which you regret having 
obeyed it ; and you cannot remember a single instance in 
which you do not regret having disobeyed it. There can 



70 RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 

nothing happen to you so bad as to have done wrong; there 
can nothing be gained so valuable as to have done right 
And remember, that it is only by cultivating the practical 
supremacy of conscience, over every other impulse, that you 
can attain to that bold, simple, manly, elevated character, 
which is essential to true greatness. 

This has been frequently taught us, even by the heathen 
poets. 



Virtus, repulsac nescia sordidse, 
Intaminatis fulget honoribus : 
Nee sumit aut ponit secures, 
Arbitrio, popularis aurae. 
Virtus, recludens immeritis mori 
Caelum, negata tentat iter via, 
Coetus que vulgares et udam 
Spernit humum fugiente perm a. 



Horace, Lib. iii. Can. 2. 



A greater than a heathen has said: "If thine eye be single, 
thy whole body shall be full of light ;" and has enforced the 
precept, by the momentous question, " what shall it profit a 
man, though he should gain the whole world, and lose his 
own soul; or what shall a man give in exchange for his souL n 

II. After an action has been performed. 

1. Cultivate the habit of reflecting upon your actions, and 
upon the intention with which they have been performed, and 
of thus deciding upon their moral character. This is called 
self-examination. It is one of the most important duties in 
the life of a moral, and specially of a probationary, existence, 

Tis greatly wise, to talk with our past hours, 
And ask them what report they bore to Heaven, 
And how they might have borne more welcome news. 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 71 

1. Perform this duty deliberately. It is not the business 
of hurry, or of negligence. Devote time exclusively to it. 
Go alone. Retire, within yourself, and weigh your actions 
cooly and carefully, forgetting all other things, in the con- 
viction that you are a moral, and an accountable being. 

2. Do it impartially. Remember, that you are liable to 
be misled by the seduction of passion, and the allurements 
of self-interest. Put yourself in the place of those around 
you, and put others in your own place, and remark how you 
would then consider your actions. Pay great attention to 
the opinions of your enemies : there is generally foundation, 
or, at least, the appearance of it, in what they say of you. 
But, above all, take the true and perfect standard of moral 
character, exhibited in the precepts of the Gospel, and exem- 
plified in the life of Jesus Christ, and thus examine your 
conduct by the light that emanates from the holiness of 
Heaven. 

2. Suppose you have examined yourself, and arrived at a 
decision, respecting the moral character of your actions. 

1. If you are conscious of having done right, be thank- 
ful to that God who has mercifully enabled you to do so. 
Observe the peace and serenity which fills your bosom, and 
remark how greatly it overbalances the self-denials which it 
has cost. Be humbly thankful that you have made some 
progress in virtue. 

2. If the character of your actions have been mixed, that 
is, if they have proceeded from motives partly good, and 
partly bad, labor to obtain a clear view of each, and of the 
circumstances which led you to confound them. Avoid the 
sources of this confusion, and, when you perform the same 
actions again, be specially on your guard against the influ- 
ence of any motive of which you now disapprove. 



72 RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 

3. If conscience convicts yon of having acted wrongly. 

1. Reflect upon the wrong: survey the obligations which 
yon have violated, until you are sensible of your guilt. 

2. Be willing to suffer the pains of conscience. They 
are the rebukes of a friend, and are designed to withhold you 
from the commission of wrong in future. Neither turn a 
neglectful ear to her monitions, nor drown her voice amid 
the bustle of business, or the gaiety of pleasure. 

3. Do not let the subject pass away from your thoughts, 
until you have come to a settled resolution, a resolution, 
founded on moral disapprobation of the action, never to do 
so any more. 

4. If restitution be in your power, make it, without hesi- 
tation, and do it immediately. The least that a man ought 
to be satisfied with, who has done wrong, is to repair the 
wrong as soon as it is possible. 

5. As every act of wrong is a sin against God, seek, in 
humble penitence, his pardon, through the merits and inter- 
cession of His Son, Jesus Christ. 

6. Remark the actions, or the courses of thinking, which 
were the occasions of leading you to do wrong. Be specially 
careful to avoid them in future. To this effect, says Presi- 
dent Edwards : " Resolved, that when I do any conspicu- 
ously evil action, to trace it back till I come to the original 
cause ; and then both carefully endeavour to do so no more, 
and to fight and pray, with all my might, against the original 
of it." 

7. Do all this, in humble dependence upon that merciful, 
and every-where present, Being, who is always ready to 









RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 73 

grant us all assistance necessary to keep his commandments; 
and who will never leave us, nor forsake us, if we put our 
trust in him. 

It seems, then, from what has been remarked, that we are 
all endowed with conscience, or a faculty for discerning a 
moral quality in human actions, impelling us towards right, 
and dissuading us from wrong ; and that the dictates of this 
faculty, are felt and known to be, of supreme authority. 

The possession of this faculty, renders us accountable 
creatures. Without it, we should not be specially distin- 
guished from the brutes. With it, we are brought into 
moral relations with God, and all the moral intelligences in 
the universe. 

It is an ever-present faculty. It always admonishes us, if 
we will listen to its voice, and frequently does so, even when 
we wish to silence its warnings. Hence, we may always 
know our duty, if we will inquire for it. We can, therefore, 
never have any excuse for doing wrong, since no man need 
do wrong, unless he chooses ; and no man will do it igno- 
rantly, unless from criminal neglect of the faculty which 
God has given him. 

How solemn is the thought, that we are endowed with 
such a faculty, and that we can never be disunited from it. 
It goes with us through all the scenes of life, in company 
and alone, admonishing, warning, reproving, and recording; 
and, is a source of happiness, or of misery, it must abide 
with us for ever. Well doth it become man to reverence 
himself. 

And thus we see, that, from his moral constitution, were 
there no other means of knowledge of duty, man is an ac- 
countable creature. Man is under obligation to obey the will 
of God, in what manner soever signified. That it is signified 

8 



74 RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 

in this manner, I think there cannot be a question; and, for 
this knowledge, he is justly held responsible. Thus, the 
Apostle Paul declares, " that the Gentiles, who have not the 
law, are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the 
law, written on their hearts, their consciences being con- 
tinually excusing or accusing one another." How much 
greater must be the responsibility of those to whom God has 
given the additional light of natural and revealed religion. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
SECTION I. 

OF VIRTUE, IN GENERAL. 

It has been already remarked, that we find ourselves so 
constituted, as to stand in various relations to all the beings 
around us, especially to our fellow-men, and to God. There 
may be, and there probably are, other beings, to which, by 
our creation, we are related; but we, as yet, have no infor- 
mation on the subject, and we must wait, until we enter 
upon another state, before the fact, and the manner of the 
fact be revealed. 

In consequence of these relations, and, either by the ap- 
pointment of God, or from the necessity of the case, if, in- 
deed, these terms mean any thing different from each other, 
there arise moral obligations to exercise certain affections 
towards other beings, and to act towards them, in a manner 
corresponding to those affections. Thus, we are taught, in 
the Scriptures, that the relation in which we stand to Deity, 
involves the obligation to universal and unlimited obedience 
and love ; and that the relation in which we stand to each 
other, involves the obligation to love, limited and restricted; 
and of course, to a mode of conduct, in all respects, corre- 
sponding with these affections. 

An action is right, when it corresponds with these obliga- 
tions, or, which is the same thing, is the carrying into effect 



76 OF VIRTUE, IN GENERAL. 

of these affections. It is wrong, when it is in violation of 
these obligations, or, is the carrying into effect of any other 
affections. 

By means of our intellect, we become conscious of the re- 
lations in which we stand to the beings, with whom we are 
connected. Thus, by the exertion of our intellectual facul- 
ties, we become acquainted with the existence and attributes 
of God, his power, his wisdom, his goodness ; and, it is by 
these same faculties, that we understand and verify those de- 
clarations of the Scriptures, which give us additional know- 
ledge of his attributes; and, by which we arrive at a knowl- 
edge of the conditions of our being, as creatures; and, 
also, of the various relations in which we stand to each 
other. 

Conscience, as has been remarked, is that faculty by 
which we become conscious of the obligations arising from 
these relations, by which we perceive the quality of right in 
those actions which correspond with these obligations, and 
of wrong in those actions which violate them; and, by 
which, we are impelled towards the one, and repelled from 
the other. It is, manifestly, the design of this faculty to 
suggest to us this feeling of obligation, as soon as the rela- 
tions, on which it is founded, are understood ; and, thus, to 
excite in us the correspondent affections. 

Now, in a perfectly constituted moral and intellectual 
being, it is evident, that there would be a perfect adjustment 
between these external qualities, and the internal faculties. 
A perfect eye, is an eye, that, under the proper conditions, 
would discern every variety and shade of color, in every ob- 
ject which it was adapted to perceive. The same remark 
would apply to our hearing, or to any other sense. So, a 
perfectly constituted intellect, would, under the proper con- 
ditions, discern the relations in which the being stood to 
other beings ; and, a perfectly constituted conscience, would, 



OF VIRTUE, IN GENERAL. 77 

at the same time, become conscious of all the obligations 
which arose from such relations, and would impel us to the 
corresponding courses of conduct. That is, there would 
exist a perfect adaptation, between the external qualities 
which were addressed to these faculties, and the faculties 
themselves, to which these qualities were addressed. 

Hence, in a being thus perfectly constituted, it is manifest, 
that virtue, the doing of right, or obedience to conscience, 
would mean the same thing. 

When, however, we speak of the perfection of a moral or- 
ganization, we speak of the perfection of adjustment between 
the faculty of conscience, and the relations and obligations 
under which the particular being is created. Hence, this 
very perfection, admits of various gradations and modifica- 
tions. For example. 

1. The relations of the same being, change, during the 
progress of its existence, from infancy, through childhood, 
and manhood, until old age. This change of relations in- 
volves changes of obligations; and, the perfection of its 
moral organization, would consist in the perfect adjustment 
of its moral faculty to its moral relations, throughout the 
whole course of its history. Now, the tendency of this 
change, is, manifestly, from less to greater ; that is, from less 
imperative to more imperative, and from less numerous to 
more numerous obligations. That is, the tendency of the 
present system is, to render beings more and more capa- 
cious of virtue, and of vice, as far as we are permitted to 
have any knowledge of them. 

2. As it is manifestly impossible for us to conceive either 
how numerous, or how important, may be our relations 
to other creatures, in another state, or how much more inti- 
mate may be the relations in which we shall stand to our 
Creator; and, as there can be no limit conceived to our 

8* 



78 OF VIRTUE, IN GENERAL. 

power of comprehending these relations, nor to our pow- 
er becoming conscious of the obligation which they involve, 
so, it is manifest, that no limit can be conceived to the pro- 
gress of man's capacity for virtue. It, evidently, contains 
within itself, elements adapted to infinite improvement, in 
any state in which we may exist. 

3. And the same may be said of vice. As our obligations 
must, from what we already know, continue to increase, and 
our power for recognizing them, must also continue to in- 
crease, if we perpetually violate them, we become more and 
more capable of wrong; and thus, also, become more and 
more intensely vicious. And thus, the very elements of a 
moral constitution, seem to involve the necessity of illimita- 
ble progress either in virtue, or in vice, so long as we exist. 

4. And, as on the one hand, we can have no conception 
of the amount of attainment, both in virtue and vice, of 
which man is capable, so on the other hand, we can have 
no conception of the delicacy of that moral tinge by which 
his character is first designated. We detect moral charac- 
ter at a very early age ; but this by no means proves, that it 
did not exist long before we detected it. Hence, as it may 
thus have existed, before we were able to detect it, it is mani- 
fest, that we have no elements by which to determine the 
time of its commencement. That is to say, in general, we 
are capable of observing moral qualities within certain lim- 

1 its, as, from childhood to old age ; but this is no manner of 
indication, that these qualities may not exist in the being be- 
fore and afterwards, in degrees greatly below, and infinitely 
above any thing which we are capable of observing. 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 79 

SECTION II. 

OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

Let us now consider this subject, in relation to a being 
whose moral constitution has become disordered. 

Now, this disorder might be of two kinds. 

1. He might not perceive all the relations in which he 
stood, and which gave rise to moral obligations, and, of 
course, would be unconscious of the corresponding obliga- 
tions. 

2. He might perceive the relation, but his conscience 
might be so disordered, as not to feel all the obligation which 
corresponded with it. 

What shall we say concerning the actions of such a 
being? 

1. The relations under which he is constituted are the 
same, and the obligations arising out of these relations, are 
the same as though his moral constitution had not become 
disordered. 

2. His actions would all be comprehended under two 
classes : 

1. Those which came, if I may so express it, within the 
limit of his conscience ; that is, those in which his con- 
science did correctly intimate to him his obligation; and, 

2. Those in which it did not so intimate it. 

Now, of the first class of actions, it is manifest, that, 
where conscience did correctly intimate to him his obliga- 



80 OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

tions, the doing of right, and obedience to conscience, would, 
as in the last section, be equivalent terms. 

But, what shall we say of those without this limit; that 
is, of those, which he, from the conditions of his being, is 
under obligation to perform; but, of which, from the de- 
rangement of his moral nature, he does not perceive the obli- 
gation. 

1. Suppose him to perform these very actions, there could 
be in them no virtue ; for, the man perceiving in them no 
moral quality, and, having towards them no moral impul- 
sion, moral obligation could be no motive for performing 
them. He might act from passion, or from self-love; but, 
under such circumstances, as there is no moral motive, there 
could be no praiseworthiness. Thus, for a judge to do jus- 
tice to a poor widow, is manifestly right ; but, a man may do 
this without any moral desert ; for, hear what the unjust 
judge saith : " Though I fear not God, nor regard man, yet, 
because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest, by 
her continual coming, she weary me." 

It does not, however, follow that the performing an action, 
in this manner, is innocent. The relation in which a being 
stands to other beings, involves the obligation to certain feel- 
ings, and the acts corresponding with those feelings. If the 
act be performed, and the feeling is wanting, the obligation 
is not fulfilled, and the man may be guilty. How far he is 
so will be seen below. 

2. But, second, suppose him not to perform those actions, 
which are, as we have said, without the limit of his con- 
science. In how far is the omission of these actions, or the 
doing of the contrary, innocent ? That is to say, is the im- 
pulse of conscience, in an imperfectly constituted moral be- 
ing, the limit of moral obligation. 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 81 

This will, I suppose, depend upon the following consider- 
ations : 

1. His knowledge of the relations in which he stands. 

If he know not the relations in which he stands to others, 
and have not the means of knowing them, he is guiltless. 
If he know them, or have the means of knowing them, and 
have not improved these means, he is guilty. This is, I 
think, the principle asserted by the Apostle Paul, in his epis- 
tle to the Romans. He asserts, that the heathen are. guilty 
in sinning against God, because His attributes may be known 
by the light of nature. He also asserts that there will be a 
difference between the condemnation of the Jews and of the 
heathen, on the ground, that the Jews were informed of ma- 
ny points of moral obligation, which the Gentiles could not 
have ascertained, without a revelation. " Those that sin 
without law, shall perish without law ; and those that have 
sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law." 

2. His guilt will depend, secondly, upon the cause of this 
imperfection of his conscience. 

Were this imperfection of his conscience not the result of 
his own act, he would be guiltless. But, in just so far as it 
is the result of his own conduct, he is responsible. We have 
already seen, that conscience may be improved by use, and 
injured by disuse, or by abuse. Now, as a man is entitled 
to all the benefits which accrue from the faithful improve- 
ment of his conscience, so he is responsible for all the injury 
that results from the abuse of it. 

That this is the fact, is, I think, evident, from obvious con- 
siderations. 

1. It is well known, that the repetition of wickedness pro- 
duces great stupidity of conscience, or, as it is frequently 



82 OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

termed, hardness of heart. But, no one ever considers this 
stupidity, as in any manner an excuse. It is, on the con- 
trary, always held to be an aggravation of crime. Thus, 
we term a man, who has become so accustomed to crime, 
that he will murder without feeling, and without regret, a 
a remorseless murderer, a cold-blooded assassin ; and, every 
one knows, that, by these epithets, we mean to designate a 
special and additional element of guiltiness. This, I take 
to be the universal feeling of man. 

Again, the assertion of the contrary would lead to results 
manifestly erroneous. 

Suppose two men, of precisely the same moral attain- 
ments to-day, to commence, at the same time, two courses 
of conduct diametrically opposed to each other. The first, 
by the scrupulous doing of right, cultivates, to the utmost 
his moral nature, and increases, with every day, his capa- 
city for virtue. The sphere of his benevolent affections en- 
larges, and the play of his moral feelings becomes more and 
more intense, until he is filled with the most ardent desire to 
promote the welfare of every fellow-creature, and to do the 
will of God with his whole heart. The other, by a contin- 
ued course of crime, gradually destroys the susceptibility 
of his conscience, and lessens his capacity for virtue, until 
his soul is filled with hatred to God, and no other feeling of 
obligation remains, except that of fidelity to his co-partners 
in guilt. 

Now, at the expiration of this period, if both of these 
men should act according to what each felt to be the dictate 
of conscience, they would act very differently. But, if a 
man can be under obligation to do, and to leave undone, 
nothing but what his conscience, at a particular moment, indi- 
cates, I do not see but that these men would be, in the 
actions of that moment, equally innocent. The only differ- 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 83 

ence between them, so far as the actions of a particular mo- 
ment were concerned, would be the difference between a vir- 
tuous man and a virtuous child. 

From these facts, we are easily led to the distinction be- 
tween right and wrong, and innocence and guilt. Right 
and wrong depend upon the relations under which beings 
are created ; and, hence, the obligations resulting from these 
relations, are, in their nature, fixed and unchangeable. 
Guilt and innocence depend upon the knowledge of these 
relations ; and are, moreover, affected by the degree in which 
the imperfection of conscience was the result of the volun- 
tary agency of the individual himself. As these are manifestly 
susceptible of variation, while right and wrong are invaria- 
ble, the two notions may manifestly not always correspond 
with each other. 

Thus, for example, an action may be wrong, but, if the ac- 
tor have no means of knowing it to be wrong, he is held mo- 
rally guiltless, in the doing of it. Or, again, a man may have 
a consciousness of obligation, and a sincere desire to act in 
conformity to it; and may, from ignorance of the way in 
which that obligation is to be discharged, perform an act, in 
its nature wrong ; yet, if he have acted according to the best 
of his possible knowledge, he may not only be held guilt- 
less, but even virtuous. And, on the contrary, if a man do 
what is actually right, but without a desire to fulfil the obli- 
gation of which he is conscious, he is held to be guilty ; for 
he has not manifested a desire to act in obedience to the ob- 
ligations under which he knew himself to be created. Illus- 
trations of these remarks may be easily drawn from the or- 
dinary affairs of life, or from the Scriptures. 

And, hence, we also arrive at another principle of import- 
ance in our moral judgments, namely, that our own con- 
sciousness of innocence, or our not being conscious of guilt, 
is, by no means, a sufficient proof of our innocence. A man 



84 OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

may never have reflected on the relations in which he stands 
to other men, or to God ; and, hence, may be conscious of 
no feeling of obligation towards either, in any, or in parti- 
cular, respects. This may be the fact, but his innocence 
would not be established, unless he can also show, that he 
has faithfully and impartially used all the powers, which 
God has given him, to obtain a knowledge of these relations. 
Or, again, he may understand the relation, and have no cor- 
responding sensibility. This may be the fact, but his inno- 
cency would not be established, unless he can also show 
that he has always faithfully and honestly obeyed his con- 
science, so that his moral insensibility is, in no manner, at- 
tributable to his own acts. Until these things can be shown, 
the want of moral consciousness will be no proof of inno- 
cence. To this principle, if I mistake not, the Apostle Paul 
alludes, in 1 Cor. iv. 4. "But, with me, it is a very small 
thing to be judged of you, or of man's judgment: yea, I 
judge not my ownself, for I know nothing of my ownself, 
(or, rather, I am conscious of nothing wrong in myself; that 
is, of no unfaithfulness in office : ) yet, am I not hereby 
justified ; but he that judgeth me is the Lord." And, thus, 
a man may do great wrong, and be deeply guilty, in re- 
spect to a whole class of obligations, without being, in any 
painful degree, sensible of it. Such, I think, to be the 
moral state in which men, in general, are, in respect to their 
obligations to God. Thus saith our Saviour to the Jews : 
" I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you ;" 
while they were supposing themselves to be the special fa- 
vorites of Heaven. 

From these remarks, we may also learn the relation in 
which beings, created as we are, stand to moral law. 

Man is created, with moral and intellectual powers, capa- 
ble of progressive improvement. Hence, if he use his fac- 
ulties as he ought, he will progressively improve; that is, 
become more and more capable of virtue. He is assured of 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 85 

of enjoying all the benefits which can result from such im- 
provement. If he use these faculties as he ought not, and 
becomes less and less capable of virtue, he is hence held 
responsible for all the consequences of his misimprovement. 

Now, as this misimprovement is his own act, for which, 
he is responsible, it manifestly does not affect the relations 
under which he is created, nor the obligations resulting 
from these relations; that is, he stands in respect to the 
moral requirements under which he is created, precisely in 
the same condition as if he had always used his moral pow- 
ers correctly. That is to say, under the present moral con- 
stitution, every man is justly held responsible, at every 
period of his existence, for that degree of virtue, of which 
he would have been capable, had he, from the first moment 
of his existence, improved his moral nature, in every re- 
spect, just as he ought to have done. In other words, sup- 
pose some human being to have always lived thus, (Jesus 
Christ, for instance,) every man is, at every successive pe-^ 
riod of his existence, held responsible for the same degree of 
virtue, as such a perfect being attained to at the correspond- 
ing periods of his existence. Such, I think, evidently to be 
the nature of the obligation, which must rest upon such 
beings, throughout the whole extent of their duration. 

In order to meet this increasing responsibility, in such a 
a manner, as to fulfil the requirements of moral law, a 
being, under such a constitution, must, at every moment of 
his existence, possess a moral faculty, which, by perfect pre- 
vious cultivation, is adapted to the responsibilities of that 
particular moment. But, suppose this not to have been the 
case ; and that, on the contrary, his moral faculty, by once 
doing wrong, has become impaired, so that, it either does 
not admonish him correctly of his obligations, or that he 
has become indisposed to obey its monitions. This must, 
at the next moment, terminate in action more at variance 
with rectitude than before. The adjustment between con- 

9 



86 OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

science and the passions, must become deranged, and thus, 
the tendency, at every successive moment, must be, to in- 
volve him deeper and deeper in guilt. And, unless some 
other moral force be exerted in the case, such must be the 
tendency for ever. 

And suppose some such force to be exerted, and, at any 
period of his existence, the being to begin to obey his con- 
science in every one of its present monitions. It is mani- 
fest, that he would now need some other and more perfect 
guide, in order to inform him, perfectly, of his obligations, 
and of the mode in which they are to be fulfilled. And 
supposing this to be done, as he is, at this moment, responsi- 
ble for such a capacity for virtue^ as would have been at- 
tained by a previously perfect rectitude; and, as his capa- 
city is inferior to this, and as no reason can be suggested, 
why his progress in virtue, should, under these circum- 
stances, be more rapid, than that of a perfect being, but the 
contrary; it is manifest, that he must ever fall short of what 
is justly required of him; nay, that he must be continually 
falling farther and farther behind it. 

And hence, the present constitution tends to show us the 
remediless nature of moral evil, under the government of 
God, unless some other principle, than that of law, be ad- 
mitted into the case. These conditions of being having been 
violated, unless man be placed under some other conditions, 
natural religion would lead us to believe, that he must suf- 
fer the penalty, whatever it be, of wrong. Penitence, could, 
in no manner, alter his situation, for it is merely a temper 
justly demanded, in consequence of his sin. But this could 
not replace him in his original relation to the law which had 
been violated. Such seems to be the teaching of the Holy 
Scriptures; and, they seem to me to declare, moreover, that 
this change in the conditions of our being, has been accom- 
plished by the mediation of a Redeemer, by which we may, 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 87 

through the obedience of another, be justified; that is, treat- 
ed as though just, although we are, by confession, guilty. 

And hence, although it were shown that a man was, at 
any particular period of his being, incapable of that degree 
of virtue which the law of God required, it would neither 
follow that he was not under obligation to exercise it, nor 
that he was not responsible for the whole amount of that 
exercise of it. Since, if he have dwarfed his own powers, 
he is responsible for the result. And, conversely, if God 
requires this whole amount of virtue, it will not prove that 
man is now capable of exercising it; but only, that he is 
either thus capable, or, that he would have been so, if he 
had used correctly the powers which God gave him. 

A few suggestions, respecting the moral relations of habit, 
will close this discussion. 

Some of the most important facts, respecting habit, are 
the following: 

It is found to be the fact, that the repetition of any physi- 
cal act, at stated periods, and, especially, after brief intervals, 
renders the performance of the act easier ; it is accomplished 
in less time, with less effort, with less expense of nervous 
power, and of mental energy. This is exemplified, every day, 
in the acquisition of the mechanical arts, and in learning the 
rudiments of music. And, whoever will remark, may easi- 
ly be convinced, that a great part of our education, physi- 
cal and intellectual, in so far as it is valuable, consists in the 
formation of habits. 

The same remarks apply, to a very considerable extent, 
to moral habits. 

The repetition of a virtuous act, produces a tendency to 
continued repetition ; the force of opposing motives is les- 



88 OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

sened ; the power of the will over passion, is more decided ; 
and the act is accomplished with less moral effort. Perhaps 
we should express the fact truly, by saying, that, by the repe- 
tition of virtuous acts, moral power is gained, while, for the 
performance of the same acts, less moral power is required. 

On the contrary, by the repetition of vicious acts, a ten- 
dency is created towards such repetition; the power of the 
passions is increased ; the power of opposing forces is dimin- 
ished ; and the resistance to passion requires a greater moral 
effort; or, as in the contrary of the preceding case, a greater 
moral effort is required to resist our passions, while the 
moral power to resist them, is diminished. 

Now, the obvious nature of such a tendency, is, to arrive 
at a fixed and unalterable moral state. Be the fact accounted 
for as it may, I think that habit has an effect upon the will, 
such as to establish a tendency towards the impossibility 
to resist it. Thus, the practice of virtue seems to tend 
towards rendering a man incapable of vice, and the practice 
of vice towards rendering a man incapable of virtue. It is 
common to speak of a mnn as incapable of meanness ; and 
I think we see men as often, in the same sense, incapable of 
virtue. And, if I mistake not, we always speak of the one 
incapacity as an object of praise, and, of the other, as an ob- 
ject of blame. 

If we inquire what are the moral effects of such a condi- 
tion of our being, I think we shall find them to be as fol- 
lows : 

1. Habit cannot alter the nature of an action, as right or 
wrong. It can neither alter our relations to our fellow 
creatures, nor to God, nor the obligations consequent upon 
those relations. Hence, the character of the action must 
remain unaffected. 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 89 

2. Nor can it alter the guilt or innocence of the action 
as he who acts virtuously is entitled to the benefit of virtuous 
action, among which the tendency to virtuous action is in- 
cluded ; so, he who acts viciously, is responsible for all the 
consequences of vicious action, the corresponding tendency 
to vicious action also included. The conditions being equal, 
and he being left to his own free choice, the consequences 
of either course rest justly upon himself. 

The final causes of such a constitution are apparent. 

1 1. It is manifestly and precisely adapted to our present state, 
when considered as probationary, and capable of moral 
changes, and terminating in one where moral change is im- 
possible. The constitution, under which we are placed, 
presents us with the apparent paradox of a state of inces- 
sant moral change ; in which every individual change, has 
a tendency to produce a state that is unchangable. 

2. The fact of such a constitution is, manifestly, intended 
to present the strongest possible incentives to virtue, and mo- 
nitions against vice. It teaches us that consequences are at- 
tached to every act of both, not only present but future, and 
so far as we can see interminable. As every one can easily 
estimate the pleasures of vice and the pains of virtue, both 
in extent and duration ; but, as no one, taking into conside- 
ration the results of the tendency which each will produce, 
can estimate the interminable consequences which must 
arise from either, there is, therefore, hence derived, the 
strongest possible reason why we should always do right, 
and never do wrong. 

And again. It is evident that our capacity for increase in 
virtue, depends greatly upon the present constitution, in re- 
spect to habit. I have remarked, that the effect of the repe- 
tition of virtuous action was to give us greater moral power, 
while the given action itself required less moral effort. 



90 OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

There, hence, arises, if I may so say, a surplus of moral 
power, which may be applied to accomplishing greater moral 
achievements. He who has overcome one evil temper, has 
acquired moral power to overcome another; and that which 
was first subdued is kept in subjection without a struggle. 
He who has formed one habit of virtue practises it, without 
effort, as a matter of course, or of original impulse ; and the 
power thus acquired may be applied to the attainments of 
other and more difficult habits, and the accomplishment of 
higher and more arduous moral enterprizes. He who de- 
sires to see the influence of habit illustrated, with great 
beauty and accuracy, will be gratified by the perusal of 
" The Hermit of Teneriffe," one of the most delightful alle- 
gories to be found in the English language. 

The relation between the moral and the intellectual pow- 
ers, in the moral conditions of our being, may be thus briefly 
stated: 

1. We are created under certain relations to our Creator, 
and to our fellow-creatures. 

3. We are created under certain obligations to our Creator, 
and our fellow-creatures, in consequence of these relations ; 
obligations to exercise certain affections, and to maintain 
courses of action corresponding with those affections. 

3. By means of our intellectual powers, we perceive these 
relations. 

4. By means of our moral powers, we become conscious 
of these obligations. 

6. The consciousness of these obligations alone would 
not always teach us how they were to be discharged; as, for 
example, the consciousness of our obligations to God would 
not teach us how God should be worshipped, and so in vari- 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 91 

ous other cases. It is, by the use of the powers of our intel- 
lect, that we learn how these moral affections are to be carried 
into action. The use of the intellect is, therefore, two fold. 
First, to discover to us our relations. Second, to discover 
in what manner our obligations are to be discharged. 



CHAPTER IV. 

HUMAN HAPPINESS. 

We have already, on several occasions, alluded to the fact 
that God has created every thing double ; a world without 
us, and a corresponding world within us. He has made 
light without, and the eye within ; beauty without, and taste 
within ; moral qualities in actions, and conscience to judge 
of them ; and so of every other case. By means of this 
correspondence, our communication with the external world 
exists. 

These internal powers are called into exercise, by the pre- 
sence of their corresponding external objects. Thus, the 
organ of vision is excited by the presence of light, the sense 
of smell by odors, the faculty of taste by beauty or deformity, 
and so of the rest. 

The first effect of this exercise of these faculties is, thatwe 
are conscious of the existence and qualities of surrounding 
objects. Thus, by sight, we become conscious of the exist- 
ence and colors of visible objects, by hearing of the existence 
and sound of audible objects, &c. 

But, it is manifest, that this knowledge of the existence 
and qualities of external objects, is far from being all the in- 
tercourse which we are capable of holding with them. This 
knowledge of their existence and qualities, is, most fre- 
quently, attended with pleasure or pain, desire or aversion. 



94 HUMAN HAPPINESS. 

Sometimes the mere perception itself is immediately pleasing; 
in other cases, it is merely the sign of some other quality 
which has the power of pleasing us. In the first case, the 
perception produces gratification, in the other, it awakens 
desire. 

That is, we stand in such relations to the external world, 
that certain objects, besides being capable of being perceived, 
are also capable of giving us pleasure, and certain other ob- 
jects besides being perceived are capable of giving us pain. 
Or, to state the same truth, in the other form, we are so 
made, as to be capable, not only of perceiving, but, also, of 
being pleased with, or pained by, the various objects by 
which we are surrounded. 

This general power of being pleased or pained, may be, 
and I think frequently is, termed sensitiveness. 

This sensitiveness, or the power of being made happy, by 
surrounding objects, is intimately connected with the exer* 
cise of our various faculties. Thus, the pleasure of vision 
cannot be enjoyed in any other manner, than by the exercise 
of the faculty of sight. The pleasure of knowledge can be 
enjoyed in no other way, than by the exercise of the intel- 
lectual powers. The pleasure of beauty can be enjoyed in 
no other mannner, than by the exercise of the faculty of 
taste, and of the other subordinate faculties, on which this 
faculty depends. And, thus, in general, our sensitiveness 
derives pleasure from the exercise of those powers which 
are made necessary for our existence and well-being in our 
present state. 

Now, I think that we can have no other idea of happiness, 
than the exercise of this sensitiveness upon its corresponding 
objects and qualities. It is the gratification of desire; the 
enjoyment of what we love ; or, as Dr. Johnson remarks : 
" Happiness consists in the multiplication of agreeable con- 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 95 

It seems, moreover, evident, that this very constitution is, 
to us, an indication of the will of our Creator ; that is, inas- 
much as he has created us, with these capacities for happi- 
ness, and has also created objects around us precisely adapted 
to these capacities, he meant that the one should be exer- 
cised upon the other ; that is, that we should be made happy 
in this manner. 

And, this is more evident, from considering that this hap- 
piness is intimately connected with the exercise of those 
faculties, the employment of which is necessary to our exis- 
tence, and our well-being. It thus becomes the incitement 
to, or the reward of, certain courses of conduct, which, it is 
necessary to our own welfare, or to that of society, that we 
should pursue. 

And, thus, we arrive at the general principle that our 
desire for a particular object, and the existence of the object 
adapted to this desire, is, in itself, a reason why we should 
enjoy that object, in the same manner as our aversion to ano- 
ther object is a reason why we should avoid it. There may 
be, it is true, other reasons to the contrary, which may be 
more authoritative than that emananating from this desire 
or aversion, and these may and ought to control it; but this 
does not show that the desire is not a reason, and a suffi- 
cient one, if no better reason can be shown to the contrary. 

But, if we consider the subject a little more minutely, we 
shall find that the simple gratification of desire, in the man- 
ner above stated, is not the only conditition on which our 
happiness depends. 

We find, by experience, that a .desire or appetite may 
be so gratified as forever afterwards to destroy its power ot 
producing happiness. Thus, a certain kind of food is plea- 
sant to me, this is a reason why I should partake of it. 
But, I may eat of it to excess, so as to loathe it forever after- 



96 HUMAN HAPPINESS. 

wards, and thus annihilate, in my constitution, this mode of 
gratification. Now, the same reasoning which proves that 
God intended me to partake of this food, namely, because 
it will promote my happiness, also proves that he did not 
intend me to partake of it after this manner, for, by so doing, 
I have diminished, by this whole amount, my capacity for 
happiness, and thus defeated, in so far, the very end of my 
constitution. Or, again, though I may not destroy my 
desire for a particular kind of food, by a particular manner of 
gratification, yet, I may so derange my system that the eat- 
ing of it shall produce pain and distress, so that it ceases to 
be to me a source of happiness upon the whole. In this 
case, I equally defeat the design of my constitution. The 
result equally shows, that, although he means that I should 
eat it he does not mean that I should eat it in this manner. 

Again, every man is created with various and dissimilar 
forms of desire, corresponding with the different external 
objects disigned to promote his happiness. Now, it is found 
that one form of desire may be gratified in such a manner, 
as to destroy the power of receiving happiness from another ; 
or, on the contrary, the first may be so gratified as to leave 
the other powers of receiving happiness unimpaired. Since 
then, it is granted, that these were all given us for the same 
end, namely, to promote our happiness, if, by one manner 
of gratification, we destroy another power of gratification, 
while, by another manner of gratification, we leave this first 
power of gratification uninjured, it is, evidently, the design 
of our Creator that we should limit ourselves to this latter 
mode of gratification. 

Thus, I am so formed, that food is pleasant to me. This, 
if there were no necessity for eating, is a reason why I 
should eat it. But I am also formed with a desire for know- 
ledge. This is a reason why I should study, in order to 
obtain it. That is, God intended me to derive happiness 
from both of these sources of gratification. If, then, I eat in 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 97 

such a manner that I cannot study, or study in such manner 
that I cannot eat, in either case I defeat his design concerning 
me, by destroying those sources of happiness with which 
he created me. The same principle might be illustrated in 
various instances. 

Again, we find that the indulgence of any one form of 
gratification, in such manner as to destroy the power of 
another form of gratification, also, in the end diminishes, 
and frequently destroys the power of deriving happiness, 
even from that which is indulged. Thus, he who eats, so 
as to injure his power of intellectual gratification, injures 
his digestive organs, and produces disease, so that his plea- 
sure from eating is diminished. Or, he who studies, so as to 
destroy his appetite, in the end destroys his power of study. 
This is another and distinct reason, to show, that, while I am 
designed to be happy by the gratification of my desires, I am 
also designed to be happy by gratifying them within a limit. 
The limit to gratification enters into my constitution, as a be- 
ing designed for happiness, just as much as the power of 
gratification itself. 

And again, our Creator has endowed us with an additional 
and superior power, by which we can contemplate these two 
courses of conduct ; by which we can approve of the one, 
and disapprove of the other ; and, by which the one be- 
comes a source of pleasure and the other a source of pain ; 
both, separate and distinct from the sources of pain and 
pleasure mentioned above. And, moreover, he has so consti- 
tuted us, that, this very habit of regulating, and limiting our 
desires, is absolutely essential to our success in every under- 
taking. Both of these are, therefore, additional and distinct 
reasons for believing, that the restriction of our desires, 
within certain limits, is made, by our Creator, as clearly ne- 
cessary to our happiness, .as the indulgence of them. 

All this is true, if we consider the happiness of man merely 
10 



98 HUMAN HAPPINESS. 

as ail individual. But the case is rendered still stronger, if 
we look upon man as a society. It is manifest that the 
universal gratification of any single appetite or passion, 
without limit, not to say the gratification of all, would, in 
a very few years, not only destroy society, but absolutely put 
an end to the whole human race. And, hence, we see that the 
limitation of our desires is not only necsssary to our happi- 
ness, but also to our existence. 

Hence, while it is the truth, that human happiness con- 
sists in the gratification of our desires, it is not the whole 
truth. It consists in the gratification of our desires within 
the limits assigned to them by our Creator. And, the hap- 
piness of that man will be the most perfect, who regulates 
his desires most perfectly in accordance with the laws under 
which he has been created. And, hence, the greatest hap- 
piness of which man is in his present state capable, is to be 
attained by conforming our whole conduct to the laws of 
virtue, that is, to the will of God. 



CHAPTER V. 

OF SELF LOVE. 

By the term sensitiveness, I have designated the capacity 
of our nature, to derive happiness from the various objects 
and qualities of the world around us. Though intimately 
associated with those powers, by which we obtain a know- 
ledge of external objects, it differs from them. When a de- 
sire for gratification is excited by its appropriate objects, it is 
termed appetite, passion, &c. , 

As our means of gratification are various, and are also at- 
tended by different effects, there is evidently an opportunity 
for choice between them. By declining a gratification at 
present, we may secure one of greater value, at some fu- 
ture time. That which is, at present, agreeable, may be of 
necessity followed by pain ; and that which is, at present, 
painful, may be rewarded by pleasure which shall far over- 
balance it. 

Now, it must be evident, to every one who will reflect, 
that my happiness, at any one period of my existence, is 
just as valuable as my happiness at the present period. No 
one can conceive of any reason, why the present moment 
should take the precedence, in any respect, over any other 
moment of my being. Every moment of my past life was 
once present, and seemed of special value ; but in the re- 
trospect, all seem so far as the happiness of each is concerned 
of equal value. Eacji of those to come may, in its turn, 
claim some pre-eminence ; though, now, we plainly discover 



100 OF SELF-LOVE. 

in anticipation, that no one is more" than another entitled 
to it. Nay, if there be any difference, it is manifestly in fa- 
vor of the most distant future, in comparison with the pre- 
sent. The longer we exist, the greater is our capacity for 
virtue and happiness, and the wider is our sphere of exist- 
ence. To postpone the present for the future, seems, there- 
fore, to be the dictate of wisdom, if we calmly consider the 
condition of our being. 

But, it is of the nature Of passion, to seize upon the pre- 
sent gratification, utterly irrespective of consequences, and, 
utterly regardless of other or more excellent gratifications, 
which may be obtained by self-denial. He, whose passions 
are inflamed, looks at nothing beyond the present gratifica- 
tion. Hence, he is liable to seize upon a present enjoyment, 
to the exclusion of a much more valuable one in future ; and 
even in such a manner as to entail upon himself poignant 
and remediless misery. And, hence, in order to be enabled 
to enjoy all the happiness of which his present state is capa- 
ble, the sensitive part of man needs to be combined with 
another, which upon a comparison of the present with the 
future, shall impel him towards that mode either of gratifica- 
tion or of self-denial, which shall most promote his happiness 
upon the whole. 

Such is self-love. We give this name to that part of our 
constitution, by which we are incited to do, or to forbear, 
to gratify, or to deny our desires, simply on the ground of 
obtaining the greatest amount of happiness for ourselves, 
taking into view a limited future, or else our entire future 
existence. When we act from simple respect to present 
gratification, we act from passion. When we act from a 
respect to our whole individual happiness, without regard 
to the present, only as it is a part of the whole, and without 
any regard to the happiness of others, only as it will con- 
contribute to our own, we are then said to act from self- 
love. 



OF SELF-LOVE. 101 

The difference between these two modes of impulsion, 
may be easily illustrated. 

Suppose a man destitute of self-love, and actuated only 
by passion. He would seize, without reflection, and enjoy 
without limit, every object of gratification which the pre- 
sent moment might offer, without regard to its value in 
comparison with others, which might be secured by self- 
denial ; and without any regard to the consequences which 
might follow present pleasure, be they ever* so disastrous. 

On the contrary, we may imagine a being destitute of 
passions, and impelled only by self-love ; that is, by a desire 
for his own happiness, on the whole. In this case, so far 
as I see, he would never act at all. Having no desires to 
gratify, there could be no gratification ; and hence, there 
could be no happiness. Happiness is the result of the 
exercise of our sensitiveness upon its corresponding ob- 
jects. But we have no sensitiveness which corresponds 
with any object in ourselves ; nor do ourselves present any 
object to correspond with such sensitiveness. Hence, the 
condition of a being, destitute of passions, and actuated only 
by self-love, would be an indefinite and most painful long- 
ing after happiness, without the consciousness of any relation 
to external objects which could gratify it. Nor is this an 
entirely imaginary condition. In cases of deep melan- 
choly, and of fixed hypochondria, tending to derangement, 
I think every one must have observed in others, and he is 
happy, if he have not experienced in himself, the tenden- 
cies to precisely such a state. The very power of affection, 
or sensitiveness, seems paralyzed. This state of mind, has, 
I think, been ascribed to Hamlet by Shakspeare, in the fol-. 
lowing passage. 

"I have, of late, (but wherefore I know not,) lost all my 
mirth, foregone all custom of exercises ; and, indeed, it 
goes so heavily with my dispositions, that this goodly frame, 

10* 



102 OF SELF-LOVE. 

the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory; this most 
excellent canopy, the air — look you — this brave overhang- 
ing firmament; this majestical roof, fretted with golden fire; 
why, it appears no other thing to me, than a foul and pesti- 
lent congregation of vapours. Man delights me not, nor 
woman neither, though by your smiling you seem to say 
so." Hamlet^ Act ii, Sc. 2. 

It would seem, therefore, that self-love was not, in itself, 
a faculty, or part of our constitution, in itself, productive of 
happiness; but rather, an impulse which, out of several 
forms of gratification that may be presented, inclines us to 
select that which will be the most for our happiness, con- 
sidered as a whole. This seems the more evident, from the 
obvious fact, that a man, actuated by the most zealous self- 
love, derives no more happiness from a given gratification, 
than any other man. His pleasure, in any one act of 
enjoyment, is not in the ratio of his self-love, but of his 
sensitiveness. 

From these remarks, we can easily determine the rank to 
which self-love is entitled. 

1. Its rank is superior to that of passion. As our happi- 
ness, as a whole, is of more consequence than the happiness 
of every separate moment, so, the faculty which impels us 
towards our happiness upon the whole, was manifestly 
intended to control that which impels toward our happiness 
for a moment. If happiness be desirable, the greatest 
amount of it, is most desirable; and, as we are provided 
with a constitution, by which we are forewarned of the dif- 
ference, and impelled to a correct choice, it is the design of 
our Creator that we should obey it. 

2. Its rank is inferior to that of conscience. We are 
made not only sensitive beings, that is, beings capable of 
happiness, but, also, moral beings, that is, capable of virtue. 



OF SELF-LOVE. 103 

The latter is manifestly the most important object of our 
being, even in so far as our own happiness is concerned; 
for, by the practice of virtue, without respect to our own 
temporal happiness, we secure our moral happiness, the 
most valuable of any of which we are capable; while, by 
acting for our own happiness, when these seem to come 
into competition, we lose that which is most valuable, and 
can be, by no means, certain of obtaining the other. That 
is to say, when our own happiness, and our duty, seem 
to come into collision, we are bound to discard the con- 
sideration of our own happiness, and to do what we believe 
to be right. 

This may be illustrated by an example. 

Suppose that the two courses of action are presented to 
our choice. The one, so far as we can see, will promote 
our individual happiness ; the other, will fulfil a moral obli- 
gation. Now, in this case, we may act in either of these ways. 

1. We may seek our own happiness, and violate our ob- 
ligations. In this case, we certainly lose the pleasure of 
virtue, and suffer the pain of remorse, while we must be 
uncertain whether we shall obtain the object of our desires. 

2. We may perform the act which • conscience indicates, 
but from our self-love, as a motive. Here, we shall gain 
whatever reward, by the constitution under which we are 
placed, belongs to the action ; but we lose the pleasure of 
virtue. 

3. We may perform the act indicated by conscience, and 
from the simple impulse of duty. In this case, we obtain 
every reward which could be obtained in the preceding 
case, and, in addition, are blessed with the applauses of con- 
science. Thus, suppose I deliberate whether I shall spend a 
sum of money in self-gratification, or else, in an act of be- 



104 OF SELF-LOVE. 

nevolence, which is plainly my duty. If I pursue the for- 
mer course, it is very uncertain whether I actually secure 
the gratification which I seek, while I lose the pleasure of 
rectitude, and am saddened t>y the pains of remorse. The 
pleasure of gratification is soon over, but the pain of guilt 
is enduring. Or again, I may perform the act of benevo- 
lence from love of applause, or some modification of self- 
love. I here obtain with more certainty the reputation 
which I seek, but lose the reward of conscious virtue. Or, 
thirdly, if I do the act without any regard to my own happi- 
ness, and simply from love to God and man, I obtain all the 
rewards which attach to the action by the constitution un- 
der which I am placed, and also enjoy the higher rewards 
of conscious rectitude. 

This subordination of motives seems clearly to be referred 
to by our Saviour. " There is no man, that hath left house, 
or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or chil- 
dren, or lands, for my sake and the GospeVs ; but he shall 
receive an hundred fold, now, in this time, and, in the 
world to come, life everlasting." That is to say, a man does 
not obtain the reward of virtue, even in self-denial, unless 
he disregard the consideration of himself, and act from sim- 
ple love to God. To the same purport is the often repeated 
observation of our Saviour : " whosoever will save his life 
shall lose it ; and whosoever will lose his life, for my sake, 
shall find it." There are many passages of Scripture which 
seem to assert, that the very turning-point of moral charac- 
ter, so far as our relations to God are concerned, consists in 
yielding up the consideration of our own happiness, as a 
controlling motive, and subjecting it, without reserve, to the 
higher motive, the simple will of God. 

If these remarks be true, we see, 

1. That when conscience speaks, the voice of self-love 
must be silent. That is to say, we have no right to seek 



OF SELF-LOVE. 105 

our own happiness, in any manner at variance with moral 
obligation. Nevertheless, from several courses of action, 
either of which is innocent, we are at liberty to choose that 
which will most conduce to our own happiness. In such a 
case the consideration of our happiness is justly ultimate. 

2. The preceding chapter has shown us that man was de- 
signed to be made happy by the gratification of his desires. 
The present chapter teaches us, that, when the gratification 
of desire is at variance with virtue, a greater happiness is to 
be obtained by self-denial. Or, in other words, our greatest 
happiness is to be obtained, not by the various modes of self- 
gratification, but by simply seeking the good of others, and 
in doing the will of God, from the heart. 

3. And, hence, we may arrive at the general principle, 
that every impulse or desire is supreme within its own as- 
signed limits ; but that, when a lower comes into competi- 
tion with a higher impulsion, the inferior accomplishes its 
own object, by being wholly subject to the superior. Thus, 
desire, or the love of present gratification, may, within its 
own limits, be indulged. But, when this present gratifica- 
tion comes into competition with self-love, even passion ac- 
complishes its its own object best ; that is, a man actually 
attains to more enjoyment, by submitting present desire im- 
plicitly to self-love. And so self-love is ultimate within its 
proper limits ; but when it comes into competition with con- 
science, it actually accomplishes its own object best, by being 
entirely subject to that which the Creator has constituted its 
superior. 

4. The difference between self-love, as an innocent part of 
our constitution, and selfishness, a vicious disposition, may 
be easily seen. Self-love properly directs our choice of ob- 
jects, where both are equally innocent. Selfishness, is the 
same disposition to promote our own happiness, upon the 



106 OF SELF-LOVE. 

whole, but it disposes us to seek it, in objects over which we 
have no just control ; that is, which are not innocent, and, 
which we could not enjoy, without violating the rights of 
our neighbour. 



CHAPTER VI. 

IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE; NECESSITY 
OF SOME ADDITIONAL MORAL LIGHT. 

It has been already remarked, that a distinction may be 
very clearly observed between right and wrong, and guilt 
and innocence. Right and wrong depend upon the obliga- 
tions under which we are created; and are, in their nature 
immutable. Guilt and innocence have respect to the indi- 
vidual, and are modified moreover, by the amount of his 
knowledge, of his duty; and are not decided solely by the 
fact, that the action was, or was not, performed. 

It is, moreover, to be observed, that the results of these 
two attributes of actions, may be seen to differ. Thus, every 
right action, is followed, in some way, with pleasure or 
benefit to the individual ; and every wrong one, by pain or 
discomfort, irrespective of the guilt or innocence of the 
author of the act. Thus, in the present constitution of 
things, it is evident, that a nation, which had no knowledge 
of the wickedness of murder, revenge, uncleanness, or theft, 
would, if it violated the moral law, in these respects, suffer 
the consequences which are attached to these actions by our 
Creator. And, on the contrary, a nation which practised for- 
giveness, mercy, honesty, and purity, without knowing them 
to be right, would enjoy the benefits which are connected 
with such actions. 

Now, whatever be the object of this constitution, by 
which rewards or punishments are affixed to actions as 



108 IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 

right and wrong, whether it be as a monition, or to inform 
us of the will of God concerning us ; one thing seems evi- 
dent, it is not to punish actions as innocent or guilty, for 
the rewards and punishments, of which we speak, affect 
men simply in consequence of the action, and without any 
regard to the innocence or guilt of the actor. 

Let us now, add another element. Suppose a man to 
know the obligations which bind him to his Creator ; and, 
also, what is his Creator's will respecting a certain action ; 
and that he then deliberately violates this obligation. Now, 
every man feels that this violation of obligation deserves 
punishment; and, also, punishment in proportion to the 
greatness of the obligation violated. Hence, the conse- 
quences of any action, are to be considered in a two fold 
li^ht; first, the consequences depending upon the present 
constitution of things ; and, secondly, those which follow 
the action, as innocent or guilty; that is, as violating, or 
not, our obligations to our Creator. 

These two things are plainly to be considered distinct 
from each other. Of the one, we can form some estimate ; 
of the other, none whatever. Thus, whatever be the design 
of the constitution, by which pain should be consequent 
upon wrong actions, irrespective of guilt ; whether it be, to 
admonish us of dangers, or to intimate to us the will of our 
Creator, we can have some conception how great it would 
probably be. But, if we consider the action as guilty, that 
is, as violating the known will of our Creator, no one can 
conceive how great the punishment of such an act ought to 
be, for no one can conceive how vast is the obligation which 
binds a creature to his God; nor, on the other hand, can 
any one conceive, how vast would be the reward of this 
obligation were perfectly fulfilled. 

As, then, every moral act is attended with pleasure or 
pain, and, as every one also exposes us to the punishments 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 109 

or rewards of guilt or innocence, both of which mani- 
festly transcend our power of conception; and, if such be 
our constitution, that every moment is rendering our moral 
condition better or worse ; specially, if this world be a state 
of probation, tending to a state where change is impossible, 
it is manifestly of the greatest possible importance, that we 
should both know our duty, and be furnished with all 
suitable impulsions to perform it. The constitution under 
which man is formed, in this respect, has been explained at 
the close of the chapter on virtue. And were the intellect 
and conscience of man to be in a perfect state, and were he 
in entire harmony with the universe around him, there can 
be no doubt that his happiness, in the present state, would 
be perfectly secured. 

It would not, however, be certain, that, with intellectual 
and moral powers suited to his station, man would be in no 
need of farther communication from his Maker. Although 
his feeling of obligation, and his desire to discharge it, 
might be perfect, yet he might not be fully aware of the 
manner in which this obligation should be discharged. 
Thus, though our first parents were endowed with a perfect 
moral constitution, yet it was necessary that God should 
make to them a special revelation respecting some portion of 
his will. Such might also be the case, in any other instance, 
of a perfect moral constitution, in a being of limited capacity. 

How much more is additional light necessary, when it is 
remembered, that the moral constitution of man seems evi- 
dently to be imperfect ? This may be observed in several 
respects : 

1. There are many obligations under which man is 
created, both to his fellow-creatures and to God, which his 
unassisted conscience does not discover. Such are the 
obligations to universal forgiveness, to repentence, and 
many others. 

11 



110 IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 

2. When the obligations are acknowledged, man fre- 
quently errs, in respect to the mode in which they are to be 
discharged. Thus, a man may acknowledge his obligations 
to God, but may suppose that God will be pleased with a 
human sacrifice. A man may acknowledge his obligation 
to love his children, but may believe that this obligation 
may be discharged by putting them to death. Now, it is 
manifest, that, in both these cases, a man must suffer all the 
present evils resulting from such a course, just as much as 
though he knowingly violated these obligations. 

3. When men both know the obligations under which 
they are created, and the mode in which they are to be dis- 
charged, they wilfully disobey the monitions of conscience. 
We act according to the impulsions of blind, headlong pas- 
sion, regardless of our own best good, and of the welfare 
of others, in despite of what we know to be the will of our 
Maker. It is the melancholy fact, that men do deliberately 
violate the commands of God, for the sake of the most 
transient and trifling gratification. Hence the confession: 

Video, proboque meliora ; 
Deteriora sequor 

has become a hacknied proverb. 

And hence, it is evident, that, not only are men exposing 
themselves to the pains attendant upon wrong actions during 
the present life ; but they are also exposing themselves to 
the punishments, how great and awful soever those may 
be, which are incurred by violating our obligations to our 
Creator and our Judge. The state of human nature, in 
these respects, I suppose to be vividly set forth by St. Paul, 
in the epistle to the Romans, ch. 7, v. 7 — 25. 

If such be our state, it is manifest, that, under such a 
moral constitution as we have above described, our condi- 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. Ill 

tion must be sufficiently hopeless. Unless something be 
done, it would seem that we must all fail of a large portion 
of the happiness, to which we might otherwise in the present 
life attain, and still more, must be exposed to a condemna- 
tion greater than we are capable of conceiving. 

Under such circumstances, it surely is not improbable, 
that a benevolent Deity should make use of some additional 
means, to inform us of our duty, and thus warn us of the 
evils which we were bringing upon ourselves. Still less is 
it improbable, that a God, delighting in right, should take 
some means to deliver us from the guilty habits which we 
have formed, and restore us to that love and practice of vir- 
tue, which can alone render us pleasing to him. That God 
was under any obligation to do this, is not asserted ; but 
that a being of infinite compassion and benevolence should 
do it, though not under obligation, is surely not improbable. 

Should a revelation be made to remedy the defects of 
man's moral state, we can form some conceptions of what 
might be expected in order to accomplish such a result. 

1. Our defective knowledge of moral obligation might 
be remedied, by a clear view of the attributes of God, and 
of the various relations which we sustain to him. 

2. Our ignorance of the mode in which our obligations 
should be discharged, might be dispelled, either by a more 
expanded view of the consequences of actions, or, by direct 
precept. 

3. In order to overcome our temper of disobedience, I 
know not what means might be employed. A reasonable 
one would seem to be, the manifestation of the character of 
Deity to us, in some new relation, creating some new obliga- 
tions, and thus opening a new source of moral motives 
within the soul of man. 



U2 IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENOE. 

The first and second of these objects are accomplished 
as I suppose, by the discoveries of natural religion, and by 
the promulgation of moral law, under the Old Testament 
dispensation. The third is accomplished, by the revelation 
of the facts of the New Testament, and, specially, by the 
revelation of God, as the author of a new and a remedial 
dispensation. 

Hence, we see that the sources of moral light, irrespective 
of conscience, are, 

1. The precepts of natural religion. 

2. The precepts and motives of the sacred Scriptures. 

From what has been remarked, in the present ohapter, a 
few inferences naturally arise, which I will insert in this 
place. 

It is mentioned above, that the evil consequences of doing 
wrong, are manifestly of two kinds. First, those connected 
with an action as right or wrongs and arising from the 
present constitution of things ; and, secondly, those result- 
ing from the action as innocent or guilty \ that it, as wilfully 
violating, or not, the obligations due to our Maker. 

Now, from this plain distinction, we see, 

1. That no sin can be of trifling consequence. The 
least, as well as the greatest, being a violation of an obliga- 
tion more sacred and awful than we can conceive, must 
expose us to punishment more dreadful than we can compre- 
hend. If it be said, the thing in itself is a trifle, the answer 
is obvious : How wicked must it be, for the sake of a trifle, 
to violate so sacred and solemn an obligation as that which 
binds us to our Creator? 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 113 

2. Hence, we see, how unfounded is the assertion some- 
times made, that God could not justly, for the momentary 
actions of this short life, inflict upon us any severe or long- 
enduring punishment. If an act, whether long or short, be 
a violation of our obligations to God, if ill-desert be, accord- 
ing to the greatness of the obligation, violated; and, if no 
one can pretend to comprehend the vastness of the obliga- 
tions which binds the creature to the Creator, then, no one 
can, a 'priori, pretend to decide what is the punishment 
justly due to every act of wilful wickedness. It is evident, 
that no one can decide this question but He who fully knows 
the relation between the parties; that is, the Creator himself 

3. Since every impure, revengeful, deceitful, or envious 
thought, is a violation of our obligations to our Maker, and, 
much more, the words and actions to which these thoughts 
give rise ; and since, even the imperfect conscience of every 
individual accuses him of countless instances, if not of habits, 
of such violation ; if the preceding observations be just, it is 
manifest, that our present moral condition involves the ele- 
ments of much that is alarming. It surely must be the duty 
of every reasonable man, to inquire, with the deepest solici- 
tude, whether any way of escape from punishment, and of 
moral renovation has been revealed by the Being against 
whom we have sinned ; and, if any such revelation have 
been made, it must be our most solemn duty to conform our 
lives to such principles as shall enable us to avail ourselves 
of its provisions. 

4. The importance of this duty will be still more clearly 
evident, if we consider, that the present is a state of proba- 
tion, in which alone moral change is possible ; and which 
must speedily terminate in a state, by necessity, unchangea- 
ble, for which, also, the present state, therefore, offers us the 
only opportunity of preparation. To neglect either to 
possess ourselves of all the knowledge in our power on this 
subject, or to neglect to obey any reasonable precepts, which 

XI* 



114 IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 

afford the least probability of improving our condition for 
the future, seems a degree of folly for which it is really 
impossible to find an adequate epithet. 

5. Nor does it render this folly the less reprehensible, for 
a man gravely to assert, that we do not know any thing 
about the future world, and, therefore, it is needless to 
inquire respecting it. This is to assert, without inquiry, 
what could only be reasonably asserted after the most full 
and persevering inquiry. No man can reasonably assert 
that we know nothing respecting the other world, until he 
has examined every system of religion within his know- 
ledge, and, by the fair and legitimate use of his understand- 
ing, shown conclusively that none of them throw any light 
upon the subject. By what right, therefore, can a man utter 
such an assertion, who, at the outset, declares that he will 
examine none of them. What should we think of the man 
who declared that he would not study astronomy for that 
no one knew more about the Heavens than he did himself? 
Yet many men neglect to inform themselves on the subject 
of religion for no better reason. It is very remarkable, that 
men do not perceive the absurdity of an assertion respecting 
religion, which they would immediately perceive, if uttered 
respecting any thing else. 



CHAPTER VII. 

OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

In the preceding chapter, I have endeavored to illustrate 
the nature of our moral constitution, and to show that, in 
our present state, conscience, unassisted, manifestly fails to 
produce the results which seem to have been intended ; and 
which are necessary to our attaining the happiness which is 
put within our power ; and to avoiding the misery to which 
we are exposed. That some additional light will be granted 
us, and that some additional moral power will be imparted, 
seems clearly not improbable. This I suppose to have been 
done by the truths of natural and revealed religion. In the 
present chapter, I shall treat of natural religion under the 
following heads. 

1. The manner in which we may learn our duty, by the 
light of nature. 

2. The extent to which our knowledge of duty can be 
carried by this mode of teaching. 

3. The defects of the system of natural religion. 



116 HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 

SECTION I. 

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE MAY LEARN OUR DUTY 
BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 

In treating upon this subject it is taken for granted, 

1. That there is an intelligent and universal First Cause, 
who made us as we are, and made all things around us capa- 
ble of affecting us, both as individuals and as societies, as 
they do. 

2. That He had a design in so making us, and in constitu- 
ting the relations around us as they are constituted, and that 
a part of that design was to intimate to us his will concern- 
ing us. 

3. That we are capable of observing these relations, 
and of knowing how various actions affect us and affect 
others. 

4. And, that we are capable of learning the design with 
which their various relations were constituted ; and, spe- 
cially, that part of the design, which was to intimate to us ' 
the will of our Creator. 

The application of these self-evident principles to the 
subject of duty is easy. We know that we are so made as 
to derive happiness from some courses of conduct, and suf- 
fer unhappiness from others. Now no one can doubt that 
the intention of our Creator in these cases, was, that we 
should pursue the one course, and avoid the other. Or, again, 
we are so made, that we are rendered unhappy, on the 
whole, by pursuing a course of conduct in some particular 
manner, or beyond a certain degree. This is an intimation 
of our Creator, of the manner and of the degree in which 
he designs us to pursue that course of conduct. 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 117 

Again, as has been said before, society is necessary, not 
merely to the happiness, but to the actual existence, of the 
race of man. Hence, it is necessary, in estimating the ten- 
dency of actions upon our own happiness, to extend our 
view beyond the direct effect of an action upon ourselves. 
Thus, if we cannot perceive that any evil would result to 
ourselves from a particular course of action, yet, if it would 
tend to injure society, specially if it would tend to destroy 
society altogether, we may hence arrive at a clear indi- 
cation of the will of our Creator concerning it. As the 
destruction of society would be the destruction of the 
individual, it is as evident that God does not intend us 
, to do what would injure society, as that He does not intend 
us to do what would injure our own bodies, or diminish our 
individual happiness. And, the principle of limitation sug- 
gested above, applies in the same manner here ; that is, if a 
course of conduct, pursued in a certain manner, or to a cer- 
tain extent, is beneficial to society ; and if pursued in another 
manner, or beyond a certain extent, is injurious to it, the in- 
dication is, in this respect, clear, as to the will of our Ma- 
ker respecting us. 

To apply this to particular cases. Suppose a man were in 
doubt, whether or not drunkenness were agreeable to the 
will of his Maker. Let us suppose that drinking produces 
present pleasure, but that it also produces subsequent pain ; 
and that by continuance in the habit, the pleasure becomes 
less,and the pain greater ; and that the pain affects various 
powers of the mind, and different organs of the body. Let a 
man look around him, and survey the crime, the vice, the 
disease and the poverty, which God has set over against the 
momentary gratification of the palate^ and the subsequent ex- 
citement which it produces. Now, whoever will look at 
these results, and will consider that God had a design in 
creating things to affect us as they do, must be as fully con- 
vinced that, by these results, He intended to forbid intempe- 
rance, as though He had said so by a voice from Heaven* 



118 HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 

The same principles may be applied to gluttony, libertinism, 
or any other vice. 

Another example may be taken from the case of revenge. 
Revenge is that disposition which prompts us to inflict pain 
upon another, for the sake of alleviating the painful feeling 
of personal degradation, consequent upon an injury. Now, 
suppose a man, inflamed and excited by this feeling of injury, 
should inflict, upon the other party, pain, until his excited 
feeling was gratified: the injured party would then mani- 
festly become the injurer, and, thus, the original injurer, 
would be, by the same rule, entitled to retaliate. Thus, 
revenge and retaliation would go on increasing until the 
death of one of the parties. The duty of vengeance would 
then devolve upon the surviving friends and relatives of the 
deceased, and the circle would widen until it involved whole 
tribes or nations. Thus, the indulgence of this one evil 
passion, would, in a few generations, render the thronged 
city an unpeopled solitude. Nor is this a mere imaginary 
case. The Indians of North America are known to have 
considered the indulgence of revenge not merely innocent, 
but also glorious, and in some sense obligatory. The result 
was, that, at the time of the discovery of this continent, 
they were universally engaged in wars ; and, according to 
the testimony of their oldest and wisest chiefs, their 
numbers, were rapidly diminishing. And, hence, he who 
observes the effects of revenge upon society, must be 
convinced, that he who formed the constitution under which 
we live, must have intended, by these effects, to have for- 
bidden it, as clearly as though he had made it known by 
language. He has given us an understanding, by the sim- 
plest exercise of which, we arrive at this conclusion. 

It is still further to be observed, that, whenever a course 
of conduct produces individual, it also produces socioal 
misery; and whenever a course of conduct violates the 
social laws of our being, it of necessity produces individual 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 119 

misery. And, hence, we see that both of these indications 
are combined, to teach us the same lesson ; that is, to inti- 
mate to us, what is, and what is not the will of God respect- 
ing our conduct. 

Hen ce, we see that two views may be taken of an action, 
when it is contemplated in the light of nature ; first, as affect- 
ing ourselves; and, secondly, as affecting ourselves and 
society, specially the latter. It is, in this latter view that 
we introduce the doctrine of general consequences. We 
ask, in order to determine our duty, what would be the 
result, if this or that action were universally practised 
among men ? Or, how would it affect the happiness of 
individuals, and the whole? By the answer to these ques- 
tions, we ascertain what is the will of God in respect to that 
action, or that course of conduct. When once the will of 
God is ascertained, conscience, as we have shown, teaches 
us that we are under the highest obligation to obey it. 
Thus, from the consideration of the greatest amount of 
happiness, we arrive at a knowledge of our duty, not directly, 
but indirectly. The feeling of moral obligation, does not 
arise from the simple fact that such a course of conduct 
will, or will not, produce the greatest amount of happiness, 
but, from the fact that this tendency shows us what is the 
will of our Creator; and, we are, by the principles of our 
nature, under the highest possible obligation to obey that 
will. 

It must be evident that a careful observation of the results 
and tendencies of actions, and of different courses of conduct, 
will teach us, in very many respects, the laws of our moral 
nature; that is, what, in these respects, is the will of our 
Creator. Now, these laws thus arrived at, and reduced to 
order and arrangement, form the system of natural religion. 
So far as it goes, every one must confess such a system valu- 
able; and it, moreover, rests upon as sure and certain a 
basis as any system of laws whatever. 



120 HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 

To all this, however, I know but of one objection that 
can be urged. It is, that pain is not, of necessity, punitive, 
or prohibitory ; and that it may be merely monitory or ad- 
visory. Thus, if I put my hand incautiously too near the 
fire, I am admonished by the pain to withdraw it. Now, 
this pain is, manifestly, only monitory, and intended merely 
to warn me of danger. It is not, of necessity, prohibitory ; 
for, I may hold my hand so near to the fire as to produce 
great pain, for some necessary purpose ; as, for instance, for 
the sake of curing disease, and not violate nry obligations to 
my Creator, nor in any measure incur his displeasure. 

Now, the fact thus stated may be fully admitted, without 
in the least affecting the argument. It is evident, that many 
of the pains to which we are at present exposed, are, in 
theii nature, intended to warn us of approaching harm, as 
in the instance just mentioned ; or, they may be intimations 
of mischief actually commenced, of which we could not 'be 
otherwise aware ; as in the cases of internal diseases. And, 
it is manifest, that, such being their nature and design, they 
must be intimately connected with, and either accompany or 
precede, that injury of which they are intended to forewarn 
or to inform us ; and it is natural to expect that they would 
cease, or tend to cessation, as soon as they have accom- 
plished the object for which they were intended. And such, 
I think, will, in general, be found to be the fact, with respect 
to those pains which are in their nature monitory. 

But I think it will be evident, to every one who will ob- 
serve, that many of the pains endured under the present con- 
stitution, are not of this kind. 

Thus for example. 

1. There are many pains, which are inflicted in conse- 
quence of actions, of which we were forewarned before by 
conscience. It would seem that the design of these pains 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 121 

could not be monitory, inasmuch as monition is performed 
by another faculty. 

2. There are many pains, which, from the nature of our 
constitution, are not inrllicted until after the act has been per- 
formed, and the evil accomplished. This is the case with 
drunkenness, and many other vices. Here, the pain cannot 
be intended as a premonition for it is not inflicted in its se- 
verity, until after the injury, has actually been done. 

3. Not only does the pain, in many cases occur afterwards, 
it frequently does not occur until a long time after the offence. 
Months, and even years, may elapse, before the punishment 
overtakes the criminal. This is very frequently the case 
with youthful crimes, which, ordinarily, exhibit their result 
not until manhood, or even old age. Now, pain must here 
be intended to signify something else besides warning. 

4. We find that the punishment, in many cases, bears no 
sort of proportion either to the benefit obtained by the indi- 
vidual or even to the injury, in the particular instance, inflic- 
ted upon society. This is manifest in very many instances 
of lying, forgery, small theft, or other cases, in which, by a 
single act of wrong a person ruins a reputation which it had 
taken a whole life to establish. Now, in such a case as this, 
it is evident that the purpose of warning could not be in- 
tended, for this end could be accomplished, at vastly less ex- 
pense of happiness, in some other way. 

5. We find that the tendency of many instances of punish- 
ment, is not to leave the offender in the same state as before, 
but rather in a worse state. His propensities to do wrong are 
rendered stronger, and his inducement to do well weaker, 
and thus he is exposing himself to greater and greater pun- 
ishments. The tendency therefore is not to recovery, but to 
more fatal moral disease. 



12 



122 HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 

6. Although a man by reformation may frequently regain 
the standing which he has lost, yet there are manifest indi- 
cations, in the present constitution, that, after a given amount 
of trial has been granted, a decisive punishment is inflicted 
which extinguishes forever all hope, if not all possibility of 
recovery. A man may waste part of his youth, and may, 
by diligence regain the time which he had lost. But he 
soon arrives at a point, beyond which, such opportunity is 
impossible. Thus also in morals, a man may sometimes do 
wrong, and return to virtue and escape present punishment, 
but every instance of crime renders the probability of escape 
less, and he at last arrives at a point, beyond which nothing 
can avert the infliction of the merited and decisive calamity. 

7. We find that some actions produce misery which ex- 
tends to other beings besides those who are actually con- 
cerned in committing them. 

This takes place sometimes by example, and at other 
times, the pain is inflicted upon those, who could not be in- 
fected by the example. Illustrations of this are seen in 
cases of disease propogated by hereditary descent, in misery 
arising from the misconduct of rulers, in the suffering of 
men from flagitious crimes of relatives and acquaintances. 
And in consequence of the constitution under which we 
exist, these miseries are frequently transmitted down beyond 
any assignable limit. Thus the condition of the Jews, is 
by themselves and others believed to be the result of some 
crime committed by their forefathers either at, or before, the 
time of Christ. The effects of the persecution of protestant- 
ism in Spain and Portugal, at the time of the reformation, 
can be clearly traced in all the subsequent history of these 
countries. 

Now all these considerations seem clearly to indicate, that 
there are pains inflicted upon man for other purposes except 
warning; and that they are of the nature of punish- 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 123 

merit ; that is of pain inflicted after crime has beeen volun- 
tarily committed, in spite of sufficient warning; and in- 
flicted by way of desert, as, what the offence really merits, 
and, what it behoves a righteous governor to award to trans- 
gression. 

Nor will it avail to object that these inflictions are intended 
to be warnings to others. This is granted, but this by no 
means prevents their being also punishments in the sense in 
which we have considered them. Such is the case in all 
punishments inflicted by society. They are intended to be 
a warning to others, but this hinders not their being also in 
the strictest sense punishments ; that is, inflictions of pain as 
the just desert of crime ; and as clear indications of the will 
of society respecting the action of which they are the result. 

From what has been said I think we may safely conclude. 

1. That God has given man a moral and an intellectual 
constitution by which he may be admonished of his duty. 

2. That He allows man to act freely, and either to do 
right or wrong as he chooses. 

3. That He in the present life has connected rewards with 
the doing of right and punishments with the doing of 
wrong, and that these rewards and punishments affect both 
the individual and society. 

4. And hence, from an attentive observation of the results 
of actions upon individuals, and upon society, we may as- 
certain what is the will of God concerning us. 

5. And for all the opportunities of thus ascertaining his 
will by his dealings with men, that is by the light of nature, 
God holds all his creatures responsible. 



121 HOW FAR WE MAY LEARN OUR 

SECTION II. 

HOW FAR WE MAY DISCOVER OUR DUTY BY THE LIGHT 
OF NATURE. 

It has been shown that we may, by observing the results 
of our actions upon indivividuals and upon society, ascer- 
tain what is the will of our Creator concerning us. In this 
manner we may discover much moral truth which would be 
unknown were we left to the guidance of conscience unas- 
sisted, and we may derive many motives to virtue which 
would otherwise be inoperative. 

I. By the light of nature we discover much moral truth 
which could neve r be discovered by conscience unassisted. 

1 Conscience indicates to us our obligations to others when 
our relations to them are discovered ; and impels us toward 
that course of conduct which the understanding points out 
as corresponding with these obligations. But there are 
many obligations which conscience seems not to point out to 
men, and many ways of fulfilling these obligations which 
the understanding does not clearly indicate. In these re- 
spects we may be greatly assisted by natural religion. 

Thus, I doubt whether the unassisted conscience would 
teach the wrong of polygamy or of divorce. The Jews, even 
at the time of our Saviour, had no conception that a mar- 
riage contract was between individuals for life. But any 
one who will observe the effects of polygamy upon families 
and societies can have no doubt that the precept of the 
Gospel on this subject is the moral law of the system under 
under which we are. So, I do not know that unassisted 
conscience would remonstrate against what might be called 
reasonable revenge, or the operation of the Lex Talionis. 
But he who will observe the consequences of revenge, and 
those of forgiveness of injuries, will have no difficulty in 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 125 

deciding which course of conduct has been indicated as his 
duty by his Maker. 

2. The extent of obligations, previously known to exist, 
is made known more clearly by the light of nature. Con- 
science might teach us the obligation to love our friends, or 
our countrymen, but it might not go farther. The results 
of different courses of conduct would clearly show that our 
Creator intended us to love all men, of every nation, and 
even our enemies. 

3. It is by observing the results of our actions that we 
learn the limitations which our Creator has affixed to our de- 
sires, as we have shown in the chapter on happiness. The 
simple fact that gratification of our desires beyond a certain 
limit, will produce more misery than happiness addresses it- 
self to our self-love, and forms a reason why that limit should 
not be transgressed. The fact that this limit was fixed by 
our Creator, and that he has thus intimated to us his will ad- 
dresses itself to our conscience, and places us under obliga- 
gation to act as he has commanded on pain of his displeasure. 

4. In many cases where the obligation is acknowledged 
we might not be able without the light of natural religion to 
decide^ in what manner it could best be discharged. Thus a 
man who felt conscious of his obligations as a parent, and 
wished to discharge them, would derive much valuable in- 
formation by observing what mode of exhibiting paternal 
love had produced the happiest results. He would hence be 
able the better to decide what was required of him. 

In this manner, it cannot be doubted, that much valuable 
knowledge of moral truth might be acquired, beyond what 
is attainable by unassisted conscience. But this is not all. 

II. Natural religion presents additional motives to the 
practice of virtue. 

12* 



126 HOW FAR WE MAY LEARN OUR, &c. 

1. It does this, in the first place, by more clearly setting 
before us the rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice. 
Conscience forewarns us against crime, and inflicts its own 
peculiar punishment upon guilt; but, natural religion in- 
forms us of the additional consequences, independent of our- 
selves, which attach to moral action, according to the consti- 
tution under which we are created. Thus, conscience might 
forewarn a man against dishonesty, and, might inflict upon 
him the pains of remorse, if he had stolen ; but, her moni- 
tion would surely derive additional power, from an observa- 
tion of the effect which must be produced upon individuals 
and societies, by the practice of this immorality ; and, also, 
by the contrary effects which must arise from the opposite 
virtue. 

2. Still further. Natural religion presents us with more 
distinct and affecting views of the character of God, than 
could be obtained without it. One of the first aspirations of 
a human soul, is after an Intelligent First Cause ; and, the 
most universal dictate of conscience is, that this First Cause 
ought to be obeyed. Hence, every nation, how rude soever 
it be, has its Gods, and its religious services. But, such a 
notion of Deity is cold and inoperative, when compared 
with that which may be derived from an intelligent observa- 
tion of the laws of nature, physical and moral, which we 
see pervading the universe around us. In every moral law 
which has been written on the page of this world's history, 
we discover a new lineament of the character of Deity. 
Every moral attribute of God, which w e discover, imposes 
upon us a new obligation, and presents an additional motive 
why we should love and serve Him. Hence, we see, thai 
the knowledge of God, derived from the study of nature, 
is adapted to add greatly to the impulsive power of con- 
science. 

We see, then, how large a field of moral knowledge is 
spread open before us, if we only, in a suitable manner, 



DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM, &c. 127 

apply our understandings to the works of God around us. 
He has arranged all things, for the purpose of teaching us 
these lessons, and He has created our intellectual and moral 
nature expressly for the purpose of learning them. If, then, 
we do not use the powers which He has given us, for the 
purpose for which He has given them, He holds us respon- 
sible for the result. Thus said the prophet: "Because 
they regard not the works of the Lord, neither consider 
the operation of His hands, therefore. He shall destroy 
them, and not build them up." Thus, the Scriptures, else- 
where, declare all men to be responsible for the correct use 
of all the knowledge of duty which God had set before 
them. St. Paul, Rom. 1 : 19, 21, asserts : " That which 
may be known of God, is manifest in, (or to,) them, for God 
hath showed it to them ; so that, or therefore, they are with- 
out excuse." Thus, he also declares : " They that sin 
without law, (that is, without a written revelation,) shall 
perish without law." And, thus, we come to the general 
conclusion, that natural religion presents to all men a dis- 
tinct and important means of knowing the character and 
will of God, and the obligations and duties of man; and 
that, for this knowledge, all men are justly held responsible. 



SECTION III. 

DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

Without any argument on the subject, the insufficiency 
of natural religion, as a means of human reformation, 
might be readily made manifest by facts. 

1. The facts on which natural religion rests, and the 
intellectual power to derive the moral laws from the facts, 
have been in the possession of man from the beginning. 
Yet, the whole history of man has exhibited a constant ten- 
dency to moral deterioration. This is acknowledged, in the 



128 DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM 

fact, that every people, not enlightened by revelation, consi- 
der their period of greatest moral purity, as the earliest 
period of their history. Then, the Gods and men held 
frequent intercourse; this intercourse, in consequence of 
the sins of men, has since been discontinued. That 
was the golden age ; the subsequent ages have been of 
brass, or of iron. The political history of men seems to teach 
the same lesson. In the early ages of national existence, 
sparseness of population, mutual fear, and universal poverty, 
have obliged men to lay the foundations of society, in prin- 
ciples of justice, in order to secure national existence. But, 
as soon as, under such a constitution, wealth has increased, 
population become dense, and progress in arts and arms, 
have rendered a nation fearless, the anti-social tendencies of 
vice have shown themselves too powerful for the moral 
forces by which they have been opposed. The bonds of 
society have been gradually dissolved, and a nation, rich in 
the spoils of an hundred triumphs, becomes the prey of some 
warlike, and more virtuous horde, which takes possession of 
the spoil, merely to pursue the same career to a more speedy 
termination. 

2. The systems of religion of the heathen, may be fairly 
considered as the legitimate result of all the moral forces 
which are in operation upon man, irrespective of revelation. 
They show us, not what man might have learned by the 
proper use of his faculties in the study of duty, but what 
he has always actually learned. Now, these systems, so far 
from having any tendency to make men better, have a 
manifest tendency to make him worse. Their Gods were 
of the most profligate and demoralizing character. Had 
natural religion succeeded in instilling into the minds of 
men true ideas of virtue and duty, their imaginations in 
forming conceptions of Deities, would have invested them 
with far different attributes. 

3. The ethical systems of philosophers, it is true, not 
unfrequently presented sublime and pure conceptions of 



OF NATURAL RELIGION. 129 

Deity. But, as instruments of moral reformation, they were 
clearly inoperative. They were extremely imperfect in 
every thing which relates to our duties to man, and, spe- 
cially, in every thing which relates to our duty to God ; 
they offered no sufficient motives to obedience ; they were 
established on subtle reasonings, which could not be com- 
prehended by the common people; and they imposed no 
obligation upon their disciples to disseminate them among 
others. Hence, they were never extensively known, beyond 
the small circle of meditative students ; and, by these, they 
were considered rather as matters of doubtful speculation, 
than of practical benefit ; designed rather to the cultivation 
of intellectual acuteness, than the reformation of moral con- 
duct. I think that any one must be struck with the fact, 
on reading the ethical disquisitions of the ancients, that 
honest, and simple, and ardent love of truth, seems to have 
furnished no motive whatever to their investigations; and 
that its place was supplied by mere curiosity, or love of the 
new, the refined, or even the paradoxical. 

And, hence, as might be expected, these ethical systems 
made no converts from vice to virtue. From the era of 
which of the systems of ancient ethics, can any reformation 
be dated? Where are their effects recorded in the moral his- 
tory of man? Facts have abundantly proved them to be 
utterly destitute of any power over the conscience, or of any 
practical influence over the conduct. 

4. Nor can this failure be attributed to any want of intel- 
lectual cultivation. During a large portion of the period of 
which we have spoken, the human mind had, in many 
respects, attained to as high a state of perfection as it has 
attained at any subsequent age. Eloquence, poetry, rhetoric, 
nay, some of the severer sciences, were studied with a suc- 
cess which has never since been surpassed. This is uni- 
versally confessed. Yet what progress did the classic ages 
make in morals? And hence, we think, it must be admit- 



130 DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM 

ted, that the human mind, even under the most favourable 
circumstances, has never, when unassisted by revelation, 
deduced from the course of things around us, any such 
principles of duty, or motives to the performance of it, as 
were sufficient to produce any decided effect upon the moral 
character of man. 

And hence, were we unable to assign the cause of this 
failure, yet the fact of the failure alone, is sufficient to prove 
the necessity of some other means for arriving at a know- 
ledge of duty, than is afforded by the light of nature. 

II. But, secondly, the causes of this insufficiency, maybe, 
in many respects, pointed out. Among them, are, obviously, 
the following: 

1. The mode of teaching natural religion, is by experience. 
We can form no opinion respecting the results of two oppo- 
site courses of action, until they be both before us. Hence, 
we cannot certainly know what the law is, except by break- 
ing it. Hence, the habit of violation, must, in some sense, 
be formed, before we know what the law is which we vio- 
late. Consequently, from the nature of the case, natural 
religion must always be much behind the age, and must 
always utter its precepts to men, who are, in some manner, 
fixed in the habit of violating them. 

2. There are many moral laws, in which the connection 
between the transgression and the punishment cannot be 
shown, except in the more advanced periods of society. 
Such is the fact, in respect to those laws which can only be 
ascertained by extended and minute observation; and, of 
course, a state of society, in which knowledge is widely dis- 
seminated, and the experience of a large surface, and for a 
long period, may be necessary to establish the fact of the 
connection between this particular violation, and this parti- 
cular result. In the mean time, mankind will be suffering 



OF NATURAL RELIGION. 131 

all the consequences of vice; and the courses of conduct, 
which are the causes, of misery, will be interweaving them- 
selves with the whole customs, and habits, and interests, of 
every class of society. Thus, it too often happens, that the 
knowledge is with great difficulty acquired; and, when 
acquired, unfortunately comes too late to effect a remedy. 

3. A still more radical deficiency, however, in natural re- 
ligion is, that it is, from its nature incapable of teaching facts. 
It can only teach laws and tendencies. From observing 
what has been done, and hoiv it has been done, it can infer 
that if the same thin^ were done a^ain, it would be done in 
the same manner, and would be attended in all places, and 
at all times, if under the same conditions, with the same re- 
sults. But, as to a fact, that is, whether an action were ac- 
tually performed at some other place or time, or whether it ever 
would be, natural religion can give us no information. Thus, 
we know by experience, that if a man fall from a precipice, 
he will be destroyed ; but whether a man ever did so fall, 
much less, whether A or B did fall from it, we can never 
be informed by general principles. Thus, from the fact that 
we see guilt punished in this world, we infer, from natural 
religion, that it will always be punished in this world ; we 
infer, though not so certainly, that it will also be punished 
in another world, if there be another world ; but of the fact 
whether there be another world, natural religion can give 
us no certain information ; much less, can it give us any in- 
formation, respecting the question whether God has actually 
done any thing to remedy the evils of sin, and vary those 
sequencees which experience shows us to be inevitable. 

4. Hence natural religion must derive all its certain mo- 
tives from the present world. Those from the other world 
are, so far as it is concerned, in their nature contingent and 
uncertain. And hence, it loses all that power over man, 
which would be derived from the certain knowledge of our 



132 DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM, &c 

existence, after death, of the nature of that existence, and of 
what God has done for our restoration to virtue and happi- 
ness. All these being facts, can never be known, except by 
language, that is, by revelation. They must always remain 
in utter incertitude, so long as we are left to the teaching of 
natural religion. 

We see, then, that natural religion is obliged to meet the 
impulsions from this world, solely by impulsions from this 
world. Nay more, she is obliged to resist the power of the 
present, of passion, strengthened and confirmed by habit, by 
considerations drawn from the distant, the future, and what 
may seem to be the uncertain. Hence, its success must be 
at best but dubious, even when its power is exerted upon 
those least exposed to the allurements of vice. Who does 
not see that it is utterly vain, to hope for success from such 
a source, in our attempts to reform men in general. Every 
one, who is at all acquainted with the history of man, must 
be convinced, that nothing less powerful than the whole 
amount of motive derived from the knowledge of an end- 
less existence, has ever been found a sufficient antagonist 
force, to the downward and headlong tendencies of appetite 
and passion. 

And hence, from the fact of the recorded failure of na- 
tural religion, as a means of reformation ; and from the de- 
fects inherent in its very nature, as a means of moral im- 
provement, there seems clearly to exist a great need of some 
additional moral force, to correct the moral evils of our na- 
ture. It is surely not improbable that some additional means 
of instruction and improvement, may have been granted to 
our race by a merciful Creator. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL AND 
REVEALED RELIGION. 

If what we have said, be true, the defects of natural re- 
ligion would lead us to expect, that some other means of 
moral instruction would be afforded us. And, indeed, this is 
the conclusion to which some of the wisest of the heathen 
philosophers arrived, from a consideration of that utter igno- 
rance of futurity, to which they were of necessity led, by 
the most attentive study of natural religion. They felt con- 
vinced, that the Deity would not have constructed a system 
of moral teaching, which led to impervious darkness, unless 
He intended, out of that very darkness, at some period or 
other, to manifest light. , 

But still more, I think that an attentive observation of 
what natural religion teaches, and of its necessary and in- 
herent defects, would afford us some grounds of expectation, 
respecting the nature of that revelation which should be 
made. If we can discover the moral necessities of our race, 
and can also discover in what respects, and for what reason, 
the means thus far employed have failed to relieve them, we 
may with certainty predict some of the characteristics, which 
must mark any system, which should be devised to accom- 
plish a decided remedy. 

For example. 

1. It is granted that natural religion does teach us some 
unquestionable truths. Now, no truth can be inconsistent 

13 



134 RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL 

with itself. And hence it might be expected, that whenever 
natural and the revealed religion treated upon the same sub- 
jects, they would teach in perfect harmony. The second 
instructor may teach more than the first ; but so far as they 
give instruction on the same subjects, if both teach the truth, 
they must both teach the same lesson. 

2. It is natural to expect that a revelation would give us 
much information upon the subject of duty, which could not 
be learned by the light of nature. Thus, it might be ex- 
pected to make known more clearly to us than we could 
otherwise learn, the obligations by which we are bound to 
our fellow men, and to God ; and also the manner in which 
those obligations are to be discharged. 

3. That it would present us with motives to virtue, in ad- 
dition to those made known by the light of nature. We 
have seen that the motives of natural religion are derived 
from this world, and are in their nature insufficient. We 
should expect that those in a revelation would be drawn 
from some other source. And still more, as natural religion 
may be considered to have exhausted the motives of this 
world, it is surely not unreasonable to expect, that a revela- 
tion, leaving this world, would draw its motives principally, 
if not entirely, from another ; if it revealed to us the fact, 
that another world existed. 

4. We should not expect that Deity would employ a 
second and additional means, to accomplish what could be 
done by any modification of the means first employed. 
Hence, if a revelation were made to men, we might reasona- 
bly expect, that it would make known to us such truths as 
could not, in the nature of the case, be communicated by 
natural religion. 

These are, I think, just anticipations. At any rate, I think 
it must be admitted, that if a system of religion, purporting 



AND REVEALED RELIGION. 135 

to be a revelation from Heaven, met all these expectations, 
its relations to natural religion not only would present no ar- 
gument against its truth, but would create a strong a 'priori 
presumption in its favor. 

Now, these expectations are all fully realized, in the sys- 
tem of religion contained in the Scriptures of the Old and 
New Testaments. 

1. The truths of revealed religion harmonize perfectly 
with those of natural religion. The difference between them 
consists in this ; that the one teaches plainly, what the other 
teaches by inference ; the one takes up the lesson where the 
other leaves it, and adds to it other and vitally important pre- 
cepts. Nay, so perfect is the harmony between them, that it 
may safely be asserted, that not a single precept exists of na- 
tural religion, which is not, also, found in the Bible ; and 
still more, the Bible is every day directing us to new lessons, 
taught us by nature, which, but for its information, would 
never have been discovered. So complete is this coinci- 
dence, as to afford irrefragable proof, that the Bible contains 
the moral laws of the universe ; and hence, that the Author 
of the universe, that is, of natural religion, is also the Au- 
thor of the Scriptures. 

2. The Holy Scriptures, as has just been intimated, give 
us much information on questions of duty, which could not 
be obtained by the light of nature. Under this remark, may 
be classed the Scriptural precepts respecting the domestic re- 
lations; respecting our duties to enemies; and to men in 
general ; and especially respecting our obligations to God 
and the manner in which He may most acceptably be wor- 
shipped. 

3. The Scriptures present motives to the practice of vir- 
tue, additional, generically different from those of natural 
religion, and of infinitely greater power. 



136 [RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL 

1. The motives to virtue, from consequences in this 
world, are strengthened, by a clearer developement of the 
indissoluble connexion between moral cause and effect, than 
is made known by natural religion. 

2. In addition to these motives, we are assured of our 
existence I after death ; and eternal happiness* and eternal 
misery are set forth as the desert of virtue and vice. 

3. The Scriptures reveal to us the Deity as assuming 
new relations to us, and devising a most merciful way for 
our redemption ; by virtue of this new relation, establishing 
a new ground of moral obligation between the race of man 
and Himself, and, thus, adding a power to the impulsion of 
conscience of which natural religion must, in the nature of 
the case, be destitute. 

4. It is manifest, that much of the above knowledge, 
which the Scriptures reveal, is of the nature of fact ; and, 
therefore, could not be communicated to us by experience, 
or, in the way of general laws, but must be made known 
by language ; that is, by revelation. 

Thus, the existence of a state of being after death, the 
doctrine of the resurrection, of an unversal and impartial 
judgment, of an endless state of rewards and punishments, 
of a remedial dispensation by which the connexion between 
guilt and punishment may be conditionally severed ; the 
doctrine of the atonement, and the way in which a man 
may avail himself of the benefits of this remedial dispensa- 
tion ; all these, are manifestly of great practical importance 
in a scheme of moral reformation, and yet, all of them being 
of the nature of facts, they could be made known to man 
in no other way than by language. 

Now, as these seem clearly to be just anticipations respect- 
ing any system which should be designed to supply the evi- 



AND REVEALED RELIGION. 137 

dent defects of natural religion, and, as all these anticipa- 
tions are realized in the system of religion, contained in the 
Scriptures, each one of these anticipations, thus realized, 
furnishes a distinct a priori presumption, in favor of the 
truth of revealed religion. We do not pretend that any, or 
that all of these considerations prove the Scriptures to be a re- 
velation from God. This proof is derived from other sources. 
What we would say, is this : that, from what we know of 
God's moral government, by the light of nature, it is mani- 
festly probable that he would give us some additional instruc- 
tion, and that that instruction would be. in various impor- 
tant respects, analagous to that contained in the Holy Scrip- 
tures. And, we hence conclude, that, although it were 
granted, which, however, need not be granted, that, were 
there no antecedent facts in the case, it might seem unlikely, 
that God would condescend to make a special revelation of 
his will to men ; yet, when the antecedent facts are pro- 
perly considered, this presumption, if it ever could be main- 
tained, is now precisely reversed, and, that there now exists 
a fair presuntption that such a revelation would actually 
be made. And, hence, we conclude, that a revelation of the 
will of God, by language, is not, as many persons suppose, 
an event so unlikely, that no evidence can be conceived suf- 
ficiently strong to render it credible ; but, that it is, on the 
contrary, an event, from all that we know of God already, 
essentially probable ; and, that it is, to say the least of it, as 
fairly within the limits of evidence as any other event, and, 
when proved, on the ordinary principles of evidence, is as 
much entitled to belief as any other event. And, hence, we 
conceive that, when men demand, in support of the truth of 
revealed religion, evidence unlike to that which is demanded 
in support of any other event ; that is, evidence of which 
they themselves cannot define the nature, they demand what 
is manifestly unreasonable, and proceed upon a presumption 
wholly at variance with all the known facts in the case. 

13* 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. 

This would be the place in which to present the proof of 
the authenticity of the Holy Scriptures, as a revelation from 
God. This, however, is only a particular exemplification 
Of the general laws of evidence, and belongs to the course 
of instruction in intellectual philosophy. It must, therefore, 
be here omitted. We shall, in the remainder of these re- 
marks, take it for granted, that the Scriptures of the Old 
and New Testament contain a revelation from God to man, 
and that these books contain all that God has been pleased 
to reveal unto us by language j and, therefore, all which is re- 
corded in language that is ultimate in morals, and that is, by 
its own authority, binding upon the conscience. Taking 
this for granted, we shall in the present chapter consider, 
1st. What the Scriptures contain ; and 2d, how we may as- 
certain our duty from the Scriptures. 

SECTION I. 

A VIEW OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. 

The Holy Scriptures are contained in two separate vol- 
umes, entitled the Old and the New Testaments. These 
volumes have each a distinct object, and yet, their objects 
are in perfect harmony ; and together, they contain, all that 
could be desired, in a revelation to the human race. 

The design of the Old Testament mainly, is, to reveal a 
system of simple law ; to exhibit the results of such a sys- 



140 A VIEW OF THE 

tern, upon the human race and to direct the minds of men to 
the remedial dispensation which was to follow. In accom- 
plishing this design it contains several distinct parts. 

1. An account of the creation of the world, of the crea- 
tion and fall of man ; and a brief history of the race of man 
until the deluge. The cause of this deluge is stated to be, 
the universal and intense wickedness of man. 

2. The account of the separation of a particular family, 
the germ of a nation, designed to be the depositaries of the 
revealed will of God ; and the history of this nation, from 
the call of Abraham, until the return from the captivity in 

Babylon, a period of about fifteen hundred years. 

3. The system of laws which God gave to this nation. 
These laws may be comprehended under three classes. 

1. Moral laws ; or, those which arise from the immutable 
relations existing between God and man. 

2. Civil laws, or those enacted for the government of 
civil society, adapted specially to the Jewish Theocracy ; or 
that form of government, in which, God was specially re- 
cognized as King. 

3. Ceremonial laws. These were of two kinds. First 
Those which were intended to keep this nation separate from 
other nations, and second, those intended to prefigure events, 
which were to occur under the second or new dispensation. 

4. Various events in their history, discourses of prophets 
and inspired teachers, prayers, odes of pious men ; all tend- 
ing to illustrate what are the effects of a system of moral 
law upon human nature, is, even when placed under the 
most favorable circumstances. 



HOLY SCRIPTURES. 141 

The result of all this series of moral means seems to be 
this, God, in various modes, suited to their condition, made 
known his will to the whole human race. They all, with 
the exception of a single family, became so corrupt that he 
destroyed them by a general deluge. He, then, selected a 
single family, and gave them his written law, and by pecu- 
liar enactments, secluded them from all other nations, that 
the experiment might be tried under the most favorable cir- 
cumstances. At the same time, the effects of natural reli- 
gion, were tested among the heathen nations that surrounded 
them. The result was, a clear demonstration, that, under 
the conditions of being in which man was created, any re- 
formation was hopeless, and, that, unless some other condi- 
tion was revealed, the race would perish by its own vicious 
and anti-social tendencies, and enter the other world to reap 
the reward of its guilt forever. 

The design of the New Testament is, to reveal to the 
race of man the new conditions of being, under which he 
is placed, by virtue of a remedial dispensation. 

In pursuance of this design the New Testament contains. 

1. A narrative of the life and death, resurrection and as- 
cension, the acts, and conversasions of Jesus of Nazareth ; a 
Being in whom the divine and human natures were mys- 
teriously united ; who appeared on earth, to teach us what- 
ever was necessary to be known of our relations to God, and 
by his obedience to the law, and voluntary sufferings and 
death, to remove the obstacles which under the former dis- 
pensation existed, to our pardon in consequence of the holi- 
ness of God. 

2. A brief narrative of the facts, relating to the progress 
of the Christian religion, for several years, after the ascension 
of Jesus of Nazareth. 



142 HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 

3. The instructions, which his immediate followers or 
Apostles, by divine inspiration, gave to the men of their own 
time, and which were rendered necessary in consequence 
of their ignorance of the principles of religion, or the weak- 
ness of their virtue, and the imperfection of their faith. 

The whole of this volume taken together, teaches us the 
precepts, the sanctions and the rewards of the law of God 
with as great distinctness as we could desire, and also, 
a way of salvation, on different grounds from that re- 
vealed both by natural religion, and by the Old Testament ; 
a way depending for merits upon the doings and sufferings 
of another, but yet available to us, on no other conditions, 
than those of supreme, strenuous and universal moral effort 
after perfect purity of thought, and word, and action. 

This being a remedial dispensation, is, in its nature, fixed. 
We have no reason to expect any other; nay, the idea of 
another, would be at variance with the belief of the truth of 
this. And hence, the Scriptures of the Old and New Tes- 
taments, contain all that God has revealed to us by lan- 
guage respecting his will. What is contained here alone, is 
binding upon the conscience. Or, in the words of Chilling- 
worth, " The Bible, the Bible, the religion op Pro- 
testants." 



SECTION II. 

IN WHAT MANNER ARE WE TO ASCERTAIN OUR DUTY 
FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES? 

Taking it for granted that the Bible contains a revelation 
of the will of God, such as is stated in the preceding section, 
it will still be of importance for us to decide, how we may 
ascertain, from the study of it, what God really requires of 
us. Much of it is mere history, containing an unvarnished 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 143 

narration of the actions of good and of bad men. Much of it 
has reference to a less enlightened age, and to a particular 
people, set apart from other people, for a special and pecu- 
liar purpose. Much of it consists of exhortations and re- 
proofs, addressed to this people, in reference to the laws then 
existing, but which have been since abrogated. Now, 
amidst this variety of instructions, given to men at different 
times, and of different nations, it is desirable, that the prin- 
ciples be settled, by which we may decide what portion of 
this mass of instruction is binding upon the conscience, at 
the present moment. My object, in the present section, is, 
to ascertain, as far as possible, the principles by which we 
are to be guided in such a decision. 

When a revelation is made to us by language, it is taken 
for granted, that whatever is our duty, will be signified to 
us by command ; and hence, what is not commanded, is not 
to be considered by us as obligatory. Did we not establish 
this limitation, every thing recorded, as all the actions both 
of good and ol bad men, might be regarded as authority ; and 
thus, a revelation, given for the purpose of teaching us our 
duty, might be used as an instrument to confound all dis- 
tinction between right and wrong. 

The ground of moral obligation, as derived from a revela- 
tion, must, therefore, be a command of God. 

Now, a command, seems to involve three ideas. 

1. That an act be designated. This may be, by the 
designation of the act itself, as, for instance, giving bread to 
the hungry, or else by the designation of a temper of mind, 
as that of universal love, under which, the above act, and 
various other acts, are clearly comprehended. 

2. That it be somehow signified to be the will of God, 
that this act be performed. Without this intimation, every 



141 HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 

act that is described, or even held up for our reprobation, 
might be quoted as obligatory. 

3. That it be signified, that we are included within the 
number, to whom the command is addressed. Otherwise, 
all the commandments, to the patriarchs, and prophets, 
whether ceremonial, symbolical, or individual, would be 
binding upon every one who might read them. And hence, 
in general, whosoever urges upon us any duty, as the com- 
mand of God, revealed in the Bible, must show, that God 
has, somewhere, commanded that action to be done ; and 
that he has commanded us to do it. 

This principle will exclude — 

1. Every thing which is merely history. Much of i( the 
Bible contains mere narrative of facts. For the truth of 
this narrative, the veracity of Deity is pledged. We may 
derive, from the account of God's dealings, lessons of in- 
struction to guide us in particular cases ; and, from the evil 
conduct of men, matter of warning. But the mere fact, 
that any thing has been done, and recorded in the Scrip- 
ture, by no means places us under obligation to do it. 

2. It excludes from being obligatory upon all, what has 
been commanded, but which can be shown to have been in- 
tended only, for individuals, or nations and not for the whole 
human race. Thus many commands are recorded in the 
Scriptures, as having been given to individuals. Such was 
the command to Abraham, to offer up his son ; of Moses, 
to stand before Pharaoh ; of Samuel, to anoint Saul and 
David; and a thousand others. Here, evidently, the Divine 
direction was exclusively intended for the individual to 
whom it was given. No one can pretend that he is com- 
manded to offer up his son, because Abraham was so com- 
manded. 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 145 

2. Thus also, many of the commands of God in the Old 
Testament were addressed to nations. Such were the direc- 
tions to the Israelites to take possession of Canaan ; to make 
war upon the surrounding nations ; to keep the ceremonial 
law ; and so of various other instances. Now of such precepts, 
it is to be observed, 1st. They are to be obeyed, only at the 
time, and in the manner, in which they were commanded. 
Thus, the Jews, at present would have no right, in virtue of 
the original command, to expel the Mahometans from Pales- 
tine ; though, the command to Joshua was a sufficient war- 
rant for expelling the Canaanites, at the time in which it was 
given. 2. They are of force only to those to whom they were 
given. Thus, supposing the ceremonial law was not abolished, 
as it was given specially to Jews, and to no one else, it would 
bind no one but Jews now. Supposing it to be abolished, it 
of course now binds no one. For if, when in force, it was 
obligatory on no one but the Jews ; and was nothing to any 
one else, when it is abolished, as to them, it is nothing to 
any one. Such is the teaching of Paul on this subject. 
3. It would exclude what ever was done by inspired men, 
if it was done without the addition of being some how com- 
manded. Thus, the New Testament was manifestly in- 
tended for the whole human race, and at all times ; and it 
was written by men who were inspired by God to teach us 
His will. But still, their example is not binding per se ; 
that is, we are not under obligation to perform an act, simply 
because they have done it. Thus, Paul and the other apos- 
tles kept the Feast of Pentecost ; but this imposes no such 
obligation upon us. Paul circumcised Timothy ; but this 
imposes no obligation upon us to do likewise; for upon 
another occasion he did not circumcise Titus. The exam 
pies of inspired men, in the New Testament, would, unless 
exception be made, prove the lawfulness of an act ; but it 
could by no means establish its obligatoriness. 

This principle will include as obligatory, 
14 



146 HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 

1. Whatever has been enjoined as the will of God upon 
vian, as man, in distinction from what has been enjoined 
upon men as individuals, or as nations. The command 
may be given us, 1st. By God himself, as when he pro- 
claimed his law from Mount Sinai, or, 2d. By the Medi- 
ator Christ Jesus, or, 3d. By any persons divinely commis- 
sioned to instruct us in the will of God; as prophets, 
apostles, or evangelists. This includes, as obligatory on the 
conscience, simply what is proved to be intended, according 
to the established principles of interpretation. But it by 
no means includes any thing which man may infer from 
what is intended. Any idea which man adds to the idea 
given in the Scriptures, is the idea of man, and has no more 
obligation on the conscience, than any other idea of man. 

But it may be asked, granting that nothing but a Divine 
command is obligatory on the conscience ; yet, as general 
and particular commandments in the Scriptures are fre- 
quently, in a considerable degree, blended together ; how 
may we learn to distinguish that part which is obligatory 
upon us, from that which is in its nature local and peculiar. 
In attempting to answer this question, I would suggest, — 

1. That the distinction of nations or individuals is no 
where adverted to in the New Testament. Its instructions 
are clearly intended for men of all ages and nations, and 
hence they never involve any thing either local or peculiar, 
but are universally binding upon all. The question must 
therefore refer to the Old Testament. 

If we confine ourselves to the Old Testament, this ques- 
tion may be decided on the following principles : 

1. In, by far the greater number of cases, we shall be able 
to decide, by reference to the nature of the Jewish Common- 
wealth ; a temporary or preparatory dispensation, which was 
to cease, when that to which it was preparatory had ap- 
peared. 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 147 

2. The New Testament being thus intended for the whole 
human race, and being a final revelation of the will of God 
to man, may be supposed to contain all the moral precepts, 
both of natural religion, and of the Old Testament, together 
with whatever else it was important to our salvation that we 
should know. If, then, a revelation has been made in the 
Old Testament, which is repeated in the New Testament, we 
shall be safe in making the later revelation the criterion, by 
which we shall judge respecting the precepts of the earlier. 
That is to say, that no precept of the Old Testament, which 
is not given to man as man, or which is not either repeated, 
or its obligations acknowledged under the new dispensation, 
is binding upon us at the present day. This principle is, I 
think avowed in substance by the Apostle Paul, in various 
places in his epistles. While he repeatedly urges the moral 
precepts, of the Old Testament as of unchanging obligation, 
he speaks of every thing else, so far as moral obligation is 
concerned, as utterly annihilated. 

Such, then, are the means afforded to us by our Creator, 
for acquiring a knowledge of our duty. They are ; first, 
natural religion ; second, the Old Testament, or a dispensa- 
tion of law; third, the Gospel, or remedial dispensation, or 
a dispensation of grace. 

The relation existing between our moral power, and these 
means of moral cultivation, may, I suppose, be stated some- 
what as follows : 

1. By conscience, we attain a feeling of moral obligation 
towards the various beings to whom we are related. The ele- 
ments of this feeling are developed, as soon as we come to the 
knowledge of the existence and attributes of those beings, 
and the relation in which we stand to them. Such elements 
are, the feeling of obligation of reciprocity to man, and of 
universal love and obedience to our Creator, 



116 HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 

2. In order to illustrate the relations in which we stand to 
other beings, created and uncreated, as well as to teach us 
His character and His will, concerning us, God has given 
us other means of instructiion. 

1. He has so arranged, and governed all the events of 
this world, as to illustrate His character by His dealings with 
men, and He has given us powers, by which we may, if we 
will, acquire the knowledge thus set before us. The fact 
that we may acquire this knowledge of the will of God, and 
that we are so constituted as to feel that we ought to do the 
will of God, renders us responsible for obedience to all the 
light which we may acquire. 

2. In the utter failure of this mode of instruction, to 
reclaim men, God has seen fit to reveal His will to us, by lan- 
guage. Here the truth is spread before us, without the neces- 
sity of induction from a long and previous train of reason- 
ing. This knowledge of the will of God, thus obtained, 
renders man responsible for the additional light thus com- 
municated. 

3. In the same manner, when this means failed to produce 
any important moral result, a revelation has been made, in- 
structing us still farther, concerning our duties to God, His 
character and will ; and, above all, informing us of a new 
relation in which the Deity stands to us, and of those new 
conditions of being under which we are placed. And, we 
are, in consequence of our moral constitution, rendered re- 
sponsible for a conduct, corresponding to all this additional 
moral light, and consequent moral obligation. 

Now, if it be remembered, that we are under obligations, 
greater than we can estimate, to obey the will of God, by 
what manner soever signified, and that we are under obliga- 
tion, therefore, to obey Him, if he had given us no other 
intimation of His will, than merely the monition of con- 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 149 

science, unassisted by natural or revealed religion, how 
greatly must that obligation be increased, when these addi- 
tional means of information are taken into the account? 
And, if the guilt of our disobedience be in proportion to the 
knowledge of our duty, and, if that knowledge of our duty 
be so great, that we cannot readily conceive how, consistently 
with the conditions of our being, it could have been greater, 
we may judge how utterly inexcusable must be every one 
of our transgressions. Such, does the bible represent to be 
the actual condition of man ; and, hence, it every where 
treats him as under a just and awful condemnation ; a con- 
demnation from which there is no hope of escape but by 
means of the special provisions of a remedial dispensation, 

It belongs to theology, to treat of the nature of this reme- 
dial dispensation. We shall, therefore, attempt no exhibi- 
tion, either of its character or its provisions, beyond a sim- 
ple passing remark, to show its connexions with our present 
subject. 

The law of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, repre- 
sents our eternal happiness as attainable upon the simple 
ground of perfect obedience, and perfect obedience upon 
the principles already explained. But this, in our present 
state, is manifestly unattainable. A single sin, both on the 
ground of its violation of the conditions on which our 
future happiness was suspended, as well as by the effects 
which it produces upon our whole subsequent moral charac- 
ter, and capacity for virtue, renders our loss of happiness 
inevitable. Even, after reformation, our moral attainment 
must fall short of the requirements of the law of God, and 
thus present no claim to the Divine favor. For this reason, 
our salvation is made to depend upon the obedience and 
merits of another. But, we are entitled to hope for salva- 
tion, on the ground of the merit of Christ, solely upon 
the condition of yielding ourselves up in entire obedience 
to the whole law of God. " He that saith I know him, and 

14* 



150 HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN, &c. 

keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is 
not hi him." John, 2 : 4. And, hence, a -knowledge of 
the law of God is of just as great importance to us, under a 
remedial dispensation, as under a dispensation of law ; not 
on the ground that we are to be saved by keeping it without 
sin ; but, on the ground, that, unless the will of God be 
the habitually controlling motive of all our conduct, we are 
destitute of the elements of that character to which the 
blessings of the remedial dispensation are promised. Hence, 
under the one dispensation, as well as under the other, 
though on different grounds, the knowledge of the law of 
God is necessary to our happiness both here and hereafter. 



BOOK II. 



PRACTICAL ETHICS 



PRACTICAL ETHICS 



In the preceding pages, it has been my design to illustrate* 
the moral constitution of man, and to point out the sources 
from which that truth emanates, which is addressed to his 
moral constitution. My design, in the present book, is, to 
classify and explain some of the principal moral laws un- 
der which God has placed us, in our present state. We 
shall derive these laws from natural, or from revealed re- 
ligion, or from both, as may be most convenient for our 
purpose. 

The Scriptures declare that the whole moral law is con- 
tained in the single word, love. 

The beings to whom man is related, in his present state, 
are, so far as this subject is concerned, God, his Creator, and 
man, his fellow-creature. Hence, the moral obligations of 
men are of two kinds; first, Love to God, or Piety; 
second, Love to Man, or Morality. 

This book will, therefore, be divided into two parts, in 
which these two subjects will be treated of in their order. 



PART I. 

LOVE TO GOD, OR PIETY. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE GENERAL OBLIGATION TO SUPREME 
LOVE TO GOD. 

The scriptural precept on this subject, may be found 
recorded in various passages. It is in these words, " Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all 
thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. 
See Matthew, xxii. 37; Mark xii. 30; Luke x. 27. 

In order to illustrate this precept, I shall consider, first, 
the relation which exists between us and the Deity; second, 
the obligations which that relation imposes ; and, third, the 
facts in our constitution which show that this is manifestly 
the law of our being. 

I. The relation which exists between us and God. 

1. He is our Creator and Preserver, A few years since, 
and we had no existence. Within a few more years, and 
this whole system, of which we form a part, had no exist- 
ence. Over our own existence, neither we, nor any created 
thing has any more than the semblance of power. We 
are upheld in being, by the continued act of Omnipo- 
tence. Not only we, ourselves, but every faculty which we, 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 155 

and which all creatures enjoy, was created, and is continu- 
ally upheld, by the same Creator. Nor this alone; all the 
circumstances by which we are surrounded, and all the 
modifications of external nature, of what sort soever they 
may be, whether physical, intellectual, social, or moral, are 
equally created and sustained by God, and derive their pow- 
ers to render us happy, or wise, or good, purely from his 
own provident care, and from the exertion, of His omnipo- 
tent and omnipresent goodness. The relation, therefore, 
existing between the Deity and us, is that of dependance 
more profound, universal, and absolute, than we are able 
adequately to comprehend, upon a Being, absolutely, and 
essentially, independent, omniscient, omnipotent, and all- 
providing. 

2. The Deity has revealed himself to us, as a Being, in 
whom are united, by the necessity of his existence, every 
perfection of which the human mind can conceive, and 
every perfection that can possibly exist, how much soever 
they may transcend the powers of our conception. To Him 
belong, from the necessity of His being, almighty power, 
omniscient wisdom, unchanging veracity, inflexible justice, 
transcendent purity, illimitable benevolence, and universal 
love. Not only does He treasure up within Himself all that 
can be conceived of every perfection, but He is the exhaust- 
less fountain, from which emanates all of these attributes, 
that exists throughout this wide creation. As every object 
in nature that we see, is seen only by reflecting the rays of 
the sun, so every exhibition of goodness which we behold in 
creatures, is nothing but the reflection of the perfections of 
Him who is the Father of Lights, with whom is neither 
variableness nor shadow of turning. The relation, there- 
fore, in this respect, which exists between us and the Crea- 
tor, is that between beings whom He has formed to admire 
and love all these perfections, and the Uncreated Being, in 
whom they all exist, in a degree infinitely surpassing all 
that it is in our power to conceive. 



156 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

3 This creative power, and this incomprehensible wisdom 
have been exerted, in obedience to all these transcendant 
moral perfections, for the production of our best good, our 
highest temporal and eternal happiness, nay, they have been 
as fully exerted in behalf of our race, as though there were 
no other race in existence ; and in behalf of each one of 
us, as though each individual were the only being created, 
within this illimitable universe. And upon all this exertion 
of goodness, towards us, we have not the semblance of a claim, 
for God was under no manner of obligation to create us, 
much less, to create us capable of that happiness which we 
enjoy. The relation, therefore, in this respect, existing be- 
tween us and the Deity, is that between beings who without 
any claim whatever, are, at every moment, receiving the re- 
sults of the exercise of every conceivable perfection, from a 
being, who is moved thus to conduct towards us, by nothing 
but Ins own independent goodness. 

II. From these relations, existing between creatures and 
the Creator, there arise various rights of the Creator, and 
various obligations of the creature. 

Every one, who will reflect upon this subject," must be 
convinced, that, inasmuch as, these relations are entirely be- 
yond the range of human analogies, and also manifestly be- 
yond the grasp of finite conception, they must involve obli- 
gations, in their very nature more profound and universal, 
than we can adequately comprehend ; and that, therefore, no 
conception of ours can possibly transcend their solemnity 
and awfulness. As, in our present state, we are so little able 
to understand them, or even to enquire after them, we see the 
need of instruction concerning them, from him, who alone, of 
all beings that exist, can fathom their depth or measure their 
immensity. Let us therefore inquire, what are the claims, 
which, in his revealed word, God asserts over us, and what 
are the obligations which in his sight bind us to Him. 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 157 

1. By virtue of his relation to us as Creator, he asserts 
over us the right of unlimited possession. Inasmuch as we 
are his creatures, we are his in the highest and most extensive 
sense, in which we can conceive of the idea of possession. Nei- 
ther we ourselves, nor anything which we seem to possess, are 
our own. Our wills are not our own, but he claims that we 
shall only will precisely what He wills. Our faculties, of 
what sort soever, are not our own. He claims, that, from 
the commencement of our existence, they be used precisely 
in the manner, for the purposes, and within the limits, that 
He shall direct. Not only does God assert this right in his 
word, but we find that he actually exercises it. Without 
regard to what we will, He does his pleasure, in the armies 
of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. He 
takes from us health, possessions, friends, faculties, life, and 
He giveth not account of any of his matters. That is, 
he manifestly acts upon the principle, that He is the Sov- 
reign and rightful possessor, both of ourselves, and of all 
that we seem to ourselves to possess. 

And, thus, on the other hand, God asserts that we are all 
under obligations, greater and more solemn than we can 
possibly conceive, to render to Him that entire obedience 
and submission, which his essential right over us renders 
manifestly his due. 

This right, and the correspondent obligation, have respect 
to two classes of duties. The first class is, that which re- 
spects simply our relations to him, and, which would be 
obligatory upon us, although each one of us was the only 
created being in the universe. The second class of duties 
respects our fellow creatures. If we could suppose moral 
creatures to exist without a Creator, there would yet be du- 
ties which, from their constitution as moral creatures, they 
would owe to each other. But inasmuch as every creature is 
the creature of God, He has made the duties which they 
owe to each other, a part of their duty to Him. That is to 

15 



158 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

say, he requires us who are his creatures, and under uni- 
versal obligations to him, to treat our fellow creatures, who 
are also his creatures, and under his protection, in such 
manner as he shall direct. He is the Father of us all, and 
he requires that every one of his children conduct towards 
others, who are also his children, as he shall appoint. And 
hence, the duties which are required of us to our fellow 
creatures, are required of us under a twofold obligation. 
First, that arising from our relation to God, and second, 
that arising from our relation to our fellows. And hence, 
there is not a single act, which we are under obligation to 
perform, which we are not also under obligation to perform 
from the principle of obedience to our Creator. Thus the 
obligation to act religiously, or piously, extends to the mi- 
nutest action of our lives, and no action of any sort what- 
ever, can be, in the full acceptation of the term, virtuous, 
that is, be entitled to the praise of God, which does not in- 
volve in its motives the temper of filial obedience to the 
Deity. And still more, as this obligation is infinitely supe- 
rior to any other that can be conceived, an action performed 
from the conviction of any other obligation, if this obliga- 
tion be excluded, fails, in infinitely the most important re- 
spect, and must, by the whole amount of this deficiency, 
expose us to the condemnation of the law of God, whatever 
that condemnation may be. 

And, once more, we are taught, in the Scriptures, that the 
relation in which we stand to the Deity, places us under 
such obligations, that, while our whole and uninterrupted 
service is thus due to God, after it is all performed, we can 
in no manner bring him under any any obligation to us. 
This, I suppose, to be the meaning intended by our Saviour, 
in the parable, Luke xvii. 7, 10. " But which of you, having 
ft servant, (a slave,) ploughing or feeding cattle, will say unto 
him, by and by, when he is come from the field, go and sit 
down to meat, and will not rather say unto him make ready 
wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself and serve me, until 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 159 

I have eaten and drunken, and, afterwards, thou shalt eat 
and drink ? Doth he thank that servant because he hath 
done the things that were commanded himl I suppose 
not. So, likewise ye, when ye have done all the things 
which are commanded you, say we are unprofitable servants, 
we have done that which was our duty to do." That is, 
the obligation of the servant is not fulfilled by doing any 
one thing, but only by occupying his whole time, and ex- 
erting his whole power, to its full extent, in doing what- 
ever is commanded him. And, when all this is done, such 
is the relation between the parties, that he has placed the 
Master, God, under no obligation ; he has only discharged a 
duty ; he has merely paid a debt ; nor, is it possible, from 
the nature of the relation, that he could ever do anything 
more. Such, I think, every one will acknowledge, upon 
reflection, to be the relation existing between us and our 
Creator. 

And, hence, we see, that a failure in duty to God, on the 
part of the creature, must be remidiless. At every moment, 
he is under obligation to the full amount of his ability, and, 
when this whole amount of obligation is discharged, he has 
simply fulfilled his duty. Hence, no act can have any 
retrospective effect; that is, it cannot supply the deficiencies 
of any other act. This would be the case, even if the 
moral powers were not injured by sin. But, if we add this 
other element, and reflect, that, by sin, the moral powers are 
permanently injured ; that is, the capacity for virtue is dimi- 
nished, according to the laws of our constitution, by how 
much more is it evident, that, under a system of mere law, 
a single failure in our duty to God, must be of necessity 
fatal. What shall we then say of a life, of which every act 
is, when strictly considered, by confession, a moral failure? 

2. God has revealed himself to us as a Being endowed 
with every attribute of natural and moral excellence, and, 



160 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

ill virtue of the relation which, on this account, he sustains 
to us, a new form of obligation is imposed upon us. 

We are evidently formed tolove whatever is beautiful, and 
to admire whatever is great in power, or excellent in wisdom. 
This is too evident to need illustration. But we are so made 
as to love and admire still more, the cause from which all 
these emanate. We admire the tragedies of Shakespeare, 
and the epic of Milton, but how much more the minds in 
which these works were conceived, and by which they were 
executed. Now, all that we see in creation, whether of 
beauty or loveniness, or grandeur, is the work of the Crea- 
tor. It all existed in His conceptions, before it existed in 
fact. Nor this alone. The powers by which we perceive 
and are affected by these exhibitions, all proceed from 
Him, and both the external qualities, and the internal sus- 
ceptibilities, are upheld by his all-sustaining energy. Thus, 
every feeling of love or of admiration which we exercise, 
involves, from the constitution of our nature, the obliga- 
tion to exercise these feelings, in a higher degree towards 
Him who is the author of all. But, as he is the author, 
not only of whatever is lovely or glorious that we see, 
but, of all that we have ever seen ; not only of all that we 
have ever seen, but of all that has ever existed ; not only of 
all that has ever existed, but of all that ever can exist ; by 
how much are we under obligation to love Him better than 
all things else that we khow? and, by how much more than 
any individual form of excellence, with which it is pos- 
sible for us ever to become acquainted? 

Again, God reveals himself to us as the possessor of every 
moral attribute, in infinite perfection. In him are united, 
infinitely more than we or other created beings can conceive, 
of justice, holiness, mercy, compassion, goodness, and truth. 
Now, we are manifestly formed to love and admire actions 
emanating from such attributes, as they are exhibited on 
earth, and specially the moral characters of those, by whom 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 161 

sttch actions are performed. We are not only formed to 
do this, but we are specially formed to do so. We are cre- 
ated with an impulsion to exercise these affections, and we 
are conscious that it is the highest impulsion of our nature. 
Now, whatever we see of moral excellence on earth, springs 
from Him, as its first and original cause, He created the 
circumstances under which it exists, and created, with all 
its powers, the beings by whom it is displayed. Nor this 
alone. He possesses, essentially, and in an infinite degree, 
and without the possibility of imperfection, every moral at- 
tribute. If, then, the highest impulsion of our nature teaches 
us to love and venerate these attributes, even as they are 
displayed in their imperfection on earth, by how much more 
are we under obligation to love these attributes, as they are 
possessed by our Father who is in Heaven. If a single act 
of justice deserves our veneration, how much more should 
we venerate that justice which has governed this universe 
without the shadow of a spot, from eternity. If a single act 
of purity deserves our regard, with what awe should we 
adore the holiness of Him, in whose sight the heavens are un- 
clean. If a single act of benevolence deserves our love, 
with what affection should we bow before Him, who, from 
eternity, has been pouring abroad a ceaseless flood of blessed- 
ness, over the boundless universe by which He is surrounded. 

And yet more, I think it is manifest that we are so consti- 
stituted as to be under obligations to love such attributes as 
I have mentioned, entirely aside from the consideration of 
their connexion with ourselves. We admire justice and 
benevolence in men who existed ages ago, and in countries 
with which we have no interests in common. And thus these 
obligations to love and adore these attributes in the Deity, 
would exist in full force, irrespective of the fact of our receiv- 
ing any benefit from them. And our Creator might, and 
would, justly require of us all these affections of which I have 
spoken, did these moral attributes exist in some other being 
beside himself. The obligation is sustained upon the sim- 
15* 



m OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

pie consideration, that we are constituted such moral beings 
as we are, and that another being exists, endowed with at- 
tributes, in this particular manner, corresponding to our 
moral constitution. By how much is this obligation in- 
creased, by the consideration that He, in whom these attri- 
butes exist, stands to us in the relation of Creator. 

3. As, by the constitution of our moral nature, we are 
under obligation to love whatever is morally excellent, irre- 
spective of any benefit which we may derive from it our- 
selves ; so, when this moral excellence is intentionally the 
source of happiness to us, we are under the additional obli- 
gation to gratitude, or a desire to do something which shall 
please Him, from whom our happiness has proceeded. 
This obligation is so manifestly recognized as one of the 
instinctive impulses of our nature, that, whilst we merely 
esteem him who acts in obedience to it ; the neglect of it, 
without the exhibition of the positively opposite temper, 
is always met by the feeling of intense moral reprobation. 

Now, since whatever of favor we receive from others, is 
derived from them merely as second causes, it all originates 
essentially, from the First, and All-pervading Cause. What- 
ever gratitude we feel, therefore, towards creatures, is really, 
and in the highest possible sense, due to God, from whom 
it all really emanates. * 

But how small is that portion of the happiness which we 
enjoy, which is conferred by the favour of our fellows. 
Immeasurably the greater part, is the direct gift our Crea- 
tor. The obligation to gratitude, is in proportion to the 
amount of benefits conferred, and the disinterestedness of 
the goodness from which they have proceeded. By these 
elements, let us estimate the amount of obligation, of grati- 
tude to God. 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 163 

As the Deity is essentially independent of all his crea- 
tures, and as He has created us from nothing, and as He has 
created, also, all the circumstances under which we exist, 
He can be under no sort of obligation to us, nor can our 
relation to Him ever be of any other sort, than that of the 
recipients of favor, which we can, b y no possibility, merit. 

Under such circumstances, a sensation of happiness for a 
single moment, even if it terminated with that single mo- 
ment, would be a cause for gratitude, so long as it could be 
remembered. How much more, if this form of happiness 
continued throughout our whole extent of being. The 
enjoyment of one form of happiness, say of that derived 
from a single sense, would deserve our gratitude ; how much 
more that derived from all our senses, and specially that 
derived from the combination of them all. The enjoyment 
of ever so transient a sensation of intellectual happiness, 
would deserve our gratitude, how much more that of a per- 
manent constitution, which was a source of perpetual intel- 
lectual happiness, and specially, a constitution involving a 
great variety of forms of intellectual happiness. Thus, 
also, a single emotion of moral happiness, would deserve 
our gratitude ; how much more a constitution formed for 
perpetual moral happiness. And yet more, if these forms 
of happiness, taken singly, would be each a cause of per- 
petual and increasing gratitude, how much more a constitu- 
tion, by which the very relations which they sustain to each 
other, become a source of additional and increased happi- 
ness. Add to this, that the external world, is itself adjusted 
to all these powers and susceptibilities of man, and each ad- 
justment is manifestly intended for our best good. And add 
to this, that such are the conditions of being, under which 
we are placed, that, if we only use these powers according 
to the will of God, and to the nature which He has given us, 
that is, in such a way as to promote our highest happiness 
here, we shall be advanced to a state of happiness more 
excellent and glorious than any of which we can conceive ; 



164 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

and we shall be fixed in it unchangeably and for ever. 
Now, if a single act of disinterested goodness, and unde- 
served favor, deserves our gratitude for ever, what limits 
can be set to the intensity of that grateful adoration, which 
should, throughout our whole being, pervade our bosoms, 
towards him, from whom every blessing is perpetually 
flowing, in so exhaustless a flood of unfathomable goodness. 

Such then are the obligations to love and gratitude, which 
in addition to that of obedience, we owe to our Creator. 
But it deserves to be remarked, that these forms of obliga- 
tion reciprocally involve each other. For if we possess that 
temper of entire obedience, which springs from a recogni- 
tion of the universal right of the Creator over us, we shall 
dedicate our affections to Him, as entirely as our will, that 
is, we shall love only what he commands, and just as he has 
commanded, that is, we not only shall do his will, but we 
shall love to do it, not only on account of what he is in 
himself, but also on account of what he is and always has 
been to us. And, on the other hand, if we love his charac- 
ter and attributes as they deserve, we shall love to perform 
actions which are in harmony with those attributes, that is, 
which spring from the same dispositions in ourselves. In 
other words, we shall love to act in perfect accordance with 
the will of God. And still more, if we are penetrated with 
a proper conviction of the obligations of gratitude under 
which we are placed, we shall love to please our Supreme 
Benefactor, and the only way in which we can do this, is, 
by implicitly obeying his commands. 

It was remarked, in a former part of this work, that hap- 
piness consists in the exercise of our sensitiveness upon its 
appropriate objects. Now, that man has moral sentiments, that 
is, that he is formed to derive happiness from the contempla- 
tion of moral qualities, and specially from the love of those 
beings, in whom these moral qualities reside, is too evident 
to need argument. It is also evident, that this is the highest 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 165 

and most exalted form of happiness, of which he is suscep- 
tible. But created beings and the moral qualities of created 
beings, are not the objects adapted to his moral sensitive- 
ness. This power of our being, finds its appropriate object, 
in nothing less than in supreme and unlimited and infinite 
moral perfection. And yet more, the moral susceptibility of 
happiness expands by exercise, and the uncreated object to 
which it is directed, is, by necessity, unchangeable, eternal 
and infinite. A provision is thus made for the happiness 
of man, eternal and illimitable ; that is to say, not only is 
it evident, from the constitution of man, that he is made to 
love God, but also that he is made to love Him infinitely 
more than any thing else ; to be happier from loving Him 
than from loving any thing else ; and, also to be more and 
more intensely happy, from loving Him, throughout eternity. 

Thus, in general, from the relations which we sustain to 
God, we are under more imperative obligations than we are 
able to conceive, to exercise towards him that temper of 
heart, which is, perhaps, in the language of men, best ex- 
pressed by the term, a filial disposition ; that is, a disposition 
to universal obedience, pervaded by the spirit of supreme 
and grateful affection. This temper of heart is, that gene- 
rically denominated in the Scriptures, faith. In the New 
Testament, it is somewhat modified, by the relations in 
which we stand to God, in consequence of the provisions 
of the remedial dispensation. 

Now, all these dispositions would be required of us, if we 
were sinless beings, and possibly no others would be required. 
The same are manifestly our duty, after we have sinned, 
for our sin changes neither the character of God, nor His 
claim upon our obedience and affection. A child who has 
done wrong, is not under any the less imperative obliga- 
tions to exercise a filial disposition towards a parent. But, 
suppose a creature to have sinned, it is manifest, that he 
would be under obligations to exercise another moral dispo- 



166 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

sition. He ought to regret his fault, not on account of its 
consequences to himself, but on account of the violation of 
moral obligation, which is the essence of its guiltiness. 
Acknowledging its utter wrongfulness, justifying God, and 
taking all the blame of his act upon himself, he ought to 
hate his own act, and, from such feelings to the act, as 
well as from the temper of filial obedience to God, com- 
mence a life of moral purity. Such is repentance. This 
is the temper of heart, which the Scriptures teach us, that 
God requires of us as sinners. 

III. Such, then, is the obligation under which, by our 
creation, we stand to God. It would be easy to show, 
that this is the only principle of action suited to our nature, 
under the present constitution. 

For, 1. As we live under a constitution of law, that is, under 
which every action is amenable to law, and since to every 
action is affixed, by Omnipotent power, and unsearchable wis- 
dom, rewards or punishments, both in this life and also in 
the other, and, as these consequences can, by no power of 
ours, be severed from the action, it is manifest, that we can 
only attain to happiness, and escape from misery, by per- 
fectly obeying the will of our Creator. And yet more, since 
we are creatures, endowed with will, and the power of choice, 
we never can be completely happy unless we act as we 
choose ; that is, unless we obey, because we love to obey. 
Hence, from the elements of our constitution, it is evident, 
we can be happy on no other principles than those of per- 
fect obedience to God, and obedience emanating from, and 
pervaded by, love. 

2. The same truth is evident, from a consideration of the 
relations which every individual sustains to the whole race 
of man. It manifestly enters into the constitution under 
which we exist, that every individual shall have a power over 
society, both for good and for evil, so far as we can see, in its 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 167 

nature, illimitable. That such is the fact, will be evident to 
every one, who will reflect for a moment upon the results 
emanating from the lives of St. Paul, Luther, Howard, 
Clarkson, or Wilberforce, and of Alexander, Julius Caesar, 
Voltaire, Lord Byron, or Napoleon. Now, it is only neces- 
sary to recollect, that the being, possessed of this power, is by 
nature utterly ignorant of the future, wholly incapable, even 
during life, and much more after death, of controlling and 
directing the consequences of his actions, and still more that 
he is fallible, that is, liable not only to err from ignorance, 
but also from a wrong moral bias ; and we must be convinced 
that the exercise of this power could never be safe for his 
fellows, unless it were under the supreme direction of a being 
who knew the end from the beginning, and who was by his 
very nature incapable of wrong. 

From what has been said, it will follow, that our duty 
to God forbids — 

1. Idolatry, that is, rendering divine homage to any other 
being than the Deity. 

2. Rendering obedience to any creature, in opposition to 
the will of the Creator. 

3. Yielding obedience to our own will, or gratifying our 
own desires, in opposition to His will. 

4. Loving any thing which He has forbidden. 

5. Loving any thing which He has allowed, in a manner 
and to a degree, that He has forbidden. 

6. Loving any thing created, in preference to Him. 

Each of these topics is susceptible of extended illustration. 
As, however, they are discussed in full, in works on The- 



168 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 

oloarv, to which science they more particularly belong, we 
shall leave them with this simple enumeration. In treat- 
ing of the remainder of this subject, we shall, therefore, con- 
sider only the means by which the love of God, or piety, 
may be cultivated. These are three. 1st. A spirit of devo- 
tion. 2d. Prayer. 3d. The observance of the Sabbath. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 

From what has been already said, it will be seen, that the 
relation which we sustain to God, imposes upon us the obli- 
gation of maintaining an habitual temper towards Him, 
which shall continually incite us to do whatever will please 
Him. It is natural to suppose, that our Creator Would 
have placed us under such circumstances as would, from 
their nature, cultivate in us such a temper. Such we find to 
be the fact. We are surrounded by objects of knowledge, 
which, not merely by their existence, but also by their cease- 
less changes, remind us of the attributes of God, and of the 
obligations under which we are placed to Him. A devo- 
tional spirit consists in making the moral use which is in- 
tended, of all the objects of intellection, that come within 
our experience and observation. 

1. Our existence is dependent on a succession of changes, 
which are taking place at every moment in ourselves, over 
which we have no power whatever, but of which each one 
involves the necessity of the existence and the superintend- 
ing power of the Deity. The existence of the whole mate- 
rial universe is of the same nature. Now, each of these 
changes is, with infinite skill, adapted to the relative condi- 
tions of all the beings whom they effect ; and they are sub- 
jected to laws, which are most evident expressions of al- 
mighty power, of unsearchable wisdom, and exhaustless 
goodness'. Now, were we merely intellectual beings, it 
would not be possible for us to consider any thing more than 

16 



170 THE CULTIVATION OF 

the so laws themselves ; but inasmuch as we are intellectual 
and also moral beings, we are capable not only of consider- 
ing the laws, but also the attributes of the Creator from 
whom such laws are the emanations. As every thing which 
we can know teaches a lesson concerning God ; if we con- 
nect that lesson with every thing we learn, every thing will 
be resplendent with the attributes of Deity. By using, in 
this manner, the knowledge which is every where spread 
before us, we shall habitually cultivate a devout temper of 
mind. Thus, " the Heavens will declare unto us the glory 
of God, and the firmament will show his handywork ; thus 
day unto day will utter speech, and night unto night show 
forth knowledge of Him. 

2. Nor is this true of physical nature alone. The whole 
history of the human race, teaches us the same lesson. 
The rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice, as 
they are beheld in the events which befal both individuals 
and nations, all exhibit the attributes of Deity. It is He 
that Q stilleth the noise of the seas, the noise of their waves, 
and the tumult of the people." " The Lord reigneth, let the 
earth rejoice; let the multitude of isles be glad thereof. 
Clouds and darkness are round about him ; righteousness 
and judgment are the habitation of his throne." His forbear- 
ance and long-suffering, and, at the same time, His inflexi- 
ble justice, His love of right, and His hatred of wrong, ar^ 
legibly written in every page of individual and national' 
history. And hence it is, that every part that we witness 
in the government of moral beings, has a twofold chain of 
connections and relations. To the mere political economist, 
or the statesman, it teaches the law by which cause and 
effect are connected. To the pious man, it also teaches the 
attributes of that being, who has so connected cause and 
effect;' and who, amidst all the intricate mazes of human 
motive and social organization, carries forward his laws 
with unchanging certainty, and unerring righteousness. 
Now, it is by observing not merely the law, but the moral 



A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 171 

lesson derived from the law; it is by observing not merely 
the connections of events with each other, but, also, their 
connection with the Great First Cause, that a devotional 
spirit is to be cultivated. 

And hence, we see that knowledge of every sort, if suita- 
bly improved, has, in its very nature, a tendency to devo- 
tion. If we do not thus use it, we sever it from its most 
important connections. We act simply as intellectual, and 
not as moral beings. We act contrary to the highest and 
most noble principles of our constitution. And hence, we 
see how progress in knowledge really places us under pro- 
gressive obligations to improvement in piety. This should 
be borne in mind by every man, and specially by every edu- 
cated man. For this improvement of our knowledge, Goi3 
holds us accountable. " Because they regard not the works 
of the Lord, nor consider the operations of his hand, there- 
fore will He destroy them." 

3. But, if such are the obligations resting upon us from 
our relation to the works of Nature and Providence, how 
much are these obligations increased by our knowledge of 
God, as it is presented to us by revelation. I suppose that 
a person acquainted with the laws of optics, who had always 
stood with his back to the sun, might acquire much im- 
portant knowledge of the nature of light, and of the path of 
the sun through the heavens, by reasoning from the reflec- 
tion of that light, observed in the surrounding creation. 
But how uncertain would be this knowledge, compared 
with that which he would acquire, by looking directly upon 
the sun, and tracing his path by his own immediate obser- 
vation. So of revelation. Here, we are taught by language, 
that truth, which we, otherwise, could learn only by long 
and careful induction. God has here made known to us 
His attributes and character; here He has recorded His law ; 
here He has written a portion of the history of our race, as a 
specimen of His providential dealings with men; and here 



172 THE CULTIVATION OF 

He has, more than all, revealed to us a remedial dispensa- 
tion, by which our sins may be forgiven, and we be raised to 
higher and more glorious happiness than that which we 
have lost. It surely becomes us, then, specially to study 
the Bible, not merely as a book of antiquities, nor as a 
choice collection of poetry, and an inexhaustible storehouse 
of wisdom, but for the sole purpose of ascertaining the 
character of God, and our relations to Him, and thus culti- 
vating towards Him those feelings of filial and reverential 
homage, which are so manifestly our duty, and which such 
contemplations are in their nature so adapted to foster and 
improve. 

4. A devout temper is also cultivated by the exercise of 
devotion. The more we exercise the feeling of veneration, of 
love, of gratitude, and of submission towards God, the more 
profound, and pervading, and intense, and habitual, will 
these feelings become. And, unless the feelings themselves 
be called into exercise, it will be in vain that we are per- 
suaded that we ought to exercise them. It is one thing to 
be an admirer of devotion, and another thing to be really 
devout. It becomes us, therefore, to cultivate these feelings, 
by actually exercising towards God the very tempers of 
mind indicated by our circumstances, and our progressive 
knowledge. Thus, submission to His will, thankfulness for 
His mercies, trust in His providence, reliance on His power, 
and sorrow for our sins, should be not the occasional exer- 
cise, but the habit of our souls. 

5. By the constitution of our nature, a most intimate 
connexion exists between action and motive ; between the 
performance o f an action and the principle from which it 
emanates. The one cannot long exist without the other. 
True charity cannot long exist in the temper, unless we 
perform acts of charity. Meditation upon goodness will 
soon become effete, unless it be strengthened by good 
works. So, the temper of devotion will be useless ; nay, 



A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 173 

the profession of it must, of necessity, be hypocritical, unless 
it produce obedience to God. By this alone is its existence 
tested ; by this alone can it be successfully cultivated. The 
more perfectly our wills are subjected to the will of God, 
and our whole course of conduct regulated by His com- 
mands, the more ardent will be our devotion, and the more 
filial the temper from which our actions proceed. 

6. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that, as penitence 
is a feeling resulting from a conviction of violated obliga- 
tion, it is to be cultivated, not merely by considering the cha- 
racter of God, but also our conduct towards him. The con- 
trast between his goodness and compassion, and our ingra- 
titude and rebellion, is specially adapted to fill us with humi- 
lity and self-abasement, and also with sorrow for all our 
past transgressions. Thus said the prophet : " Woe is me, 
for 1 am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst ol 
a people of unclean lips, for mine eyes have seen the King^ 
the Lord of Hosts." 

Lastly. It is surely unnecessary to remark, that such a 
life as this is alone suited to the character of man. If God 
have made us capable of deriving our highest happiness 
from Him, and have so constituted the universe around us 
as perpetually to lead us to this source of happiness, the 
most unreasonable, ungrateful, and degrading, not to say the 
most guilty, course of conduct, which we can pursue, must 
be, to neglect and abuse this, the most noble part of our 
constitution, and to use the knowledge of the world around 
us, for every other purpose, than that for which it was crea- 
ted. Let every frivolous, thoughtless, human being reflect 
what must be his condition, when he, whose whole thoughts 
are limited by created things, shall stand in the presence of 
Him, " before whose face the Heavens and the earth shall 
flee away, and there be no place left for them?" 

16* 



CHAPTER III. 

OF PRAYER. 

In the present chapter, we shall treat of the nature, the 
obligation, and the utility of prayer. 

1. The nature of prayer. 

Prayer is the direct intercourse of the spirit of man, with 
the spiritual and unseen Creator. " God is a spirit, and 
those that worship Him, must worship Him in spirit and in 
truth." 

It consists in the expression of our adoration, the ac- 
knowledgment of our obligations, the offering up of our 
thanksgivings, the confession of our sins, and in supplica- 
tion for the favors, as well temporal as spiritual, that we 
need; always accompanied with a suitable temper of mind. 

This temper of mind pre-supposes, 

1. A solemn conviction of the character and attributes of 
God, and of the relations which He sustains to us. 

2. A conviction of the relations which we sustain to 
Him, and of our obligations to Him. 

3. An affecting view of our sinfulness, helplessness, and 
misery. 



170 OF PRAYER. 

4. Sincere gratitude for all the favors which we have 
received. 



5. A fixed and undissembled resolution to obey the com- 
mands of God iii future. 

6. Unreserved submission to all His will. 

7. Unshaken confidence in the veracity of God. 

8. Importunate desires that our petitions, specially for 
spiritual blessings, should be granted. 

9. A soul at peace with all mankind. 

Illustrations of all these dispositions, from the prayers 
recorded in the Holy Scriptures, as well as the precepts by 
which they are enforced, might be easily adduced. I pre- 
sume, however, they are unnecessary. I will remark, that 
it is not asserted that all these dispositions are to be in exer- 
cise at the same time, but only such of them as specially 
belong to the nature of our supplications. 

Inasmuch as we are dependent on God, not only for all the 
blessings which we derive directly from His hands, but also 
for all those which arise from our relations to each other, it 
is manifestly proper that we confess our sins, and supplicate 
His favor, not only as individuals, but as societies. Hence, 
prayer may be divided into individual, domestic, and social. 

Individual Prayer. As the design of this institution is, 
to bring us as individuals into direct communion with God, 
to confess our personal infirmities, and to cultivate personal 
piety, it should be strictly in private. We are commanded 
to pray to our Father in secret. It should moreover, be so- 
lemn, unreserved, and, in general, accompanied with the 
reading of the Holy Scriptures. As, moreover, this direct 



OF PRAYER. 177 

communion with the unseen Creator, is intended to be the 
great antagonist force to the constant pressure of the things 
seen and temporal, it should be habitual and frequent. 

Domestic Prayer. As the relation sustained by parents 
and children is the source of many and peculiar blessings ; 
as the relation involves peculiai responsibilities, in the ful- 
filment of which we all need special guidance and direc- 
tion, there is a peculiar propriety in the acknowledgment of 
God, in connexion with this relation. The importance of 
this duty is specially urged upon us, by its effect upon the 
young. It associates with religion all the recollections of 
childhood, and all the sympathies of home. It gives to pa- 
rental advice the sanction of religion, and in after life, recalls 
the mind to a conviction of duty to God, with all the motives 
drawn from a father's care and a mother's tenderness. 

Social Prayer. Inasmuch as all our* social and civil bless- 
ings are the gift of God, it is meet that we should, as socie- 
ties, meet to acknowledge them. This is one of the most 
important duties of the Sabbath day. It will, therefore, be 
more fully treated of, under that branch of the subject. 

Since prayer is the offering up of our desires, &c. with a 
suitable temper of heart, it is manifest, that the question 
whether a form of prayer, or extempore prayer should be 
used, is merely one of expediency, and has no connexion with 
morals. The obligation is, to use that which is of the 
greatest spiritual benefit to the individual. Private prayer 
should, however, I think, be expressed in the words of the 
supplicant himself. 

II. The duty of prayer. 

The duty of prayer may be seen from the conditions of 
our being, and from the holy Scriptures. 



ITS OF PRAYER. 



I. The conditions of our being. 



1. We are utterly powerless, ignorant of the future, essen- 
tially dependent at the present and for the future, and are 
miserably sinful. We need support, direction, happiness, 
pardon, and purification. These can come from no other 
being than God, who is under no obligation to confer them 
upon us. What can be more manifestly proper, than that 
we should supplicate the Father of the universe for those 
blessings which are necessary, not only for our happiness, 
but for our existence, and that we should receive every favor 
with a devout acknowledgment of the terms on which it is 
bestowed. 

2. Inasmuch as we are sinners, and have forfeited the 
blessings which we daily receive, what can be more suitable 
than that we should humbly thank that Almighty power, 
from whom comes such an inexhaustible supply of goodness, 
to us so utterly undeserving. And what more obligatory, 
than to ask the pardon of our Creator, for those sins of 
omission and of commission, with which we are every hour 
justly chargeable. 

3. Specially is this our duty, when we reflect, that this very 
exercise of habitual reliance upon God, is necessary to our 
happiness, in our present state, and that, the temper which 
it pre-supposes, is essential to our progress in virtue. 

i 
That such is the dictate of our moral constitution, is evi- 
dent from the fact, that all men who have any notion of a 
Supreme Being, under any circumstances, acknowledge it as 
a duty, and, in some form or other, profess to practise it. And 
besides, all men, even the most abandoned and profligate, 
when in danger, pray most eagerly. This has been the case, 
with men who, in health and safety, scoff at religion, and 
ridicule the idea of moral obligation. But it is evident, that 
it can be neither more proper nor more suitable to pray in 



OF PRAYER. 179 

danger, than at any other time ; for our relations to God are 
always the same, and we are always essentially dependent 
upon Him for every thing, both temporal and spiritual, that 
we enjoy at the present, or hope for in the future. It is 
surely as proper to thank God for those mercies which we 
receive every moment, as to deprecate those judgments by 
which we are occasionally alarmed. 

II. The duty of prayer as taught in the Scriptures. 

The Scriptures treat of prayer, as a duty arising so imme- 
diately out of our relations to God, and our obligations to 
Him, as scarcely to need a positive precept. Every dis- 
position of heart which we are commanded to exercise 
towards God, pre-supposes it. Hence, it is generally refer- 
red to, incidentally, as one, of which the obligation is already 
taken for granted. Precepts, however, are not wanting, in 
respect to it. I only speak of the general tendency of the 
Scripture instructions. 

1. It is expressly commanded: " Pray without ceasing P 
" In every thing giving thanks, for this is the will of God, in 
Christ Jesus, concerning you." " In all things, by prayer 
and supplication, let your request be made known unto God." 
Phil. 4:6. "I exhort that supplications and prayers, inter- 
cessions and giving of thanks, be made for all men ; for 
this is good and acceptable in the sight of God, our Sa- 
viour." 1 Tim. 2: 1,3. 

2. God declares it to be a principal condition on which 
He will bestow favors. " If any man lack wisdom, let him 
ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth 
not, and it shall be given him." James 1:5. " Ask, and 
it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and 
it shall be opened unto you: for every one that asketh 
receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that 
knocketh it shall be opened. Or, what man is there of you, 



ISO OF PRAYER. 

whom, if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone ; or, if 
he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent. If ye, then, being 
evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how 
much more shall your Father, that is in Heaven, give good 
things to them that ask him?" Matthew 7: 7, 11. Now, 
it is too obvious to need a remark, that God would not have 
connected so important consequences with prayer, unless He 
meant to inculcate it as a universal duty. 

3. The Scriptures make the habit of prayer the mark of 
distinction between the righteous and the wicked ; between 
the enemies and the friends of God. Thus, the wicked 
say : " What is the Almighty, that we should serve Him ? 
or, what profit shall we have, if we call upon Him?" 
Job 21 : 15. " The wicked, through the pride of his coun- 
tenance, will not seek after God. God is not in all his 
thoughts." Psalms 10: 4. On the contrary, righteous 
persons, those whom God approves, are specially designated 
as those who call upon Him. 

4. The examples of the prayers of good men are, in the 
Scriptures, very abundant. In fact, a large portion of the 
bible is made up of the prayers and praises of those whom 
God has held up for our examples. To transcribe these 
would be to transcribe a large portion of the sacred books. 

5. The bible abounds with examples recorded by God, of 
special answers to prayer of every kind, that can be con- 
ceived. There are examples of the successful prayer of 
individuals for temporal and for spiritual blessings ; for 
themselves and for others ; of individual prayers for nations, 
and of nations for themselves ; of individuals for societies, 
and of societies for individuals; and, indeed, of men in all 
the circumstances in which they can be placed, for every 
blessing, and under every variety of relation. Now, what 
God has, at so great length, and in so great a variety of 



OF PRAYER. 181 

ways, encouraged us to do, must be not only a privilege, 
but a duty. 

In a word, the bible teaches us, on this subject, that our 
relation to God is infinitely nearer, and more universal, than 
that in which we can possibly stand to any other being. He 
allows us, with the simplicity and confidence of children, 
to unbosom all our cares — to make known all our wants, 
and express all our thanks with unreserved freedom to Him, 
He assures us, that this exercise, and the temper from which 
it springs, and which it cultivates, is most acceptable to Him. 
And, having thus condescended to humble Himself to our 
situation, He holds us as most ungrateful, proud, insolent, and 
sinful, if we venture to undertake any business, or receive 
any favor, without holding direct and child-like communion 
with Him. 

Under the remedial dispensation, a special encourage- 
ment is given to prayer. We are there taught, that, though 
we are unworthy of the blessings which' we need, yet we 
may ask and receive, for the sake of the Mediator. "What- 
soever ye shall ask the Father, in my name, He will give it 
you." The death of Christ is also held forth as our special 
ground of confidence in prayer. "He that spared not His 
own Son, but gave Him up for us all, how shall He not, 
with Him, freely give us all things ? And, yet more, we are 
informed, that it is the special office of the Exalted Media- 
tor, to intercede for us before the Throne of God. Greater 
encouragements than these, to prayer, could not possibly 
be conceived. 

III. The utility of prayer. 

This may be shown — 

1. From the nature and attributes of God, He would not 
require any thing of us which was not for our good. 

17 



182 OF PRAYER. 

2. The utility of prayer is seen from the tempers of mind 
which it pre-supposes. We have already shown what 
these tempers of mind are. Now, it must be evident to 
every one, that the habitual exercise of these dispositions, 
must be, in the nature of the case, in the highest degree, 
beneficial to such creatures as we. 

3. The utility of prayer is also evident from its con- 
nexion with our reception of favors from God. 

1. In the government of this world, God establishes such 
connexions between cause and effect, or antecedent and 
consequent, as he pleases. He has a perfect right to do so. 
The fact, that one event is the antecedent of another, in- 
volves not the supposition of any essential power in the 
antecedent, but merely the supposition, that God has placed 
it in that relation to something that is to follow. 

2. The bestowment of favors is one event. God has a 
right to ordain whatever antecedent to this event he chooses. 
We are not competent to say, of any event, that it cannot 
be the antecedent to the bestowment of favors, any more 
than that rain cannot be the antecedent to the growth of 
vegetation. 

3. Since, then, any event whatever, may be the antece- 
dent to any other event whatever, we are, surely, not com- 
petent to say that prayer cannot be the antecedent to the 
bestowment of favors, any more than to say this of any 
tiling else. It is, surely, to say the least of it, as good as any 
oilier antecedent, if God saw fit so to ordain. 

4. But. since God is a moral Governor, and must there- 
fore delight in, and reward virtuous tempers, there is a 
manifest moral propriety in his making these tempers the 
antecedent to his bestowment of blessings. Nay, we cannot 
conceive how he would be a righteous moral Governor, 



OF PRAYER. 183 

unless he did do so. And hence, we see, that the supposi- 
tion that God bestows blessings in answer to prayer, which 
he would not bestow on any other condition, is not only 
not at variance with any of his natural attributes, but that 
it is even demanded by his moral attributes. 

5. But, inasmuch as God has revealed to us the fact, that 
this is the condition on which he bestows the most valuable 
of his gifts ; and as he has bound himself, by his promise, 
to reward, abundantly, all who call upon him, the utility of 
prayer to creatures situated as we are, is as manifest as our 
necessities are urgent, both for time and for eternity. 

And, finally, there can be no clearer evidence of the 
goodness of God, than just such a constitution as this. 
God promises favors in answer to prayer ; but prayer, as 
we have seen, is one of the most efficient means of promot- 
ing our moral perfection, that is, our highest happiness ; 
that is to say, God promises us favors, on conditions, 
which, in themselves, involve the greatest blessings which 
we could possibly desire. Bishop Wilson beautifully re- 
marks, " How good is God, who will not only give us what 
we pray for, but will reward us for going to him, and laying 
our wants before him." 

That a man will, however, receive every thing he asks 
for, and just as he asks for it, is by no means asserted, in 
an unlimited sense ; but only that which he prays for, in a 
strict sense. True prayer, is the offering up of our desires, 
in entire subjection to the will of God; that is, desiring 
that he will do what we ask, if He, in His infinite wisdom 
and goodness, sees that it will be best. Now, if we ask 
thus, our prayer will be granted, for thus He has promised 
to do for us. Hence, our prayer respecting temporal bless- 
ings, are answered only contingently; that is, under this 
condition ; but our prayer respecting spiritual blessings, are* 



184 OF PRAYER. 

answered absolutely, for God has positively promised to 
give His holy spirit to them that ask Him. 

If God has allowed us thus to hold the most intimate and 
unreserved communion with Him; and if He has promised, 
on this condition, to support us by His power, to teach us 
by His wisdom, to purify us by His spirit, and to work in us 
all those tempers which He sees will best prepare us for the 
highest state of future felicity, what can be more ennobling, 
and more lovely, than a prayerful life? and what more 
ungrateful and sinful, than a life of thoughtless irreverence 
and impiety 1 Is not the single fact, of living without habi- 
tual prayer, a conclusive evidence that we have not the love 
of God in us ; that we are living in habitual violation of 
every obligation that binds us to our Maker ; and that, we 
are, therefore, under the solemn condemnation of His most 
Holy Law. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 

This is the second special means appointed by our Crea- 
tor, for the purpose of cultivating in us suitable moral dispo- 
sitions. We shall treat, first, of the original institution of 
the Sabbath ; secondly, of the Mosaic Sabbath ; thirdly, of 
the Christian Sabbath. 

Although the Sabbath is a positive institution, and, there- 
fore, the proof of its /obligation is to be sought for entirely 
from revelation, yet there are indications, in the present 
constitution, that periods of rest are necessary, both- for man 
and for beast. The recurrence of night, and the necessity 
of repose, shows that the principle of rest enters into the 
present system, as much as that of action. And, besides, it 
is found that animals which enjoy one day in seven for 
rest, live longer, and enjoy better health, than those which 
are worked without intermission. The same may, to a 
considerable degree, be said of man. The late Mr. Wilber- 
force attributed his length of life, and the superiority of 
health which he enjoyeo), over his political contemporaries, 
mainly, to his resolute and invariable observance of the 
Sabbath day ; a duty, which, unfortunately, they too fe 
quently neglected. 

I shall not go into the argument, on this subject, m detail, 
as the limits of the present work will not admit of it, but 
shall merely give what seem to me the results. To those 
who wish to examine the question of the obligation of the 

17* 



f86 THE OBSERVANCE 

Sabbath at large, I would recommend the valuable treatise 
of Mr. J. J. Gurney, on the history, authority, and use of the 
Sabbath ; from which much of the present article is merely 
an abridgment. 

I. Of the original institution of the Sabbath. 

First. The Divine Authority, for the institution of the Sab- 
bath, is found in Genesis ii. 1, 3. " Thus, the heavens 
and the earth were finished, and all the hosts of them ; 
and, on the seventh day, God ended his work which He had 
made, and He rested on the seventh day from all his works 
which He had made. And God blessed the seventh day, 
and sanctified it ; because that, in it He had rested from all 
His work which God had created and made." 

Now, concerning this passage, we remark : 

1. It was given to our first parents ; that is, to the whole 
human race. 

2. God blessed it ; that is, bestowed upon it a peculiar 
blessing, or made it a source of peculiar blessings to man. 
Such, surely, must be that day, which is given to cultivate, 
in ourselves, moral excellence, and prepare for us the happi- 
ness of Heaven. He sanctified it ; that is, set it apart from 
a common to a sacred and religious use. 

3. The reason, is a general one : God rested. This has 
no reference to any peculiar people, but seems in the light of 
an example from God for all the human race. 

4. The nature of the ordinance is general. God sancti- 
fied it ; that is, the day. The act refers not to any parti- 
cular people, but to the day itself. 



OF THE SABBATH. 187 

5. The object to be accomplished is general, and can 
apply to no one people more than to another. If it be rest, 
all men equally need it. If it be moral cultivation, surely 
no people has ever existed, who did not require such a 
means to render them better. 

Second. There are indications that the hebdomadal divi- 
sion of time was observed by the Patriarchs, before the time of 
Moses; and, that the Sabbath was regarded as the day for 
religious worship. 

1. Genesis iv. 3. "And, in process of time, it cajpie to 
pass that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offer- 
ing to the Lord." The words, rendered "in process of 
time," literally signify " at the end of days ;" or, , " at the 
cutting off of days ;" that is, as I think probable, at the 
close, as we should say, of a section of days, a very natural 
expression for the end of a week. If this be the meaning, 
it would seem to refer to the division of time just previously 
mentioned, and also to the use of this day for religious 
worship. 

2. Noah seems to have observed the same hebdomadal 
division of time. The command to enter into the Ark was 
given, seven days before the flood came. Genesis vii. 4, 10. 
So, he allowed seven days to elapse between the times of 
sending forth the dove. Genesis viii. 10, 12. Now, I think, 
that these intimations show, that this division of time was 
observed, according to the original command ; and, we may 
well suppose that with it was connected the special time for 
religious worship. Thus, also, Joseph devoted seven days, 
or a whole week, to the mourning for his father. 

3. The next mention of the Sabbath is, shortly after the 
Israelites had left Egypt, and were fed with manna in the 
wilderness. Exodus xvi. 22, 30. As the passage is of con- 



188 THE OBSERVANCE 

siderable length, I need not quote it. I would, however, 

remark: 

1. It occurs before the giving of the law; and, therefore, 
the obligatoriness of the Sabbath is hereby acknowledged, 
irrespective of the Mosaic law. 

2. When first alluded to, it is spoken of as a thing known. 
God, first, without referring to the Sabbath, informs Moses, 
that, on the sixth day, the Israelites should gather twice as 
much manna as on any other day. From this, it seems that 
the division of time by weeks was known ; and that it was 
taken for granted that they would know the reason for the 
making of this distinction. In the whole of the narration, 
there is no precept given for the keeping of the day, but 
they are reproved for not suitably keeping it, as an institu- 
tion with which they ought to have been familiar. 

Besides these, there are many indications, in the earliest 
classics, that the Greeks and Romans observed the heb- 
domadal division of time ; and, also, that the seventh day 
was considered peculiarly sacred. This seems to have been 
the case in the time of Hesiod. The same is supposed to 
have been the fact, in regard to the northern nations of 
Europe, from which we are immediately descended. The 
inference which seems naturally to arise from these facts, is, 
that this institution was originally observed by the whole 
human race ; and that it was transmitted, with different 
degrees of care, by different nations, ilntil the period of the 
commencement of our various historical records. 

From the above facts, I think we are warranted in the 
conclusion, that the seventh day, or, perhaps, generally, the 
seventh part of time, was originally set apart for a religious 
purpose, by our Creator, for the whole human race ; that it 
was so observed by the Hebrews previously to the giving of 



OF THE SABBATH. 189 

the law; and that, probably, the observance was, in the 
infancy of our race, universal. 

II. The Mosaic Sabbath. 

The precept for the observance of the Sabbath, at the 
giving of the law, is in these words; "Remember the Sab- 
bath day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and 
do all thy work ; but the seventh is the Sabbath of the Lord 
thy God ; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy 
son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid- 
servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy 
gates ; for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the 
sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day. 
Wherefore the Lord blessed the seventh day, and hallowed 
it." Exodus xx. 11. 

Now, concerning this precept, there are several things 
worthy of remark. 

1. It is found in the law of the ten commandments 
which is always referred to in the Scriptures, as containing 
the sum of the moral precepts of God to man. Our Saviour, 
and the Apostles, who made the most decided distinction 
between moral and ceremonial observances, never allude 
to the law of the ten commandments, in any other manner, 
than as of permanent and universal obligation. Now, I 
know of no reason which can be assigned, why this precept 
should be detached from all the rest, and considered as cere- 
monial, when the whole of these taken together, are allowed, 
by universal consent, to have been quoted as moral precepts 
by Christ and his Apostles. 

2. The reasons given for observing it, are the same as 
those given at the time of its first institution. Inasmuch as 
these reasons are, in their nature, general, we should natu- 



190 THE OBSERVANCE 

rally conclude that the obligation which it imposes, is uni- 
versal. 

3. This commandment is frequently referred to by the 
prophets, as one of high moral obligation; the most solemn 
threatening are uttered against those who profane it; and 
tin 1 greatest rewards promised to those who keep it. See 
Isaiah lvi. 2, 6; Jeremiah xvii. 24, 25; Nehemiah xiii. 
15, 21. 

4. In addition to rest from labor, the meeting together 
for worship, and the reading of the Scriptures, was made a 
part of the duty of the Sabbath day. Six days shall work 
be done; but the seventh is the Sabbath of rest; a holy con- 
vocation. Leviticus xxiii. 3. Thus, also, Moses, of old 
time, hath, in every city, them that preach him, being read 
in the Synagogues every Sabbath day. Acts xv. 21. 

Besides this re-enaction of the Sabbath day, in the Mosaic 
Law, there were special additions made to its observance, 
which belong to the Jews alone, and which were a part of 
their civil or ceremonial law. With this view, other rea- 
sons were given for observing it, and other rites were added. 
Thus, far instance— 

1. It was intended to distinguish them from the sur- 
rounding idolatrous nations. Exodus xxxi. 12, 17. 

2. It was a memorial of their deliverance from Egypt. 
Deuteronomy v. 15. 

3. And, with these views, the principle of devoting the 
seventh part of time, was extended also to years, every 
seventh year being a year of rest. 

4. The violation of the Sabbath was punished with death 
by the civil magistrate. 



OF THE SABBATH. 191 

Now, whatever is in its nature local, and designed for a 
particular purpose, ceases, whenever that purpose is accom- 
plished. Hence, these civil and ceremonial observances 
cease, with the termination of the Jewish polity ; while that 
which is moral and universal, remains as though the ceremo- 
nial observances had never existed. I think that this view 
of the subject is also confirmed, by the example and precept 
of Christ, who gave directions concerning the manner in 
which the Sabbath was to be kept, and also, was himself ac- 
customed to observe the day for the purposes of religious 
worship. " As his custom was, he went into the synagogue 
on the Sabbath day, and stood up to read" Luke iv. 16. 
See also Matthew xii. 2, 13. When our Lord, in teaching 
the mode in which the Sabbath is to be kept, specifies what 
things it is lawful to do on the Sabbath day, he clearly pro- 
ceeds Upon the principle that it was lawful to do things 
on other days, which it would not be lawful to do on the Sab- 
bath day. 

III. The Christian Sabbath. 

We shall consider here, 1st. The day on which the Chris- 
tian Sabbath is to be kept ; 2d. The manner in which it is 
to be kept. 

First. The day on which the Christian Sabbath is to be 
kept. 

First. There are indications, from the facts which tran- 
spired on that day, that it was to be specially honored under 
the new dispensation. 

1. Our Saviour arose on that day from the dead, having 
accomplished the work of man's redemption. 

2. On this day he appeared to his Apostles, a week from 



192 THE OBSERVANCE 

his resurrection, at which time he had his conversation with. 
Thomas. 

3. On this day, also, occurred the feast of Pentecost, when 
the Spirit was in so remarkable a manner poured out, and 
the new dispensation emphatically commenced. 

Second. That the primitive Christians, in the days of the 
apostles, were accustomed to observe this day, as their day 
of weekly worship, is evident from several passages in the 
New Testament, and also from the earliest ecclesiastical 
records. 

1. That the early disciples, in all places, were accustomed 
to meet statedly, to worship and celebrate the Lord's Supper, 
is evident from 1 Corinthians xi. 1, 20, 14, 23, 40. And 
that these meetings were on the first day of the week, may 
be gathered from 1 Corinthians xvi. 1, 2. 

2. That these meetings were held on the first day of the 
week, is also further evident from Acts xx. 6, 11 ; where 
we are informed, that in Troas the Christians met on the first 
day of the week to break bread, ( that is, to celebrate the 
Lord's Supper,) and to receive religious instruction. From 
these passages, we see that this custom had already become 
universal, not merely in the neighborhood of Jerusalem, 
but throughout the regions in which the Christian religion 
was promulgated. 

3. Again, Revelations i. 10, it is observed by John, " I 
was in the Spirit on the Lord's day" From this remark, 
it is probable that John kept this day with peculiar solem- 
nity. It is certain that the day had already obtained a par- 
ticular name ; a name by which it has continued to be dis- 
tinguished in every subsequent age. 

Besides these allusions to the day from the New Testament, 



OF THE SABBATH. 193 

there are various facts bearing upon the subject from unin- 
spired historians. 

1. The early fathers frequently refer to this day, as the 
day set apart for religious worship ; and allude to the differ- 
ence between keeping this day, and keeping the seventh, or 
Jewish Sabbath, specially on the ground of its being the 
day of our Saviour's resurrection. 

2. Pliny, in his letter to Trajan, remarks that the Chris- 
tians " were accustomed, on a stated day, to meet before day- 
light, and to repeat among themselves a hymn to Christ, as 
to a God, and to bind themselves, by a sacred obligation, not 
to commit any wickedness, but on the contrary, to abstain 
irom thefts, robberies, and adulteries ; also, not to violate 
their promise, or deny a pledge ; after which it was their 
custom to separate, and meet again at a promiscuous and 
harmless meal." It is needless here to remark the exact co- 
incidence between this account from the pen of a heathen 
magistrate, with the account of the keeping of the day, in 
the places where it is mentioned in the New Testament. 

3. That this stated day was the first day of the week, or 
the Lord's day, is evident from another testimony. So well 
known was the custom of the early Christians on this sub- 
ject, that the ordinary question put by their persecutors to 
the Christian martyrs was, " Hast thou kept the Lord's day ?" 
Dominicum servasti ? To which the usual answer was, " I 
am a Christian : I cannot omit it." Christianus sum, in- 
termittere non possum. 

4. It is, however, manifest, that the Jews, who were strongly 
inclined to blend the rites of Moses with the Christian 
religion, at first kept the seventh day ; or, what is very pro- 
bable, at first kept both days. The Apostles declared that 
the disciples of Jesus are not under obligation to observe 
the seventh day. See Colossians ii. 16, 17. Now, as the 

18 



194 THE OBSERVANCE 

observance of the Sabbath is a precept given to the whole 
human race; as it is repeated, in the Mosaic law, as a moral 
precept; as the authority of this precept is recognised both 
by the teaching and example of Christ and his Apostles ; as 
the Apostles teach, that the keeping of the seventh day is 
not obligatory : and as they did keep the first day as a day 
of religious worship, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
they intended to teach, that the first day was that which we 
are, as Christians, to observe. 

5. From these considerations, we feel warranted to con- 
clude, that the first day of the week was actually kept by the 
inspired Apostles, as the Christian Sabbath. Their example 
is sufficient to teach us that the keeping of this day is accept- 
able to God ; and we are, on this ground, at liberty to keep 
it as the Sabbath. If, however, any other person be dissatis- 
fied with these reasons, and feel under obligation to observe 
the seventh day, I see no precept in the word of God to for- 
bid him. 

6. If, however, as seems to me to be the case, both days 
are allowable, that is, if I have sufficient reason to believe 
that either is acceptable to God ; but if, by observing the 
first day, I can enjoy more leisure, and suffer less interrup- 
tion, and thus better accomplish the object of the day ; and 
if, besides, I have the example of inspired Apostles in favor 
of this observance, I should decidedly prefer to observe the 
first day. Nay, I should consider the choice of that day as 
obligatory. For, if I am allowed to devote either day to the 
worship of God, it is surely obligatory on me to worship God 
on that day on which I can best accomplish the very object 
for which the day was set apart. 

If it be asked when this day is to begin, I answer, that I 
presume we are at liberty to commence this day at the same 
time that we commence other days, for the obvious reason, 



OF THE SABBATH. 195 

that thus we can generally enjoy the quiet of the Sabbath 
with less interruption. 

Secondly. Of the manner in which the Christian Sab- 
bath is to be observed. 

The design for which the Sabbath was instituted, I sup- 
pose to be, to set apart a portion of our time for the uninter- 
rupted worship of God, and the preparation of our souls for 
eternity ; and also, to secure to man and beast, one day in 
seven as a season of rest from labor. 

Hence, the law of the Sabbath forbids — 

1. All labor of body or mind, of which the immediate ob- 
ject is not the worship of God, or our own religious im- 
provement. The only exceptions to this rule are, works of 
necessity or of mercy. The necessity, however, must be one 
which is imposed by the providence of God, and not by our 
own will. Thus, a ship when on a voyage may sail on the 
Sabbath as well as on any other day, without violating the 
rule. The rule, however, would be violated by commencing 
the voyage on the Sabbath, because here a choice of days is 
in the power of the master. 

2. The labor of those committed to our charge. 

1. The labor of servants. Their souls are of as much 
value as our own, and they need the benefit of this law as 
much as ourselves. Besides, if this portion of their time is 
claimed by our Creator, we have no right to purchase it, nor 
have they a right to negotiate it away. Works of necessity 
must, of course, be performed ; but these should be restricted 
within the limits prescribed by a conscientious regard to the 
object and design of the day. 



190 THE OBSERVANCE 

2. Brutes are, by the fourth commandment, included in 
the law which ordains rest to all the animate creation. They 
need the repose which it grants, and they are entitled to their 
portion of it. 

3. The pursuit of pleasure, or of any animal, or merely in- 
tellectual, gratification. Hence, the indulgence of our ap- 
petites, in such manner as to prevent us from free and buoy- 
ant spiritual contemplation, riding or journeying for amuse- 
ment, the merely social pleasure of visiting, the reading of 
books designed for the gratification of the taste or the imagi- 
nation, are all, by the principles of the command, forbidden. 

On the contrary, the law of the Sabbath enjoins. 

I. The employment of the day, in the more solemn and 
immediate duties of religion. 

1. Reading the Scriptures, religious meditation, prayer in 
private; and also the special instruction in religion, of those 
committed to our charge. And, hence, it enjoins such 
domestic arrangements as are consistent with these duties. 

2. Social worship. Under the Mosaic and Christian dis- 
pensation, this was an important part of the duties of 
the day. As the setting apart of a particular day to be 
universally observed, involves the idea of social as well as 
personal religion, one of the most obvious duties which it 
imposes, is that of social worship; that is, of meeting 
together in societies to return thanks for our social mercies ; 
to implore the pardon of God for our social sins, and be- 
seech His favor for those blessings which we need as socie- 
ties, no less than as individuals. 

The importance of the religious observance of the Sab- 
bath, is rarely sufficiently estimated. Every attentive ob- 
server has remarked, that the violation of this command, by 



OF THE SABBATH. 197 

the young, is one of the most decided marks of incipient 
moral degeneracy. Religious restraint is fast losing its hold 
upon that young man, who, having been educated in the 
fear of God, begins to spend the Sabbath in idleness, or in 
amusement. And so, also, of communities. The desecra- 
tion of the Sabbath is one of those evident indications of 
that thoughtless recklessness — that insane love of pleasure, 
and that subjection to the government of appetite and pas- 
sion, which forebodes, that the " beginning of the end" of 
social happiness, and of true national prosperity, has arrived. 

Hence, we see how imperative is the duty of parents, and 
of Legislators, on this subject. The head of every family, 
is obliged, by the command of God, not only to honor this 
day himself, but to use all the means in his power to secure 
the observance of it, by all those committed to his charge. 
He is, thus, not only promoting his own, but his children's 
happiness ; for nothing is a more sure antagonist force to all 
the allurements of vice, as nothing tends more strongly to 
fix in the minds of the young, a convidtion of the exist- 
ence and attributes of God, than the solemn keeping of this 
day. And, hence, also, Legislators are false to their trust, 
who, either by the enactment of laws, or by their example, 
diminish, in the least degree, in the minds of a people, the 
reverence due to that day, which God has set apart for him- 
self. 

The only question which remains, is the following: 

Is it the duty of the civil magistrate to enforce the observ- 
ance of the Sabbath % 

We are inclined to think not, and for the following 
reasons. 

1. The duty arises solely from our relations to God, and 

18* 



198 THE OBSERVANCE 

not from our relations to man. Now, our duties to God ar£ 
never to be placed within the control of human legislation, 

2. If the civil magistrate has a right to take cognizance 
of this duty to God, he has a right to take cognizance of 
every other. And, if he have a right to take cognizance of 
the duty, he has a right to prescribe in what manner it shall 
be discharged ; or, if he see fit, to forbid the observance of 
it altogether. The concession of this right would, therefore, 
lead to direct interference with liberty of conscience. 

3. The keeping of the Sabbath is a moral duty. Hence, 
if it be acceptably observed, it must be a voluntary service. 
But, the civil magistrate can never do anything more than 
produce obedience to the external precept ; which, in the 
sight of God, would not be the keeping of the Sabbath at all. 
Hence, to allow the civil magistrate to enforce the observ- 
ance of the Sabbath, would be to surrender to him the con- 
trol over the conscience, without attaining even the object 
for which the surrender was made, 

4. It is, however, the duty of the civil magistrate, to pro- 
tect every individual in the undisturbed right of worship- 
ping God as he pleases. This protection every individual 
has a right to claim, and society is under obligation to ex- 
tend it. And, also, as this is a leisure day, and is liable to 
various abuses, the magistrate has a right to prevent any 
modes of gratification which would tend to disturb the peace 
of society. This right is acknowledged in regulations re- 
specting other days of leisure, or rejoicing; and, there can 
be no reason, why it should not be exercised, in respect to 
the Sabbath. 

5. And, lastly, the law of the Sabbath applies equally to 
societies, and to individuals. An individual is forbidden to 
labor on the Sabbath, or to employ another person to labor 
for him. The rule is the same, when applied to any number 



OF THE SABBATH. 199 

of individuals; that is, to a society. Hence, a society has 
no right to employ persons to labor for them. The contract 
is a violation of the SabbatiGal law. It is on this ground, 
that I consider the carrying of the mail, on this day, a s o~ 
cial violation of the Christian Sabbath. 



PART II. 

DUTIES TO MAN. 

RECIPROCITY AND BENEVOLENCE. 

DIVISION I. 

THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 

GENERAL PRINCIPLE ILLUSTRATED, AND THE DUTIES 
OF RECIPROCITY CLASSIFIED. 

It has been already observed, that our duties, both to God 
and man, are all enforced by the obligation of love to God. 
By this we mean, that, in consequence of our moral consti- 
tution, we are under obligation to love our fellow-men, 
because they are our fellow-men; and we are also under 
obligation to love them, because we have been so com- 
manded to love them by our Father, who is in heaven. 
The nature of this obligation, may be illustrated by a 
familiar example. Every child in a family is under obliga- 
tion to love its parent. And every child is bound to love 
its brother, both because he is its brother, and, also, because 
this love is a duty enforced by the relation in which they 
stand to their common parent. 

The relation in which men stand to each other, is essen- 
tially the relation of equality ; not equality of condition, but 
equality of right. 



202 THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 

Every human being, is a distinct and separately accounta- 
ble individual. To each one, God has given just such 
moans of happiness, and placed him under such circum- 
stances for improving those means of happiness, as it has 
pleased him. To one, he has given wealth; to another, 
intellect; to another, physical strength; to another, health ; 
and to all in different degrees. In all these respects, the 
human race presents a scene of the greatest possible diver- 
sity. So far as natural advantages are concerned, we can 
scarcely find two individuals, who are not created under 
circumstances, widely dissimilar. 

But, viewed in another light, all men are placed under 
circumstances of perfect equality Each separate indivi- 
dual, is created with precisely the same right to use the 
advantages with which God has endowed him. This 
proposition seems to me in its nature so self-evident, as 
almost to preclude the possibility of argument. The only 
reason that I can conceive, on which any one could found 
a plea for inequality of right, must be inequality of condi- 
tion. But this can manifestly create no diversity of right. 
I may have been endowed with better eye-sight than my 
neighbor ; but this, evidently, gives me no right to put out 
his eyes, or to interfere with his right to derive from them 
whatever of happiness the Creator has placed within his 
power. I may have greater muscular strength than my 
neighbor ; but this gives me no right to break his arms, or 
to diminish, in any manner, his ability to use them for the 
production of his own happiness. Besides, this supposition 
involves direct and manifest contradiction. For, the prn> 
pie asserted, is, that superiority of condition confers supe- 
riority of right. But, if this be true, then every kind of 
superiority of condition, must confer corresponding superi- 
ority of right. Superiority in muscular strength must con- 
fer it, as much as superiority of intellect, or of wealth; and 
must confer it in the ratio of that superiority. In that case, 
if A, on the ground of intellectual superiority, have a right 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 203 

to improve his own means of happiness, by diminishing 
those which the Creator had given to B, B would have the 
same right over A, on the ground of superiority of muscular 
strength ; while C would have a corresponding right over 
them both, on the ground of superiority of wealth ; and so 
on, indefinitely; and these rights would change every day, 
according to the relative situation of the respective parties. 
That is to say, as right is, in its nature, exclusive, all the 
men in the universe have an exclusive right to the same 
thing; while the right of every one absolutely annihilates 
that of every other. What is the meaning of such an asser- 
tion, I leave it for others to determine. 

But let us look at man in another point of light. 

1. We find all men possessed of the same appetites and 
passions, that is, of the same desire for external objects, 
and the same capacity for receiving happiness from the 
gratification of these desires. We do not say, that all men 
possess them all in an equal degree ; but only, that all men 
actually possess them all ; and that their happiness depends 
upon the gratification of them. 

2. These appetites and passions are created, so far as they 
themselves are exclusively concerned, without limit. Grati- 
fication generally renders them both more intense and more 
numerous. Such is the case with the love of wealth, the 
love of power, the love of sensual pleasure, or with any of 
the others. 

3. These desires may be gratified in such a manner, as 
not to interfere with the right which every other man has 
over his own means of happiness. Thus, I may gratify my 
love of wealth by industry and frugality, while I conduct 
towards every other man with entire honesty. I may gratify 
my love of science, without diminishing, in any respect, the 
means of knowledge of another. And, on the other hand, 



•201 THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 

I am created with the physical power to gratify my desires 
in such a wanner as to interfere with the right which ano- 
ther has over the means of happiness which God has given 
him. Tims, I have the physical power, to gratify my love 
of property by stealing the property of another, as well as to 
gratify it by earning property for myself. I have, by the 
gifl of speech, the physical power to ruin the reputation of 
another, for the sake of gratifying my own love of approba- 
tion. I have the physical power to murder a man, for the 
sake of using his body, to gratify my love of anatomical 
knowledge. And so of a thousand cases. 

4. And hence, we see, that the relation in which human 
beings stand to each other, is the following. Every indi- 
vidual is created with a desire to use the means of hap- 
piness which God has given him, in such manner as he 
thinks will best promote that happiness ; and of this man- 
ner he is the sole judge. Every individual is endowed 
with the same desires, which he may gratify in such man- 
ner as will not interfere with his neighbor's means of hap- 
piness ; but each individual has, also, the physical power of 
so gratifying his desires as will interfere with the means of 
happiness which God has granted to his neighbor. 

5. From this relation, it is manifest, that every man is 
under obligation to pursue his own happiness, in such man- 
ner only, as will leave his neighbour in the undisturbed 
exercise of that common right which the Creator has 
equally conferred upon both; because in no other man- 
ner can the evident design of the Creator, the common hap- 
piness of all, be promoted. 

That this is the law of our being, may be shown from 

era) considerations. By violating it, the happiness of 

the aggressor is not increased, while that of the sufferer 

is diminished: while, by obeying it, the greatest amount 

of happiness is secured, of which our condition is suscepti- 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 205 

ble, because, by obeying it, every one derives the greatest 
possible advantage, from the gifts bestowed upon him by 
his Creator* 

2. Suppose any other rule of obligation, that is, that man 
is not under obligation to observe, with this exactitude, the 
rights of his neighbor. Where shall the limit be fixed? 
If violation be allowed in a small degree, why not in a great 
degree ? and, if he may interfere with one right, why not 
with all ? And, as all men come under the same law, this 
principle would lead to the same absurdity, as that of which 
we have before spoken ; that is, it would abolish the very 
idea of right; and, as every one has an equal liberty of vio- 
lation, would surrender the whole race to the dominion of 
unrestrained desire. 

3. If it be said, that one class of men is not under the 
obligation to observe this rule in its conduct towards ano- 
ther class of men, then it will be necessary to show that the 
second class are not men, that is, human beings : for these 
principles apply to men, as men ; and, the simple fact, that 
a being is a man, places him within the reach of their obli- 
gation, and of their protection. Nay, more, suppose the 
inferior class of beings were not truly men ; if they were 
intelligent moral agents, I suppose that we should be under 
the same obligation to conduct towards them upon the prin- 
ciple of reciprocity. I see no reason why an angel would 
have a right, by virtue of his superior nature, to interfere 
with the means of happiness which God has conferred upon 
man. By parity of reasoning, therefore, superiority of rank 
would give to man no such power over an inferior species 
of moral and intelligent beings. 

And, lastly, if it be true that the Creator has given to 
every separate individual control over those means of hap- 
piness which He has bestowed upon him, then the simple 
question is, which is of the highest authority ; this grant of 

19 



906 THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 

the Creator, or the desires and passions of the creature? for 
these are really the notions which are brought into collision. 
That is to say, ought the grant of God, and the will of God, 
to limit my desires ; or ought my desires to vitiate the grant 
and set at defiance the will of God. On this question a 
moral and intelligent creature can entertain but one opinion. 

Secondly. Let us examine the teaching of the holy Scrip- 
tures on this subject. - 

The precept in the Bible is in these words : " Thou shalt 
love thy neighbor as thyself." 

Two questions are here to be considered. First, to 
whom this command applies ; or, in other words, who is 
my neighbor ? and, secondly, what is implied in the precept 1 

1. The first of these questions is answered by our Sa- 
viour himself, in the parable of the good Samaritan. Luke 
x. 25, 37. He there teaches us that we are to consider as 
our neighbor, not our relation, or our fellow-citizen, or those 
to whom we are bound by the reception of previous kind- 
ness, but the stranger, the alien, the hereditary national 
enemy ; that is, man as man, any human being to whom we 
may in any manner do good. Every man is our neighbor, 
and, therefore, we are under obligation to love every man as 
ourselves. 

2. What is the import of the command to love such an one 
as ourselves ? 

The very lowest meaning that we can assign to this pre- 
cept is as follows. I have already stated, that God has be- 
stowed upon every man such means of happiness, as, in his 
own sovereign pleasure, he saw fit ; and that has given to 
every man an equal right to use those means of happiness as 
each one supposes will best promote his own well-being. 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. - 207 

Besides this, every one has an instinctive desire thus to use 
them. He cannot be happy unless this desire be gratified, 
and he is painfully conscious of injury, if this right be inter- 
fered with. In this manner, he loves himself. Now, in the 
same manner, he is commanded to love his neighbor. That 
is, he is, by this precept, obliged to have the same desire that 
his neighbor should have the unmolested control over what- 
ever God has bestowed upon him, as he has to enjoy, unmo- 
lested, the same control hiihself ; and to feel the same con- 
sciousness of injury, when another man's rights are invaded, 
as when his own rights are invaded. With these senti- 
ments, he would be just as unwilling to violate the rights of 
another, as he would be to suffer a violation of his own. 
That this view of the subject exhausts the command, we by 
no means assert, but we think it evident, that the language 
is capable of no less comprehensive meaning. 

The same precept is expressed, in other places, under ano- 
ther form of language. " All things whatsoever ye would 
that men should do unto you, do you even so unto them ; 
for this is the law and the prophets." Matthew vii. 12. 

The words here, as in the former case, are used to denote 
a principle of universal obligation. " All things whatso- 
ever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so 
unto them." 

The precept itself teaches us to estimate the rights of 
others, by the consciousness of individual right in our own 
bosoms. Would we wish to know how delicate a regard 
we are bound to entertain towards the control which God 
has given to others over the means of happiness which He 
has granted to them, let us decide the question by asking 
how tender and delicate is the regard which we would wish 
them to entertain towards us, under similar circumstances. 
The decision of the one question will always be the deci- 
sion of the other. And this precept goes a step farther. It 



108 THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 

renders it obligatory on every man to commence such a 
course of conduct, irrespective of whatever may be the con- 
duct of others to himself. It forbids us to demand more 
than the law of reciprocity allows; it commands us always 
to render it ; and, still more, if we complain to another of his 
violation of the law ; it renders it imperative on us, while 
we urge upon him a change of conduct, to commence, by 
setting him the example. And, it really, if carried out to 
the utmost, would preclude our claim upon him, until we 
had ourselves first manifested towards him the very dispo- 
sition which we demand towards ourselves. The moral 
beauty of this precept will be at once seen by any one who 
will take the trouble, honestly, to generalize it. He will 
immediately perceive that it would always avert injury at 
the very outset ; and by rendering both parties more vir- 
tuous, would tend directly to banish injury, and violence, 
and wrong, from the earth. 

Thirdly. This law of universal reciprocity applies with 
the same force to communities, as to individuals. 

Communities are composed of individuals, and can have, 
in respect to each other, no other rights than those of the in- 
viduals who constitute them. If it be wrong for one man to 
injure another man, it must be equally wrong for two men 
to injure two other men ; and so of any other number. And 
moreover, the grant of the Creator is, in both cases, under 
the same circumstances. God has bestowed upon nations, 
physical and intellectual advantages, in every possible de- 
gree of diversity. But He has granted to them all an equal 
right to use those advantages, in such manner as each one 
may suppose will best conduce to the promotion of his own 
happiness. 

Hence it will follow — 

1. That the precept applies as universally to nations as 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 209 

to individuals. Whenever societies of men treat with each 
other, whether powerful with weak, or polite with rude, 
civilized with savage, or intelligent with ignorant ; whether 
friends with friends, or enemies with enemies ; all are bound, 
by the law of reciprocity, to love each other as themselves, 
and to do unto others, in all things, whatsoever they would 
desire others to do unto them. 

2. And hence, also, the precept itself is equally obliga- 
tory upon nations as individuals. Every nation is bound to 
exhibit as sensitive a regard for the preservation inviolate of 
the rights of another nation, as it exhibits for the preser- 
vation inviolate of its own rights. And still more, every na- 
tion is under the same obligation as every individual, to 
measure the respect and moderation which it displays to 
others, by the respect and moderation which it demands for 
itself; and is also, if it complain of violation of right, to set 
the first example of entire and perfect reciprocity and fidel- 
ity. Were this course pursued by individuals and nations, 
the causes of collision would manifestly cease, and the ap- 
peal to arms would soon be remembered, only as one of the 
strange infatuations of by-gone barbarous and blood-thirsty 
ages. Chicanery, and intrigue, and overreaching, are as 
wicked and as disgraceful in the intercourse of nations and 
societies as in that of individuals ; and the tool of a nation 
or of a party, is as truly contemptible as the tool of an indi- 
vidual. The only distinction which I perceive is, that in the 
one case, the instrument of dishonesty is ashamed of his 
act, and dare not wear the badge of his slavery ; while in 
the other case, even the ambiguous virtue of shame has 
been lost, and the man glories in the brand which marks 
him for a villain. 

19* 



210 THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE DUTIES ARISING FROM THE LAW 
OF RECIPROCITY. 

The duties of reciprocity may be divided into three 
classes. 

Class 1. Duties to men as men. 

Class 2. Duties arising from the constitution of 

THE SEXES. 

Class 3. Duties arising from the constitution of 
civil society. 

Class 1. Duties to men as men. 

This includes justice and veracity. 

I. Justice^ as it regards, 1. Liberty. 

2. Property. 

3. Character. 

4. Reputation. 

II. Veracity. 1. Of the past and present. 

2. Of the future. 

Class 2. Duties arising from the constitution of 

the sexes. 

Including, 1. General duty of chastity. 

2. The law of marriage. 

3. The duties and rights of parents. 

4. The duties and rights of children. 

Class 3. Duties arising from the constitution of 
civil society. 

1. The nature of civil society. 

2. The mode in which the authority of civil society is 
maintained. 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 211 

3. Of forms of Government. 

4. Duties of magistrates. 

5. Duties of citizens. 



CLASS I. 

JUSTICE AND VERACITY. 

Of Justice. 

Justice, when used in a judicial sense, signifies that tem- 
per of mind which disposes a man to administer rewards 
and punishments according to the character and actions 
of the object. 

It is also used, to designate the act by which this admi- 
nistration is effected. Thus, we speak of a judge who 
administers justice. 

In the present case, however, it is used in a more exten- 
sive signification. It is here intended, to designate that 
temper of mind which disposes us to leave every other 
being, in the unmolested enjoyment of those means of hap- 
piness bestowed upon him by his Creator. It is, also, fre- 
quently used for the exhibition of this conduct in outward 
act. Thus, when a man manifests a proper respect for the 
rights of others, we say, he acts justly ; when he, in any 
manner, violates these rights, we say, he acts unjustly. 

The most important means of happiness which God has 
placed in the power of the individual, are, first, his own 
person; second, property; third, character; fourth, 
reputation. 



CHAPTER I. 

PERSONAL LIBERTY. 
SECTION I. 

NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 

Every human being is, by his constitution, a separate 
and distinct, and complete, system, adapted for all the pur- 
poses of self-government, and responsible, separately, to God, 
for the manner in which his powers are employed. Thus, 
every individual possesses a body, by which he is connected 
with the physical universe, and by which that universe is 
modified for the supply of his wants ; an understanding, by 
which truth is discovered, and by which means are adapted 
to their appropriate ends ; passions and desires, by which 
he is excited to action, and in the gratification of which his 
happiness consists ; conscience, to point out the limit with- 
in which these desires may be rightfully gratified : and a 
will, which determines him to action. The possession of 
these is necessary to a human nature, and it also renders 
every being, so constituted, a distinct and independent indi- 
vidual. He may need society, but every one needs it 
equally with every other one ; and, hence, all enter into it 
upon terms of strict and evident reciprocity. If the indi- 
vidual uses these powers according to the laws imposed by 
his Creator, his Creator holds him guiltless. If he use 
them in such manner as not to interfere with the use of the 
same powers which God has bestowed upon his neighbor, 



Jll N ITURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 

he is. as u respects bis neighbor, whether that neighbor be 
an individual or the community, independent. So long as 
he uses them within this limit, he has a right, so far as his 
fellow-men are concerned, to use them, in the most unli- 
mited sense, suo arbitrio, at his own discretion. His will is 
a sufficient and ultimate reason. He need assign no other 
km son for his conduct, than his own free choice. Within 
tiiis limit, he is still responsible to God ; but, within this limit, 
he is not responsible to man, nor is man responsible for 
kirn. 

1. Thus, a man has an entire right to use his own body as 
he will, provided he do not so use it as to interfere with the 
rights of his neighbor. He may go where he will, and 
stay where he please; he may work, or be idle; he may 
pursue one occupation, or another, or no occupation at all ; 
and it is the concern of no one else, if he leave inviolate the 
rights of every one else ; that is, if he leave every one else 
in the undisturbed enjoyment of those means of happiness 
bestowed upon him by the Creator. 

But it may be said, in this case, the individual may 
become chargeable to the community. To this, I answer, 
not unless the community assume the charge. If every 
man is left to himself, but is obliged to respect the rights of 
others, if he do not labor, a remedy is provided in the laws 
of the system, — he will very soon starve ; and, if he prefer 
starvation to labor, he has no one but himself to blame. 
While the law of reciprocity frees him from the control of 
society, it discharges society from any responsibility for the 
result of his actions upon himself. I know that society 
undertakes to support the indigent and helpless, and relieve 
men in extreme necessity. This, however, is a conven- 
tional arrangement, into which, men who choose, have a 
right to enter; and, having entered into it, they are bound 
by its provision. If they become responsible for the support 
of the individual's life, they have a right over his power of 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 215 

labor sufficient to cover that responsibility. And he who 
has become a member of such a society, has surrendered 
voluntarily his control over his body to this amount. But 
as he has done it voluntarily, such a conviction proceeds 
upon the concession, that the original right vests in the in- 
dividual. 

It seems almost trifling to argue a point, which is in its 
nature so evident upon inspection. If, however, any addi- 
tional proof be required, the following considerations will 
readily suggest themselves. It is asserted that every indi- 
vidual has an equal and ultimate right to the use of his body, 
his mind, and all the other means of happiness, with which 
God has endowed him. But suppose it otherwise. Suppose 
that one individual has a right to the body, or mind, or means 
of happiness of another. That is, suppose that A has a right to 
use the body of B according to his, that is, A's will Now, 
if this be true, it is true universally ; and hence, A has the 
control over the body of B, and B has control over the body 
of C, O of D, &c., and Z again over the body of A; that is, 
every separate will has the right of control over some other 
body besides its own, and has no right of control over its 
own body or intellect. Whether such is the constitution of 
human nature, or, if it be not, whether it would be an 
improvement upon the present constitution, may be easily 
decided. 

And, if it be said, that, to control one man's body by 
another man's will, is impossible, for that every man acts as 
he will, since he cannot do any thing unless he will do it, 
it may be answered, that the term will is used here in a dif- 
ferent sense from that intended in the preceding paragraph. 
Every one must see, that a man, who, out of the various 
ways of employing his body, set before him by his Creator, 
chooses that which he prefers, is in a very different condi- 
tion from him who is debarred from all choice, excepting 
that he may do what his fellow-man appoints, or else suffer 



210 NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY- 

what his fellow-man chooses to inflict. Now, the true con- 
dition of a human being, is that in which his will is influ- 
enced by no other circumstances than those which arise 
from the constitution under which his Creator has placed 
him. And he who places his fellow-man under any other 
conditions of existence, is guilty of the most odious tyranny, 
and seems to me to arrogate to himself the authority of the 
Most High God. 

2» The same remarks apply to the use of the intellect. 

If the preceding observations are just, it will follow, that 
every man, within the limit before suggested, has a right to 
use his intellect as he will. He may investigate whatever 
subjects he will, and in what manner soever he will, and 
may come to such conclusions as his investigations may 
teach, provided he interfere with the happiness of no other 
human being. The denial of this right, would lead to the 
same absurdities as in the former case. 

If it be said that the individual may, by so doing, involve 
himself in error, and thus diminish his own happiness, the 
answer is at hand, namely, for this the constitution of 
things provides its appropriate and adequate punishment. 
He who imbibes error, suffers, in his own person, the conse- 
quences of error, which are misfortune and loss of respect. 
And, besides, as for his happiness, society is, in no respect, 
responsible ; there can be no reason, derived from the con- 
sideration of his happiness, why society should interfere 
with the free use of this instrument of happiness, which the 
Creator has intrusted solely to the individual himself. 

But, it may be asked, has not society a right to oblige men 
to acquire a certain amount of intellectual cultivation? I 
answer, men have a right to form a society upon such con- 
ditions as they please ; and, of course, so to form it, that it 
shall be necessary, in order to enjoy its privileges, for the 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 217 

individual to possess a certain amount of knowledge. Hav- 
ing formed such a society, every one is bound by its provi- 
sions, so long as he remains a member of it ; and the enforc- 
ing its provisions upon the individual, is no more than 
obliging him to do what he, for a sufficient consideration, 
voluntarily contracted to do. And, society may, rightfully, 
enforce this provision in one of two ways. It may with- 
hold, from every man who neglects to acquire this know- 
ledge, the benefits of citizenship ; or may grant these benefits 
to every one, and oblige every one to possess the assigned 
amount of knowledge. In this case, there is no violation 
of reciprocity, for the same requirements are made upon all, 
and every one receives his full equivalent, in the results of 
the same law upon others. More than this, the individual 
could not justly require. He could not justly demand to be 
admitted to rights which presuppose certain intellectual 
attainments ; and which can only be enjoyed by those who 
have made these attainments, unless he be willing to con- 
form to the condition necessary to the enjoyment. 

3. I have thus far considered man only in his relations to 
the present life. So far as I have gone, I have endeavored 
to show that, provided the individual interfere not with the 
rights of others, he has a right to use his own body and 
mind, as he thinks will best promote his own happiness ; 
that is, as he will. But, if he have this right, within these 
limits, to pursue his present happiness., how much more 
incontrovertible must be his right to use his body and mind 
in such manner as will best promote his eternal happiness ! 
And besides, if, for the sake of his own happiness, he has a 
right to the unmolested enjoyment of whatever God has 
given him, how much more is he entitled to the same unmo- 
lested enjoyment, for the sake of obeying God, and fulfill- 
ing the highest obligation of which he is susceptible ! 

We say, then, that every man, provided he does not inter- 
fere with the rights of his neighbor, has a right, so far as 

20 



218 NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 

his neighbor is concerned, to worship God, or not to wor- 
ship him — to worship him in any manner that he will ; 
and that, for the abuse of this liberty, he is accountable 
only to God. 

If it be said, that, by so doing, a man may ruin his own 
soul, the answer is obvious ; for this ruin, the individual 
himself, and not society, is responsible. And, moreover, as 
religion consists in the temper of heart, which force cannot 
affect, — and not in external observance, which is all that 
force can affect, — no application of force can change our re- 
lations to God, or prevent the ruin in question. All appli- 
cation of force must then be gratuitous mischief. 

To sum up what has been said — all men are created 
with an equal right to employ their faculties of body or of 
mind, in such manner as will promote their own happiness, 
either here or hereafter ; or, which is the same thing, every 
man has a right to use his own powers, of body or mind, in 
such manner as he will ; provided, he do not use them in 
such manner as to interfere with the rights of his neighbor. 

The exceptions to this law are easily denned. 

1. The first exception is, in the case of infancy. 

By the law of nature, a parent is under obligation to sup- 
port his child, and is responsible for his actions. He has, 
therefore, a right to control the actions of the child, so long 
as this responsibility exists. He is under obligations to 
render that child a suitable member of the community, and, 
this obligation he could not discharge, unless the physical 
and intellectual liberty of the child were placed under his 
power. 

2. As the parent has supported the child during infancy, 
he has, probably, by the law of nature, a right to his services 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 219 

during youth, or for so long a period as may be sufficient to 
insure an adequate remuneration. When, however, this 
remuneration is received, the right of the parent over the 
child ceases forever. 

3. This right, he may, if he see fit, transfer to another, 
as in case of apprenticeship. Bat he can transfer the right 
for no longer time than he holds it. He can, therefore, nego- 
tiate it away for no period beyond the child's minority. 

4. A man may transfer his right over his own labor, for 
a limited time, and for a satisfactory equivalent. But, this 
transfer proceeds upon the principle, that the original right 
vests in himself ; and it is, therefore, no violation of it. He 
has, however, no right to transfer the services of any other 
person, except his child ; nor of his child, except under the 
limitations above specified. 

In strict accordance with these remarks is the memorable 
sentence in the commencement of the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that 
all men are created equal ; that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights ; that among these 
are, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." That the 
equality here spoken of is not of the means of happiness, 
but in the right to use them as any one wills, is too evident 
to need illustration. 



SECTION II. 

MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 

Personal liberty may be violated in two ways : 1 . By the 
individual. 2. By society. 



220 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

Part First. Of the violation of personal liberty by the 
individual . The most common violation of personal liberty 
under this head, is, in the case of Domestic Slavery. 

Domestic slavery proceeds upon the principle that the 
master has a right to control the actions, physical and intel- 
lectual, of the slave, for his own, that is, the master's, indi- 
vidual benefit ; and, of course, that the happiness of the 
master, when it comes in competition with the happiness of 
the slave, extinguishes in the latter the right to pursue it. 
It supposes, at best, that the relation between master and 
slave is not that which exists between man and man, but is 
a modification of that which exists between man and the 
brutes. 

Now, this manifestly supposes that the two classes of 
beings are created with dissimilar rights : that the master 
possesses rights which have never been conceded by the 
slave ; and, that the slave has no rights at all over the 
means of happiness which God has given him, whenever 
these means of happiness can be rendered available to the 
service of the master. It supposes that the Creator intended 
one human being to govern the physical, intellectual, and 
moral actions, of as many other human beings, as by pur- 
chase he can bring within his physical power ; and, that 
one human being may thus acquire a right to sacrifice the 
happiness of any number of other human beings, for the 
purpose of promoting his own, 

Slavery, thus, violates the personal liberty of man as a 
physical, intellectual, and moral being. 

1. It purports to give to the master a right to control the 
physical labor of the slave, not for the sake of the happi- 
ness of the slave, but for the sake of the happiness of the 
master. It subjects the amount of labor, and the kind of 
labor, and the remuneration for labor, entirely to the will of 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 221 

the one party, to the entire exclusion of the will of the other 
party. 

2. But if this right in the master over the slave be con- 
ceded, there is of course conceded all other rights necessary 
to insure its possession. Hence, inasmuch as the slave can 
be held in this condition only while he remains in the 
lowest state of mental imbecility, it supposes the master to 
have the right to control his intellectual development, just 
as far as may be necessary to secure entire subjection. 
Thus, it supposes the slave to have no right to use his intel- 
lect for the production of his own happiness, but, only to 
use it in such manner as may conduce to his master's profit. 

3. And, moreover, inasmuch as the acquisition of the 
knowledge of his duty to God could not be freely made with- 
out the acquisition of other knowledge, which might, if uni- 
versally diffused, endanger the control of the master, slavery 
supposes the master to have the right to determine how 
much knowledge of his duty a slave shall obtain, the man- 
ner in which he shall obtain it, and the manner in which 
he shall discharge that duty after he shall have obtained a 
knowledge of it. It thus subjects the duty of man to God 
entirely to the will of man ; and this for the sake of the 
pecuniary profit. It renders the eternal happiness of the 
one party subservient to the temporal happiness of the other. 
And this principle is commonly carried into effect in slave- 
holding countries. 

If argument were necessary to show that such a system 
as this must be at variance with the ordinance of God, it 
might be easily drawn from the effects which it produces 
both upon morals and upon national wealth. 

1. Its effects must be disastrous upon the morals of both 
parties. By presenting objects on whom passion may be 
satiated without resistance, and without redress, it cultivates 
in the master pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licen- 

20* 



•222 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

tionsness. By accustoming the slave to subject his moral 
principles to the will of another, it tends to abolish in him 
all moral distinction, and thus fosters in him lying, deceit, 
hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up 
to minister to the appetites of his master. That in all 
slave-holding countries there are exceptions to this remark, 
and that there are principles in human nature, which in 
many cases limit the effects of these tendencies, may be 
gladly admitted. Yet, that such is the tendency of slavery 
as slavery, we think no reflecting person can for a moment 
hesitate to allow. 

2. The effects of slavery on national wealth may be easily 
seen, from the following considerations : 

1. Instead of imposing upon all, the necessity of labor, it 
restricts the number of laborers, that is, of producers, within 
the smallest possible limit, by rendering labor disgraceful. 

2. It takes from the laborers the natural stimulus to labor, 
namely, the desire in the individual of improving his con- 
dition ; and substitutes in the place of it, that motive which 
is the least operative and the least constant, namely, the fear 
of punishment without the consciousness of moral delin- 
quency. 

3. It removes as far as possible from both parties the dis- 
position and the motives to frugality. Neither the master 
learns frugality from labor, nor the slave from the benefits 
which it confers. And here, while the one party wastes 
from ignorance of the laws of acquisition, and the other be- 
cause he can have no motive to economy, capital must 
accumulate but slowly, if indeed it accumulate at all. 

And that such are the tendencies of slavery is manifest 
from observation. No country, not of great fertility, can 
long sustain a large slave population. Soils of more than 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 223 

ordinary fertility cannot sustain it long, after the first rich- 
ness of the soil has been exhausted. Hence, slavery in this 
country is acknowledged to have impoverished many of our 
most valuable districts ; and hence, it is continually migra- 
ting from the older settlements, to those new and untilled 
regions, where the accumulated manure of centuries of ve- 
getation, has formed a soil, whose productiveness may, for a 
while, sustain a system at variance with the laws of nature. 
Many of our free and of our slave-holding states were peo- 
pled at about the*same time. The slave-holding states had 
every advantage, both in soil and climate, over their neigh- 
bors. And yet the accumulation of capital has been greatly 
in favor of the latter. If any one doubts, whether this differ- 
ence be owing to the use of slave labor, let him ask himself 
what would have been the condition of the slave-holding 
states, at this moment, if they had been inhabited, from the 
beginning, by an industrious yeomanry, each one holding 
his own land, and each one tilling it with the labor of his 
own hands. 

But let us inquire what is the doctrine of revelation on 
this subject. 

1. The moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically op- 
posed to slavery. They are, Thou shalt love thy neighbor 
as thyself, and all things whatsoever ye would that men 
should do unto you, do ye even so unto them. 

The application of these precepts is universal. Our 
neighbor is every one whom we may benefit. The obliga- 
tion respects all things whatsoever. The precept then, 
manifestly, extends to men as men, or men in every con- 
dition, and if to all things whatsoever, certainly to a thing 
so important as the right to personal liberty. 

Again. By this precept, it is made our duty to cherish as 
tender and delicate a respect for the right which the mean- 



224 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

est individual possesses over the means of happiness bestowed 
upon him by God, as we cherish for our own right over our 
own means of happiness ; or as we desire any other indi- 
vidual to cherish for it. Now, were this precept obeyed, it 
is manifest that slavery could not in fact exist for a single 
instant. The principle of the precept, is absolutely subver- 
sive of the principle of slavery. That of the one, is entire 
equality of right ; that of the other, of the entire absorption 
of the rights of one in the rights of the other. 

If any one doubts respecting the bearing of the Scripture 
precept upon this case, a few plain questions may throw ad- 
ditional light upon the subject. For instance — 

1. Do the precepts and the spirit of the Gospel allow me 
to derive my support from a system which extorts labor 
from my fellow-men, without allowing them any voice in 
the equivalent which they shall receive, and which can 
only be sustained, by keeping them in a state of mental de- 
gradation, and by shutting them out, in a great degree, 
from the means of salvation ? 

2. Would the master be willing that another person should 
subject him to slavery, for the samp reasons, and on the same 
grounds, that he holds his slave in bondage ? 

3. Would the Gospel allow us, if it were in our power, to 
reduce our fellow-citizens of our own color to slavery ? But 
the Gospel makes no distinction between men on the ground 
of color or race. God has made of one blood all the nations 
that dwell on the earth. I think that these questions will 
easily test the Gospel principles on this subject. 

But to this it is objected that the Gospel never forbids 
slavery, and still more, that by prescribing the duties of 
masters and servants, it tacitly allows it. This objection is of 
sufficient importance to deserve attentive consideration. 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 225 

The following will I think be considered by both parties 
a fair statement of the teaching of the New Testament on 
this subject. The moral principles of the Gospel, are 
directly subversive of the principles of slavery ; but, on the 
other hand, the Gospel neither commands masters to manu- 
mit their slaves, nor authorizes slaves to free themselves 
from their masters ; and also, it goes further, and prescribes 
the duties suited to both parties in their present condition. 

1. Now,if this be admitted,it will ,so far as I see,be sufficient 
for the argument. For if the Gospel be diametrically opposed 
to the principle of slavery, it musrbe opposed to the practice 
of slavery : and therefore, were the principles of the Gospel 
fully adopted, slavery could not exist. 

2. This very course which the Gospel takes on this subject 
seems to have been the only one that could have been taken, 
in order to effect the universal abolition of slavery. The 
Gospel was designed, not for one race or for one time, but 
for all races and for all times. It looked not at the abolition 
of this form of evil for. that age alone, but for its universal 
abolition. Hence, the important object of its author was, 
to gain it a lodgment in every part of the known world ; 
so that, by its universal diffusion among all classes of society, 
it might quietly and peacefully modify" and subdue the evil 
passions of men ; and thus, without violence, work a revolu- 
tion in the whole mass of mankind. In this manner alone 
could its object, a universal moral revolution, have been 
accomplished. For, if it had forbidden the evil, instead of 
subverting the principle ; if it had proclaimed the unlaw- 
fulness of slavery, and taught slaves to resist the oppression 
of their masters ; it would instantly have arrayed the two 
parties in deadly hostility, throughout the civilized world : 
its announcement would have been the signal of servile war; 
and the very name of the Christian religion would have 
been forgotten amidst the agitations of universal bloodshed. 
The fact, under these circumstances, that the Gospel does 



226 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

not forbid slavery, affords no reason to suppose that it does 
not mean to prohibit it ; much less does it afford ground for 
belief, that Jesus Christ intended to authorize it. 

3. It is important to remember that two grounds of moral 
obligation are distinctly recognised in the Gospel. The first 
is, our duty to man as man, that is, on the ground of the 
relation which men sustain to each other ; the second is our 
duty to man as a creature of God, that is, on the ground of 
the relation which we both sustain to God. On this latter 
ground, many things become our duty which would not be 
so on the former. It is on this ground, that we are com- 
manded to return good for evil, to pray for them that 
despitefully use us, and when we are smitten on one cheek to 
turn also the other. To act thus is our duty, not because our 
fellow-man has a right to claim this course of conduct of us 3 
nor because he has a right to inflict injury upon us, but 
because such conduct in us will be well pleasing to God. And 
when God prescribes the course of conduct which will be well 
pleasing to him, he by no means acknowledges the right of 
abuse in the injurious person, but expressly declares, Ven- 
geance is mine, and I will repay it, saith the Lord. Now, it 
is to be observed, that it is precisely upon this latter ground, 
that the slave is commanded to obey his master. It is never 
urged, like the duty of obedience to parents, because it is 
right ; but because the cultivation of meekness and for- 
bearance under injury, will be well pleasing unto God. Thus 
servants are commanded to be obedient to their own masters 
" in singleness of heart as unto Christ" " doing the will of 
God from the heart, with good will doing service as to the 
Lord and not to men." Eph. vi. 5-7. " Servants are com- 
manded to count their masters worthy of all honor, that 
the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed." 
1 Tim. vi. 1. " Exhort servants to be obedient to their own 
masters," (fee. " that they may adorn the doctrine of God 
our Saviour in all things." Titus iii. 9. The manner in 
which the duty of servants or slaves is inculcated, therefore, 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 227 

affords no ground for the assertion, that the Gospel authorizes 
one man to hold another in bondage, any more than the 
command to honor the king, when that king was Nero, 
authorized the tyranny of the Emperor ; or than the com- 
mand to turn the other cheek, when one is smitten, justifies 
the infliction of violence by an injurious man. 

In a word: If the Gospel rule of conduct is directly at 
variance with the existence of slavery ; if the manner in 
which it treats it, is the only manner in which it could 
attempt its utter and universal extermination ; and if it 
inculcates the duty of slaves on principles which have no 
connection with the question of the right of masters over them, 
I think it must be conceded that the precepts of the Gospel 
in no manner countenance, but are entirely opposed to the 
institution of domestic slavery. 

Before closing this part of the subject, it may be proper to 
consider the question, what is the duty of masters and slaves^ 
under a condition of society in which slavery now exists ? 

I. As to masters. 

Tf the system be wrong, as we have endeavored to show, 
if it be at variance with our duty both to God and to 
man, it must be abandoned. If it be asked when, I ask 
again, when shall a man begin to cease doing wrong? Is 
not the answer, immediately ? If a man is injuring us, 
do we ever doubt as to the time when he ought to cease 7 
There is then no doubt in respect to the time when we 
ought to cease inflicting injury upon others. 

But it may be said, immediate abolition would be the* 
greatest possible injury to slaves themselves. They are not 
competent to self-government. 

This is a question of fact, which it is not in the province 



223 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

of moral philosophy to decide. It very likely may be so. 
So far as I know, the facts are not sufficiently known to 
warrant a full opinion on the subject. We will, therefore, 
suppose it to be the case, and ask, what is the duty of 
masters under these circumstances ? 

1. This situation of the slaves, in which this obstacle 
consists, is not by their own act, but by the act of their 
masters ; and, therefore, the masters are bound to remove 
it. The slaves were brought here without their own con- 
sent, they have been continued in their present state of 
degradation without their own consent, and they are not 
responsible for the consequences. If a man have done in- 
justice to his neighbor, and have also placed impediments 
in the way of remedying that injustice, he is as much under 
obligation to remove the impediments in the way of justice 
as he is to do justice. Were it otherwise, a man might, by the 
accumulation of injury, at last render the most atrocious 
injury innocent and right. 

2, But it may be said, this cannot be done unless the 
slave is held in bondage until the object be accomplished. 
This is also a question of fact, on which I will not pretend 
to decide. But suppose it to be so, the question returns, what 
then is the duty of the master ? I answer, supposing such to 
be the fact, it may be the duty of the master to hold the 
slave ; not, however, on the ground of right over him, but 
of obligation to him, and of obligation to him, for the purpose 
of accomplishing a particular and specified good. And, 
of course, he who holds him for any other purpose, holds 
him wrongfully, and is guilty of the sin of slavery. In the 
mean while, he is innocent, in just so far as he, in the fear 
of God, holds the slave, not for the good of the master, but 
for the good of the slave, and with the entire and honest in- 
tention of accomplishing the object as soon as he can, and 
of liberating the slave as soon as the object is accomplished. 
He thus admits the slave to equality of right. He does unto 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 229 

another as he would that another should do unto him ; and, 
thus acting, though he may in form hold a fellow-creature 
in bondage, he is in fact innocent of the crime of violation 
of liberty. This opinion, however, proceeds upon the sup- 
position that the facts are as above stated. As to the ques- 
tion of fact, I do not feel competent to a decision. 

IL The duty of slaves is also explicitly made known in 
the Bible. They are bound to obedience, fidelity, submis- 
sion, and respect to their masters, not only to the good and 
kind, but also to the unkind and froward ; not, however, on 
the ground of duty to ma r n, but on the ground of duty to 
God. This obligation extends to every thing but matters of 
conscience. When a master commands a slave to do 
wrong, the slave ought not to obey. The Bible does not, as 
I suppose, authorize resistance to injury, but it commands 
us to refuse obedience, and suffer the consequences, looking 
to God alone to whom vengeance belongeth. Acting upon 
these principles, the slave may attain to the highest grade 
of virtue, and may exhibit a sublimity and purity of moral 
character, which, in the condition of the master, is abso- 
lutely unattainable. 

Thus, we see, that the Christian religion not only forbids 
slavery, but that it also provides the only method in which, 
after it has once been established, it may be abolished, and 
that with entire safety and benefit to both parties. By in- 
stilling the right moral dispositions into the bosom of the 
master and of the slave, it teaches the one the duty of re- 
ciprocity, and the other the duty of submission ; and thus, 
without tumult, without disorder, without revenge, but by 
the real moral improvement of both parties, restores both to 
the relation towards each other intended by their Creator. 

Hence, if any one will reflect on these facts, and remem- 
ber the moral law of the Creator, and the terrible sanctions 
by which his laws are sustained, and also the provision 

21 



•230 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

which, in the gospel of reconciliation, He has made for re- 
moving this evil after it has once been established, he must, I 
think, be convinced of the imperative obligation which rests 
upon him to remove it without the delay of a moment. The 
Judge of the whole earth will do justice. He hears the cry 
of the oppressed, and he will in the end terribly vindicate 
right. And, on the other hand, let those who suffer wrong- 
fully bear their sufferings with patience, committing their 
souls unto him as unto a Faithful Creator. 

Secondly. The right of personal liberty may be violated 
by society. 

As the right to use the means of happiness which God 
has given him, in such manner as he will, provided he do not 
violate the corresponding rights of others, is conferred upon 
the individual by his Creator, it is manifest that no being 
but the Creator can rightly restrict it. The individual is 
just as truly, in this sense, independent of society as he is 
of individuals. Society is composed of individuals, and can 
have no other rights than the individuals of which it is com- 
posed, only in just so far as the individual voluntarily, and 
for an equivalent, has conceded to it, in given and limited 
respects, some of the rights of which he was originally pos- 
sessed. Whenever society interferes with these original 
rights, unless in the cases in which they have been volun- 
tarily ceded, then the right of personal liberty is violated. 
Thus the declaration of independence above quoted, after 
having asserted the universality of the equality of men by 
virtue of their creation, and that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, proceeds to state, 
" that to secure these rights, governments were instituted 
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed;" (that is by the concession of the individual 
to society;) "that when any form of government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 231 

or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying 
its foundation in such principles, and organizing its powers 
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect 
their safety and happiness." 

Society may violate the personal rights of the individual. 

1. By depriving him, unjustly, of his physical liberty. 
This is done, first, whenever any individual is imprisoned, 
except for crime. 

2. Whenever, although he may have been guilty of crime, 
he is imprisoned without a fair and impartial trial ; for, as 
every man is presumed to be innocent until he shall have 
been proved to be guilty, to imprison him, without such 
proof, is to imprison him while he is innocent. This re- 
mark, however, does not apply to the detention of prisoners 
in order for trial. The detention in this case is not for the 
purposes of punishment, but simply to prevent escape, and 
as a necessary means for the execution of justice. It is also 
no injustice; for it is a power over theu\ persons, which the 
individuals have, for mutual good, conceded to society. 

3. Inasmuch as every individual has the right to go 
where he pleases, under the limitations above specified, 
this right is violated, not merely by confining him to a par- 
ticular place, but also by forbidding his going to any par- 
ticular place, within the limits of the society to which he 
belongs, or by forbidding him to leave it when and how he 
pleases. As his connection with the society to which he be- 
longs is a voluntary act, his simple will is an ultimate reason 
why he should leave it ; and the free exercise of this will 
cannot, without injustice, be restrained. 

The great clause in the Magna Charta on this general 
subject, is in these memorable words : " Let no freeman be 
imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or in any manner 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

injured or proceeded against, by us, otherwise than by the 
legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." 
And the full enjoyment of this right is guaranteed to every 
individual in this country and in Great Britain by the cele- 
brated act of Habeas Corpus ; by which, upon a proper 
presentation of the case before a judge, the judge is under 
obligation, if there be cause, to command the person, who 
has the custody of another, to bring him immediately before 
him ; and is also obliged to set the prisoner at large, unless 
it appear to him that he is deprived of his liberty for a satis- 
factory reason. 

2. Society may violate the rights of the individual, by 
restraining his intellectual liberty. 

I have before stated that a man has the right to the use 
of his intellect, in such manner as he pleases, provided he 
interfere not with the rights of others. This includes, ^rs£, 
the right to pursue what studies he pleases ; and, secondly -, 
to publish them when and where he pleases, subject to the 
above limitation. 

1. This right is violated, first, when society, or government, 
which is its agent, prohibits any course of study or investi- 
gation to which the inclination of the individual may deter- 
mine him, 

2. When government prohibits him from publishing these 
results, and from attempting, by the use of argument, to 
make as many converts to his opinions as he can, in both 
cases within the limits specified. If it be said, the man may 
thus be led into error, the answer is, for this error the indi- 
vidual himself, and not his neighbor, is responsible ; and. 
therefore, the latter has no authority to interfere. 

These remarks apply to those cases only, in which the use 
of the individual's intellect is without injury to the rights of 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 233 

others. They, however, by the terms of the case, exclude 
those modes of intellectual employment, which do thus in- 
terfere. It is obvious that a man has no more right to re- 
strict, by the use of his intellect, my just control over the 
means of happiness bestowed upon me, than by the use of 
his body, or the use of his property. What I have said, 
therefore, in no manner precludes the right of society to re- 
strict the use of the individual's intellect, in those cases 
where this violation exists. 

But when this violation is supposed to exist, by what rule 
is society to be governed, so as, in the exercise of the right 
of restraint, to avoid infringement of the law of intellectual 
liberty ? I am aware that the decision of this question is at- 
tended with great difficulties. I shall, however, endeavor to 
suggest such hints as seem to me to show light upon it, in 
the hope that the attention of some one better able to eluci- 
date it, may be thus more particularly attracted to the dis- 
cussion. 

1. Society is bound to protect those rights of the individ- . 
ual which he has committed to its charge. Among these, 
for instance, is reputation. As the individual relinquishes 
the right of protecting his own reputation, as well as his pro- 
perty, society undertakes to protect it for him. 

2. Society has the right to prevent its own destruction. 
As, without society, individual man would, almost univer- 
sally, perish ; so men, by the law of self-preservation, have a 
right to prohibit those modes of using a man's mind, as well, 
as those of using his body, by which society would be anni- . 
hilated. 

3. As society has the right to employ its power to prevent 
its own dissolution, it also has the same right to protect 
itself from causeless injury. A man has no more right to 
carry on a trade by which his neighbor is annoyed, than one 

21* 



234 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

by which he is poisoned. So, if the employment of a man's 
intellect be not of such a character as to be positively fatal, 
ye\ if it be positively mischievous, and if such be its tenden- 
cy, society has a right to interfere and prohibit it 

4. It is however a general principle that society is not to 
interfere, while the individual has in himself the means of 
repelling or rendering nugatory the injury. Whenever, 
therefore, although the publication of opinions be confess- 
edly injurious, as erroneous opinions always must be, yet if 
they be of such a nature, that every individual can protect 
himself from them, in this case, society leaves the individual 
to the use of that power which he still retains, and which is 
sufficient to remedy the evil. 

If I mistake not, these principles will enable us to distin- 
guish between those cases in which it is, and those in which 
it is not the duty of society to interfere with the freedom of 
the human intellect. 

~t 

1. Whenever the individual possesses within himself the 
means of repelling the injury, society should not interfere. 
As for instance, so far as an assertion is false, and false sim- 
ply, as in philosophical or mathematical error, men have in 
their own understandings and instinctive perception of truth 
a safeguard against injury. And besides this, when discus- 
sion is free, error may be refuted by argument, and in this 
contest truth has always, from the constitution of things, 
the advantage. It needs not, therefore, physical force to as- 
sist it. The confutation of error is also decisive. It redu- 
ces it absolutely to nothing. Whereas the forcible prohibi- 
tion of discussion leaves things precisely as they were, and 
gi res to error the additional advantage of the presumption, 
that it could not be answered by argument, that is, that it is 
the truth. 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 235 

2. But suppose the matter made public is also injurious, 
and is either false, or if true is of such a nature as directly to 
tend to the destruction of individual or social happiness, and 
the individual has not in himself the power of repelling the 
injury. Here, the facts being proved, society is bound to in- 
terfere, and impose such penalty, and render such redress, as 
shall, if possible, remunerate the injured party, or, at least, 
prevent the repetition of the offence. 

Under this head several cases occur. 

1. If a man use his intellect for the purpose of destroying 
his neighbor's reputation, it is the duty of society to inter- 
fere. There is here a manifest injury, inasmuch as reputa- 
tion is a means of happiness, and as much the property of an 
individual, as his house or lands, or any other result of his 
industry. He has besides no method of redress within him- 
self, for he may be ruined by a general assertion, which is in 
its nature incapable of being disproved. As if A asserted 
that B had stolen ; this, if believed, would ruin B ; but he 
could not disprove it, unless he could summon all the men 
with whom, in his whole life, he had ever had any transac- 
tions. Besides, if he could do this, he could never convey 
the facts to all persons to whom A had conveyed the scandal. 
Were such actions allowed, every one might be deprived of 
his reputation, one of his most valuable means of happiness. 
It is the duty of society, therefore, in this case, to guard the 
rights of the individual, by granting him redress, and pre- 
venting the repetition of the injury. 

2. Inasmuch as men are actuated by various passions, 
which are only useful when indulged within certain re- 
straints, but which, when indulged without these restraints, 
are destructive of individual right, as well as of society it- 
self, society has a right to prohibit the use of intellect for 
the purpose of exciting the passions of men beyond those 
limits, As he is guilty who robs another, so is he also 



236 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

guilty who excites another to robbery ; and still more, who 
excites not one man, but a multitude of men, to robbery. 
Hence, society has a right to prohibit obscene books, obscene 
pictures, and every thing of which the object and tendency 
is, to promote laciviousness. On the same ground, it has a 
right to prohibit incendiary and seditious publications, and 
every thing which would provoke the enmity or malice of 
men against each other. 

The reason of this is, first : Injury of this kind cannot be 
repelled by argument, for it is not addressed to the reason ; 
and the very mention of the subject excites those imagina- 
tions from which the injury to society arises. As the evil is 
susceptible of no other remedy than prohibition, and as the 
welfare of society requires that a remedy be found, prohibi- 
tion is the right and the duty of society. 

Another reason applicable to most 'publications of this 
sort, is found in the nature of the parental relation. The 
parent, being the guardian of his child's morals, has the 
right of directing what he shall and what he shall not read. 
Hence, all the parents of a community, that is, society at 
large, have a right to forbid such books as shall, in their 
opinion, injure the moral character of their children. 

3. Again : society may be dissolved, not merely by the 
excitation of unlawful passion, but by the removal of moral 
restraint. Every one must see, that, if moral distinctions 
were abolished, society could not exist for a moment. Men 
might be gregarious, but they would cease to be social. If 
any one, therefore, is disposed to use his intellect for the 
purpose of destroying, in the minds of men, the distinction 
between virtue and vice, or any of those fundamental prin- 
ciples on which the existence of society depends, society 
has a right to interfere and prohibit him. 

The right of society is founded, first, upon the right of 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 237 

self-preservation ; and, secondly, upon the ground of com- 
mon sense. Society is not bound to try, over and over 
again, an experiment which the whole history of man has 
proved always to end in licentiousness, anarchy, misery, and 
universal bloodshed. Nor can any man claim a right to use 
his mind in a way which must, if allowed, produce un- 
mixed misery, and violation of right, wherever its influence 
is exerted. 

Besides, in this, as in the other cases specified, society has 
no means of counteracting the injury by argument ; because 
such appeals are made not to the reason and the conscience, 
but to the rapacious passions of men ; and also, because 
those persons who would listen to such suggestions, would 
rarely, if ever, be disposed to read, much less to examine 
and reflect upon, any argument that could be offered. 

But it maybe objected, that a society constituted on these 
principles might check the progress of free discussion, and, 
under the pretext of injurious tendency, limit the liberty of 
fair discussion. 

To this it may be answered — 

It is no objection to a rule that it is capable of abuse ; 
for this objection will apply to all laws and to all arrange- 
ments that man has ever devised. In the present imperfect 
condition of human nature, it is frequently sufficient that a 
rule prevents greater evil than it inflicts. 

It is granted, that men may suppose a discussion injurious 
when it is not so, and may thus limit unnecessarily the free- 
dom of inquiry. But let us see in what manner this abuse 
is guarded against. 

The security, in this case, is the trial by jury. When 
twelve men, taken by lot from the whole community, sit in 



238 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

judgment, and specially when the accused has the right of 
excepting, for cause, to as many as he will, he is sure of 
having at least an impartial tribunal. These judges are 
themselves under the same law which they administer to 
others. As it is not to be supposed that they would wish to 
abridge their own personal liberty, it is not to be supposed 
that they would be willing to abridge it for the sake of in- 
terfering with that of their neighbor. The question is, there- 
fore, placed in the hands of as impartial judges as the na- 
ture of the case allows. To such a tribunal no reasonable 
man can, on principle, object. To their decision, every can- 
did man would, when his duty to God did not forbid, readily 
submit. 

Now, as it must be granted that no man has a right to 
use his intellect to the injury of a community, the only 
question in any particular case is, whether the use com- 
plained of is injurious, and injurious in such a sense as to 
require the interference of society. It surely does not need 
argument to show that the unanimous decision of twelve 
men, is more likely to be correct than the decision of one 
man ; and specially that the decision of twelve men who 
have no personal interest in the affair, is more likely to be 
correct, than that of one man, who is liable to all the in- 
fluences of personal vanity, love of distinction, and pecuni- 
ary emolument. There surely can be no question whether, 
in a matter on which the dearest interests of others are con- 
cerned, a man is to be a judge in his own case, or whether 
as impartial a tribunal as the ingenuity of man has ever de- 
vised, shall judge for him. If it be said that twelve impar- 
tial men are liable to error, and by consequence to do in- 
justice, it may be answered, how much more liable is one, 
and he a partial man to err, and to do injury ! If, then, a 
system of trial of this sort, not only must prevent more in- 
jury than it inflicts, but is free from all liability to injury, 
except such as results from the acknowledged imperfections 
of our nature, the fault, if it exist, is not in. the rule, but in 



LIBERTY MAY- BE VIOLATED. 239 

the nature of man, and must be endured until the nature of 
man be altered. 

And I cannot close, without remarking, that a most so- 
lemn and imperative duty seems to me to rest upon judges, 
legislators, jurors, and prosecuting officers, in regard to this 
subject. We hear at the present day very much about the 
liberty of the press, the freedom of inquiry, and the freedom 
of the human intellect. All these are precious blessings — 
by far too precious to be lost. But it is to be remembered, 
that no liberty can exist without restraint ; and the remark 
is as true of intellectual as of physical liberty. As there 
could be no physical liberty if every one both bad and good 
did what he will, so there would soon be no liberty, either 
physical or intellectual, if every man were allowed to pub- 
lish what he will. The man who publishes what will in- 
flame the licentious passions, or subvert the moral principles 
of others, is undermining the foundations of the social fabric ; 
and it is kindness, neither to him, nor to society, quietly to 
look on until both he and we are crushed beneath the ruins. 
The danger to liberty is pre-eminently greater, at the pre- 
sent day, from the licentiousness than from the restriction of 
the press. It therefore becomes all civil and judicial officers, 
to act as the guardians of society, and unawed by popular 
clamor, and unseduced by popular favor, resolutely to defend 
the people against their worst enemies. Whatever may be 
the form of a government, it cannot long continue free, after 
it has refused to acknowledge the distinction between the 
liberty and the licentiousness of the press. And much as 
we may execrate a profligate writer, let us remember, that 
the civil officer who, from pusillanimity, refuses to exercise 
the power placed in his hands to restrain abuse, deserves at 
least an equal share of our execration. 

Thirdly. The right of religious liberty may be violated 
by society. 



240 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

We have before said, that every individual has the right 
to pursue his own happiness, by worshipping his Creator in 
any way that he pleases, provided he do not interfere with 
the rights of his neighbor. 

This includes the following things : He is at liberty to 
worship God in any form that he deems most acceptable to 
him, to worship individually or socially, and to promote that 
form of worship which he considers acceptable to God, by 
the promulgation of such sentiments as he believes to be 
true, provided he leave the rights of his neighbors unmo- 
lested, and of this liberty he is not to be restricted, unless such 
molestation be made manifest to a jury of his peers. 

As a man is at liberty to worship God individually, or in 
societies collected for that purpose ; if his object can be se- 
cured, in his own opinion, by the enjoyment of any of the 
facilities for association granted to other men for innocent 
purposes, he is entitled to them just as other men. The 
general principle applicable to the case I suppose to be this. 
A man, in consequence of being religious, that is, of worship- 
ping God, acquires no human right whatever, for it is, so far 
as his fellow-men's rights are concerned, the same thing 
whether he worship God or not. And, on the other hand, 
in consequence of being religious, he loses no right, and for 
the same reason. And therefore, as men are entitled to all 
innocent facilities which they need, for prosecuting an inno- 
cent object, a religious man has the same right to these fa- 
cilities for promoting his objects ; and it is the business of no 
one to inquire, whether these be religious, scientific, me-, 
chanical, or any other, so long as they be merely innocent. 

Now this right is violated by society. 

1. By forbidding the exercise of all religion ; as in the 
case of the French Revolution. 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 241 

2. By forbidding or enforcing the exercise of any form of 
religion. In so far as an act is religious, society has no right 
of control over it. If it interfere with the rights of others, 
this puts it within the control of society, and this alone, and 
solely for this reason. The power of society is, therefore, 
in this case, exercised, simply on the ground of injury per- 
petrated and proved, and not on account of the truth or 
falseness, the goodness or badness, of the religion in the 
sight of the Creator. 

3. By inflicting disabilities upon men, or depriving them 
of any of their rights as men, to promote their own happi- 
ness, because they are or are not religious. This violation 
occurs, in all cases, in which society interferes, to deny to 
religious men the same privileges for promoting their hap- 
piness by way of religion, as they enjoy for promoting their 
happiness in any other innocent way. Such is the case 
when religious societies are denied the right of incorpora- 
tion, with all its attendant privileges, for the purposes of 
religious worship, and the promotion of their religious 
opinions. Unless it can be shown that the enjoyment of 
such privileges interferes with the rights of others, the de- 
nial of them is a violation of religious liberty. Depriving 
clergymen of the elective franchise is a violation of a simi- 
lar character. 

4. By placing the professors of any peculiar form of reli- 
gion under any disabilities, as for instance rendering them 
ineligible to office, or in any manner making a distinction 
between them and any other professors of religion, or any 
other men. As society has no right to inflict disabilities 
upon men on the ground of their worshipping God in gene- 
ral, by consequence, it has no right to inflict disabilities 
on the ground of worshipping God in any manner in par- 
ticular. If the whole subject is without the control of so- 
ciety, a part of it is also without its control. Different 

22 






242 MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 

modes of worship may be more or less acceptable to God ; 
but this gives to no man a right to interfere with those 
means of happiness, which God has conferred upon any 
other man. 

The question may arise here, whether society has a right 
to provide by law for the support of religious instruction, 
I answer, if the existence of religious instruction be neces- 
sary to the existence of society, and if there be no other 
mode of providing for its support, but by legislative enact- 
ment, then, I do not see any more violation of principle in 
such enactment, than in that for the support of common 
schools ; provided that no one were obliged to attend unless 
he chose, and that every one were allowed to pay for that 
form of worship which he chose. There are other objec- 
tions, however, to such a course, aside from that arising 
from supposed violation of civil liberty. 

1. It cannot be shown that religious teachers cannot be 
supported without legislative aid. The facts teach a differ^ 
ent result. 

2. The religion of Christ has always exerted its greatest 
power, when, entirely unsupported, it has been left to exert 
its own peculiar effect upon the consciences of men. 

3. The support of religion by law is at variance with the 
genius of the Gospel. The Gospel supposes every man to 
be purely voluntary in his service of God, in his choice of 
the mode of worship, of his religious teachers, and of the 
compensation which he will make to them for their services. 
Now, all this is reversed in the supposition of a ministry 
supported by civil power. We therefore conclude, that, 
although such support might be provided without inter- 
ference with civil liberty, it could not be done without vio- 
lation of the spirit of the Gospel. That is, though the 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 243 

state might be desirous of affording aid to the church, the 
church is bound, on principle, resolutely and steadfastly to 
protest against in any manner receiving it. 

4. And I think that the facts will show that this view of 
the subject is correct. The clergy, as a profession, are bet- 
ter remunerated by voluntary support than by legal enact- 
ment. When the people arrange the matter of compensa- 
tion with their clergyman themselves, there are no rich and 
overgrown benefices, but there are also but few miserably 
poor curacies. The minister, if he deserve it, generally 
lives as well as his people. If it be said, that high talent 
should be rewarded by elevated rank in this profession, as 
in any other ; I answer, that such seems to me not to be the 
genius of the Gospel. The Gospel presents no inducements 
of worldly rank, or of official dignity, and it scorns to hold 
out such motives to the religious teacher. I answer again ; 
official rank, and luxurious splendor, instead of adding to, 
take from, the real influence of a teacher of religion. They 
tend to destroy that moral hardihood which is necessary to 
the success of him, whose object it is to render men better ; 
and, while they surround him with all the insignia of power, 
enervate that very spirit on which moral power essentially 
depends. And besides, a religion supported by the govern- 
ment must soon become the tool of the government ; or, at 
least, must be involved and implicated in every change which 
the government may undergo. How utterly at variance 
this must be with the principles of Him, who declared, " My 
kingdom is not of this world," surely need not be illustrated. 



CHAPTER II. 

JUSTICE IN RESPECT TO PROPERTY. 
SECTION I. 

THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

I. Definition of the right of property. 

The abstract right of property, is the right to use some- 
thing in such manner as I choose. 

But, inasmuch as this right of use is common to all men, 
and as one may choose to use his property in such a way 
as to deprive his neighbor of this or of some other right, the 
right to use as I choose, is limited by the restriction, that I 
do not interfere with the rights of my neighbor. The 
right of property, therefore, when thus restricted, is the right 
to use something as I choose, provided I do not so use it, as 
to interfere with the rights of my neighbor. 

Thus, we see that from the very nature of the case, the 
right of property is exclusive ; that is to say, if I have a 
right to any thing, this right excludes every one else from 
any right over that thing ; and it imposes upon every one 
else the obligation to leave me unmolested in the use of it, 
within those limits to which my right extends. 

II. On what the right of property is founded. 

22* 



£46 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

The right of property is founded on the will of God, as 
made known to us by natural conscience, by general con- 
sequences, and by revelation. 

Ourselves, and every thing which we behold, is essen- 
tially the property of the Creator ; and he has a right to 
confer the use of it upon whomsoever, and under what 
restrictions soever, he will. We may know in what rela- 
tions he wills us to stand towards the things around us, 
by the principles which he has implanted within us, and 
by the result produced, in individuals and communities, by 
the different courses of conduct of which men are capable. 

Now God signifies to us his will on this subject. 

First By the decisions of natural conscience. This is 
known from several circumstances. 

1. All men, as soon as they begin to think, even in early 
youth and infancy, perceive this relation. They imme- 
diately appropriate certain things to themselves, they feel 
injured if their control over those things is violated, and 
they are conscious of guilt, if they violate this right of 
others. 

2. The relation of property is expressed by the possessive 
pronouns. These are found in all languages. So univer- 
sally is this idea diffused over the whole mass of human 
action and human feeling, that it would be scarcely possible 
for two human beings to converse for even a few minutes, 
on any subject, or in any language, without the frequent 
use of the words which designate the relation of possession. 

3. Not only do men feel the importance of sustaining each 
other in the exercise of the right of property, they mani- 
festly feel that he who violates it has done wrong ; that is, 
has violated obligation., and hence deserves punishment, on 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 247 

the ground, not simply of the consequences of the act, but 
of the guiltiness of the actor. Thus, if a man steal, other 
men are not satisfied when he has merely made restitution, 
although this may perfectly make up the loss to the injured 
party. It is always considered that something more is due, 
either from God or from man, as a punishment for the crime. 
Hence the Jewish law enjoined tenfold restitution, and 
modern law inflicts fines, imprisonment, and corporal 
punishment. 

Second. That God wills the possession of property is evi- 
dent from the general consequences which result from the 
existence of this relation. 

The existence and progress of society, nay the very 
existence of our race, depends upon the acknowledgment 
of this right. 

Were not every individual entitled to the results of his 
labor, and to the exclusive enjoyment of the benefits of these 
results, 

1. No one would labor more than was sufficient for his 
own individual subsistence, because he would have no 
more right to the value which he had created than another 
person. 

2. Hence, there would be no accumulation, of course no 
capital, no tools, no provisions for the future, no houses, and 
no agriculture. Each man alone would be obliged to con- 
tend with the elements, the wild beasts, and also with the 
rapacity of his fellow-man. The human race, under such 
circumstances, could not long exist. 

3. Under such circumstances, the race of man must 
speedily perish, or its existence be prolonged, even in favora- 
ble climates, under every accumulation of wretchedness. 



213 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

Progress would be out of the question ; and the only change 
which could take place would be, that arising from the 
pressure of heavier and heavier penury, as the spontaneous 
productions of the earth became rarer, from improvident 
consumption, without any corresponding labor for repro- 
duction. 

4. It needs only be remarked, in addition, that just in 
proportion as the right of property is held inviolate, just in 
that proportion does civilization advance, and the comforts 
and conveniences of life multiply. Hence it is that in free 
and well ordered governments, and specially during peace, 
property accumulates, all orders of society enjoy the bless- 
ings of competence, arts flourish, science advances, and 
men begin to form some conception of the happiness of 
which the system is capable. And, on the contrary, under 
despotism, when law spreads its protection over neither 
house, land, estate, nor life, and specially during civil wars, 
industry ceases, capital stagnates, arts decline, the people 
starve, population diminishes, and men rapidly tend to a 
state of barbarism. 

Third. The Holy Scriptures treat of the right of property as 
a thing acknowledged, and direct their precepts against every 
act by which it is violated, and, also, against the tempers of 
mind from which such violation proceeds. The doctrine of 
Revelation is so clearly set forth on this subject, that I need 
not delay for the sake of dwelling upon it. It will be suffi- 
cient to refer to the prohibitions in the decalogue against 
stealing and coveting, and to the various precepts in the 
New Testament respecting our duty in regard to our neigh- 
bor's possessions. 

I proceed, in the next place, to consider — 

III. The modes in which the right of property may be 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 249 

acquired. These may be divided into two classes; first, 
direct ; second, indirect. 

First. Direct. 

1. By the immediate gift of God. 

When God has given me a desire for any object, and has 
spread this object before me, and there is no rational creature 
to contest my claim, I may take that object and use it as I 
will, subject only to the limitation of those obligations to 
Him and my fellow-creatures which have been before specified. 
On this principle is founded my right to enter upon wild 
and unappropriated lands, to hunt wild game, to pluck wild 
fruit, to take fish, or any thing of this sort. This right is 
sufficient to exclude the right of any subsequent claimant ; 
for, if it has been given to me, that act of gift is valid, until 
it can be shown by another that it has been annulled. A 
grant of this sort, however, applies only to an individual so 
long as he continues the locum tene?is, and no longer. He 
has no right to enter upon unappropriated land, and leave it, 
and then claim it afterward by virtue of his first possession. 
Were it otherwise, any individual might acquire a title to a 
whole continent, and exclude from it the whole of the rest of 
his species. 

2. By the labor of our hands. 

Whatever value I have created by my own labor, or by 
the innocent use of the other means of happiness which God 
has given me, is mine. This is evident from the principle 
already so frequently referred to, namely, that I have a right 
to use, for my own happiness,. whatever God has given me, 
provided I use it not to the injury of another. Thus, if I 
catch a deer, or raise an ear of corn upon land otherwise 
unappropriated, that deer or that corn are mine. No reason 
can possibly be conceived, why any other being should raise 



250 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

a claim to them which could extinguish, or even interfere 
with mine. 

This, however, is not meant to assert, that a man has a 
right to any thing more than the results of his labor. He 
has no right, of course, to the results of the labor of another. 
If, by my labor, I build a mill, and employ a man to take the 
charge of it, it does not follow that he has a right to all the 
profits of the mill. If I, by my labor and frugality, earn 
money to purchase a farm, and hire a laborer to work upon 
it, it does not follow, that he has a right to all the produce of 
the farm. The profit is, in this case, to be divided between 
us. He has a right to the share which fairly belongs to his 
labor, and I have a right to the share that belongs to me, as 
the proprietor and possessor of that which is the result of my 
antecedent labor. It would be as unjust for him to have the 
whole profit, as for me to have the whole of it. It is fairly a 
case of partnership, in which each party receives his share 
of the result, upon conditions previously and voluntarily 
agreed upon. This is the general principle of wages. 

Secondly. The right of property may be acquired indirectly : 

1. By exchange. 

Inasmuch as I have an exclusive right to appropriate 
innocently the possessions which I have acquired by the 
means stated above, and inasmuch as every other man has 
the same right, we may, if we choose, voluntarily enlarge 
our right to particular things, with each other. If I culti- 
vate wheat, and my neighbor cultivates corn, and we both of 
us have more of our respective production than we wish to 
use for ourselves, we may, on such terms as we can agree 
upon, exchange the one for the other. Property held in 
this manner is held rightfully. This exchange is of two 
kinds, first, barter, where the exchange, on both sides, con- 
rsists of commodities ; and, second, bargain and sale, where 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 251 

one of the parties gives, and the other receives, money for 
his property. 

2. By gift 

As I may thus rightfully part with, and another party 
rightfully receive, my property, for an equivalent rendered, 
so I may, if I choose, part with it without an equivalent ; 
that is, merely to gratify my feelings of benevolence, or 
affection, or gratitude. Here, I voluntarily confer upon 
another the right of ownership, and he may rightfully 
receive and occupy it. 

3. By will. 

As I have the right to dispose of my property as I please 
during my life-time, and may exchange it, or give it as 
I will, at any time previous to my decease, so I may give 
it to another, on the condition that he shall not enter into 
possession until after my death. Property acquired in this 
manner is held rightfully. 

4. By inheritance. * 

Inasmuch as persons frequently die without making a 
will, society, upon general principles, presumes upon the 
manner in which the deceased would have distributed his 
property, had he made a will. Thus, it is supposed that he 
would distribute his wealth among his widow and children, 
or, in failure of these, among his blood relations ; and in 
proportions corresponding to their degree of consanguinity. 
Property may be rightfully acquired in this manner. 

5. By possession. l 

In many cases, although a man have no moral right 
to property, yet he may have a right to exclude others from 



252 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

it ; and others are under obligation to leave him unmolested 
in the use of it. Thus, a man has by fraud obtained pos- 
session of a farm, and the rightful owners have all died : 
now, although the present holder has no just title to the 
property, yet, if it were to be taken from him and held by 
another, the second would have no better title than the first ; 
and a third person would have the same right to dispossess 
the second, and in turn be himself dispossessed, and so on 
forever ; that is, there would be endless controversy, without 
any nearer approximation to justice ; and hence, it is better 
that the case be left as it was in the first instance ; that is, 
in general, possession gives a right, so far as man is con- 
cerned, to unmolested enjoyment, unless some one else can 
establish a better title. 

6. And hence, in general, I believe it will hold, that 
while merely the laws of society do not give a man any 
moral right to property, yet, when these laws have once 
assigned it to him, this simple fact imposes a moral obliga- 
tion upon all other men to leave him in the undisturbed 
possession of it. I have no more right to set fire to the 
house of a man who has defrauded an orphan to obtain it, 
than I have to set fire to the house of any other man. 

To sum up what has been said: Property may be origi- 
nally acquired either by the gift of God, or by our own 
labor : it may be subsequently acquired either by exchange, 
or by gift during life, or by will; but in these cases of 
transfer of ownership, the free consent of the original owner 
is necessary to render the transfer morally right ; and lastly, 
where the individual has not acquired property justly, yet 
mere possession, though it alters not his moral right to posses- 
sion, yet it is a sufficient bar to molestation, unless some 
other claimant can prefer a better title. These, I think, 
comprehend the most important modes by which the right 
of property can be acquired. 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 253 

That principles, somewhat analogous to these, are in 
accordance with the laws of God, is, I think, evident from 
observation of the history of man. The more rigidly these 
principles have been carried into active operation, the greater 
amount of happiness has been secured to the individual, and 
the more rapidly do nations advance in civilization, and the 
more successfully do they carry into effect every means of 
mental and moral cultivation. The first steps that were 
taken in the recovery of Europe from the misery of the 
dark ages, consisted in defining and establishing the right 
of property upon the basis of equitable and universal law. 
Until something of this sort is done, no nation can emerge 
from a state of barbarism.* 

And hence, we see the importance of an able, learned, 
upright, and independent judiciary, and the necessity to 
national prosperity, of carrying the decisions of law into 
universal and impartial effect. It not unfrequently happens 
that, for the purposes of party, the minds of the people are 
inflamed against the tribunals whose duty it is to administer 
justice, or else, on the other hand, for the same purpose, a 
flagrant violation of justice by a popular favorite is looked 
upon as harmless. Let it be remembered, that society must 
be dissolved, unless the supremacy of the law be main- 
tained. " The voice of the law " will cease to be " the har- 
mony of the world," unless " all things," both high and low, 
"do her reverence." How often has even-handed justice 
commended the chalice to the lips of the demagogue ; and 
he has been the first to drink of that cup which he supposed 
himself to be mingling for others. 

* Robertson's Preliminary Dissertation to the History of Charles V. 



23 



254 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 



SECTION II. 

MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY MAY BE 
VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 

I have already remarked, that the right of property, so far 
as it extends, is exclusive both of the individual and of 
society. This is true, in respect to both parties. Thus, 
whatever I own, I own exclusively both of society, and of 
individuals ; and whatever either individuals or society own, 
they own exclusively of me. Hence, the right of property 
is equally violated, in taking viciously either public or pri- 
vate property ; and it is equally violated by taking viciously, 
whether the aggressor be the public, or an individual. And, 
moreover, it is exclusive to the full amount of what is owned. 
It is, therefore, as truly a violation of the right of property, 
to take a little as to take much ; to purloin a book, or a pen- 
knife, as to steal money ; to steal fruit as to steal a horse ; to 
defraud the revenue as to rob my neighbor ; to overcharge 
the public as to overcharge my brother ; to cheat the post- 
office as to cheat my friend. 

It has already been observed, that a right to the property 
of another can only be acquired by his own voluntary choice. 
This follows, immediately, from the definition of the right 
of property. But, in order to render this choice of right 
available, it must be influenced by no motives presented 
wrongfully by the receiver. Thus, if I demand a man's 
purse, on the motive that I will shoot him if he deny me, he 
may surrender it, rather than be shot ; but, I have no right 
to present such an alternative, and the consent of the owner 
renders it no less a violation of the right of property. If I 
inflame a man's vanity, in order to induce him to buy of me 
a coach, which he does not want, the transaction is dis- 
honest; because, I have gained his will by a motive which I 
had no right to use. So, if I represent an article in ex- 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 255 

change to be different from what it is, I present a false motive, 
and gain his consent by a lie. And thus, in general, as I 
have said, a transfer of property is morally wrong, where 
the consent of the owner is obtained by means of a vicious 
act on the part of the receiver. 

The right of property may be violated, 

1. By taking property without the knowledge of the 
owner, or theft. It is here to be remembered, that the con- 
sent of the owner is necessary to any transfer of property. 
We do not vary the nature of the act, by persuading our- 
selves that the owner will not care about it, or that he would 
have no objection, or that he will not know it, or that it will 
never injure him to lose it. All this may, or may not be ; 
but none of it varies the moral character of the transaction. 
The simple question is, has the owner consented to the 
transfer % If he have not, so long as this circumstance, 
essential to a righteous transfer, is absent, whatever other 
circumstances are present it matters not, the taking of ano- 
ther's property is theft. 

2. By taking the property of another, by consent, violently 
obtained. 

Such is the case in highway robbery. Here we wickedly 
obtain control over a man's life, and then offer him the alter- 
native of death, or delivery of his property. Inasmuch as 
the consent is no more voluntary than if we tied his hands, 
and took the money out of his pocket, the violation of pro- 
perty is as great. And, besides this, we assume the power of 
life and death over an individual, over whom we have no 
just right whatever. In this case, in fact, we assume the 
unlimited control over the life and possessions of another, 
and, on pain of death, oblige him to surrender his pro- 
perty to our will. As, in this case, there is a double and 
aggravated violation of right, it is in all countries considered 



256 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

deserving of condign punishment, and is generally rendered 
a capital offence. 

3. By consent, fraudulently obtained, or cheating. 

This may be of two kinds. 

1. Where no equivalent is offered, as when a beggar ob- 
tains money on false pretences. 

2. Where the equivalent is different from what it purports 
to be ; or, where the consent is obtained by an immoral act, 
on the part of him who obtains it. As this includes, by far, 
the greatest number of violations of the law of property, it 
will occupy the remainder of this section, and will require to 
be treated of somewhat at length. 

We shall divide it into two parts. 

1. Where the equivalent is material, 

2. Where it is immaterial. 

1. Where the equivalent is material, as in cases of barter, 
and of bargain and sale ; when the transfer of the right of 
property is on both sides perpetual. This includes the law 
of buyer and seller. 

The principle laws of buyer and seller will be seen from 
a consideration of the relation in which they stand to each 
other. The seller, or merchant, is supposed to devote his 
time and capital to the business of supplying his neighbors 
with articles of use. For his time, risk, interest of money, 
and skill, he is entitled to an advance on his goods ; and the 
buyer is under a corresponding obligation to allow that ad- 
vance, except in those cases of a change in the market price 
to be noticed subsequently. 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 257 

Hence, 1. The seller is under obligation to furnish goods 
of the same quality as that ordinarily furnished at the same 
prices. He is paid for his skill in purchasing, and of course 
he ought to possess that skill or to suffer the consequences. If 
he furnishes goods of this quality, and they are, so far as his 
knowledge extends, free from any defect, he is under 
obligation to do nothing more than to offer them. He is 
under no obligations to explain their adaptation, and direct 
the judgment of the buyer, except on the law of benevo- 
lence. Having furnished goods to the best of his skill, and 
of the ordinary quality, his responsibility ceases, and it is 
the business of the buyer to decide whether the article is 
adapted to his wants. If, however, the seller has purchased 
a bad article, and has been deceived, he has no right to sell 
it at the regular price, on the ground that he gave as much 
for it as for what should have been good. The error of 
judgment was his, and in his own profession ; and he must 
bear the loss by selling the article for what it is worth. 
That this is the rule, is evident from the contrary case. If 
he had, by superior skill, purchased an article at much less 
than its value, he would consider himself entitled to the ad- 
vantage, and justly. Where he is entitled, however, to the 
benefit of his skill, he must, under corresponding circum- 
stances, suffer from the want of it. Hence we say, that a 
seller is under obligation to furnish goods at the market 
price, and of the market goodness, but is under no obliga- 
tion to assist the judgment of the buyer, unless the article 
for sale is defective, and then he is under obligation to 
reveal it. 

The only exception to this rule is, when, from the condi- 
tions of the sale, it is known that no guarantee is offered. 
As when a horse is sold at auction, without any recom- 
mendation, Here every man knows that he buys at his 
own risk, and gives accordingly. 

2. Every one who makes it his business to sell, is not only 

23* 



25S MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

bound to sell, but is also at liberty to sell at the market 
price. That he is bound to sell thus, is evident from the 
fact that he takes every means to persuade the public that 
he does so ; he would consider it a slander were any one to 
assert the contrary ; and, were the contrary to be believed, 
his business would soon be ruined. Where a belief is so 
widely circulated, and so earnestly inculcated, by the seller, 
he is manifestly under obligation to fulfil an expectation 
which he has been so anxious to create. 

He is also at liberty to sell at the market price. That is, 
as he is obliged to sell without remuneration, or even with 
loss, if the article falls in price while in his possession ; so he 
is at liberty to sell it at above a fair remuneration, if the price 
of the article advances. As he must suffer in case of the fall 
of merchandize, he is entitled to the corresponding gain, if 
merchandize rises ; and thus his chance on both sides is 
equalized. Besides, by allowing the price of an article to rise 
with its scarcity, the rise itself is in the end checked ; and, by 
attracting an unusual amount of products to the place of 
scarcity, the price is most speedily reduced again to the 
ordinary and natural equilibrium of supply and demand. 

3. While the seller is under no obligation to set forth the 
quality of his merchandize, yet he is at liberty to do, con- 
fining himself to truth. He has, however, no right to influ- 
ence the will of the buyer by any motives aside from those 
derived from the real value of the article in question. 

Thus, he has no right to appeal to the fears, or hopes, or 
avarice, of the buyer. This rule is violated when, in 
dealings on the exchange, false information is circulated 
for the purpose of raising or depressing the price of stocks. 
It is violated by speculators, who monopolize an article to 
create a scarcity, and thus raise the price while the supply 
is abundant. The case is the same when a salesman looks 
upon a stranger who enters his store, and deliberately cal- 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 259 

culates how he shall best influence, and excite, and mislead 
his mind, so as to sell the greatest amount of goods at the 
most exorbitant profit. And, in general, any attempt to 
influence the mind of the purchaser, by motives aside from 
those derived from the true character of the article for sale, 
are always doubtful, and generally vicious. 

It is in vain to reply to this, that if this were not done, 
men could not support their families. We are not inquiring 
about the support of families, but about a question of right. 
And it is obvious that, were this plea allowed, it would put 
an end to all questions of morals, for there never was an 
iniquity so infamous as not to find multitudes who were 
ready to justify it on this plea. But we deny the validity 
of the plea altogether. Were men to qualify themselves 
properly for business, and to acquire and exert proper skill 
in the management of it ; that skill would be beneficially 
exerted for the community at large, and men would find it 
for their interest to employ it. He who understood his own 
profession well, and industriously and honestly put his 
talents into requisition, never stood in need of chicanery in 
order to support either himself or his family. 

These remarks have been made with respect to the seller. 
But it is manifest that they are just as applicable to the 
buyer. Both parties are under equally imperative and cor- 
responding obligations. If the seller is bound to furnish an 
article of ordinary goodness, and to sell it at the market 
price ; that is, if he is obliged to exert his skill for the benefit 
of the buyer, and to charge for that skill and capital no 
more than a fair remuneration ; then the buyer is under the 
same obligation, freely and willingly to pay that remunera- 
tion. It is disgraceful to him, to wish the seller to labor 
for him for nothing, or for less than a fair compensation. If 
the seller has no right by extraneous considerations to in- 
fluence the motives of the buyer, the buyer has no jight by 
any such considerations to influence the motives of the 



260 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

seller. The buyer is guilty of fraud, if he underrates the 
seller's goods, or by any of the artifices of trafic, induces 
him to sell at less than a fair rate of profit. " 'Tis naught, 
'tis naught saith the buyer, but when he goeth his way then 
he boasteth," Such conduct is as dishonest and dishonorable 
now, as it was in the days of Solomon. 

It should have been remarked, when treating of the 
market price, that the rule applies mainly to those, whose 
occupation is traffic in the article bought and sold. A dealer 
in china-ware, is bound to sell china-ware at the market 
price ; but if a man insists upon buying his coat, he is under 
no such obligation, for this is not his business. Should he 
put himself to inconvenience by selling his apparel, to gratify 
the whim of his neighbor, he may, if he will, charge an 
extra price for this inconvenience. The rule applies in any 
other similar case. It, however, would become an honest 
man fairly to state that he did not sell at the market price, 
but that he charged what he chose, as a remuneration for his 
trouble. 

A bargain is concluded when both parties have signified 
to each other their will to make the transfer ; that is, that 
each chooses to part with his own property, and to receive 
that of the other in exchange. Henceforth, all the risk 
of loss, and all the chances of gain, are, of course, mutually 
transferred ; although the articles themselves remain pre- 
cisely as they were before. If a merchant buy a cargo of 
tea ; after the sale, no matter where the tea is, the chances 
of loss or gain are his, and as much in one place as 
another. 

So, if the article, after the sale, become injured, before I 
take actual possession of it, I bear the loss, because, the right 
of ownership being vested in me, I could have removed it if 
I chose, and no one had a right without my direction to 
remove it. 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 261 

The only exception to this, exists in the case where by 
custom or contract, the obligation to deliver, is one of the 
conditions of the sale. Here the seller, of course, charges 
more for assuming the responsibility to deliver, and he is to 
bear the risk for which he is fairly paid. It is frequently a 
question, when is the act of delivery completed? This 
must be settled by precedent, and can rarely be known in 
any country, until a decision is had in the courts of law. 
As soon as such a case is adjudicated, the respective parties 
govern themselves accordingly. 

It has been observed above, that when the seller knows of 
any defect in his product he is bound to declare it. The 
same rule of course applies to the buyer. If he knows that 
the value of the article has risen without the owner's know- 
ledge, he is bound to inform him of this change in its value. 
The sale is otherwise fraudulent. Hence all purchases and 
sales, effected in consequence of secret information procured 
in advance of our neighbor, are dishonest. If property 
rises in value by the providence of God, while in my neigh- 
bor's possession, that rise of value, is as much his, as the 
property itself ; and I may as honestly deprive him of the 
one, without an equivalent, as of the other. 

The ordinary pleas, by which men excuse themselves for 
violation of the moral law of property, are weak and wicked. 
Thus, when men sell articles of a different quality from that 
which their name imports, as when wines or liquors are 
diluted or compounded ; when the ordinary weight or 
measure is curtailed ; or where they defraud ignorant 
persons of their wages, as I am told is sometimes the case 
with those who employ certain classes of laborers ; it is 
common to hear it remarked, "the competition is so great that 
we could sell nothing unless we adopted these methods," or 
else " the practice is universal, and if we did not do thus, 
other persons would, and so the evil would not be diminish- 
ed." To all this it is sufficient to reply ; the law of God is 



262 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

explicit on this subject. — Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself ; and God allows of no excuses for the violation of 
his commands. " He hath shewed it unto them, therefore, 
they are without excuse." These pleas are either true or 
false. If false, they ought to be abandoned. If true, then 
the traffic itself must be given up ; for no man has any right 
to be engaged in any pursuit, in violation of the laws of 
God. 

But the transfer of the right of property is not always per- 
petual It is sometimes only temporary ; and, in this case, 
the borrower pays a stipulated equivalent for the use of it. 

That he should do so is manifestly just, because the pro- 
perty in the hands of the owner is capable of producing an 
increase, and the owner, if he held it would derive the bene- 
fit of that increase. If he parts with his benefit for the ad- 
vantage of another, it is just that the other should allow him 
a fair remuneration. If the borrower could not, after paying 
this remuneration, grow richer than he would be without 
the use of his neighbor's capital, he would not borrow. But 
inasmuch as he, by the use of it, can be benefited, after pay- 
ing for the use, no reason can be conceived why he should 
not pay for it. 

The remuneration paid for the use of capital, in the form 
of money, is called interest ; when in the form of land or 
houses, it is called rent. 

The principles on which the rate of this remuneration are 
justly fixed are these : The borrower pays, first for the use, 
and second for the risk. 

1. For the use. 

Capital is more useful, that is, it is capable of producing a 
greater remuneration at some times than at others. Thus 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 263 

a flour mill at some seasons of the year is more productive 
than at others. Land in some places is capable of yielding 
a greater harvest than in others. And thus, at different times, 
the same property may be capable of bringing in a very dif- 
ferent income. And, in general, where the amount of capital 
to be loaned is great, and the number of those who want 
to borrow small, the interest will be low; and where the 
number of borrowers is great, and the amount of capital 
small, the rate of interest will be high. The reasons of all 
this are too obvious to need illustration. 

2. For the risk. 

When an owner parts with his property, it is put under 
the control of the borrower, and passes, of course, beyond 
the control of the owner. Here there arises a risk over 
which he has no control. It varies with the character of 
the borrower for prudence and skill. It varies with the 
business in which he is engaged. Property in ships is ex- 
posed to more risk than property in land. A man would con- 
sider the chance of having his property returned much bet- 
ter if employed in the building of dwelling houses, than in 
the manufacture of gunpowder. Now as all these circum- 
stances of risk may enter more or less into every loan, it is 
evident that they must, in justice, vary the rate at which a 
loan may be procured. 

Hence, I think that the rate of interest of every sort being 
liable to so many circumstances of variation, it should not 
in any case, be fixed by law, but should be left in all cases 
to the discretion of the parties concerned. 

This remark applies as well to loans of money as to loans 
of other property, because the reasons apply just as much to 
these as any other. If it be said, men may charge exorbitant 
interest, I reply, so they may charge exorbitant rent for 
houses, and exorbitant hire for horses. And, I ask, how is 



264 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

this evil of exorbitant charges in other cases remedied? 
The answer is plain. We allow a perfectly free competi- 
tion, and then the man who will not loan his property, 
unless at an exorbitant price, is underbidden, and his own 
rapacity defeats and punishes itself. 

And on the contrary, by fixing a legal rate of interest, we 
throw the whole community into the power of those who are 
willing to violate the law. For, as soon as the actual value 
of money is more than the legal value, those who consider 
themselves under obligation to obey the laws of the land, will 
not loan, for they can employ their property to better advan- 
tage. Hence, if all were obedient to the law, as soon as pro- 
perty arrived at this point of value, loans would instantly 
and universally cease. But as some persons are willing to 
evade the law, they will loan at illegal interest, and as the 
capital of those who are conscientious is withdrawn from the 
market, and an artificial scarcity is thus produced, they have 
it in their power to charge whatever they choose. 

Again, when we pay for money loaned, we pay first for 
the use, and second for the risk ; that is, we pay literally a 
premium of insurance. As both of these vary with time and 
with individuals, there is a double reason for variation in the 
rate of interest. When we have a house insured, we pay 
only for the risk, and hence there is only a single cause of 
variation. But while all governments have fixed the rate of 
interest by law, they have never fixed the rate of insurance ; 
which being less variable is more properly subject to a fixed 
rule. This is surely inconsistent ; is it not also unjust ? 

Nevertheless, for the sake of avoiding disputes, and errors 
of ignorance, it might be wise for society to enact, by law, 
what should be the rate of interest, in cases where no rate 
is otherwise specified. This is the extent of its proper ju- 
risdiction, and doing any thing further is, I think, not only 
injurious to the interests of the community, but also a vio- 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 265 

lation of the right of property. While, however, I hold this 
to be true, I by no means hold, that the laws remaining as 
they are, any individual is justified in taking or giving more 
than the legal rate of interest. When conscience does not 
forbid, it is the business of a good citizen to obey the laws ; 
and the faithful obedience to an unwise law, is generally the 
surest way of working its overthrow. 

We shall now proceed to consider the laws which govern 
this mode of transfer of property. 

1. The loan of money. 

1. The lender is bound to demand no more than a fair 
remuneration for the use of his capital, and for the risk to 
which it is exposed. 

2. He is bound to make use of no unlawful means to in- 
fluence the decision of the borrower. The principles here, 
are the same as govern in the permanent exchange of pro- 
perty. All rumors and false alarms, and all combinations of 
capitalists to raise by a monopoly the price of money, are 
manifestly dishonest ; nor are they the less so, because many 
persons may enter into them, or because they have skill or 
power to evade the laws of the land. 

3. The lender is bound to pay a just equivalent as I 
have stated it above ; and he is equally forbidden to use any 
dishonest motives to influence the decision of the lender. 

4. Inasmuch as the risk of the property is one part of 
the consideration for which the owner receives remunera- 
tion ; and as it is in every case supposed to be a specified 
quantity ; the borrower has no right to expose the property 
of another to any risk not contemplated in the contract. 
Hence, he has no right to invest it in a more hazardous 
trade, nor has he a right to employ it in a more hazardous 
speculation ; and if he does, he is usine* it in a manner for 

24 



266 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

which he has paid no equivalent. He is also under obliga- 
tion to take all the care to avoid losses which he would 
take if the property were his own ; and to use the same 
skill to conduct his affairs successfully. 

5. He is also bound to repay the loan exactly, according 
to the terms specified in the contract. This requires that 
he pay the full sum promised, and that he pay it precisely 
at the time promised. A failure in either case is a breach 
of the contract. 

The question is often asked, whether a debtor is morally 
liberated by an act of insolvency. I think not, if he ever 
afterwards have the means of repayment. It may be said, 
this is oppressive to debtors ; but we ask, is not the contrary 
principle oppressive to creditors ; and are not the rights of 
one party just as valuable, and just as much rights, as 
those of the other. It may also be remarked that, were this 
principle acted upon, there would be fewer debtors, and 
vastly fewer insolvents. The amount of money actually 
lost by insolvency is absolutely enormous ; and it is gen- 
erally lost by causeless, reckless speculation, by childish 
and inexcusable extravagance, or by gambling and profli- 
gacy, which are all stimulated into activity by the facility 
of credit, and the facility with which debts may be can- 
celled by acts of insolvency. The more rigidly contracts 
are observed, the more rapidly will the capital of a country 
increase ; the greater will be the inducements to industry, 
and the stronger will be the barriers against extravagance 
and vice. 

Of laws of other property. 

The principles which apply in this case are very similar 
to those which have been already stated. 

1. The lender is bound to furnish an article, which, so 
far as he knows, is adapted to the purposes of the borrower. 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 267 

That is, if the thing borrowed has any internal defect, he 
is bound to reveal it. If I loan a horse to a man who 
wishes to ride forty miles to-day, while I know he is able to 
go but thirty, it is a fraud. If I let to a man a house which 
I. know to be in the neighborhood of a nuisance, or to be in 
part uninhabitable, from smoky chimneys, and do not in- 
form him, it is fraud. The loss in the value of the pro- 
perty is mine, and I have no right to transfer it to another. 

2. So the lender has a right to charge the market price 
arising from the considerations of use, risk, and variation in 
supply and demand. This depends upon the same princi- 
ples as those already explained. 

3. The borrower is bound to take the same care of the 
property of another, as he would of his own ; to put it to 
no risk diiferent from that specified or understood in the 
contract, and to pay the price upon the principle stated 
above. Neither party has any right to influence the other 
by any motives, extraneous to the simple business of the 
transfer. 

4. The borrower is bound to return the property loaned, 
precisely according to the contract. This includes time and 
condition. He must return it at the time specified, and 
in the condition in which he received it, ordinary wear and 
tear only excepted. If I hire a house for a year, and so 
damage its paper and painting, that before it can be let 
again it will cost half the price of the rent to put it in re- 
pair, it is a gross fraud. I have by negligence, or other 
cause, defrauded the owner of half his rent. It is just as 
immoral as to pay him the whole, and then pick his pocket 
of the half of what he had received. 

The important question arises here, if a loss happen while 
the property is in the hands of the borrower, on whom 
shall it fall. The principle I suppose to be this. 



268 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

1. If it happen while the property is subject to the use 
specified in the contract, the owner bears it ; because, it is 
to be supposed that he foresaw the risk, and received remu- 
neration for it. As he was paid for the risk, he of course 
has assumed it, and justly suffers it. 

2. If the loss happen in consequence of any use not con- 
templated in the contract, then the borrower suffers it. He 
having paid nothing to insure against this risk, there is no 
body but himself to sustain it, and he sustains it accordingly. 
Besides, were any other principle adopted, it must put an 
end to the whole business of loaning, for no one would part 
with his property temporarily, to be used in any manner the 
borrower pleased, and be himself responsible for all the loss. 
If a horse die while I am using it well, and for the purpose 
specified, the owner suffers. If it die by careless driving, I 
suffer the loss. He is bound to furnish a good horse, and I 
a competent driver. 

3. So, on the contrary, if a gain arise unexpectedly. If 
this gain was one which was contemplated in the contract, it 
belongs to the borrower. If not, he has no equitable claim 
upon it. If I hire a farm, I am entitled, without any addi- 
tional charge for rent, to all the advantages arising from the 
rise in the price of wheat, or from my own skill in agricul- 
ture. But if a mine of coal be discovered on the farm, I 
have no right to the benefit of working it, for I did not hire 
the farm for this purpose. 

The case of insurance. 

Here no transfer of property is made, and of course no- 
thing is paid for use. But the owner chooses to transfer 
the risk of use from himself to others, and to pay for their 
assuming this risk a stipulated equivalent. The loss to so- 
ciety of property insured, is just the same as when uninsured. 
A town is just as much poorer, when property is destroyed 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 269 

that is insured, provided it be insured in the town, as though 
no insurance is effected. The only difference is, that the 
loss is equalized. Ten men can more easily re-place one 
hundred dollars a piece, who have nine hundred remaining", 
than the eleventh can re-place his whole property of one 
thousand. 

The rule in this case is simple. The insured is bound 
fully to reveal to the insurer every circumstance, within his 
knowledge, which could in any measure affect the value of 
the risk, that is to say, the property must be so far as he 
knows what it purports to be, and the risks none other than 
such as he reveals them. If he expose the property to other 
risks the insurance is void, and the underwriter, if the pro- 
perty is lost, refuses to remunerate him, and if it be safe he 
returns the premium. If the loss occur within the terms 
of the policy, the insurer is bound fully and faithfully to 
make remuneration, precisely according to the terms of the 
contract. , 

As to the rate of insurance very little need be said. It 
varies with every risk, and is made up of so many conflict- 
ing circumstances, that it must be agreed upon by the par- 
ties themselves. When the market in this species of traffic 
is unrestrained by monopolies, the prices of insurance, like 
any other commodity, will regulate themselves. 

Next, where the equivalent is immaterial, as where one 
party pays remuneration for some service rendered. 

The principle cases here are these : That of master and 
servant, and that of principal and agent. 

1. Of master and servant 

1. The master is bound to allow to the servant a fair re- 
muneration. This is justly estimated by uniting the con- 

24* 



•270 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

siderations of labor, skill, and fidelity, varied by the rise and 
fall of the price of such labor in the market. As this, how- 
ever, would be liable to inconvenient fluctuation, it is gene- 
rally adjusted by a rate agreed upon by the parties. 

2. He is bound to allow him all the privileges to which 
moral law, or established usage, entitles him, unless some- 
thing different has been stipulated in the contract ; and is 
at liberty to require of him service upon the same prin- 
ciples. 

3. The servant is bound to perform the labor assigned 
him by usage, or by contract (matters of conscience only 
excepted), with all the skill he possesses, making the in- 
terests of his employer his own. If either party fail, that is, 
if the master demand service for which he does not render 
compensation, or if the servant receive wages for which he 
does not render the stipulated equivalent, there is a violation 
of the right of property. Thus, also, there is a violation of 
right, if the master do not fulfil the terms of the contract just 
as it was made ; as for instance, if he do not pay a servant 
punctually. When the service is performed, the wages be- 
long to the servant, and the master has no more right to 
them, than to the property of any one else. Thus saith St. 
James, " The hire of your laborers that have reaped your 
fields, that is kept back by fraud, crieth, and the cry is come 
into the ears of the Lord of Sabbaoth." And on the con- 
trary, the servant is bound to use his whole skill and eco- 
nomy in managing the property of his master, and if he 
destroy by negligence or fault, he ought to make restitution. 

Of principal and agent. 

It frequently happens that in the transaction of business, 
duties devolve upon an individual, that are to be discharged 
in different places at the same time. In other cases, in con- 
sequence of the subdivision of labor, he requires something 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 271 

to be done for him. which another person can do better than 
himself. In either case, from necessity or for his own conve- 
nience and interest, he employs other men as agents. 

Agencies are of two kinds; first, where the principal 
simply employs another to fulfil his own (that is, the princi- 
pal's) will. Here, the principal's will is the rule, both as 
to the object to be accomplished, and the manner in which, 
and the means whereby, it is to be accomplished. 

2. Where the principal only designates the objects to be 
accomplished, reposing special trust in the skill and fidelity 
of the agent as to the manner and means by which it is to 
be accomplished. Such I suppose to be the case in regard 
to professional assistance. 

The laws on this subject respect, first, the relation exist- 
ing between the principal and the community ; and, second, 
the relation existing between the principal and agent. 

I. The principal is bound by the acts of the agent, while 
the agent is employed in the business in which the princi- 
pal has engaged him ; but he is responsible no farther. 

Thus, it is known that a merchant employs a clerk to 
receive money on his account. For his-rferk's transactions, 
in this part of his affairs, he is responsible ; but he would 
not be responsible if money were paid to his porter or 
coachman, because he does not employ them in this man- 
ner. Hence, if the clerk be unfaithful, and secrete the 
money, the merchant suffers. If the coachman receive the 
money, and be unfaithful, the payer suffers. It is the mer- 
chant's business to employ suitable agents; but it is the 
business of his customers to apply to those agents only, 
whom he has employed. 

An important question arises here, namely, when is it to 



272 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF 

be understood that a principal has employed an agent ? It is 
generally held that, if the principal acknowledge himself 
responsible for the acts of the agent, he is hereafter held to 
be responsible for similar acts until he gives notice to the 
contrary. 

2. Laws arising from the relation subsisting between the 
principal and the agent. 

1. The laws respecting compensation are the same as 
those already specified, and, therefore, need not be repeated. 

2. The agent is bound to give the same care to the affairs 
of the principal as to his own. He is another self, and 
should act in that capacity. The necessity of this rule is 
apparent from the fact, that no other rule could be devised, 
by which either party would know what justly to demand, 
or when the demands of justice were fulfilled. 

Hence, if an agent do not give all the care to the affairs 
of his principal that he would do to his own, and loss occur, 
he ought to sustain it. If a lawyer lose a cause through 
negligence or palpable ignorance, he ought in justice to 
suffer the consequences. He receives fees for conducting 
the cause to the best of his ability; and, by undertaking to 
conduct it, puts it out of the power of the client to employ 
any one else. Thus, if he neglect it, and by neglecting it, 
his client is worse off than if he had not undertaken it, he 
accepts fees for really injuring his neighbor. He ought to 
bear the loss which has occurred by his own fault. 

A question frequently arises here of considerable import- 
ance. It is, when is he obliged to obey the instructions of 
his principal; and when is he obliged to act without regard 
to them? Although this question does not come under 
the right of property, it may be as well to notice it here as 
any where else. 



PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED, &c. 273 

The question, I suppose, is to be answered by deciding to 
which of the above specified kinds of agencies the case to 
be considered, belongs. 

1. If it be simple agency, that is, where the agent under- 
takes merely to execute the will of the principal, and in the 
manner and by the means specified by the principal, he 
must obey implicitly ', (conscience only excepted,) unless 
some fact material to the formation of a judgment has come 
to light after giving the order, which, if known, would have 
necessarily modified the intention of the principal. This is 
the law of the military service. Even here, when an agent 
disobeys, he does it at his own risk ; and hence, the modi- 
fying facts should be clear and explicit, in order to justify 
the variation from the instructions. 

2. When the agency is of the other kind, and the will 
of the principal is only supposed to direct the end, and 
that the means and manner are to be decided upon by 
the professional skill of the agent, I suppose that the agent 
is not bound to obey the directions of his principal. He is 
supposed to know more on the subject, and to be better able 
to decide what will benefit his principal, than the principal 
himself; and he has no right to injure another man ; even 
if the other man desires it ; nor has he a right to lend him- 
self as an instrument by which another man, by consequence 
of his ignorance, shall injure himself. Besides, every man 
has a professional reputation to sustain, on which his means 
of living depend. He has no right to injure this for the 
sake of gratifying another, especially when, by so gratifying 
the other, he shall ruin himself also. A physician has no 
right to give his patient drugs which will poison him, be- 
cause a patient wishes it. A lawyer has no right to bring 
a cause into court, in such a manner as will ensure 
the loss of it, because his client insists upon it. The 
professional agent is bound to conduct the business of his 
profession to the best of his ability. This is the end of his 



274 VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF 

responsibility. If it pleases his client, well : if not, the rela- 
tion must cease, and the principal must find another agent. 

A representative in Congress is manifestly an agent of the 
latter of these two classes. He is chosen on account of his 
supposed legislative ability. Hence, he is strictly a profes- 
sional agent ; and, on these principles, he is under no sort 
of obligation to regard the instructions of his constituents. 
He is merely bound to seek their best interests, but the man- 
ner is to be decided by his superior skill and ability. 

But. secondly. Is he bound to resign his seat, if he dif- 
fer from them in opinion ? This is a question to be de- 
cided by the constitution of the country under which he 
acts. Society, that is, the whole nation, have a right to 
form a government as they will ; and to choose representa- 
tives during good behavior, that is, for as long a time as 
they and their representatives entertain the same views : or, 
setting aside this mode for reasons which may seem good to 
themselves, to elect them for a certain period of service. 
Now, if they have chosen the latter mode, they have bound 
themselves to abide by it, and have abandoned the former. 
If they elect him during pleasure, he is so elected. If they, 
on the contrary, elect him for two years, or for six years, 
he is so elected. And, so far as I can discover, here the 
question rests. It is in the power of society to alter the 
tenure of office, if they please ; but, until it be altered, 
neither party can claim any thing more or different from 
what that tenure actually and virtually expresses. 



SECTION III. 

RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS VIOLATED BY SOCIETY. 

I have already stated that, whatever a man possesses, he 
possesses exclusively of every man, and of all men. He 



PROPERTY BY SOCIETY. 275 

has a right to use his property in such manner as will pro- 
mote his own happiness, provided he do not interfere with 
the rights of others. But with this right society may inter- 
fere, as well as individuals ; and the injury is the greater 
here, inasmuch as it is remediless. In this world the indi- 
vidual knows of no power superior to society, and from its 
decisions, even when unjust ; he has no appeal. A few 
suggestions on this part of the subject will close the present 
chapter. 

I have mentioned that the individual has a right to use 
his property, innocently, as he will, exclusively of any man, 
or of all men. It is proper to state here, that this right is 
apparently modified by his becoming a member of society. 
When men form a civil society, they mutually agree to con- 
fer upon the individual certain benefits upon certain condi- 
tions. But as these benefits cannot be attained without in- 
curring some expenses, as, for instance, of courts of justice, 
legislation, &c, it is just that every individual who enters 
the society, and thus enjoys these benefits, should pay his 
portion of the expense. By the very act of becoming a 
member of society he renders himself answerable for his 
portion of that burden, without the incurring of which society 
could not exist. He has his option, to leave society or to 
join it. But if he join it, he must join it on the same con- 
ditions as others. He demands the benefit of laws and of 
protection ; but he has no right to demand what other men 
have purchased, unless he will pay for it an equitable price. 

From these principles it will follow, that society has a 
natural right to require every individual to contribute his 
portion of those expenses necessary to the existence of 
society. 

Besides these, however, the members of a society have 
the power to agree together to contribute for objects, if not 
essential to the existence, yet important to the well-being, 



276 VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF 

of society. If they so agree, they are bound to fulfil this 
agreement ; for a contract between the individual and so- 
ciety, is as binding as one between individual and indi- 
vidual. Hence, if such an agreement be made, society has 
a right to enforce it. This, however, by no means decides 
the question of the original wisdom of any particular com- 
pact ; much less to assert that the individual is bound by 
the acts of a majority, when that majority has exceeded its 
power. These subjects belong to a subsequent chapter. 
What is meant to be asserted here, is, that there may arise 
cases in which society may rightfully oblige the individual 
to contribute for purposes which are not absolutely neces- 
sary to the existence of society. 

The difference which we wish to establish is this. In 
the case of whatever is necessary to the existence of society, 
society has a natural right to oblige the individual to bear 
his part of the burden ; that is, it has a right over his pro- 
perty to this amount, without obtaining any concession on 
his part. Society has manifestly a right to whatever is 
necessary to its own existence. 

Whatever, on the other hand, is not necessary to the 
existence of society, is not in the power of society, unless it 
has been conferred upon it by the will of the individual. 
That this is the rule is evident from the necessity of the 
case. No other rule could be devised which would not put 
the individual wholly in the power of society, or in other 
words absolutely destroy the liberty of the individual. 

If such be the facts, it will follow that society has a right 
over the property of the individual for all purposes neces- 
sary to the existence of society ; and secondly, in all re- 
spects in which the individual has conferred that power, 
but only for the purposes for which it was conferred. 

And on the contrary, it is the duty of the individual to 
hold his property always subject to these conditions, and, 



PROPERTY BY SOCIETY. 277 

for such purposes, freely to contribute his portion of that 
expense for which he, in common with others, is receiving 
an equivalent. No one has any more right than another to 
receive a consideration without making a remuneration. 

2. The individual has a right to demand that no imposi- 
tions be laid upon him, unless they come under one or the 
other of these classes. 

3. He has a right to demand that the burdens of society 
be laid upon individuals according to some equitable law. 
This law should be founded, as nearly as possible, upon the 
principle that each one should pay, in proportion to the 
benefits he receives from the protection of society. As 
these benefits are personal and pecuniary, and as those 
which are personal are equal, it would seem just that the 
variation should be in proportion to property. 

If these principles be just, it is evident that society may 
violate the right of individual property in the following 
ways : 

1. By taking, through the means of government, which 
is its agent, the property of the individual arbitrarily, or 
merely by the will of the executive. Such is the nature of 
the exactions in despotic governments. 

2. When, by arbitrary will or by law, it takes the pro- 
perty of the individual for purposes whether good or bad, 
not necessary to the existence of society ; when the individuals 
of society have not consented that it be so appropriated. 
This consent is never to be presumed, except in necessary 
expenditures, as has been shown. Whenever this plea 
cannot be made good, society has no right to touch the pro- 
perty of the individual, unless it can show the constitu- 
tional provision. Were our government to levy a tax to 
build churches, it would avail nothing to say that churches 

25 



278 VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT, &c. 

were wanted, or that the good of society demanded it ; it 
would be an invasion of the right of property, until the 
article in the constitution could be shown, granting to 
government power over property for this very purpose. 

3. Society, even when the claim is just, may violate the 
rights of the individual by adopting an inequitable rule in 
the distribution of the public burden. Every individual 
has an equal right to employ his property unmolested, in 
just such manner as will innocently promote his own hap- 
piness. That is, it is to society a matter of indifference in 
what way he employs it. Provided it be innocent, it -does 
not come within the view of society. Hence, in this respect 
all modes of employing it are equal. And the only ques- 
tion to be considered in adjusting the appropriation is, how 
much does he ask society to protect ? and by this rule it 
should, as we have said before, be adjusted. If, then, be- 
sides this rule, another be adopted ; and an individual is 
obliged, besides his pro rata proportion, to bear a burden 
levied on his particular calling, to the exemption of an- 
other, he has a right to complain. He is obliged to bear a 
double burden^ and one portion of the burden is laid for a 
cause,over which society professes itself to have no jurisdiction. 

4. Inasmuch as the value of property depends upon the 
unrestrained use which I am allowed to make of it ? for the 
promotion of my individual happiness, society interferes 
with the right of property if it in any manner abridges any 
of these. One man is rendered happy by accumulation, 
another by benevolence ; one by promoting science, another 
by promoting religion. Each has a right to use what is his 
own, exactly as he pleases. And if society interfere by 
directing the manner in which he shall appropriate it, it 
must be by an act of injustice. It is as great a violation of 
property, for instance, to interfere with the purpose of the 
individual in the appropriation of his property for religious 
purposes, as it is to enact that a farmer shall keep but three 
cows, or a manufacturer employ but ten workmen. 



CHAPTER III. 



■ JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 

Character is the present intellectual, social, and moral 
condition of an individual: It comprehends his actual acqui- 
sitions, his capacities, his habits, his tendencies, his moral feel- 
ings, and every thing which -enters into a man's state for the 
present, or his powers for attaining to a better state in the 
future. 

That character, in this sense, is by far the most important 
of all the possessions which a man can call his own, is too 
evident to need discussion. It is the source of all that he 
suffers or enjoys here, and of all that he fears or hopes for 
hereafter. 

If such be the fact, benevolence would teach us the obli- 
gation to do all in our power to improve the character of our 
neighbor. This is its chief office. This is the great prac- 
tical aim of Christianity. Reciprocity merely prohibits the 
infliction of any injury upon the character of another. 

The reasons of this prohibition are obvious. No man can 
injure his own character, but by violating the laws of God, 
and also creating those tendencies which result in violation 
of the laws of man. He who, in any manner, becomes 
voluntarily the cause of this violation, is a partaker ; and, 



280 JUSTICE AS IT 

not unfrequently, the largest partaker in the guilt. As he 
who tempts another to suicide, is, in the sight of God, guilty 
of murder, so he who instigates another to wickedness, by 
producing those states of mind which necessarily lead to it, 
is, in the sight of God, held responsible, in no slight degree, 
for the result. 

Again, consider the motives which lead men to injure the 
characters of each other. These are either pure malice, or 
reckless self-gratification. 

Firsts malice. Some men so far transcend the ordinary limits 
of human depravity, as to derive a truly fiend-like pleasure 
in alluring and seducing from the paths of virtue, the com- 
paratively innocent, and to exult over the moral desolations 
which they have accomplished. " They will compass sea 
and land, to make one proselyte, and when he is made, 
they make him tenfold more the child of hell than them- 
selves." It is scarcely necessary to add, that language has 
no terms of moral indignation that are capable of branding, 
with adequate infamy, conduct "so intensely vicious. It is 
wickedness without excuse, and without palliation. Or, 
second, take the more favorable case. One man wishes to ac- 
complish some purpose of self-gratification, to indulge his 
passions, to increase his power, or to feed his vanity ; and, 
he proceeds to accomplish that purpose by means of ren- 
dering another immortal and accountable moral creature, 
degraded forever, — a moral pest henceforth on earth, and 
both condemned, and the cause of condemnation to others, 
throughout eternity. Who has given this wretch a right to 
work so awful a ruin among God's creatures, for the gratifi- 
cation of a momentary and an unholy desire 1 And will not 
the Judge of all, when He maketh inquisition for blood; press 
to the lips of such a sinner the bitterest dregs of the cup of 
trembling? 

With this, all the teaching of the Sacred Scriptures is 



RESPECTS CHARACTER. 281 

consonant. The most solemn maledictions in the Holy 
Scriptures are uttered against those who have been the instru- 
ments of corrupting others. In the Old Testament, Jere- 
boam is signalized as a sinner of unparalleled atrocity, because 
he made Israel to sin. In the New Testament, the judg- 
ment of the Pharisees has been already alluded to. And 
again, " Whosoever shall break the least of these command- 
ments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the 
Kingdom of Heaven." > By comparison with the preceding 
verse, the meaning of this passage is seen to be, that, as the 
doing and teaching the commandments of God is the great 
proof of virtue, so the breaking them, and the teaching others 
to break them, is the great proof of vice. And, in the reve- 
lation, where God is represented as taking signal vengeance 
upon Babylon, it is because " she did corrupt the earth with 
her wickedness." 

The moral precept, on this subject then, is briefly this : 
We are forbidden for any cause, or under any pretence, or 
in any manner, willingly to vitiate the character of another. 

This prohibition may be violated in two ways. 

1. By weakening the moral restraints of men. 

2. By exciting their evil passions. 

I. By weakening the moral restraints of men. 

It has been already shown, that the passions of men were 
intended to be restrained by conscience ; and, that the re- 
straining power of conscience is increased by the doctrines 
and motives derived from natural and revealed religion. 
Whoever, therefore, in any manner, renders obtuse the moral 
sensibilities of others, or diminishes the power of that moral 
truth, by which these sensibilities are rendered operative, 

25* 



3& JUSTICE AS IT 

inflicts permanent injury upon the character of his fellow- 
men. This is done by all wicked example ; for, as we have 
seen before, the sight of wickedness weakens the power of 
conscience over ns. It is done, when, either by conversation 
or by writing, the distinctions between right and wrong are 
treated with open scorn, or covert contempt ; by all conduct 
calculated to render inoperative the sanctions of religion, as 
profanity or Sabbath breaking ; by ridicule of the obligations 
of morality and religion, under the names of superstition, 
priestcraft, prejudices of education ; or, by presenting to men 
such views of the character of God as would lead them to 
believe that he cares very little about the moral actions of 
his creatures, but is willing that every one shall live as he 
chooses ; and that, therefore, the self-denials of virtue are 
only a form of gratuitous, self-inflicted torture. 

It is against this form of moral injury that the young need 
to be specially upon their guard. The moral seducer, if he 
be a practised villain, corrupts the principles of his victim, 
before he attempts to influence his or her practice. It is not 
until the moral restraints are silently removed, and the heart 
left defenceless, that he presents the allurements of vice, 
and goads the passions to madness. His task is then easy. 
If he has succeeded in the first effort, he will rarely fail in 
the second. Let every young man, especially every young 
woman, beware of listening for a moment to any conversa- 
tion, of which the object is, to show that the restraints of vir- 
tue are unnecessary, or to diminish, in aught, the reverence 
and obedience, which are due from the creature to the law of 
his Creator. 

II. We injure the characters of men by exciting to 

ACTION THEIR EVIL DISPOSITIONS. 

1. By viciously stimulating- their imaginations. No 
one is corrupt in action, until he has become corrupt in 



RESPECTS CHARACTER. 283 

imagination. And, on the other hand, he who has filled 
his imagination with conceptions of vice, and, who loves to 
feast his depraved moral appetite, with imaginary scenes of 
impurity, needs but the opportunity, to become openly 
abandoned. Hence, one of the most nefarious means of 
corrupting men, is to spread before them those images of 
pollution, by which they will, in secret, become familiar with 
sin. Such is the guilt of those who write, or publish, or 
sell, or lend, vicious books, under whatever name or charac- 
ter, and of those who engrave, or publish, or sell, or lend, or 
exhibit, obscene or lascivious pictures. Few exhibitions of 
human depravity are marked by deeper atrocity, than that 
of an author, or a publisher, who from literary vanity, or 
sordid gain, pours forth over society a stream of moral 
pollution, either in prose or in poetry. 

And yet, there are not only men who will do this, but ? 
what is worse, there are men, yes, and women too, who, if 
the culprit have possessed talent, will commend it, and even 
weep tears of sympathy over the infatuated genius, who 
was so sorely persecuted by that unfeeling portion of the 
world, who would not consider talent synonymous with 
virtue, and wlm could not applaud the effort of that genius, 
which was exerted only to multiply the victims of vice. 

2. By ministering to the appetites of others. Such is 
the relation of the power of appetite, to that of conscience, 
that, where no positive allurements to vice are set before 
men, conscience will frequently retain its ascendency. While 
on the other hand, if allurement be added to the power of 
appetite, reason and conscience prove a barrier too feeble to 
resist their combined and vicious tendency. Hence he who 
presents the allurements of vice before others, who procures 
and sets before them the means of vicious gratification, is 
in a great degree responsible for the mischief which he 
produces. Violations of this law occur in most cases of 



284 JUSTICE AS IT 

immoral traffic, as in the sale, and manufacture of intoxica- 
ting liquors, the sale of opium to the Chinese, &c. Under the 
same class is also- comprehended the case of female prosti- 
tution. 

3. By using others to minister to our vicious appetites. 
We cannot use others as ministers to our vices, without 
rendering them corrupt, and frequently inflicting an incurable 
wound upon their moral nature. For the sake of a base and 
wicked momentary gratification, the vicious man ; willingly, 
ruins forever an immortal being, who was, but for him, 
innocent ; and yet more, not unfrequently considers this 
ruin a matter of triumph. Such is the case in seduction, 
and adultery, and in a modified degree in all manner of 
lewdness and profligacy. 

4. By cherishing the evil passions of men. By passion, 
in distinction from appetite, I mean the spiritual in opposition 
to the corporeal desires. It frequently happens, that we 
wish to influence men, who cannot be moved by an appeal 
to their reason or conscience, but, who can be easily moved 
by an appeal to their ambition, their avarice, their party 
zeal, their pride, or their vanity. An acquaintance with 
these peculiarities of individuals, is called, understanding 
human nature, knowing the iveak sides of men, and is, by 
many persons, considered the grand means for great and 
masterly effect. But he can have but little practical ac- 
quaintance with a conscience void of offence, who does not 
instinctively feel, that such conduct is unjust, mean and 
despicable. It is accomplishing our purposes, by means of 
the moral degradation of him to whom we profess to be the 
friends. It is manifestly doing a man a greater injury than 
simply to rob him. If we stole his money, he would be 
injured only by being made poorer. If we procure his 
services or his money, in this manner, we make him poorer; 
we cultivate those evil dispositions, which already expose 



RESPECTS CHARACTER. 285 

him to sharpers ; and also render him more odious to the 
God before whom he must shortly stand. 

Nor do the ordinary excuses on this subject avail. It 
may be said, men would not give to benevolent objects but 
from these motives. Suppose it true. What if they did not? 
They would be as well off, morally -, as now. A man is no 
better, after having refused from avarice, who, at length, 
gives from vanity. His avarice is no better, and his vanity 
is even worse. It may be said, the cause of benevolence 
could not be sustained without it. Then, I say, let the cause 
of benevolence perish. God never meant one party of his 
creatures to be relieved by our inflicting moral injury on 
another. If there be no other way of sustaining benevo- 
lence, God did not mean that benevolent designs should be 
prosecuted. But it is not. so. The appeal to men's better 
feelings, is the proper appeal to be made to men. It will, 
when properly made, generally succeed ; and, if it do not, 
our responsibility is at an end. 

I cannot leave this subject without urging it upon those 
who are engaged in promoting the object of benevolent 
associations. It seems to me, that no man has a right to 
present any other than an innocent motive to urge his fel- 
low-men to action. Motives derived from party zeal, from 
personal vanity, from love of applause, however covertly in- 
sinuated, are not of this character. If a man, by exciting 
such feelings, sold me a horse at twice its value, he would 
be a sharper. If he excites me to give, from the same motives, 
the action partakes of the same character. The cause of 
benevolence is holy: it is the cause of God. It needs not 
human chicanery to approve it to the human heart. Let 
him who advocates it, therefore, go forth strong in the 
strength of Him whose cause he advocates. Let him rest 
his cause upon his own merits, and leave every man's con- 
science to decide whether or not he will enlist himself in its 



286 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS, &c. 

support. And, besides, were men conscientiously to confine 
themselves to the merits of their cause, they would much 
more carefully weigh their undertakings before they at- 
tempted to enlist others in support of them. Much of that 
fanaticism which withers the moral sympathies of man, 
would thus be checked at the outset. 



CHAPTER IV 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 

It has been already remarked, that every man is, by the 
laws of his Creator, entitled to the physical results of his 
labor ; that is, to those results which arise from the operation - 
of those laws of cause and effect which govern the material 
on which he operates. Thus, if a man form several trees 
into a house, the result of this labor, supposing the materials 
and time to be his own, are his own also. Thus, again, if a 
man study diligently, the amount of knowledge which he 
gains, is at his own disposal ; and he is at liberty, innocently, 
to use it as he will. And, in general, if a man be indus- 
trious, the immediate results of industry are his, and no one 
has any right to interfere with them. 

But these are not the only results. There are others 
springing from those laws of cause and effect, which govern 
the opinions and actions of men towards each other, which are 
frequently of as great importance to the individual as the 
physical results. Thus, if a man have built a house, the 
house is his. But, if he have done it well, there arises, in the 
minds of men, a certain opinion of his skill, and a regard 
towards him on account of it, which may be of more value to 
him than even the house itself; for it may be the foundation of 
great subsequent good fortune. The industrious student is 
entitled, not merely to the use of that knowledge which he 
has acquired, but also the esteem which the possession of 
that knowledge gives him among men. Now, these second- 



288 JUSTICE AS IT 

ary and indirect results, though they may follow other laws 
of cause and effect, are yet as truly effects of the original 
cause, that is, of the character of the man himself; and they 
as truly belong to him, as the primary and direct results of 
which we have before spoken. And hence, to diminish the 
esteem in which a man is held by his fellows, to abstract 
from the reputation which he has thus acquired, is as great a ' 
violation of justice, nay, it may be a far greater violation of 
justice, than robbing him of money. It has, moreover, the 
additional aggravation of conferring no benefit upon the ag- 
gressor, beyond that of the gratification of a base and malig- 
nant passion. 

But, it may be said, the man has a reputation greater than 
he deserves, or for that which he does not deserve. Have I 
not a right to diminish it to its true level? 

We answer, the objection proceeds upon the concession 
that the man has a reputation. That is, men have such or 
such an opinion concerning him. Now, the rule of property 
formerly mentioned, applies here. If a man be in possession 
of property, though unjustly in possession, this gives to no 
one a right to seize upon that property for himself, or to seize 
it and destroy it, unless he can, himself, show a better title. 
The very fact of possession bars every other claimant except 
that claimant whom the present possessor has defrauded. 
So, in this case, if this reputation injures the reputation of 
another, the other has a right to set forth his own claims; 
and any one else has a right, when prompted by a desire of 
doing justice to the injured, to state the facts as they are; 
but where this element of desire to do justice does not enter, 
no man has a right to diminish the esteem in which another 
is hold, simply because he may believe the other to have 
more than he deserves. 

The moral rule, on this subject, I suppose to be this : We 
are forbidden to utter anything which will be injurious to 
the reputation of another, except for adequate cause. I say, 



RESPECTS REPUTATION. 289 

for adequate cause, because occasions may occur, in which 
it is as much our duty to speak, as it is at other times our 
duty to be silent. The consideration of these cases will be 
a subsequent concern. The precept, thus understood, ap- 
plies to the cases in which we speak either from no sufficient 
motive, or from a bad motive. It is merely an extension of 
the great principle of the law of reciprocity, which com- 
mands us to have the same simple desire that every other 
man should enjoy unmolested the esteem in which he is 
held by men, that we have, to enjoy unmolested the same 
possession ourselves. 

I do not here consider the cases in which we utter, either 
wilfully or thoughtlessly, injurious falsehood respecting 
another. In these cases, the guilt of lying is superadded 
to that of slander. I merely here consider slander by itself; 
it being understood that, when what is asserted is false, it 
involves the sin of lying, besides the violation of the law of 
reciprocity which we here endeavor to enforce. 

The precept here includes several specifications. Some 
of them it may be important to enumerate. 

I. It prohibits us from giving publicity to the bad actions 
of men, without cause. The guilt here consists in giving 
publicity. Of course it does not include those cases in 
which the man himself gives publicity to his own bad 
actions. He has himself diminished his reputation, and 
his act becomes a part of public indiscriminate information. 
We are at liberty to mention this, like any other fact, when 
the mention of it is demanded ; but not to do it for the sake 
of injuring him. So whenever his bad actions are made 
known by the providence of God, it comes under the same 
rule. Thus, I may know that a man has acted dishonestly. 
This alone does not give me liberty to speak of it. But, if 
his dishonesty has been proved before a court of justice, it 
then becomes really a part of his reputation, and I am at 

26 



'290 JUSTICE AS IT 

liberty to speak of it in the same manner as of any other 
fact. Yet even here, if I speak of it with pleasure, or with 
desire of injury, I commit sin. 

Some of the reasons for this rule are the following : 

1. The very act itself is injurious to the slanderer's own 
moral character, and to that of him who lends himself to be 
his auditor. Familiarity with wrong, diminishes our ab- 
horrence of it. The contemplation of it in others, fosters 
the spirit of envy and uncharitableness, and leads us, in the 
end, to exult in, rather than to sorrow over, the faults of 
others. 

2. In the present imperfect state, where every individual, 
being fallible, must fail somewhere, if every one were at 
liberty to speak of all the wrong and all the imperfection of 
every one whom he knew, society would soon become in- 
tolerable from the festering of universal ill-will. What 
would become of families, of friendships, of communities, if 
parents and children, husbands and wives, acquaintances, 
neighbors, and citizens, should proclaim every failing which 
they knew or heard of, respecting each other ? Now, there 
can no medium be established between telling every thing 
and forbidding every thing to be told which is said without 
cause. 

3. We may judge of the justice of the rule by applying it 
to ourselves. We despise the man who, either thoughtlessly 
or maliciously, proclaims what he considers, either justly or 
unjustly, our failings. Now what can be more unjust, or 
despicable, than to do that which our own conscience tes- 
tifies to be unjust and despicable in others? 

II. The same law forbids us to utter general conclusions 
respecting the characters of men, drawn from particular bad 
actions which they may have committed. This is manifest 



RESPECTS REPUTATION. 291 

injustice, and it includes frequently lying as well as slan- 
der. A single action is rarely decisive of character, even 
in respect to that department of character to which it be- 
longs. A single illiberal action does not prove a man to be 
covetous, any more than a single act of charity proves him to 
be benevolent. How unjust, then, must it be, to proclaim a 
man as destitute of a whole class of virtues, because of one 
failure in virtue. How much more unjust, for one fault, to 
deny him all claim to any virtue whatsoever. Yet such is 
frequently the very object of calumny. And, in general, 
this form of vice is added to that just noticed. Men first, in 
violation of the law of reciprocity, make public the evil 
actions of others, and then, with a malignant power of gene- 
ralization, proceed to deny their claims, not only to a whole 
class of virtues, but, not unfrequently, to all virtue whatso- 
ever. The reasons, in this case, are similar to those just 
mentioned. 

I III. We are forbidden to judge, that is, to assign unneces- 
sarily bad motives to the actions of men. I say unnecessa- 
rily ; for some actions are in their nature such, that to pre- 
sume a good motive is impossible. 

This rule would teach us, first, to presume no unworthy 
motive, when the action is susceptible of an innocent one. 

And, secondly, never to ascribe to an action which we 
confess to be good, any other motive than that from which 
it professes to proceed. 

This is the rule by which we are bound to be governed 
in our own private opinions of men. And, if from any 
circumstances, we are led to entertain any doubts of the 
motives of men, we are bound to retain these doubts within 
our own bosoms, unless we are obliged, for some sufficient 
reason, to disclose them. But if we are obliged to adopt 
this rule respecting our own opinions of others, by how much 



292 JUSTICE AS IT 

more are we obliged to adopt it in the publication of our 
opinions. If we are not allowed unnecessarily to suppose 
an unworthy motive; by how much less are we allowed to 
circulate it, and thus render it universally supposed. 

The reasons for this rule are obvious. 

1. The motives of men, unless rendered evident by their 
actions, can be known by God alone. They are, evidently, 
out of the reach of their fellow men. In assigning mo- 
tives, unnecessarily, we therefore undertake to assert for 
fact, what we at the outset confess that we have not the means 
of knowing to be such ; which is, in itself, falsehood : and 
we do all this for the sake of gratifying a contemptible va- 
nity, or a wicked envy ; or what is scarcely less reprehensi- 
ble, from thoughtless love of talking. 

2. There is no offence, by which we are excited to a 
livelier or more just indignation, than by the misinterpreta- 
tion of our own motives. This quick sensitiveness in our- 
selves, should admonish us of the guilt which we incur ? 
when we traduce the motives of others. 

Fourthly. By the same rule we are forbidden to lessen the 
estimation in which others are held, by ridicule, mimicry, or 
by any means by which they are brought into contempt. 
No man can be greatly respected by those to whom he is 
the frequent subject of laughter. It is but a very imperfect 
excuse for conduct of this sort, to plead that we do not 
mean any harm. What do we mean 7 Surely, reasonable 
beings should be prepared to answer this question. Were 
the witty calumniator to stand concealed, and hear himself 
made the subject of remarks precisely similar to those in 
which he indulges respecting others, he would have a very 
definite conception of what others meant. Let him then 
carry the lesson home to his own bosom. 



RESPECTS REPUTATION. 293 

And lastly, if all this be so, it will be readily seen, that a 
very large portion of the ordinary conversation of persons, 
even in many respects estimable, is far from being innocent. 
How very common is the discussion of personal character, 
in all its length and breadth, the matter of common conver- 
sation. And in this discussion, men seem to forget that they 
are under any other law than that which is administered by 
a judge and jury. How commonly are characters dissected 
with apparently the only object of displaying the power 
of malignant acumen possessed by the operators ; as though 
another's reputation was made for no other purpose than the 
gratification of the meanest and most unlovely attributes of 
the human heart. Well may we say with the apostle James, 
" If any man offend not in vmrd, the same is a perfect man, 
able to bridle the whole body." Well may we tremble be- 
fore the declaration of the blessed Saviour, " For every idle 
word that men speak, they shall give an account in the day 
of Judgment." 

Nor is this evil the less, for the veil under which it is fre- 
quently and hypocritical ly hidden. Men and women propa- 
gate slander under the cover of secrecy, supposing that by 
uttering it under this injunction, the guilt is of course re- 
moved. But it is not so. The simple question is this ; does my 
duty to God or to man require me to publish this which will 
injure another. If it do, publish it wherever that duty re- 
quires, and do it fearlessly. If it do not, it is just as great 
guilt to publish it to one as to another. We are bound in 
all such cases to ask ourselves the question, am I under obli- 
gation to tell this fact to this person. If not, we are under 
the contrary obligation, to be silent. And still more. This 
injunction of secrecy is generally nothing better than the 
mere dictate of cowardice. We wish to gratify our love 
of detraction, but are afraid of the consequences to our- 
selves. We therefore converse under this injunction, that 
the injury to another may be with impunity to ourselves. 

26* 



:294 JUSTICE AS IT 

And hence it is, that in this manner the vilest and most 
injurious calumnies are generally circulated. 

The following extract from Bishop Wilson on this sub- 
ject, breathes the spirit of true Christian philanthropy, " It 
is too true, that some evil passion or other, and to gratify our 
corruption, is the aim of most conversations. We love to 
speak of past troubles ; hatred and ill-will make us take 
pleasure in relating the evil actions of our enemies. We 
compare, with some degree of pride, the advantages which 
we have over others. We recount, with too sensible a 
pleasure, the worldly happiness which we enjoy. This 
strengthens our passions, and increases our corruption. God 
grant that I may watch against a weakness that has such 
evil consequences ! May I never hear, and never repeat, 
with pleasure, such things as may dishonor God, hurt my 
own character, or injure my neighbor." — Bishop Wilson's 
Sacra Privata. 

The precepts of the Scriptures on this subject, are nu- 
merous and explicit. It will only be necessary here to refer 
to a few, for the sake of illustrating their general tendency. 
Matthew vii. 1, 5. " Judge not, that ye be not judged ; for 
with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged ; and with 
what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. 
And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's, 
eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own 
eye." 

Ephesians iv. 31. "Let all bitterness, and wrath, and 
clamor, and evil-speaking be put away from you." 

Titus iii. 2, " Speak evil of no man." 

1 Peter iii. 10, u He that will love life and see good days, 
let hi in refrain his tongue from evil." 

See also James, third chapter, for a graphic delineation of 
the miseries produced by the unlicensed use of the tongue. 



RESPECTS REPUTATION. 295 

Secondly. I have thus far, considered the cases, in which 
silence is our duty, respecting the evil actions of others. It 
is our duty, when we have no just cause, either for speaking, 
or for speaking to the particular person whom we address. 
But where there is a sufficient cause, we are under an equally 
imperative obligation to speak, wherever and whenever the 
cause shall demand it. The common fault of men is, that 
they speak when they should be silent, and are silent, only, 
when they should speak. 

The plain distinction in this case is the following. We 
are forbidden, causelessly, to injure another, even if he have 
done wrong. Yet, whenever justice can be done, or inno- 
cence protected, in no other manner, than by a course which 
must injure him, we are under no such prohibition. No 
man has a right to expect to do wrong with impunity; 
much less has he a right to expect that, in order to 
shield him from the just consequences of his actions, injus- 
tice should be done to others, or that other men shall, by 
silence, deliver up the innocent and unwary into his power. 

The principle by which we are to test our own motives, 
in speaking of that which may harm others, is this. When 
we utter any thing, which will harm another, and we do it 
either without cause, or with pleasure, or thoughtlessly, we 
are guilty of calumny. When we do it with pain and sor- 
row for the offender, and from the sincere motive of protect- 
ing the innocent, of promoting the ends of public justice, or 
for the good of the offender himself, and speak of it only to 
such persons, and in such manner as is consistent with these 
ends, we may speak of the evil actions of others, and yet be 
wholly innocent of calumny. 

We are therefore bound to speak of the faults of others. 

1. To promote the ends of public justice. He who con- 
ceals a crime against society, renders himself a party to the 



296 JUSTICE AS IT 

offence. We are bound here, not merely to speak of it, but 
also to speak of it to the proper civil officer, in order that it 
may be brought to trial and punishment. The ordinary 
prejudice against informing, is unwise and immoral. He 
who, from proper motives, informs against crime, performs 
an act as honorable as that of the judge who tries the cause, 
or of the juror who returns the verdict. That this may be 
done from improper motives alters not the case. A judge 
may hold his office for the love of money, but this does not 
make the office despicable. 

2. To protect the innocent. When we are possessed of 
a knowledge of certain facts in a man's history, which if 
known to a third person, would protect him from important 
injury ; it may frequently be my duty to put that person on 
his guard. If A knows that B, under the pretence of re- 
ligion, is insinuating himself into the good opinion of 0, for 
the purpose of gaining control over his property, A is bound 
to put C upon his guard. If I know that a man who is already 
married, is paying his addresses to a lady in another coun- 
try, I am. bound to give her the information. So if I know 
of a plan laid for the purpose of seduction, I am bound to 
make use of that knowledge to defeat it. All that is required 
here is, that I know what I assert to be fact ; and that I use 
it simply for the purposes specified. 

3. For the good of the offender himself. When we know 
of the crimes of another, and there is some person, for in- 
stance, a parent, a guardian, or instructer, who might, by 
control or advice, be the means of the offender's reformation ; 
it is our duty to give the necessary information. It is fre- 
quently the greatest kindness that we can manifest to both 
parties. W^ere it more commonly practised, the allurements 
to sin would be much less attractive ; and the hope of suc- 
cess in correcting the evil habits of the young much more 
encouraging. — No wicked person has a right to expect, that 
the community will keep his conduct a secret from those 



RESPECTS REPUTATION. 297 

who have a right specially to be informed of it. He who 
does so is partaker in the guilt. 

4. Though we may not be at liberty to make public the 
evil actions of another, yet no obligation exists to conceal 
his fault, by maintaining towards him our former habits of 
intimacy. If we know him to be unworthy of our con- 
fidence or acquaintance, we have no right to act a lie, by 
conducting towards him in public or in private, as though 
he was worthy of it. By associating with a man, we give 
to the public an assurance, that we know of nothing to 
render him unworthy of our association. If we falsify this 
assurance, we are guilty of deception, and of a deception, 
by which we benefit the wicked at the expense of the inno- 
cent ; and, so far as our example can do it, place the latter 
in the power of the former. And still more, if we associate, 
on terms of voluntary intimacy, with persons of known bad 
character ; we virtually declare, that such offences consti- 
tute no reason why the persons in question are not good 
enough associates for us. We thus virtually become the 
patrons of their crime. 

5. From what has been remarked, we see what is the 
nature of an historian's duty. He has to do with facts 
which the individuals themselves have made public, or 
which have been made public by the providence of God. 
He records what has already been made known. What has 
not been made known, therefore, comes not within his pro- 
vince, but whatever has been made known, comes properly 
within it. This latter he is bound to use without either 
fear, favor, or affection. If from party zeal, or sectarian 
bigotry, or individual partiality, he exaggerate, or conceal, 
or misrepresent, if he " aught extenuate or set down aught 
in malice," he is guilty of calumny of the most inexcusable 
character. It is calumny perpetrated deliberately, under the 
guise of impartiality, and perpetrated in a form intended to 
give it the widest publicity and the most permanent duration. 



298 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS, &c. 

These remarks have had respect, principally, to the pub- 
lication of injurious truth or falsehood, by conversation- 
But it will be immediately seen that they apply, with addi- 
tional force, to the publication of whatever is injurious, by 
the press. If it be wrong to injure my neighbor's reputa- 
tion within the limited circle of my acquaintance, how much 
more wrong must it be to injure it throughout a nation. 
If it be by universal acknowledgment mean, to underrate the 
talents or vilify the character of a personal rival, how much 
more so, that of a political opponent. If it would be degrad- 
ing in me to do it myself, by how much is it less degrading 
to cause it to be done by others ; and to honor or dishonor 
with my confidence, and reward with political distinction, 
those who do it ? Because a man is a political opponent, 
does he cease to be a creature of God ; and do we cease to 
be under obligations to obey the law of God in respect to 
him ? or rather I might ask, do men think that political col- 
lisions banish the Deity from the throne of the universe 7 
Nor do these remarks apply to political dissensions alone. The 
conductor of a public press possesses no greater privileges 
than any other man, nor has he any more right than any 
other man to use, or suffer to be used, his press, for the 
sake of gratifying personal pique, or avenging individual 
wrong, or holding up individuals, without trial, to public 
scorn. Crime against society is to be punished by society, 
and by society alone; and he who conducts a public press 
has no more right, because he has the physical power, to 
inflict pain, than any other individual. If one man may 
do it because he has a press, another may do it because he 
has muscular strength; and thus, the government of society 
is brought to an end. Nor has he even a right to publish 
cases of individual vice, unless the providence of God has 
made them public before. While they are out of sight 
of the public, they are out of his sight, unless he can show 
that he has been specially appointed to perform this service. 



CLASS FIRST. 

DUTIES TO MEN AS MEN 



PART II 



VERACITY. 



Every individual, by necessity, stands in most important 
relations, both to the past and to the future. Without a 
knowledge of what has been, and of what, so far as his fel- 
low-men are concerned, will be, he can form no decision in 
regard to the present. But this knowledge could never be 
attained, unless his constitution were made to correspond 
with his circumstances. It has, therefore, been made to 
correspond. There is, on the one hand, in men, a strong 
a priori disposition to tell the truth ; and it controls them, 
unless some other motive interpose: and there is, on the 
other hand, a disposition to believe what is told, unless some 
counteracting motive is supposed to operate. 

Veracity has respect to the past and present, or to the 
future. "We shall consider them separately. 



CHAPTER I 



VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS THE PAST AND 
PRESENT. 

Veracity, in this sense, always has respect to a fact, 
that is, to something done, or to something which we believe 
to be doing. 

Moral truth consists in our intention to convey to another, 
to the best of our ability, the conception of a fact, exactly as 
it exists in our own minds. 

Physical truth consists in conveying to another the con- 
ception of a fact, precisely as it actually existed. 

These two, it is evident, do not always coincide. 

I may, innocently, have obtained an incorrect conception 
of a fact myself, and yet may intend to convey it to another 
precisely as it exists in my own mind. Here, then, is a 
moral truth, but a physical untruth. 

Or again, I may have a correct conception of a fact, sup- 
posing it to be an incorrect one, and may convey it to 
another with the intention to deceive. Here, then, is a 
moral falsehood and a physical truth. Pure truth is com- 
municated only when I have a correct conception of a fact, 
and communicate it, intentionally, to another, precisely as 
it exists in my own mind. 

27 



302 VERACITY NS IT RESPECTS 

The law on this subject is, that when we profess to con- 
vey a fact to another, we, to the best of our ability, convey 
to him the impression which exists in our own minds. 
This implies, first, that we convey the impression which 
exists, and not another ; and, secondly, that impression, 
without diminution or exaggeration. In other words, we 
are obliged, in the language of jurisprudence, to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 

This law therefore forbids 

1. The utterance, as truth, of what we know to be false. 
I say the utterance as truth, for we sometimes imagine cases 
for the sake of illustration, as parables, or fictitious writing, 
where it is known beforehand, that we merely address the 
imagination. Since we utter it as fiction, and wish it not to 
be believed, there is no falsehood if it be not true. 

2. Uttering as truth, what we do not know to be true. 
Many things which men assert they cannot know to be true ; 
such for instance, are, in many cases, the motives of others. 
There are many other things which may be probable, and 
we may be convinced that they are so, but of which we can- 
not arrive at the certainty. There are other things which 
are merely matters of opinion, concerning which every sev- 
eral man may hold a different opinion. Now, in any such 
case, to utter as truth what we cannot know, or have not 
known to be truth, is falsehood. If a man utters any thing 
as truth, he assumes the responsibility of ascertaining it to 
be so. If he who makes the assertion be not responsible, 
where shall the responsibility rest ? And, if any man may 
utter what he chooses, under no responsibility, there is the 
end of all credibility. 

But, it will be said, are we never to utter any thing which 
we do not know to be true? I answer : we are never to utter 
as truth, what we do not know to be true. Whatever is a 



THE PAST AND PRESENT. 303 

matter of probability, we may utter as a matter of probabili- 
ty ; whatever is a matter of opinion we may state as a mat- 
ter of opinion. If we convey to another a conception as 
true, of which we have only the impression of probability, 
we convey a different conception from that which exists in 
our own minds, and of course we do in fact speak falsely. 

3. Uttering what may be true in fact, but uttering it in 
such a manner, as to convey a false impression to the 
hearers. 

As 1. By exaggerating some, or all of the circumstances 
attendant upon the facts. 

2. By extenuating some, or all of the circumstances 
attendant upon the facts. 

3. By exaggerating some and extenuating others. 

4. By stating the facts just as they existed, but so arrang- 
ing them as to leave a false impression upon the hearer. As, 
for instance, I might say, A entered B's room, and left it at 
ten o'clock. Within five minutes after he left it, B disco- 
vered that his watch had been stolen. Now, although I do not. 
say, that A stole B's watch, yet if I intentionally so arrange 
and connect these facts as to leave a false impression upon 
the mind of the hearer, I am guilty of falsehood. If I do it 
intentionally, it is wilful falsehood. This is a crime to which 
pleaders and partial historians, and all party narrators, are 
specially liable. 

4. As the crime, here considered, consists in making a 
false impression, with intention to deceive, the same effect 
may be produced by the tones of the voice, a look of the eye, 
a motion of the head, or any thing by which the mind of 
another may be influenced. The same rule, therefore, ap- 
plies to impressions made in this manner, as to those made 
by words. 



304 VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS 

5. As this rule applies to our intercourse with men as in- 
telligent agents, it applies to our intercourse with men under 
all the possible relations of life. Thus, it forbids parents to 
lie to children, and children to lie to parents ; instructers to 
pupils, and pupils to instructers ; the old to the young, and 
the young to the old ; attorneys to jurors, and jurors to at- 
torneys ; buyers to sellers, and sellers to buyers. That is, 
the obligation is universal, and cannot be set aside, by any 
of the complicated relations in which men stand to each 
other. 

Nor can it be varied, by the considerations often intro- 
duced, that the person with whom we are conversing has no 
right to know the truth. This is a sufficient reason why we 
should not tell the truth, but it is no reason why we should 
tell a falsehood. Under such circumstances we are at lib- 
erty to refuse to reveal any thing, but we are not at liberty 
to utter what is false. 

The reason for this is the following : The obligation to 
veracity does not depend upon the right of the inquirer to 
know the truth. Did our obligation depend upon this, it 
would vary with every person with whom we conversed ; 
and, in every case before speaking, we should be at liberty to 
measure the extent of our neighbor's right, and to tell him 
truth or falsehood accordingly. And, inasmuch, as the per- 
son whom we address, would never know at what rate we 
estimated his right, no one would know how much to 
believe, any more than we should know how much truth or 
falsehood we were at liberty to tell. This would at once 
destroy every obligation to veracity. On the contrary, inas- 
much as we are under obligation to utter nothing but truth, 
in consequence of our relations to God;* this obligation is 
never affected by any of the circumstances under which we 
are called upon to testify. Let no one, therefore, excuse 
himself, on the ground that he only tells innocent lies. It 
cannot be innocent to do that which God has forbidden. 






THE PAST AND PRESENT. 305 

" Lie not one to another, brethren, seeing ye have put off the 
old man with his deeds." 

That obedience to this law is demanded by the will of 
God, is manifest from several considerations. 

1. We are created with a disposition to speak what is 
true, and also to believe what is spoken. The fact that we 
a*e thus constituted conveys to us an intimation that the 
Creator wills us to obey this constitution. The intention is 
as evident as that which is manifested in creating the eye 
for light, and light for the eye. 

2. We are created with a moral constitution, by which 
we suffer pain whenever we violate this law, (unless our 
moral susceptibility shall have been destroyed,) and by 
which also we receive pleasure whenever, under circum- 
stances which urge to the contrary, we steadfastly obey it. 

3. We are so constituted that obedience to the law of 
veracity is absolutely necessary to our happiness. Were 
we either to lose our feeling of obligation to tell the truth, 
or our disposition to receive as truth whatever is told to us, 
there would at once be an end to all science and all know- 
ledge, beyond that which every man had obtained by his 
own personal observation and experience. No man could 
profit by the discoveries of his contemporaries, much less 
by the discoveries of those men who have gone before him. 
Language would be useless, and we should be but little 
removed from the brutes. Every one must be aware, upon 
the slightest reflection, that a community of entire liars 
could not exist in a state of society. The effects of such a 
course of conduct upon the whole shows us what is the 
will of God in the individual case. 

4. The will of God is abundantly made known to us in 
the Holy Scriptures. I subjoin a few as examples : 

27* 



306 VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS 

Ex. 20. 16. — " Thou shalt not bear false witness against 
thy neighbor." 

Prov. 6. 16. — "Lying lips are an abomination to the 
Lord." 

Psalm 34. 13. — "Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips 
that they speak no guile." 

John 8. 44. — " Those that speak lies are called children of 
the devil ; that is, followers, imitators of the actions of the 
devil." 

See also the cases of Ananias and Sapphira, and of Ge- 
hazi. Acts 5, and 2 Kings 5. 20—27. 

Rev. 21. 8. — "All liars shall have their portion in the 
lake that burneth with fire and brimstone." 

27. — " There shall in no wise enter therein, (into Hea- 
ven) any thing that maketh a lie." 

Prom what has been said, the importance of strict ad- 
herence to veracity is too evident to need further remark. 
I will, however, add, that the evil of falsehood in small 
matters, in lies told to amuse, in petty exaggerations, and in 
complimentary discourse, is not by any means sufficiently 
remembered. Let it be always borne in mind that he, who 
knowingly utters what is false, tells a lie ;, and a lie, whether 
white, or of any other color, is a violation of the command 
of that God by whom we must be judged. And let us also 
remember, that there is no vice, which, more easily than 
this, stupifies a man's conscience. He who tells lies fre- 
quently, will soon become an habitual liar ; and an habitual 
liar will soon lose the power of readily distinguishing be- 
tween the conceptions of his imagination and the recollec- 
tions of his memory. I have known a few persons, who 
seemed to have arrived at this most deplorable moral condi- 
tion. Let every one, therefore, beware of even the most 
distant approaches to this detestable vice. A volume might 
easily be written on the miseries and loss of character which 
have grown out of a single lie ; and another volume of 
illustrations of the moral power which men have gained by 



THE PAST AND PRESENT. 307 

means of no other prominent attribute than that of bold, 
unshrinking veracity. 

If lying be thus pernicious to ourselves, how wicked 
must it be to teach it, or specially to force it upon others. 
What shall we say of parents, who, to accomplish a mo- 
mentary purpose, will not hesitate to utter to a child the 
■ most flagitious falsehoods ? Or, what shall we say of those 
heads of families, who direct their children or servants de- 
liberately to declare that they are not at home, while they 
are quietly sitting in their parlor or their study ? What 
right has any one, for the purpose of securing a momentary 
convenience, or avoiding a petty annoyance, to injure for- 
ever the moral sentiments of another? How can such a 
man or woman expect to hear the truth from those whom 
they have deliberately taught to lie ? The expectation is 
absurd ; and the result will show that such men in the 
end drink abundantly of the cup which they themselves 
have mingled. Before any man is tempted to lie, let him 
remember that God governs this universe on the principles 
of veracity ; and, that the whole constitution of things is 
arranged by him so as to vindicate truth, and to expose 
falsehood. Hence, the first lie always requires a multitude 
of lies to conceal it ; each one of which plunges the crimi- 
nal into more inextricable embarrassment ; and, at last, all 
of them will combine to cover him with shame. The in- 
conveniences of truth, aside from the question of guilt and 
innocence, are infinitely less than the inconveniences of 
falsehood. 



CHAPTER II. 

VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 

The future is, within some conditions, subject to our 
power. We may, therefore, place ourselves under moral 
obligations to act, within those conditions, in a particular 
manner. When we make a promise, we voluntarily place 
ourselves under such a moral obligation. The law of 
veracity obliges us to fulfil it. 

This part of the subject includes promises and contracts. 

I. Of promises. 

In every promise, two things are to be considered : the 
intention^ and the obligation. 

1. The intention. The law of veracity, in this respect, 
demands that we convey to the promisee the intention as it 
exists in our own minds. When we inform another that 
we intend to do a service for him to-morrow, we have no 
more right to lie about this than about any other matter. 

2. The obligation. The law of veracity obliges us to 
fulfil the intention just as we made it known. In other 
words, we are under obligation to satisfy, precisely, the ex- 
pectation which we voluntarily excited. The rule of Paley 
is, " a promise is binding in the sense in which the promiser 
supposed the promisee to receive it." 



310 VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 

The modes in which promises may be violated, and the 
reasons for believing the obligation to fulfil promises to be 
the law of God, are so similar to those mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, that I will not repeat them. 

I therefore proceed to consider in what cases promises 
are not binding. The following are, I think, among the 
most important. 

Promises are not binding 

1. When the performance is impossible. We cannot be 
under obligation to do what is plainly out of our power. 
The moral character of such a promise will, however, vary 
with the circumstances under which the promise was made. 
If I knew nothing of the impossibility, and honestly ex- 
pressed an intention which I designed to fulfil, I am, at the 
bar of conscience, acquitted. The providence of God has 
interfered with my intention, and I am not to blame. If, 
on the other hand, I knew of the impossibility, I have vio- 
lated the law of veracity. I expressed an intention which 
I did not mean to fulfil. I am bound to make good to the 
other party all the loss which he may have sustained by my 
crime. 

2. When the promise is unlawful. No man can be 
under obligation to violate obligation ; for this would be to 
suppose a man to be guilty for not being guilty. Much 
less, can he be under moral obligation to violate his obliga- 
tions to God. Hence, promises to lie, to steal, or in any 
manner to violate the laws of society, are not binding. And 
the duty of every man who has placed himself under any 
such obligation, is, at once, to confess his fault, to declare 
himself free from his engagement, and to endeavor to per- 
suade others to do the same. Here, as in the former in- 
stance, there are two cases. Where the unlawfulness was 
not known, the promiser is under no other obligation than 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 311 

that of informing the promisee of the facts as soon as possi- 
ble. -Where the unlawfulness was known to the promiser, 
and not to the promisee, I think that the former is bound to 
make good the loss to the latter, if any occur. When it is 
known to both parties, either is at liberty to disengage him- 
self, and neither is under any obligation to make any resti- 
tution, for the fault is common to both, and each should 
bear his own share of the inconvenience. 

3. Promises are not binding where no expectation is 
voluntarily excited by the promiser. He is bound only to 
fulfil the expectation which he voluntarily excites • and, if 
he have excited none, he has made no promise. If A tell 
B that he shall give a horse to C ; and B, without A's know- 
ledge or consent, inform C of it, A is not bound. But, if he 
directed B to give the information, he is as much bound as 
though he informed C himself. 

4. Promises are not binding when they are known by 
both parties to proceed upon a condition, which condition 
is subsequently ', by the promiser. found not to exist. As, if 
A promises to give a beggar money on the faith of his story, 
and the story is subsequently found to be a fabrication ; A, 
in such a case, is manifestly not bound. 

5. As the very conception of a promise implies an obliga- 
tion entered into between two intelligent moral agents, I 
think there can be no such obligation entered into where 
one of the parties is not a moral agent. I do not think we 
can properly be said to make a promise to a brute, nor to vio- 
late it. I think the same is true of a madman. Neverthe- 
less, expediency has, even in such cases, always taught the 
importance of fulfilling expectation which we voluntarily 
excite. I think, however, that it stands on the ground of 
expediency, and not of obligation. I do not suppose that 
any one would feel any guilt in deceiving a madman, in 
order to lead him to a madhouse. 



312 VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 

These seem to me to be the most common cases in which 
promises are not binding. The mere inconvenience to 
which we may be exposed by fulfilling a promise, is not a 
release. We are at liberty, beforehand, to enter into the 
obligation, or not. No man need promise, unless he please. 
But, having once promised, he is holden until he be morally 
liberated. Hence, as, after the obligation is formed, it can- 
not be recalled, prudence would teach us to be extremely 
cautious in making promises. Except in cases where we 
are, from long experience, fully acquainted with all the ordi- 
nary contingencies of an event ; we ought never to make a 
promise without sufficient opportunity for reflection. It is a 
good rule to enter into no important engagement on the same 
day in which it is first presented to our notice. And I be- 
lieve that it will be generally found, that those who are most 
careful in promising, are the most conscientious in perform- 
ing ; and that, on the contrary, those who are willing, on all 
occasions, to pledge themselves on the instant, have very 
little difficulty in violating their engagements with corre- 
sponding thoughtlessness. 



OP CONTRACTS. 

The peculiarity of a contract is, that it is a mutual 
promise. That is, we promise to do one thing, on the condi- 
tion that another person does another. 

The rule of interpretation, the reasons for its obligatori- 
ness, and the cases of exception to the obligatoriness, are the 
same as in the preceding cases, except that it has a specific 
condition annexed, by which the obligation is limited. 

Hence, after a contract is made, while the other party per- 
forms his part, we are under moral obligation to perform our 
part ; but, if either party fail, the other is, by the failure of 
the condition essential to the contract, liberated. 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 313 

But this is not all. Not only is the one party liberated 
by the failure of the other party to perform his part of the 
contract ; the first has, moreover, upon the second, a claim 
for damages to the amount of what he may have suffered by 
such failure. 

Here, however, it is to be observed, that a distinction is to 
be made between a simple contract, that is, a contract to do 
a particular act, and a contract by which we enter upon a 
relation established by oUr Creator. Of the first kind are 
ordinary mercantile contracts to sell or deliver merchandise 
at a particular place, for a specified sum, to be paid at a par- 
ticular time. Here, if the price is not paid, we are under no 
obligation to deliver the goods ; and, if the goods are not 
delivered, we are under no obligation to pay the price. Of 
the second kind are the contract of civil society, and the mar- 
riage contract. These, being appointed by the constitution 
under which God has placed us, may be dissolved only for 
such reasons as he has appointed. Thus, society and the 
individual enter mutually into certain obligations with re- 
spect to each other ; but it does not follow that either party 
is liberated by every failure of the other. The case is the 
same with the marriage contract. In these instances, each 
party is bound to fulfil its part of the contract, notwithstand- 
ing the failure of the other. 

It is here proper to remark, that the obligation to veracity 
is precisely the same, under what relations soever it may be 
formed. It is as binding between individuals and society, 
on both parts, and upon societies and societies, as it is be- 
tween individuals. There is no more excuse for society, 
when it violates its obligation to an individual, or for an 
individual when he violates his obligations to society, than 
in any other case of deliberate falsehood. By how much 
more are societies or communities bound to fidelity in their 
engagements with each other, since the faith of treaties is 
the only barrier which interposes to shield nations from the 

28 



314 VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 

appeal to bloodshed in every case of collision of interests. 
And the obligation is the same, under whal circumstances 
soever nations may treat with each other. A civilized peo- 
ple has no right to violate its solemn obligations, because the 
other party is uncivilized. A strong nation has no right to 
lie to a weak nation. The simple fact, that two communi- 
ties of moral agents have entered into engagements, binds 
botli of them equally in the sight of their common Creator. 
And He, who is the judge of all, in His holy habitation, will 
assuredly avenge, with most solemn retributions, a violation 
of faith, in which the peculiar blessings bestowed upon one 
party are made a reason for inflicting misery upon the other 
party, with whom he has dealt less bountifully. Shortly be- 
fore the death of the Duke of Burgundy, the pupil of Fene- 
lon, a cabinet council was held, at which he was present, to 
take into consideration the expediency of violating a treaty, 
which it was supposed could be done with manifest advan- 
tage to France. The treaty was read ; and the ministers 
explained in what respects it operated unfavorably, and how 
great an accession of territory might be made to France, by 
acting in defiance of its solemn obligations. Reasons of 
state were, of course, offered, in abundance, to justify the 
deed of perfidy. The Duke of Burgundy heard them all in 
silence. When they had finished, he closed the conference 
by laying his hand upon the instrument, and saying, with 
emphasis, " Gentlemen, there is a treaty." This single 
sentiment is a more glorious monument to his fame, than a 
column inscribed with the record of an hundred victories. 

It is frequently said, partly by way of explanation, and 
partly by way of excuse, for the violation of contracts by 
communities, that corporate bodies have no conscience. In 
what sense this is true, it is not necessary here to inquire. It 
is sufficient to know, that every one of the corporators has a 
conscience, and is responsible to God for obedience to its 
dictates. Men may mystify before each other, and they 
may stupify the monitor in their own bosoms, by throwing 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 315 

the blame of perfidy upon each other ; — but it is yet worthy 
to be remembered, that they act in the presence of a Being 
with whom the night shineth as the day ; and that they must 
appear before a tribunal where there will be "no shuffling." 
For beings acting under these conditions, there surely can be 
no wiser or better course than that of simple, unsophisti- 
cated verity, under what relations soever they may be called 
upon to act. 



CHAPTER III. 



OF OATHS. 



Theory of oaths; lawfulness of oaths ; manner of in- 
terpretation ; different kinds of oaths. 

I. The theory of oaths. 

It is, frequently, of the highest importance to society, that 
the facts relating to a particular transaction should be dis- 
tinctly and accurately ascertained. Unless this could be 
done, neither the innocent could be protected, nor the guilty 
punished; that is, justice could not be administered, and 
society could not exist. 

To almost every fact, or to the circumstances which deter- 
mine it to be fact, there must be, from the laws of cause and 
effect, and from the social nature of man, many witnesses. 
The fact can, therefore, be generally known, if the wit- 
nesses can be induced to testify, and to testify the truth. 

To place men under such circumstances, that, upon the 
ordinary principles of the human mind, they shall be most 
likely to testify truly, is the design of administering an oath. 

In taking an oath, besides incurring the ordinary civil 
penalties incident to perjury, he who swears calls upon God 

28* 



318 GF OATHS. 

to witness the truth of his assertions ; and, also, either ex- 
pressly, or by implication, invokes upon himself the judg- 
ments of God, if he speak falsely. The ordinary form of 
swearing in this country, and in Great Britain, is to close 
the promise of veracity, with the words " So help me God ;" 
that is, may God only help me as I tell the truth. Inasmuch 
as, without the help of God, we must be miserable for time 
and for eternity; to relinquish his help if we violate the 
truth, is, on this condition, to imprecate upon ourselves the 
absence of the favor of God, and of course, all possible 
misery forever. 

The theory of oaths, then, I suppose to be as follows: 

1. Men naturally speak the truth, when there is no coun- 
teracting motive to prevent it; and, unless some such mo- 
tive be supposed to supervene, expect the truth to be spoken. 

2. When, however, by speaking falsely some immediate 
advantage can be gained, or some immediate evil avoided,, 
tjiey will frequently speak falsely. 

3. But, when a greater good can be gained, or a greater 
evil avoided, by speaking the truth, than could possibly be 
gained or avoided by speaking falsely, they will, on the ordi- 
nary principles of the human mind, speak the truth. To 
place them under such circumstances, is the design of an 
oath. 

4. Now, as the favor of God is the source of every bless- 
ing which man can possibly enjoy, and as his displeasure 
must involve misery utterly beyond the grasp of our limited 
conceptions ; if we can place men under such circum- 
stances, that, by speaking falsely, they relinquish all claim to 
the one, and incur all that is awful in the other, we mani- 
festly place a stronger motive before them for speaking the 
truth than can possibly be conceived for speaking falsehood. 



OF OATHS. 319 

Hence, it is supposed, on the ordinary principles of the hu- 
man mind, that men, under such circumstances, will speak 
the truth. 

Such, I suppose to be the theory of oaths. There can be 
no doubt, that, if men acted upon this conviction, the truth 
would be, by means of them, universally elicited. 

But, inasmuch as men may be required to testify, whose 
practical conviction of these great moral truths, is at best 
but weak, and who are liable to be more strongly influenced 
by immediate, than by ulterior motives, human punishments 
have always been affixed to the crime of perjury. These, 
of course, vary with different ages, and in different periods 
of society. The most equitable provision seems to be that 
of the Jewish law, by which the perjurer was made to suffer 
precisely the same injury which he had designed to inflict 
upon the innocent party. The Mosaic enactment seems in- 
tended to have been, in regard to this crime^ unusually rigor- 
ous. The judges are specially commanded not to spare, 
but to exact an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. It cer- 
tainly deserves serious consideration, whether modern legisla- 
tors might not derive important instruction from this feature 
of Jewish jurisprudence, 

II. The lawfulness of oaths. On this subject, a diversity 
of opinion has been entertained. It has been urged, by those 
who deny the lawfulness of oaths, 

1. That oaths are frequently forbidden in the New Testa- 
ment ; and that we are commanded to use yes for our affirm- 
ative, and no for our negative, for the reason, that, " what- 
ever is more than these cometh of evil, or of the evil one." 

2. That no man has a right to peril his eternal salvation, 
upon a, condition, which, from intellectual or moral imbeci- 
lity, he would be so liable to violate. 



320 OF OATHS. 

3. That no one has a right to oblige another to place him- 
self under such conditions. 

4. That the frequent use of oaths, tends, by abating our 
reverence for the Deity, to lessen the practical feeling of obli- 
gation to veracity. 

5. That no reason can be assigned, why this crime should 
be treated so differently from every other. Other crimes, so 
far as man is concerned, are left to human punishments ; and 
there can be no reason why this crime should involve the 
additional punishment, intended by the imprecation of the 
loss of the soul. 

6. It is said, that those sects who never take an oath, are 
as fully believed upon their simple affirmation as any others ; 
nay, that false witness among them is more rare than 
among other men taken at random. This is, I believe, 
acknowledged to be the fact. 

Those who defend the lawfulness of oaths urge on the 
contrary : 

1. That those passages in the New Testament which have 
been referred to, forbid, not judicial oaths, but merely pro- 
fanity. 

2. That our Saviour responded when examined upon 
oath. This, however, is denied by the other party to be a 
fair interpretation. 

3. That the Apostles, on several occasions, call God to 
witness, when they are attesting to particular facts. The 
instances adduced are such phrases as these, " God is my 
witness ;" " Behold before God I lie not." The example, in 
this case, is considered sufficient to assure us of the lawful- 
ness of this sort of appeal. 



OF OATHS. 321 

4. That the importance of truth, to the purposes of justice, 
warrants us in taking other measures for the prevention of 
perjury than are taken for the prevention of other crimes ; 
and specially, as this is one to the commission of which 
there may always exist peculiarly strong temptations. 

These are, I believe, the principle considerations, which 
have been urged on both sides of the question. It seems to 
me to need a more thorough discussion than can be allowed 
to it in this place. One thing, however, seems evident, that 
the multiplication of oaths, demanded by the present practice 
of most Christian nations, is not only very wicked, but that 
its direct tendency is to diminish our reverence for the Deity; 
and thus, in the end, to lead to the very evil which it is 
intended to prevent. 

III. Interpretation of oaths. 

As oaths are imposed for the safety of the party adminis- 
tering them, they are to be interpreted as he understands 
them. The person under oath has no right to make any 
mental reservation, but to declare the truth, precisely in the 
manner that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, is expected of him. On no other principle would we 
ever know what to believe or to expect from a witness. If, 
for the sake of personal friendship, or personal advantage, 
or from fear of personal inconvenience, or from the excite- 
ment of party partiality, he shrink from declaring the whole 
truth, he is as truly guilty of perjury as though he swore 
falsely for money. 

IV. Different kinds of oaths. 

Oaths respect either the past or the future, that is, are 
either assertory or promissory. 

1. The oath respecting the past is definite. A transaction 



322 OF OATHS. 

either took place, or it did not take place, and we either 
have or have not some knowledge respecting it. It is, there- 
fore, in our power either to tell what we know, or to tell 
where, and in how much, we do not know. This is the 
proper occasion for an oath. 

2. The oath respecting the future is of necessity indefi- 
nite, as when we promise upon oath to discharge, to the best 
of our ability, a particular office. Thus, fhe parties may- 
have very different views of what is meant, by discharging 
an office according to the best of our ability ; or this obliga- 
tion may conflict with others, such as domestic or personal 
obligations, and the incumbent may not know, even with 
the best intentions, which obligation ought to take the pre- 
cedence, that is, what is the best of his ability. Such being 
the case, who, that is aware of the frailty of human nature, 
will dare to peril his eternal salvation upon the performance, 
to the best of his ability, of any official duty ? And, if these 
allowances are understood by both parties, how are they to 
be limited, and if they be not limited, what is the value of 
an oath ? Such being the case, it is, at best, doubtful, 
whether promissory oaths of office ought ever to be re- 
quired. Much less ought they to be required, as is fre- 
quently the case, in the most petty details of official life. 
They must be a snare to the conscience of a thoughtful 
man ; and must tend to obliterate moral distinctions from 
the mind of him who is, as is too frequently the case, un- 
fortunately thoughtless. Why should one man, who is 
called upon to discharge the duties of constable, or overseer 
of common schools, or even of a counsellor or a judge, be 
placed under the pains and perils of perjury, or under peril 
of his eternal salvation, any more than his neighbor, who 
discharges the duty of a merchant, of an instructer of youth, a 
physician, or a clergyman. It seems to me, that no man can 
take such an oath of office, upon reflection, without such men- 
tal reservation, as must immediately convince him, that the 
requirement is nugatory ; and if so, that it must be injurious. 



CLASS SECOND. 



DUTIES WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONSTITU- 
TION OF THE SEXES. 

It has already been remarked, that the very fact, that 
our Creator has constituted us with a capacity for a par- 
ticular form of happiness, and has provided means for the 
gratification of that desire, is, in itself, an intimation that he 
intended that this desire should be gratified. But as our hap- 
piness is the design of this constitution, it is equally evident, 
that he intended this desire to be gratified, only in such 
manner as would conduce to this result ; and that, in esti- 
mating that result, we must take into view the whole nature 
of man, as a rational and accountable being, and not only 
man as an individual, but man also as a society. 

I. The subject upon which we now enter, presents a 
striking illustration of the truth of these remarks. On the 
one hand, it is evident that the principle of sexual desire, 
is a part of the constitution of man. That it was intended 
to be gratified, is evident from the fact, that without such 
gratification, the race of man would immediately cease to 
exist. Again, if it were not under restrictions, that is, were 
promiscuous intercourse permitted, the race would perish 
from neglect of offspring, and universal sterility. Thus 
universal celibacy and unlimited indulgence, would both 
equally defeat the end of the Creator. It is, therefore, as 



324 DUTIES, &c. 

evident, that our Creator has imposed a limit to sexual de- 
sire, as a part of our constitution, as that he has implanted 
within us the desire itself. It is the object of the laws of 
chastity to explain and enforce this limit. 

2. As it is manifestly the object of the Creator, that the 
sexes should live together, and form a society with each 
other, in many respects dissimilar to every other society, 
producing new relations, and imposing new obligations, the 
laws of this society need to be particularly explained. This 
is the law of marriage. 

3. As the result of marriage is children, a new relation 
arises out of this connexion, namely, the relation of parent 
and child. This imposes special obligations upon both par- 
ties ; namely, the duties and rights of parents, and the 
duties and rights of children. 

This class of duties will therefore be treated of in the 
following order : 

Chapter 1. The general duty of chastity. 

2. The law of marriage. 

3. The rights and duties of parents. 

4. The rights and duties of children. 



CHAPTER I 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

The sexual appetite being a part of our constitution, and 
a limit to the indulgence of it being fixed by the Creator, 
the business of moral philosophy is to ascertain this limit. 

The moral law on this subject is as follows : 

The duty of chastity limits the indulgence of sexual in- 
tercourse to individuals who are exclusively united to each 
other for life. 

Hence it forbids — 

1. Adultery, or illicit intercourse between a married per- 
son and every other person, except that person to whom he 
or she is united for life. 

2. Polygamy, or a plurality of wives, or of husbands. 

3. Concubinage, or the temporary cohabitation of indi- 
viduals with each other. 

4. Fornication, or intercourse with prostitutes, or with 
any individual under any other condition than that of the 
marriage covenant. 

29 



326 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

5. Inasmuch as the sexual desire is strongly excited by 
the imagination, the law of chastity forbids all impure 
thoughts, all unchaste conversation, looks or gestures, the 
reading of obscene or lascivious books, and every thing 
which would naturally produce in us a disposition of mind 
to violate this precept. 

That the above is the law of God on this subject, is mani- 
fest both from natural and from revealed religion. 

The law, as above recited, contains two restrictions. 

1. That the individuals be exclusively united to each 
other, and, 

2. That this exclusive union be for life. 

Let us examine the indications of natural religion upon 
both of these points. 

I. The indulgence of the sexual desire is, by the law of 
God, restricted to individuals exclusively united to each 
other. This may be shown from several considerations. 

1 . The number of births of both sexes, under all circum- 
stances, and in all ages, has been substantially equal. Now, 
if single individuals be not exclusively united to each 
other, there must arise an inequality of distinction, unless 
we adopt the law of promiscuous concubinage. But as the 
sexual desire is universal, it cannot be intended that the 
distribution should be unequal ; for thus many would, from 
necessity, be left single. And the other alternative, promis- 
cuous concubinage, would very soon lead, as we have 
already remarked, to the extinction of society* 

2. The manifest design of nature is to increase the human 
species, in the most rapid ratio consistent with the condition's 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 327 

of our being. That is always the most happy condition of 
a nation, and that nation is most accurately obeying the 
laws of our constitution, in which the number of the human 
race is most rapidly increasing. Now, it is certain, that, 
under the law of chastity, as it has been explained, that is? 
where individuals are exclusively united to each other, the 
increase of population will be more rapid, than under any 
other circumstances. 

3. That must be the true law of the domestic relations which 
will have the most beneficial effect upon the maintenance 
and education of children. Under the influence of such a 
law as I have described, it is manifest, that children will be 
incomparably better provided for than under that of any 
other. The number of children, produced by a single pair 
thus united will ordinarily be as great as can be supported 
and instructed by two individuals. And besides, the care of 
children, under these circumstances, becomes a matter, not 
merely of duty, but of pleasure. On the contrary, just as 
this law is violated, the love of offspring diminishes. The 
care of a family instead of a pleasure becomes an insupporta- 
ble burden ; and in the worst states of society, children 
either perish by multitudes from neglect, or are murdered 
by their parents in infancy. The number of human beings, 
who perish by infanticide in heathen countries, is almost 
incredible. And in countries not heathen, it is a matter ot 
notoriety, that neglect of offspring is the universal result of 
licentiousness in parents. The support of foundlings, in 
some of the most licentious districts in Europe, has become 
so great a public burden as to give rise to serious appre- 
hension. 

4. There can be no doubt, that man is intended to derive, 
by far the greatest part of his happiness, from society. And 
of social happiness, by far the greatest, the most exquisite, 
and the most elevating portion, is that derived from the 
domestic relations ; not only those of husband and wife, but 



328 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

those of parent and child, of brother and sister, and those 
arising from the more distant gradations of collateral 
kindred. Now, human happiness, in this respect, can exist 
only in proportion to our obedience to the law of chastity. 
What domestic happiness can be expected in a house con- 
tinually agitated, by the ceaseless jealousy of several wives, 
and the interminable quarrels of their several broods 
of children. How can filial love dwell in the bosoms of 
children, the progeny of one father by several concubines. 
This state of society existed under the most favorable 
circumstances, in the patriarchal age ; and its results even 
here are sufficiently deplorable. No one can read the histories 
of the families of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and David, 
without becoming convinced, that no deviation can be 
made from the Gospel law of marriage, without creating a 
tendency to wrangling without end, to bitterness and strife, 
nay, to incest and murder. And if this be the result of 
polygamy, and concubinage, in what language is it possible 
to describe the effects of universal licentiousness ? By this, 
the very idea of home would be abolished. The name of 
parent would signify no more in man than in the brutes. 
Man, instead of being social would become nothing more than 
a gregarious animal, distinguished from his fellow animals 
by nothing else than greater intellectual capacity, and the 
more disgusting abuse of it. 

5. No reason can be assigned, why the intellectual, moral, 
and social happiness of one sex, is not as valuable in the 
sight of the Creator as that of the other. Much less can 
any reason be assigned, why the one sex should be to the 
other merely a source of sexual gratification. But, just as 
we depart from the law of chastity, as it has been here ex- 
plained, woman ceases to be the equal and the companion of 
man, and becomes either his timid and much abused slave, 
or else the mere instrument for the gratification of his lust. 
No one can pretend to believe, that the Creator ever 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 329 

intended that one human being should stand, in such a 
relation as this, to any other human being. 

II. The second part of the law of chastity requires that 
this union should be for life. 

Some of the reasons for this are as follows : — 

1. In order to domestic happiness, it is necessary that 
both parties should cultivate a spirit of conciliation and 
forbearance ; and mutually endeavor to conform their 
individual peculiarities to each other. Unless this be done, 
instead of a community of interests, there will arise 
incessant collision. Now, nothing can tend more directly 
to the cultivation of a proper temper, than the consideration, 
that this union is indissoluble. A mere temporary union, 
liable to be dissolved by every ebullition of passion, would 
foster every impetuous and selfish feeling of the human 
heart. 

2. If the union be not for life, there is no other limit to 
be fixed for its continuance than the will of either party. 
This would speedily lead to promiscuous concubinage, and 
all the evils resulting from it, of which I have already 
spoken. 

3. Children require the care of both parents until they 
have attained to maturity; that is, generally, during the 
greater part of the life time of their parents, at least, during 
all that period of their life in which they would be most 
likely to desire a separation. Besides, the children are the 
joint property of both parents ; and, if the domestic society 
is dissolved, they belong to one no more than to the other ; 
that is, they have no protector, but are cast out defenceless 
upon the world. 

4. Or, if this be not the case, and they are protected by 

29* 



330 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

one parent, they must suffer an irreparable loss by the with- 
drawal of the other parent from his or her share of the pa- 
rental responsibility. In general, the care would fall upon 
the mother, whose parental instincts are the strongest, but 
who is, from her peculiar situation, least able to protect 
them. The whole tendency of every licentious system is, 
to take advantage of the parental tenderness of the mother, 
and basely to devolve upon her a burden which she is 
wholly unable to sustain ; because she had rather die than 
leave her children to perish. 

5. Parents themselves in advanced years need the care of 
their children, and become dependent, in a great measure, 
for their happiness, upon them. But all this source of hap- 
piness is dried up by any system which allows of the dis- 
ruption of the domestic society, and the desertion of off- 
spring, simply at the will of the parent. 

The above considerations, may perhaps be deemed suffi- 
cient to establish the general law, and to show what is the 
will of the Creator on this subject. But it may be sug- 
gested that all these consequences need not follow occasional 
aberrations, and that individual cases of licentious indul- 
gence should be exempted from the general rule. To this 
I answer — 

1. The severity of the punishment which God has 
affixed to the crime, in general, shows how severe is his 
displeasure against it. God is no respecter of persons, but 
will visit upon every one the strict reward of his iniquity. 
And he does thus act. In woman this vice is immediately 
fatal to character ; and in man it leads directly to those 
crimes which are the sure precursors of temporal and eter- 
nal perdition. 

2. The God who made us all, and who is the Father and 
the Judge of his creatures, is omniscient ; and will bring 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 331 

every secret thing into judgment. Let the seducer and the 
fornicator remember, that each must stand, with his victim 
and his partner in guilt, before the Judge of quick and 
dead ; where a recompence will be rendered to every man, 
according to his deeds. 

3. Let it be remembered, that a female is a moral and 
accountable being, hastening with us to the bar of God ; 
that she is made to be the centre of all that is delightful in 
the domestic relations ; that, by her very nature, she looks 
up to man as her protector, and loves to confide in his hands 
her happiness for life ; and that she can only be ruined by 
abusing that confidence, proving false to that reliance, and 
using the very loveliest trait in her character as the instru- 
ment of her own undoing. * And then let us consider the 
misery into which a" loss of virtue must plunge the victim 
and her friends forever ; the worth of that soul, which, unless 
a miracle interpose, must, by the loss of virtue, be consigned 
to eternal despair ; and I ask whether, in the whole cata- 
logue of human crime, there be one whose atrocity more 
justly merits the deepest damnation, than that, which, for 
the momentary gratification of a lawless appetite, will vio- 
late all these obligations, outrage all these sympathies, and 
work out so wide-spreading, so interminable a ruin. 

Such is the lesson of natural religion on this subject. 

III. The precepts of revealed religion may be very briefly 
stated. 

1. The seventh commandment is, " Thou shalt not com- 
mit adultery." Ex. xx. 14. By the term adultery is meant 
every unlawful act and thought. The Mosaic law enacted 
that he who seduced a woman should marry her. Ex. xxii. 
16, 17. This is, doubtless, the equitable rule ; and there is 
no reason why it should not be strictly enforced now, both 
by civil law and by the opinions of the community. 



332 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

2. The punishment of adultery was, under the same law, 
death to both parties. Lev. x. 22. Deut. xxii. 22. That 
this should now be enforced, no one will contend. But it is 
sufficient to show in what abhorrence the crime is held by 
the Creator. 

3. The consequences of whoredom and adultery are fre- 
quently set forth in the prophets, and the most awful judg- 
ments of God are denounced against them. This subject is 
also treated with graphic power by Solomon, in the book of 
Proverbs. See Proverbs v. 3 — 29. vii. 5 — 26. 

4. Our Saviour explains the law of chastity and marriage in 
his sermon on the mount ; and declares it equally to respect 
unclean thoughts and actions. Matt. v. 27 — 32. "Ye 
have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, thou 
shalt not commit adultery. But I say unto you, that who- 
soever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed 
adultery with her already in his heart. And if thy right 
eye offend thee, (or cause thee to offend,) pluck it out, and 
cast it from thee ; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy 
members should perish, and not that thy whole body should 
be cast into hell." That is, as I suppose, eradicate from 
your bosom every impure thought, no matter at what sacri- 
fice; for no one who cherishes impurity, even in thought, 
can be an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven. 

Uncleanness is also frequently enumerated among the 
crimes which exclude men from the Kingdom of Heaven. 

Ephesians v: 5, 6. No whoremonger or unclean person 
hath any inheritance in the Kingdom of Christ and God. 

Galatians v: 19, 21. Now the works of the flesh are 
manifest, which are these, adultery, fornication, unclean- 
ness, lasciviousness; of the which I tell you beware; as I 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 333 

have told you in times past, that they which do such things 
shall not inherit the Kingdom of God. 

Colossians iii : 5, 6. Mortify, therefore, your members 
which are upon the earth, fornication, uncleanness, inordi- 
nate affections, for which things' sake the wrath of God 
cometh upon the children of disobedience. 

Let every one remember, therefore, that whoever violates 
this command, violates it in defiance of the most clearly 
revealed command of God, and at the peril of his own soul. 
He must meet his act, and the consequences of it, at that 
day when the secrets of all hearts are made manifest, when 
every hidden thing will be brought to light, and when God 
will judge every man according to his deeds. 

I remarked above, that the law of chastity forbade the 
indulgence of impure or lascivious imaginations, the harbor- 
ing such thoughts in our minds, or the doing of any thing 
by which such thoughts should be excited. Of- no vice is 
it so true as of this, that "lust, when it is cherished, bringeth 
forth sin, and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." 
Licentiousness in outward conduct never appears until the 
mind has become defiled by impure imaginations. When, 
however, the mind has become thus defiled, nothing is 
wanted but suitable opportunity to complete the moral 
catastrophe. Hence, the necessity of the most intense vigi- 
lance in the government of our thoughts, and in the avoiding 
of all books, and all pictures, and all society, of which the 
tendency is to imbue our imaginations with any thing at 
variance with the purest chastity. Whatever 'in other re- 
spects may be the fascinations of a book, if it be impure or 
lascivious, let it be eschewed. Whatever be the accomplish- 
ments of an acquaintance, if he or she be licentious in con- 
versation or action, let him or her be shunned. No man 
can take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned. 
We cannot mingle with the vile, let that vileness be dressed 
in ever so tasteful a garb, without becoming defiled. The 



334 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

only rule of safety is, to avoid the appearance of evil ; for 
thus alone shall we be able to avoid the reality. Hence it 
is that a licentious theatre, (and the tendency of all theatres 
is to licentiousness,) immodest dancing-, and all amusements 
which tend to inflame the passions, are horribly pernicious 
to the morals of a community. It would be interesting to 
learn on what principle of morals a virtuous woman would 
justify her attendance upon an amusement, in which she 
beholds before her a once lovely female uttering covert 
obscenity in the presence of thousands, and where she is 
surrounded by hundreds of women, also once lovely but 
now abandoned, whose ruin has been consummated by this 
very means, and who assemble in this place, with the more 
certain assurance of thus being able, most successfully, to 
effect the ruin of others, 



CHAPTER II 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 

It has been already remarked in the preceding section, 
that the law of chastity forbids all sexual intercourse be- 
tween persons who have not been exclusively united for life. 
In the act of marriage, two persons, under the most solemn 
circumstances, are thus united; and they enter into a mutual 
contract thus to live in respect to each other. This relation 
having been established by God, the contract thus entered 
into has all the solemnity of an oath. Hence, he who vio- 
lates it is guilty of a two-fold crime ; first, the violation of 
the law of chastity; and, secondly, of the law of veracity, — 
a veracity pledged under the most solemn circumstances. 

But this is by no means all that is intended by the institu- 
tion of marriage. By the contract thus entered into, a society 
is formed of a most interesting and important character ; 
which is the origin of all civil society ; and in which children 
are prepared to become members of that great community. 
As our principal knowledge of the nature and obligations of 
this institution is derived from the sacred Scriptures, I shall 
endeavor briefly to explain the manner in which they treat 
of it, without adding any thing to what I have already said 
in regard to the teaching of natural religion. 

I shall consider, first, the nature of this contract ; and, 
second, the duties which it enjoins, and the crimes which it 
forbids. 



336 THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 

I. The nature of the contract. 

1. The contract is for life, and is dissoluble for one cause 
only — the cause of whoredom. 

Matthew xix : 3, 6, 9. Then came some of the Pharisees 
to him, and tempting him asked, can a man, upon every 
pretence, divorce his wife? He answered, Have ye not 
read, that at the beginning, when the Creator made man, 
he formed a male and female, and said, for this cause shall 
a man leave father and mother, and adhere to his wife ; and 
they two shall be one flesh. Wherefore, they are no longer 
two, but one flesh. What then God hath conjoined, let not 
man separate. Wherefore, I say unto you, whosoever 
divorceth his wife, except for whoredom, and marrieth 
another, committeth adultery ; and whosoever marrieth the 
woman divorced, committeth adultery. I use here the 
translation of Dr. Campbell, which, I think, conveys more 
correctly than the common version the meaning of the 
original. 

2. We are here taught that marriage, being an institution 
of God, is subject to his laws alone, and not to the laws of 
man. 

3. This contract is essentially mutual. By entering into 
it, the members form a society ; that is, they have some- 
thing in common. Whatever is thus in common belongs 
equally to both. And, on the contrary, what is not thus 
surrendered remains as before in the power of the individual. 

4. The basis of this union is affection. Individuals thus 
contract themselves to each other on the ground not merely 
of mutual regard, but also of a regard stronger than that 
which they entertain for any other persons else. If such 
be not the condition of the parties, they cannot be united 
with any fair prospect of happiness. 






THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 337 

5. Now, such is the nature of the human affections, that 
we derive a higher and a purer pleasure from rendering 
happy those whom we love, than from self-gratification. 
Thus, a parent prefers self-denial for the sake of a child, 
to self-indulgence. The same principle is illustrated in 
every case of pure and disinterested benevolence. This is 
the essential element, on which depends the happiness of 
the married state. To be in the highest degree happy, we 
must each prefer the happiness of another to our own. 

6. I have mentioned above, that, this being a voluntary 
compact, and forming a peculiar society, there were some 
things which, by this compact, each surrendered to the 
other, and also other things which were not surrendered. 
It is important that these be distinguished from each 
other. 

I remark, then, 

Neither party surrenders to the other any control over 
any thing appertaining to the conscience. From the nature 
of our moral constitution, nothing of this sort can be sur- 
rendered to any created being. For either party to interfere 
with the discharge of those duties, which the other party 
really supposes itself to owe to God, is therefore wicked and 
oppressive. 

Neither party surrenders to the other any thing which 
would violate prior and lawful obligations. Thus, a hus- 
band does not promise to subject his professional pursuits to 
the will of his wife. He has chosen his profession, and if 
he pursue it lawfully, it does not interfere with the contract. 
So, also, his duties as a citizen are of prior obligation ; and 
if they really interfere with any others, those subsequently 
formed must be construed in subjection to them. Thus, 
also, the filial duties of both parties remain, in some re- 

30 



338 THE LAW OF MARRIAGE* 

spects, unchanged after marriage, and the marriage contract 
should not be so interpreted as to violate them. 

On the other hand I suppose that the marriage con- 
tract binds each party, whenever individual gratification is 
concerned, to prefer the happiness of the other party to its 
own. If pleasure can be enjoyed by both, the happiness of 
both is increased by enjoying it in common. If it can be 
enjoyed but by one, each should prefer that it be enjoyed 
by the other. And if there be sorrow to be endured, or in- 
convenience to be suffered, each should desire, if possible, 
to bear the infliction for the sake of shielding the other from 
pain. 

7. And, as I have remarked before, the disposition to do 
this arises from the very nature of the principles on which 
the compact is formed, that is, unreserved affection. This 
is the very manner in which affection always displays itself. 
This is the very means by which affection is created. " She 
loved me for the dangers I had seen, and I loved her that 
she did pity them," And this is the only course of conduct 
by which affection can be retained. And the manifestation 
of this temper is, under all circumstances, obligatory upon 
both parties. 

8. As, however, in all societies, there may be differences 
of opinion, even where the harmony of feeling remains un- 
impaired, so there may be differences here. Where such 
differences of opinion exist, there must be some ultimate 
appeal. In ordinary societies, such questions are settled by 
a numerical majority. But, as in this case, such a decision 
is impossible, some other principle must be adopted. The 
right of deciding must rest with either the one or the other* 
As the husband is the individual who is responsible to civil 
society ; as his intercourse with the world is of necessity 
greater ; the voice of nature and of revelation unite in con- 
ferring the right of ultimate authority upon him. By this 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 339 

arrangement the happiness of the wife is increased no less 
than that of the husband. Her power is always greatest in 
concession. She is graceful and attractive while meek and 
gentle ; but when angered and turbulent, she loses the 
fascination of her own sex, without attaining to the dignity 
of the other. 

" A woman, moved, is like a fountain troubled, 
Muddy, ill-seeming, and bereft of beauty." — Shakspeare. 

Secondly. I come now to speak of the duties imposed 
by the marriage relation. 

I. The marriage relation imposes upon both parties 
equally the duty of chastity. 

1. Hence it forbids adultery, or sexual intercourse with 
any other person than that one, to whom the individual is 
united in marriage. 

2. And hence, it forbids all conduct in married persons, 
or with married persons, of which the tendency would be 
to diminish their aifection for those to whom they are united 
in marriage ; or of which the tendency would be, to give 
pain to the other party. This is evident from what we 
have before said. For, if the contract itself proceeds upon 
the principle of entire and exclusive affection, any thing 
must be a violation of it which destroys or lessens that 
affection ; and that which causes this affection to be doubted, 
produces to the party in which the doubt exists, the same 
misery that would ensue from actual injury. 

The crime of adultery is of an exceedingly aggravated 
nature. As has been before remarked, aside from being a 
violation of the law of chastity, it is also a violation of a most 
solemn contract. The misery which it inflicts upon parents 
and children, relatives and friends ; the total annihilation of 



340 THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 

domestic happiness, and the total disruption of parental and 
filial ties, which it necessarily produces, mark it for one of 
the basest forms of human atrocity. Hence, as might be ex- 
pected, it is spoken of in the Scriptures as one of those crimes 
on which God has set the seal of his peculiar displeasure. 
In addition to the passages already quoted on this subject, 
I barely mention the following. 

Matthew v. 28. Whosoever looketh on a woman to che- 
rish impure desire, hath committed adultery with her already, 
in his heart. Hebrews xiii. 4. Marriage is honorable in all, 
and the bed undeflled ; but whoremongers and adulterers God 
will judge. Revelations xxi. 8. Murderers and the lasciv- 
ious shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire 
and brimstone, which is the second death. Throughout the 
writings of the prophets, in numberless instances, this crime 
is singled out, as one for which God visits with the most 
awful judgments both nations and individuals. And if any 
one will reflect, that the happiness and prosperity of a coun- 
try must depend on the virtue of the domestic society, more 
than on any thing else; he cannot fail to perceive that a crime, 
which by a single act sunders the conjugal tie, and leaves 
children worse than parentless, must be attended with more 
abundant and remediless evils, than almost any other that 
can be named. The taking of human life can be attended 
with no consequences more dreadful. In the one case the 
parental tie is broken, but the victim is innocent. In the 
other, the tie is broken, with the additional aggravation of 
an irretrievable moral stain, and a wide spreading dishonor 
that cannot be washed away. 

II. The law of marriage enforces the duty of mutual 
affection. 

Affection towards another is the result of his or her actions 
and temper towards us. Admiration and respect may be 
the result of other manifestations of character, but nothing is 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 341 

so likely as evidence of affection toward ourselves, to beget 
in us affection towards others. • 

Hence the duty of cultivating affection, imposes upon each 
party the obligation to act in such manner as to excite affec- 
tion in the bosom of the other. The rule is "as ye would that 
others should do (or be affected towards) you, do ye even so, 
(or be ye so affected towards) them." And the other gospel 
rule is here also verified : " Give, and it shall be given unto 
you, good measure, pressed down, and heaped together, and 
running over, shall men give into your bosom." To culti- 
vate affection, then, is not to strive to excite it by any direct 
effort of abstract thinking, but to show by the whole tenor of 
a life of disinterested goodness, that our happiness is really 
promoted by seeking the happiness of another. It consists 
in restraining our passions, in subduing our selfishness, in 
quieting our irritability, in eradicating from our minds every 
thing which could give pain to an ingenuous spirit; and 
in cherishing a spirit of meekness, forbearance, forgiveness, 
and of active, cheerful, and incessant desire for the happiness 
of those whom we love. At no less price than this can 
affection be purchased, and those who are willing to pur- 
chase it at this price, will rarely have reason to complain 
of the want of it. 

in. The law of marriage imposes the duty of mutual 
assistance. 

In the domestic society, as in every other, there are special 
duties devolving upon each member ; this is no more than 
to say, that it is not the duty of every member of a society to 
do every thing. So here, there are duties devolving of right 
upon the husband, and other duties devolving of right upon 
the wife. Thus, it is the duty, in the first instance, of the 
husband, to provide for the wants of the family ; and of the 
wife to assume the charge of the domestic affairs of the 
household. His sphere of duty is without, her sphere of 

30* 



342 THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 

duty is within. Both are under obligation to discharge 
these duties, specially because they are parties to this partic- 
ular compact. The Apostle Paul affirms, that he who does 
not provide for his own, specially for those of his own 
house, hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. 
That man is worthily despised, who does not qualify himself 
to support that family, of which he has voluntarily assumed 
the office of protector. Nor surely is that woman less de- 
serving of contempt, who, having consumed the period of 
youth in frivolous reading, dissipating amusement, and in 
the acquisition of accomplishments, which are to be consign- 
ed immediately after marriage to entire forgetfulness ; enters 
upon the duties of a wife, with no other expectation, than 
that of being an useless and prodigal appendage to a 
household, ignorant of her duties, and of the manner of 
discharging them; and with no other conceptions of the 
responsibilities which she has assumed, than such as have 
been acquired from a life of childish caprice, luxurious self 
indulgence, and sensitive, feminine, yet thoroughly finished 
selfishness. And yet I fear that the system of female edu- 
cation at present in vogue, is in many respects liable to the 
accusation of producing precisely this tendency. 

I have remarked, that the duties of the husband and wife 
are thus, in the first instance, apportioned. Yet, if one be 
disabled, all that portion of the duty of the disabled party, 
which the other can discharge, falls upon that other. If the 
husband cannot alone support the family, it is the duty of 
the wife to assist him. If the wife is, through sickness, 
unable to direct her household, the husband is bound, in so 
far as it is possible, to assume her care. In case of the death 
of either, the whole care of the children devolves upon the 
survivor. Nor has the survivor a right to devolve it upon 
another person, if he or she can discharge it alone. 

IY. The law of marriage, both from Scripture and from 
reason, makes the husband the head of the domestic society 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 343 

Hence, when difference of opinion exists (except as stated 
above where a paramount obligation binds) the decision of 
the husband is ultimate. Hence the duty of the wife is sub- 
mission and obedience. The husband, however, has no 
more right jfchan the wife, to act unjustly, oppressively, or 
unkindly f nor is the fact of his authority in the least an 
excuse for so acting. But as differences of opinion. are al- 
ways likely to exist, and as, in such case, one or the other 
party must yield, to avoid the greatest of all evils in such a 
society, continual dissension, the duty of yielding devolves 
upon the wife. And it is to be remembered, that the act of 
submission, is in every respect as dignified and as lovely as 
the act of authority ; nay, more, it involves an element of 
virtue, which does not belong to the other. It supposes nei- 
ther superior excellence, nor superior mind, in the party 
which governs ; but merely an official relation, held for the 
mutual good of both parties, and of their children. The 
teaching of Scripture on this subject is explicit — see 1 Peter, 
iii. 1 — 7. "Likewise ye wives, be in subjection to your own 
husbands, that if any obey not the word, they also may, 
without the word, be won by the conversation of the wives ; 
while they behold your chaste conversation united with re- 
spect. Whose adorning, let it not be that outward adorning 
of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, and of putting 
on of apparel, but let it be the inward disposition of the 
mind, which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a, meek 
and quiet spirit, which is, in the sight of God, of great price. 
Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with your wives according to 
knowledge, as with the weaker party ; rendering respect to 
them, as heirs with you, of the grace of life." That is, if 
I understand the passage, conduct towards them ; as know- 
ing that they are weak, that is, needing support and protec- 
tion ; and, at the same time, rendering them all that respect 
which is due to those who are as much as yourselves, heirs 
to a blessed immortality. A more beautiful exhibition of 
the duties of a husband cannot be imagined. 



344 THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 

I shall^close this chapter with the following well known 
extract from a poet, whose purity of character and exqui- 
site sensibility, have done more than any other in our lan- 
guage, to clothe virtue in her own native attractiveness. 

Domestic happiness, thou only bliss 
Of Paradise, that has survived the fall ! 
Theugh few now taste thee unimpaired and pure, 
Or tasting, long enjoy thee ! too infirm, 
Or too incautious to preserve thy sweets 
Unmixed with drops of bitter, which neglect 
Or temper, sheds into thy crystal cup ; 
Thou art the nurse of virtue ; in thine arms 
She smiles, appearing as in truth she is, 
Heaven-born, and destined to the skies again. 
Thou art not known where pleasure is adored, 
That reeling goddess, with her zoneless waist 
And wandering eyes, still leaning on the arm 
Of novelty, her fickle, frail support ; 
For thou art meek and constant, hating change, 
And finding in the calm of truth-tried love, 
Joys which her stormy rapture never yield. 
Forsaking thee, what shipwreck have we seen 
Of honor, dignity, and fair renown! 
, 'Till prostitution elbows us aside 

In all our crowded streets. — Task. 



CHAPTER III. 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

The adaptation of the physical and moral laws under 
which man is placed, to the promotion of human happiness 
is beautifully illustrated in the relation which exists between 
the law of marriage and the laws of parent and child. 
Were the physical or moral conditions of marriage different, 
in any respect, from those which exist, the evils which 
would ensue would be innumerable. And on the contrary, 
by accurately observing them we shall see that they not 
only contain a provision for the well-being of successive 
generations, but also establish a tendency to indefinite social 
progress. 

Thus we see that mankind are incapable of sustaining 
the relation of parent, until they have arrived at the age of 
maturity, attained to considerable knowledge and experi- 
ence, and become capable of such labor as will enable them 
to support and protect their offspring. Were this otherwise, 
were children liable to become parents ; parent and child 
growing up together in physical and intellectual imbecility, 
the progress of man in virtue and knowledge would be im~ 
possible, even if the whole race did not perish from want 
and disease. 

Again, the parent is endowed with a love of his offspring, 
which renders it a pleasure to him to contribute to its wel- 



346 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

fare, and to give it, by every means in his power, the benefit 
of his own experience. And, on the contrary, there is in 
the child, if not a corresponding love of the parent, a dispo- 
sition to submit to the parent's wishes, and to yield (unless 
its instincts have been mismanaged) to his authority. Were 
either of these dispositions wanting, it is evident that the 
whole social system would be disarranged, and incalculable 
misery entailed upon our race. 

And, once more, it is evident that civil society is consti- 
tuted, by the surrender, by the individual, of his personal 
desires and propensities, to the good of the whole. It, of 
course, involves the necessity of self-restraint, that is, of 
habitual self-government. Now in this point of view, the 
domestic society is designed to be, as has been frequently 
remarked, the nursery for the state. 

Thus, the parent being of age and experience sufficient 
to control and direct the child, and being instinctively im- 
pelled to exert this control for the child's benefit ; and the 
child being instinctively disposed to yield to his authority 
when judiciously exerted ; the child grows up under a 
system, in which he yields to the will of another, and thus 
he learns at home to submit to the laws of that society of 
which he is soon to become a member. And hence it is, 
that the relaxation of parental authority has always been 
found one of the surest indications of the decline of social 
order, and the unfailing precursor of public turbulence and 
anarchy. 

But still more, it is a common remark, that children are 
influenced by example, more readily than by any other 
means. Now, by the marriage constitution, this principle of 
human nature is employed as an instrument of the greatest 
possible good. We stated, that as the basis of the marriage 
covenant is affection, and that it supposes each party to pre- 
fer the happiness of the other to its own; while the domes- 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 347 

tic society is governed by this principle, it presents to the 
children a continual example of disinterestedness and self- 
denial, and of the happiness which results from the exercise 
of these virtues. And, yet more, the affection of the parents 
prompts them to the same virtues in behalf of their children ; 
and, hence, the latter have, before their eyes, a constantly 
operating motive to the cultivation of these very dispositions. 
And lastly, as the duty of the wife is submission, children 
are thus taught, by the example of one whom they respect 
and love, that submission is both graceful and dignified; and 
that, it in no manner involves the idea of baseness or ser- 
vility. 

1. From these considerations, we learn the relation which 
exists, by nature, between parents and children. It is the 
relation of a superior to an inferior. The right of the pa- 
rent is to command — the duty of the child is to obey. Au- 
thority belongs to the one, submission to the other. This 
relation is a part of our constitution, and the obligation 
which arises from it is, accordingly, a part of our duty. It 
is not a matter of convenience, or of expediency, but it be- 
longs to the relations under which we are created ; and to 
the violation of it, our Creator has affixed peculiar and 
afflicting penalties. 

2. While this is the relation, yet the motive which should 
govern the obligation on both sides, is affection. While the 
authority to command, rests with the parent, and the duty 
of submission is imposed upon the child, yet the parent is 
not at liberty to exercise this authority from caprice, or love 
of power, or for his own advantage, but from simple love to 
the child, and for the child's advantage. The constitution 
under which we are placed, renders it necessary that the 
parent should exercise this power ; but that parent abuses 
it ; that is, he uses it for purposes for which it was not con- 
ferred, if he uses it with any other motive than duty to God, 
and love to his offspring. 



348 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

3. This relation being established by our Creator, and the 
obligations consequent upon it being binding upon both par- 
ties, the failure in one party does not annihilate the obliga- 
tions of the other. If a child be disobedient, the parent is 
still under obligation to act towards it for its own good, and 
not to exert his authority for any other purpose. If a parent 
be unreasonable, this does not release the child. He is still 
bound to honor and obey, and reverence his parent. 

The duty of parents is, then, generally, to educate, or to 
bring up, their children in such a manner as they believe will 
be most for their future happiness, both temporal and eternal. 

This comprehends several particulars. 

1. Support or maintenance. That it is the duty of the 
parents to keep alive the helpless being, whom they have 
brought into existence, need not be proved. As to the ex- 
pensiveness of this maintenance, I do not know that any 
thing very definite can be asserted. The general rule would 
seem to be, that the mode of life adopted by the parent, would 
be that which he is required to provide for the child. This, 
however, would be modified by some circumstances. If a 
parent of large wealth I r ought up his family in meanness 
and ignorance, so that they would be specially Unfitted for 
the opulence which they were hereafter to enjoy, he would act 
unjustly. He is voluntarily placing them in circumstances 
of great temptation. So, on the other hand, if a parent, 
destitute of means to render his children independent of 
labor, brings them up, whether male or female, in idleness 
and expensiveness, he violates his duty as a parent. He is 
preparing them for a life, not of happiness, but of discontent, 
imbecility, and misery. The latter, owing to the natural 
weakness of parental affection, is, by far, the most common 
error, and is liable to become peculiarly prevalent in the 
social condition of this country 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 349 

2. Physical Education. 

A parent is under obligation to use all the means in his 
power to secure to his children a good physical constitution. 
It is his duty to prescribe such food, and in such quantity, as 
will best conduce to their health, — to regulate their labor and 
exercise, so as fully to develope all the powers, and call into 
exercise all the functions of their physical system, — to accus- 
tom them to hardship, and render them patient of labor. 
Every one knows how greatly the happiness of a human 
being depends upon early physical discipline, and it is mani- 
fest, that this discipline can be enforced by no one but a 
parent, or by one who stands in the place of a parent. 

By the same rule, we see the wickedness of those parents 
who employ their children in such service, or oblige them to 
labor in such manner, as will expose them to sickness, in- 
firmity, disease, and premature death. In many manufac- 
turing countries, children are forced to labor before they 
are able to endure confinement and fatigue, or to labor vastly 
beyond their strength, so that the stamina of their constitu- 
tions are destroyed even in infancy. The power of the 
parent over the child, was given for the child's good, and not 
to gratify the parent's selfishness, or minister to his love of 
gain. It is not improper to add, that the guilt and the shame 
of this abuse of the rights of children, are equally shared be- 
tween the parent, who thus sells his child's health and life 
for gold, and the heartless agent who thus profits by his 
wickedness. Nor is this form of violation of parental obliga- 
tion confined to any one class of society. The ambitious 
mother, who, for the sake of her own elevation, or the ag- 
grandizement of her family, and without any respect to the 
happiness of her child, educates her daughter in all the 
trickery of fashionable fascination, dwarfing her mind, and 
sensualizing her aspirations, for the chance of negotiating for 
her a profitable match, regardless of the character or habits 

31 



350 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

of him to whom she is to be united for life, falls precisely 
under the same condemnation. 

2. Intellectual Education. A child enters into the world 
utterly ignorant, and possessed of nothing else than a collec- 
tion of impulses and capabilities. It can be happy and use- 
ful only as this ignorance is dispelled by education, and these 
impulses and capabilities directed and enlarged by discipline 
and cultivation. To some knowledge and discipline, the 
parent has, from the necessity of the case, attained ; and at 
least so much as this he is bound to communicate to his chil- 
dren. In some respects, however, this duty can be dis- 
charged more effectively by others than by the parent, and it 
may, therefore, very properly, be thus devolved upon a 
teacher. The parental obligation requires that it be done 
either by a parent himself, or that he procure it to be done 
by another. 

I have said, that it can, in part, be discharged by the 
teacher. But let it be remembered, it can be done only in 
part. The teacher is only the agent ; the parent is the 'prin- 
cipal. The teacher does not remove from the parent any of 
the responsibility of his relation. Several duties devolve 
upon the one, which cannot be rightfully devolved upon the 
other. 

For instance, 1. He is bound to inform himself of the 
peculiar habits, and reflect upon the probable future situation 
of his child, and deliberately to consider what sort of educa- 
tion will most conduce to his future happiness and useful- 
ness. 

2. He is bound to select such instructed as Will best 
accomplish the results which he believes will be most benefi- 
cial. 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 351 

3. He is bound to devote such time and attention to the 
subject as will enable him to ascertain whether the instructer 
of his child discharges his duty with faithfulness. 

4. To encourage his child, by manifesting such interest in 
his studies, as shall give to diligence and assiduity all the 
assistance and benefit of parental authority and friend- 
ship. 

5. And, if a parent is under obligation to do this, he is, of 
course, under obligation to take time to do it, and so to con- 
struct the arrangements of his family and business, that it 
may be done. He has no right to say, that he has no time 
for these duties. If God have required them of him, as is 
the fact, he has time exactly for them ; and the truth is, he 
he has not time for those other occupations which interfere 
with them. If he neglect them, he does it to the injury of 
his children, and, as he will ascertain, when it shall be too 
late, to his own disappointment and misery. 

Nor let it be supposed, that this will ever be done without 
bringing with it its own reward. God has always connected 
together, indissolubly, our own personal benefit and the dis- 
charge of every duty. Thus, in the present case, a parent 
who assiduously follows his children throughout the various 
steps of their education, will find his own knowledge in- 
creased, and his own education carried forward, vastly 
beyond what he would at first have conceived. There are 
very few things which a child ought to learn, from the study 
of which an adult will not derive great advantage, especially if 
he goes through the process of simplification and analysis, 
which are so necessary in order to communicate knowledge to 
the mind of the young. And yet more. It is only thus, that 
the parent will be able to retain that intellectual superiority, 
which it is so much for the interest of both parties that he 
should, for a long time, at least, possess. It is an unfortu- 



352 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

nate circumstance for a child, to suppose that he knows 
more than his parent ; and, if his supposition be true, he will 
not be slow to entertain it. The longer the parent maintains 
his superiority in knowledge and wisdom, the better will it 
be for both parties. But this superiority cannot be retained, 
if, as soon as the parent enters upon active business, he desists 
from all effort after intellectual cultivation, and surrenders 
himself a slave to physical labor ; while he devotes his child to 
mere intellectual cultivation, and thus renders intellectual 
intercourse between himself and his children, almost impos- 
sible. 

If this be so, it is evident that the violation of parental 
obligation is more common among even indulgent parents 
than would generally be supposed. 

1. Parents who render themselves slaves to fashionable 
society and amusement, violate this obligation. The mother 
who is engaged in a perpetual round of visiting and com- 
pany, and who, from the pressure of engagements to which 
she subjects herself, has no leisure to devote to the mental 
and moral culture of her children, violates her most solemn 
duties. She has no right to squander away in frivolous self- 
gratification, the time which belongs to her offspring. She 
will reap the fruits of her folly, when, in a few years, her 
children having grown up estranged from her affection, 
shall thwart her wishes, disappoint her hopes, and neglect, 
if they do not despise, the mother who bare them. 

2. The father who plunges into business so deeply, that he 
has no leisure for domestic duties and pleasures, and whose 
only intercourse with his children consists in a brief and 
occasional word of authority, or a surly lamentation over 
their intolerable expensiveness, is equally to be pitied and 
to be blamed. What right has he to devote to other pur- 
suits the time which God has allotted to his children. Nor 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 353 

is it any excuse, to say that he cannot support his family in 
their present style of living without this effort. I ask, by 
what right can his family demand to live in a manner, 
which requires him to neglect his most solemn and import- 
ant duties. Nor is it an excuse, to say that he wishes to 
leave them a competence. Is he under obligation to leave 
them that competence which he desires ? Is it an advan- 
tage to them, to be deprived of the necessity of labor ? Be- 
sides, is money the only desirable bequest which a father 
can leave to his children ? Surely, well cultivated intellects, 
hearts sensible to domestic affection, the love of parents and 
brethren and sisters, a taste for home pleasures, habits of 
order, regularity, and industry, a hatred of vice and of 
vicious men, and a lively sensibility to the excellence of 
virtue, are as valuable a legacy as an inheritance of pro- 
perty, simple property, purchased by the loss of every habit 
which could render that property a blessing. 

3. Nor can thoughtful men be always exculpated from the 
charge of this violation. The duties of a parent are estab- 
lished by God, and God requires us not to violate them. 
While the social worship of God is a duty, it ought not to 
interfere with parental duty. Parents who spend that time 
which belongs to their children, in offices of public social 
worship, have mistaken the nature of their special obliga- 
tion. I do not pretend to say what time, or how much time, 
any individual shall spend in any religious service, This 
question does not belong to the present discussion. But, 
I say, that this time must be taken out of that which belongs 
to ourselves ; and it might easily be abstracted from that 
devoted to visiting, company, or idleness ; it should not be 
taken from that which belongs, by the ordinance of God, 
to our children. 

It will be easily seen, that the fulfilment of these obliga- 
tions, in the manner I have suggested, would work a very 

31* 



354 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

perceptible change in the whole fabric of society. It would 
check the eager desire of accumulation, repress the ardor of 
ambition, and allay the feverish thirst of selfish gratification. 
But it would render a family, in truth, a society. It would 
bring back parents and children to the relations to each 
other which God has established. It would restore to home 
a meaning, and to the pleasures of home a reality, which 
they are in danger of losing altogether. Forsaking the 
shadow of happiness, we should find the substance. Instead 
of a continual round of physical excitation, and the cease- 
less pursuit of pleasures, which, as every one confesses, end 
in ennui and disappointment, we should secure 

" A sacred and home-felt delight, 
A sober certainty of waking bliss," 

of which previously we can have no conception. 
3. Moral Education. 

The eternal destiny of the child is placed, in a most im- 
portant sense, in the hands of its parents. The parent is 
under obligation to instruct, and cause his child to be 
instructed, in those religious sentiments which he believes 
to be according to the will of God. With his duty in this 
respect, until the child becomes able to decide for himself; 
no one has a right to interfere. If the parent be in 
error, the fault is not in teaching the child what he believes, 
but in believing what is false, without having used the means 
which God has given him to arrive at the truth. But if 
such be the responsibility, and so exclusive the authority of 
the parent, it is manifest that he is under a double obligation 
to ascertain what is the will of God, and in what manner the 
future happiness of an immortal soul may be secured. As 
soon as he becomes a parent, his decisions on this subject 
involve the future happiness or misery not only of his own 
soul, but also of that of another. Both considerations, 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 355 

therefore, impose upon him the obligation, of coming to a 
serious and solemn decision upon his moral condition and 
prospects. 

But besides that of making himself acquainted with the 
doctrines of religion, the relation in which he stands imposes 
upon the parent several other duties. 

It is his duty : — 

1. To teach his child its duties to God and man, and pro- 
duce in its mind a permanent conviction of its moral re- 
sponsibility. This is to be done not merely by direct, but 
also by indirect precept ; and by directing it to such trains 
of observation and reflection as shall create a correct moral 
estimate of actions and of their consequences. And specially 
should it be the constant effort of the parent to cultivate in 
his child a spirit of piety, or right feeling towards God, the 
true source of every other virtue. 

2. Inasmuch as the present state of man is morally im- 
perfect, and every individual is a sharer in that imperfection, 
it is the duty of the parent to eradicate, so far as is in his 
power, the wrong propensities of his children. He should 
watch with ceaseless vigilance for the first appearances of 
pride, obstinacy, malice, envy, vanity, cruelty, revenge, 
anger, lying, and their kindred vices ; and, by steadfast and 
unwearied assiduity, strive to extirpate them, before they 
have gained firmness by age, or vigor by indulgence. 
There cannot be a greater unkindness to a child, than to 
allow it to grow up with any of its evil habits uncorrected. 
Every one would consider a parent cruel, who allowed a 
child to grow up without having taken means to cure a 
limb which had been broken ; but how much worse is an 
evil temper than a broken limb ! 

3. Inasmuch as precept will be of no avail without a cor- 



356 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

responding example, a parent is under obligations not only 
to set no example by which the evil dispositions of his child 
will be cherished, but to set such an example as will be 
most likely to remove them. A passionate, selfish, envious 
man, must expect that, in spite of all his precepts, his 
children will be passionate, envious, and selfish. 

4. Inasmuch as all our efforts will be fruitless without 
the blessing of God, that parent must be convicted of great 
neglect of duty, who does not habitually pray for that direc- 
tion which he needs in the performance of these solemn ob- 
ligations ; as well as for that blessing upon his efforts, with- 
out which, though ever so well directed, they will be utterly 
in vain. 

5. Inasmuch as the moral character of the child is greatly 
influenced by its associations and companions, it is the duty 
of the parent to watch over these with vigilance, and to con- 
trol them with entire independence. He is false to his 
trust, if, for the sake of gratifying the desires of his child, or 
of conciliating the favor of others, or avoiding the reputa- 
tion of singularity or preciseness, he allows his child to 
form associations which he believes, or even fears, will be 
injurious to him. And, on the other hand, if such be the 
duty of the parent, he ought to be considered as fully at 
liberty to perform it, without remark and without offence. 
In such matters, he is the ultimate and the only responsible 
authority. He who reproaches another for the exercise of 
this authority, is guilty of slander. He who, from the fear 
of slander, shrinks from exercising it, is justly chargeable 
with a pusillanimity wholly unworthy of the relation which 
he sustains. 

6. As the parent sustains the same relation to all his 
children, it is manifest that his obligations to them all are 
the same. Hence, he is bound to exercise his authority 
with entire impartiality. The want of this must always 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 357 

end in jealousy, envy, and malice, and cannot fail to render 
the domestic society a scene of perpetual bickering and con- 
tention. A striking exemplification of all this is recorded 
in the history of Joseph and his brethren. 

The Rights of Parents. 

The right of the parent over his child is, of course, com- 
mensurate with his duties. If he be under obligation to 
educate his child in such manner as he supposes will most 
conduce to the child's happiness and the welfare of society, 
he has, from necessity, the right to control the child in every 
thing necessary to the fulfilment of this obligation. The 
only limits imposed, are, that he exert this control no fur- 
ther than is necessary to the fulfilment of his obligation, 
and that he exert it with the intention for which it was 
conferred. While he discharges his parental duties within 
these limits, he is, by the law of God, exempt from inter- 
ference both from individuals and from society. 

Of the duration of this obligation and this right. 

1. In infancy, the control of the parent over the child is 
absolute ; that is, it is exercised without any respect what- 
ever to the wishes of the child. 

2. When the child has arrived at majority, and has as- 
sumed the responsibility of its own conduct, both the 
responsibility and the right of the parent cease altogether. 

The time of majority is fixed in most civilized nations by 
statute. In Great Britain and in the United States, an 
individual becomes of age in his twenty-first year. The 
law, therefore, settles the rights and obligations of the 
parties, so far as civil society is concerned ; but does not 
pretend to decide upon the moral relations of the parties. 



358 THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

3. As the rights and duties of the parent, at one period, 
are absolute, and at another cease altogether ; it is reason- 
able to infer, that the control of the parent should be 
exercised on more and more liberal principles, that a wider 
and wider discretion should be allowed to the child, and that 
his feelings and predilections should be more and more 
consulted, as he grows older ; so that, when he comes to act 
for himself, he may have become prepared for the responsi- 
bility which he assumes, by as extensive an experience as 
the nature of the case admits. 

4. Hence, I think that a parent is bound to consult the 
wishes of his child, in proportion to his age, whenever this 
can be done innocently j and also, to vary his modes of 
enforcing authority, so as to adapt them to the motives of 
which the increasing intellect of the child is . susceptible. 
While it is true that the treatment proper for a young man, 
would ruin a child ; it is equally true that the treatment 
proper for a child, might very possibly ruin a young man. 
The right of control, however, still rests with the parent, 
and the duty of obedience still is imposed upon the child. 
The parent is merely bound to exercise it, in a manner 
suited to the nature of the being over whom it is to be 
exerted. 

The authority of Instructers is a delegated authority, 
derived immediately from the parent. He, for the time 
being, stands to the pupil, in loco -parentis. Hence the 
relation between him and the pupil is analogous to that 
between parent and child, that is, it is the relation of 
superiority and inferiority. The right of the instructer is 
to command, the obligation of the pupil is to obey. The 
right of the instructer is, however, to be exercised, as I before 
stated when speaking of the parent, for the pupil's benefit. 
For the exercise of it, he is responsible to the parent, whose 
professional agent he is. He must use his own best skill 
and judgment in governing and teaching his pupil. If he 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 359 

and the parent cannot agree, the connection must be 
dissolved. But as he is a professional agent, he must use 
his own intellect and skill, in the exercise of his own pro- 
fession, and in the use of it is to be interfered with by- 
no one. 



CHAPTER IV 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 

I shall consider in this chapter, the duties and the rights 
of children, and their duration. 

First. The Duties of Children. 

I. Obedience. — By this I mean, that the relation between 
parent and child, obliges the latter to conform to the will of 
the former, because it is his will, aside from the consideration, 
that what is required seem to the child best or wisest. The 
only limitation to this rule, is the limitation of conscience. 
A parent has no right to require a child to do what it 
believes to be wrong ; and a child has no right in such a 
case, to obey the commands of a parent. The child must 
obey Cod, and meekly suffer the consequences. It has even 
in this case no right to resist. 

The reasons of this rule are manifest. 

1. The design of the whole domestic constitution would 
be frustrated without it. This design, from what has been 
already remarked, is, to enable the child to avail itself both 
of the wisdom and knowledge and experience of the parent ; 
and also of that affection which prompts the parent to 
employ all these for the well-being of the child. But, of 
these advantages the child can never avail himself, unless 

32 



362 THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 

he yield obedience to the parent's authority, until he have 
acquired that age and experience which are necessary to 
enable him to direct and to govern himself, 

2. That this is the duty of children, is made apparent by 
the precepts of the Holy Scriptures. 

Exodus xx. 12. — Honor thy father and thy mother, that 
thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God 
giveth thee. This, as St. Paul remarks, Eph. vi, 2, 3, is the 
only command'frient in the decalogue, to which a special 
promise is annexed. 

In the book of Proverbs no duty is more frequently 
inculcated than this ; and of no one, are the consequences 
of obedience and disobedience more fully set forth. 

A few examples may serve as a specimen : 

Proverbs i. 8, 9. — My son, keep the instruction of thy 
father, and forsake not the law of thy mother. They shall 
be an ornament of grace unto thy head (that is a graceful 
ornament), and chains about thy neck. 

Proverbs vi. 20. — Keep thy father's commandment, and 
forsake not the law of thy mother. 

Proverbs xiii. 1. — A wise son heareth his father's instruc- 
tions, but a scorner heareth not rebuke. 

The same duty is frequently inculcated in the New Testa- 
ment. 

Ephesians vi. 1. — " Children, obey your parents in the 
Lord, for this is right." The meaning of the phrase, " in 
the Lord," I suppose to be, in accordance with the will of 
the Lord. 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 363 

Colossians hi. 20. — " Children, obey yourfparents in all 
things, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord." The phrase, 
11 well pleasing to the Lord," is here of the same meaning as 
" in the Lord," above. 

The displeasure of God against those who violate this 
command, is also frequently denounced in the Scriptures. 

Deuteronomy xxvii. 16. — " Cursed be he that setteth 
light by his father or his mother ; and all the people shall 
say Amen." ♦ 

Proverbs xv. 5. — " A fool despiseth his father's instruc- 
tions." 

Proverbs xxx. 17. — " The eye that mockethat his father, 
and despiseth to obey his mother, the ravens of the valley 
shall pluck it out, and the young eagles shall eat it." That 
is, he shall perish by a violent death ; he shall come to a 
miserable end. 

From such passages as these, and I have only selected a 
very few, from a great number that might have been quoted, 
we learn, 1. That the holy Scriptures plainly inculcate obe- 
dience to parents as a command of God. He who is guilty 
of disobedience, therefore, violates not merely the command 
of man, but of God. And it is therefore our duty always 
to urge it, and to exact it, mainly on this ground. 

2. That they consider obedience to parents as no indica- 
tion of meanness and servility, but on the contrary, as the 
most honorable and delightful exhibition of character that 
can be manifested by the young. It is a graceful ornament, 
which confers additional beauty upon that which was other- 
wise lovely. 

3. That the violation of this commandment exposes the 
transgressor to special and peculiar judgments. And even 



364 THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 

without the light of revelation, I think that the observation 
of every one must convince him, that the curse of God rests 
heavily upon filial disobedience, and that his peculiar bless- 
ing follows obedience. And, indeed, what can be a surer 
indication of future profligacy and ruin, than that turbu- 
lent impatience of restraint, which leads a youth to follow 
the headlong impulses of passion, in preference to the coun- 
sels of age and experience, even when conveyed in the lan- 
guage of tender and disinterested affection. 

II. Another dimity of children to parents, is reverence. This 
is implied in the commandment, honor thy father and thy 
mother. By reverence, I mean that conduct and those sen- 
timents which are due from an inferior to a superior. The 
parent is the superior, and the child the inferior, by virtue 
of the relation which God himself has established. What- 
ever may be the rank or attainments of the child, and how 
fcnuch soever they may be superior to those of the parent, 
these can never abrogate the previous relation which God 
has established. The child is bound to show deference to 
the parent ; whenever it is possible, to evince that he considers 
him his superior ; and to perform for him services which he 
would perform for no other person. And let it always be 
remembered, that in this, there is nothing degrading, but 
every thing honorable. No more ennobling and dignified 
trait of character can be exhibited, than that of universal 
and profound filial respect. The same principle carried 
out, would teach us universal and tender respect for old age, 
at all times and under all circumstances. 

III. Another duty of children is filial affection, or the pe- 
culiar affection due from a child to a parent, because he is a 
parent. A parent maybe entitled to our love, because he is 
a man, or because he is such a man, that is, of such excel- 
lencies of character ; but besides ail this, and aside from it 
all, he is entitled to our affection on account of the relation 
in which he stands to us. This imposes upon us the duty 
not only of hiding his foibles, of covering his defects, of 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 365 

shielding him from misfortune, and of seeking his happiness 
by whatever means Providence has placed in our power f 
but also of performing all this, and all the other duties of 
which we have spoken, from love to him, because he is our 
parent ; a love which shall render such services not a bur- 
den, but a pleasure, under what circumstances soever it 
may be our duty to render them. 

IV. It is the duty of the child, whenever it is by the Pro- 
vidence of God rendered necessary, to support his parent in 
his old age. That man would deserve the reputation of a 
monster, who would not cheerfully deny himself, in order 
to be able to minister to the comforts of the declining years 
of his parent. 

The Rights of Children. 

1. Children have a right to maintenance, and as has been 
remarked before, a maintenance corresponding to the cir- 
cumstances and condition of the parent. 

2. They have a right to expect that the parent will exert 
his authority, not for his own advantage, nor from caprice, 
but for the good of the child, according to his best judgment. 
If the parent act otherwise, he violates his duty to his chil- 
dren and to God. This, however, in no manner liberates 
the child from his obligations to his parent. These remain 
in full force, the same as before. The wrong of one party 
is no excuse for wrong in the other. It is the child's mis- 
fortune, but it can never be alleviated^ by domestic strife, 
and still less by filial disobedience and ingratitude. 

Of the duration of these rights and_obligations. 

1. Of obedience. The child is bound to obey the parent so 
long as he remains in a state of pupilage ; that is, so long as 
the parent is responsible for his conduct, and he is dependent 

32* 



366 THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 

upon his parent. This period, so far as society is Concerned, 
as has been remarked, is fixed, in most countries, by statute. 
Sometimes, by the consent of both parties, it ceases before 
that period ; at other times, it continues beyond it. With 
the termination of minority, let it occur when it will, the 
duty of obedience ceases. After this, however, the advice of 
the parent is entitled to more deference and respect than that 
of any other person ; but, as the individual now acts upon 
his own responsibility, it is only advice, since it has ceased 
to be authoritative. 

2. The conscience of a child becomes capable of deliberate 
decision, long before its period of pupilage ceases. When- 
ever this decision is fairly and honestly expressed, the parent 
ought not to interfere with it. It is his duty to strive to con- 
vince his child, if he think it to be in error ; but, if he cannot 
succeed in producing conviction, he must leave the child, 
like any other human being, to obey God in the manner it 
thinks will be most acceptable to Him. 

3. The obligation of respect and affection for parents, 
never ceases, but rather increases with advancing age. As 
the child grows older, he becomes capable of more disinter- 
ested affection, and of the manifestation of more delicate 
respect ; and, as the parent grows older, he feels more sensi- 
bly the need of attention ; and his happiness is more de- 
cidedly dependent upon it. As we increase in years, it 
should, therefore, be our more assiduous endeavor to make a 
suitable return to our parents for their kindness bestowed 
upon us in infancy and youth : and to manifest our repent- 
ance for those acts of thoughtlessness and waywardness 
which formerly may have grieved them, by unremitting 
attention, and delicate and heartfelt affection. 

That a peculiar insensibility exists, to the obligations of 
the parental and filial relation, is, I fear, too evident to need 
any extended illustration. The notion that a family is a 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 367 

society, and that a society must be governed, and that the 
right and the duty of governing this society, rests with the 
parent, seems to be rapidly vanishing from the minds of men. 
In the place of it, it seems to be the prevalent opinion, that 
children may grow up as they please ; and that the exertion 
of parental restraint, is an infringement of the personal lib- 
erty of the child. But all this will not abrogate the law of 
God ; nor will it avert the punishments which he has con- 
nected, indissolubly, with disobedience. The parent who 
neglects his duty to his children, is sowing thickly for him- 
self and for them, the seeds of his future misery. He who is 
suffering the evil dispositions of his children to grow up un- 
corrected, will find that he is cherishing a viper by which 
he himself will first be stung. That parent who is accus- 
toming his children to habits of thoughtless caprice and reck- 
less expenditure, and who stupidly smiles at the ebullitions 
of youthful passion, and the indulgence in fashionable vice, 
as indications of manly spirit, needs no prophet to foretel, 
that, unless the dissoluteness of his family leave him early 
childless, his gray hairs will be brought down with sorrow tp 
the grave. 

I remarked, at the close of the last chapter, that the duty 
of instructers was analagous to that of parents, and that they 
stood to pupils in a relation essentially parental. It is 
proper here to add, that a pupil stands to his instructer in a 
relation essentially filial. His duty is obedience, first, to his 
parent, and, secondly, to the professional agent to whom he 
has been committed by his parent. The equals, in this rela- 
tion, are the parent and the instructer ; to both of them is 
the pupil the inferior ; and to both is he under the obliga- 
tion of obedience, respect, and reverence. 

Now, such being the nature of the relation, it is the duty 
of the instructer to enforce obedience, and of the pupil to 
render it. It would be very easy to show, that, on the fulfil- 
ment of this duty on the part of the instructer, the interests 



368 THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 

of education, and the welfare of the young, vitally depend 
Without discipline, there can be formed no valuable habit. 
Without it, when young persons are congregated together, 
far away from the restraints of domestic society, exposed to 
the allurements of ever-present temptation, and excited by 
the stimulus of youthful passion, every vicious habit must 
be cultivated. The young man may applaud the negligent 
and pusillanimous instructer ; but, when that man, no longer 
young, suffers the result of that neglect and pusillanimity, it 
is well, if a better spirit have taught him to mention the 
name of that instructer without bitter execration. 

In colleges and halls in ancient days, 

There dwelt a sage called discipline. 

His eye was meek and gentle, and a smile 

Played on his lips ; and in his speech was heard 

Paternal sweetness, dignity, and love. 

The occupation dearest to his heart 

Was to encourage goodness. Learning grew 

Beneath his care a thriving vigorous plant. 

The mind was well informed ; the passions held 

Subordinate, and diligence was choice. 

If e'er it chanced, as sometimes chance it must,. 

That one among so many, overleaped 

The limits of control, his gentle eye 

Grew stern, and darted a severe rebuke. 

His frown was full of terror, and his voice 

Shook the delinquent with such fits of awe, 

As left him not, till penitence had won 

Lost favor back again, and closed the breach. 

But discipline at length, 
O'erlooked and unemployed, grew sick and died. 
Then study languished, emulation slept, 
And virtue fled. The schools became a scene 
Of solemn farce, where ignorance in stilts,. 
His cap well lined with logic not his own, 
With parrot tongue, performed the scholar's part, 
Proceeding soon a graduated dunce. 

What was learned, 
If aught was learned in childhood, is forgot ; 
And such expense as pinches parents blue, 
And mortifies the liberal hand of love, 
Is squandered in pursuit of idle sports 
And vicious pleasures. — Task. 



CLASS III. 



DUTIES OF MAN AS A MEMBER OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY. 

To this class belong the duties of magistrates and citizens. 
As these, however, would be but imperfectly understood, 
without a knowledge of the nature of civil society, and 
of the relations subsisting between society and the indivi- 
dual, it will be necessary to consider these latter before enter- 
ing upon the former. I shall, therefore, attempt to explain ; 
first, The Nature and Limitations of civil society ; secondly, 
Government, or the manner in which the obligations of 
society are discharged] thirdly, the Duties of Magistrates; 
fourthly, the Duties of Citizens. 



CHAPTER I. 



OF CIYIL SOCIETY. 

As civil society is a somewhat complicated conception, it 
may be useful, in the first place, to consider the nature of a 
society in its simplest form. This chapter will, therefore, be 
divided into two sections. The first treats of the constitu- 
tion of a simple society ; the second of the constitution of 
civil society. 



SECTION I. 

OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 

1. A society of any sort, originates in a peculiar form of 
contract, entered into between each several individual, form- 
ing the society on the one part, and all the other members of 
the society on the other part. Each party promises to do 
certain things to or for the other; and puts itself under 
moral obligation to do so. Hence, we see that conscience, 
or the power of recognising moral obligation, is, in the very 
nature of things, essential to the existence of a society. 
Without it, a society could not be formed. 

2. This contract, like any other, respects those things, and 
those things only, in which the parties have thus bound 



372 OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 

themselves to each other. As the individual is under no 
obligation to belong to the society, but the obligation is purely 
voluntary, he is bound in no other manner, and for no other 
purpose, than those in and for which he has bound himself. 
In all other respects, he is as free as he was before. 

3. Inasmuch as the formation of a society involves the 
idea of a moral obligation, each party is under moral obliga- 
tion to fulfil its part of the contract. The society is bound 
to do what it has promised to every individual, and every 
individual is bound to do what he has promised to the soci- 
ety. If either party cease to do this, the compact, like any 
other mutual contract, is dissolved. 

4. Inasmuch as every individual is, in all respects, except- 
ing those in which he has bound himself, as free as he was 
before, the society has no right to impose upon the individual 
any other obligation than those under which he has placed 
himself. For, as he has come under no such obligation to 
them, they have no more control over him than any other 
men. And, as their whole power is limited to that which has 
been conferred upon them by individuals, beyond this limit, 
they are no society ; they have no power ; their act is really 
out of the society ; and is, of course, binding upon no mem- 
ber of the society, any more than upon any other man. 

5. As every member of the society enters it upon the same 
terms ; that is, as every one comes under the same obliga- 
tions to the society, and the society comes under the same 
obligations to him, they are, by consequence, so far as the 
society is concerned, all equals or fellows. All have equal 
rights, and are all subject to the same obligations. 

6. That which defines the obligations under which the 
individual and the society have come, in respect to each 
other, is called the constitution of the society. It is intended 
to express the object of the association, and the manner in 



OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 373 

which that object is to be accomplished. That is to say, it 
declares what the individual promises to do for the soci- 
ety ; what the society promises to do for the individual ; and 
the object for which this association between the parties is 
formed. 

7. As the union of individuals in this manner is volun- 
tary, every member naturally has a right to dissolve the con- 
nection when he pleases, and the society have also a cor- 
responding right. As, however, this would frequently ex- 
pose both parties to inconvenience, it is common, in the arti- 
cles of the constitution, or the form of compact, to specify 
on what terms this may be done. When this part of the 
agreement has thus been entered into, it, of course, becomes 
as binding as any other part of it. 

Of the manner in which such a society shall be governed. 

The object of any such association is to do something. 
But it is obvious that they can act only on one of three sup- 
positions. By unanimity, by a minority, or by a majority. 
To expect unanimity in the opinions of a being so diversified 
in character as man, is frivolous. To suspend the operation 
of many, upon the decisions of one, is manifestly unjust, 
would be subversive of the whole object of the association, 
and would render the whole society more inefficient than 
the separate individuals of which it is composed. To sup- 
pose a society to be governed by a minority, would be to 
suppose a less number of equals, superior in wisdom and 
goodness to a majority, which is absurd. It remains, there- 
fore, that every society must of necessity be governed by a 
majority. 

Of the limits within which the power of the majority is 
restricted. 

The majority, as we have just seen, is vested with the 
whole power of the society. But it derives its power wholly 

33 



374 OF A SLMPLE SOCIETY. 

and exclusively from the society, and of course it can have 
no power beyond, or diverse from, that of the society itself. 
Now as the power of the society is limited by the conces- 
sions made by each individual respectively, and is bound by 
its obligations to each individual, the power of the majority 
is manifestly restricted within precisely the same limits. 

Thus, to be more particular, a majority has no right to do 
any thing, which the individuals forming the society, have 
not authorized the society to do : 

1. They have no right change the object of the society. 
If this be changed, another society is formed, and the indi- 
vidual members are, as at first, at liberty to unite with it or 
not. 

2. They have no right to do any thing beyond, or different 
from, the object of the society. The reasons are the same as 
in the former instance. 

3. Nor have they a right to do any thing, in a manner 
different from that to which the members upon entering the 
society agreed. The manner set forth in the constitution, 
was that by which the individuals bound themselves, and 
they are bound by nothing else. 

4. Nor have they a right to do any thing which violates 
the principle of the entire social equality of the members. As 
all subjected themselves equally to the same rules, any act 
which supposes a difference of right, is at variance with the 
fundamental principle of the compact. 

And hence, from the nature of the compact, it is obvious, 
that while a majority act within the limits of the authority 
thus delegated to it. the individual is under a moral obliga- 
tion to obey their decisions ; for he has voluntarily placed 
himself under such obligation, and he is bound to fulfil it. 



OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 375 

And, on the other hand, the society is bound to fulfil to the 
individual the contract which they have formed with him, 
and to carry forward the object of the association in the 
manner and in the spirit of the contract entered into. Nor 
is this a mere matter of form or expediency ; it is a matter of 
moral obligation voluntarily entered into, and it is, as binding 
as any other contract formed under any other circumstances. 

And again, if the society or the majority act in violation of 
these engagements, or if they do any thing not committed to 
them by the individual, such act is not binding upon any 
member ; and he is under no more obligation to be governed 
by it, than he would be, if it were done by any other persons, 
or if not done at all. 

If these principles be correct, they will, I think, throw 
some light upon the question of the durability of corporations. 
A corporation is a society established for certain purposes, 
which are to be executed in a certain manner. He who joins 
it, joins it under these conditions, and the whole power of 
the society consists in power to do these things in this man- 
ner. If they do any thing else, they, when doing it, are not 
this society, but some other. And of course, those, whether the 
minority or the majority, who act according to the original 
compact are the society, and the others, whether more or less, 
are something else. The act of incorporation is governed 
by the same principles. It renders the persons so associated 
a body politic and recognised in law, but it does not interfere 
with the original principles of such an association. The 
corporation, therefore, are the persons, whether more or less, 
who adhere to the original agreement, and any act declaring 
any thing else to be the society, is unjust and void. 

But suppose they have all altered their sentiments. The 
society is then of course dissolved. They may, if they 
choose, form another society, but they are not another of 



376 OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY 

course, nor can they be such, until they form another 
organization. 

Again, suppose they have property given under the original 
association, and for the promotion of its objects ; and the 
whole society, or a majority of them, has changed its objects. 
I answer, if a part still remain, and prosecute the original 
object, they are the society ; and the others, by changing the 
object, have ceased to be the society. The right of property 
vests with those who adhere to the original constitution. If 
all have changed the object, the society is dissolved, and all 
ownership, so far as the property is concerned, ceases. It 
therefore either belongs to the public, or reverts to the heirs 
at law. A company of men united for another object, though 
retaining the same name, have no more right to inherit it 
than any other citizens. The right of a legislature to give 
it to them by special act, is even very questionable. Legis- 
latures are not empowered to bestow property upon men at 
will ; and such grant, being beyond the power conceded to 
the legislator, seems to me to be null and void. 

The principles of this section seem to me to demand the 
special attention of those who are at present engaged in con- 
ducting the business of voluntary associations. It should 
always be remembered, that he who joins a voluntary asso- 
ciation, joins it for a specified object, and for no other. The 
association itself has one object, and no other. This object, 
and the manner in which it is to be accomplished, ought to 
be plainly set forth in the constitution. Now, when a ma- 
jority, or the whole society, attempt to do any thing not 
comprehended within this object thus set forth, or in a man- 
ner at variance with that prescribed, they violate the funda- 
mental article of the compact, and the society is virtually 
dissolved. And against such infraction of right, it is the 
duty of the individual to protest; and if it be persisted in, it 
is his duty to withdraw. And it seems to me that otherwise 
the whole benefit of voluntary associations will be lost. If 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 377 

the objects of such associations be not restricted, their in- 
creasing complication will render them unmanageable by 
any form of agency. If an individual, when he unites with 
others for one object, knows not for how many objects, nor 
for what modes of accomplishing them, he shall be held re- 
sponsible, who will ever unite in a benevolent enterprise ? 
And, if masses of men may be thus associated in every part 
of a country, for one professed object, and this object may be 
modified, changed, or exceeded, according to the will of an 
accidental majority, voluntary associations will very soon 
be transformed into the tools of intriguing and ambitious 
men, and thus will become a curse instead of a blessing. 



SECTION II. 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

Society an ordinance of God. Its necessary and acci- 
dental limitations. 

In order to consider this subject correctly, it will be ne- 
cessary to consider society as distinct from government. 
It may exist without government. At some time it must 
so have existed. And in all cases, government is merely the 
instrument by which it accomplishes its purposes. Govern- 
ment is the agent. Society is the principal. 

The first consideration which meets us in the discussion 
of this subject is, that civil society is an institution 
of God. Or, in other words, it is the will of God that man 
should live in a state of society. This may be shown both 
from the original impulses common to all men ; and from 
the necessities of man, arising out of the conditions of his 
present existence. 

33* 



378 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

I. From the original impulses of man. 

1. One of the strongest and most universal impulses of 
our nature is a general love for society. It commences, as 
every one must have observed, with early infancy, and con- 
tinues unabated to the close of life. The poets can conceive 
of no situation more afflictive, or more intolerable, than that 
of a human being in a state of perfect loneliness. Hence, so- 
litary confinement is considered by all mankind as one of the 
severest forms of punishment. And hence, a disposition to 
separate one's self from society is one of the surest indica- 
tions of mental derangement. Now, the natural result of 
this intense and universal impulse, is a willingness to sur- 
render what is inconsistent with it, or a disposition to 
control such other desires as shall be inconsistent with it. 
Wherever these dispositions exist, a number of human be- 
ings will as readily and naturally form a society, as they 
will do any other thing on which their happiness depends. 
A constitution of this sort manifestly shows what is the will 
of our Creator concerning us. 

2. The various forms of human attachment illustrate the 
same truth. 

Thus the attachment between the sexes, at once, forms a 
society, which is the origin of every other. Of this union 
the fundamental principle is a surrender of the happiness of 
each to that of the other, and the consequent attainment of 
an increased return of happiness. From this arises the love 
of parents to children, and of children to parents, and all the 
various modifications of affection resulting from collateral 
and more distant relationships. 

Besides these there must continually arise the feeling of 
friendship between individuals of similar habits and of cor- 
responding pursuits ; the love of benevolence towards 
those who need our succor, or awaken our sympathy ; and 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 379 

the love of approbation, which will stimulate us to deny our- 
selves, for the sake of acquiring the good opinion of those 
by whom we are surrounded. Now, the tendency of all 
these instincts is manifestly twofold. First, as in the former 
instance, as these propensities can be gratified only by so- 
ciety, we shall be disposed to surrender whatever would be 
inconsistent with the enjoyment of society ; and, secondly, 
since it is, as we have seen before, in the very nature of 
affection, to surrender our own personal gratification for the 
happiness of those whom we love, affection renders such a 
surrender one of the very sources of our individual happi- 
ness. Thus patriotism, which is only one form of the love 
of society, not only supposes a man to be willing to surrender 
something personal for the sake of something general, which 
he likes better ; but also to derive happiness from that very 
surrender, and to be actually happier when acting from these 
principles than from any other. It is almost needless to add, 
that the Creator's intention in forming beings with such im- 
pulsions is too evident to be mistaken. 

II. The same truth is taught by the necessities imposed 
upon us by the conditions of our being. 

1. Suppose the human race entirely destitute of these 
social principles, and to have been scattered abroad over the 
face of the earth, as mere isolated individuals. It is evident 
that, under such circumstances, the race of man must 
quickly have perished. Man, thus isolated, could never 
contend, either with the cold of the northern, or with the 
wild beasts of the temperate and warmer, regions. He has 
neither muscular power, nor agility, nor instinct, to protect 
him from the one, nor any natural form of clothing to shield 
him from the other. 

2. But suppose that, by any means, the race, of man could 
be continued. Without society, the progressive ameliora- 
tion of his condition would be impossible. 



380 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

Without society, there could be no division of labor. 
Every one must do every thing for himself, and at the 
greatest possible disadvantage. Without society, there 
could be neither any knowledge of the agents of nature, nor 
any application of them to the production of value. A 
man's instruments would be almost exclusively limited to 
his teeth and nails. Without society, there could be no 
acknowledged right of property. Hence, from these causes, 
there could be no accumulated capital, and each successive 
generation of men must, like the brutes, remain precisely in 
the condition of their predecessors. It is equally evident 
that, under these circumstances, there could exist no possi- 
bility of either intellectual or moral improvement. In fact, 
take the most civilized, intellectual, and moral condition in 
which man has ever existed, and compare it with the con- 
dition of man naked, wandering, destitute, exposed to the 
pel-tings of every tempest, and liable to become the prey of 
every ferocious beast, and the difference between these two 
conditions is wholly the result of society. If it be granted 
that God is benevolent, and wills the happiness of man, 
nay, if it be even granted that God wills the existence of 
man, it mast be conceded that He also wills that condition 
on which not merely his happiness, but even his very exist- 
ence, depends. 

Now, if this be the fact, that is, if civil society be an insti- 
tution of God, several important conclusions will be seen to 
follow from it. 

1. A very important distinction may be observed between 
civil society, and a simple or voluntary society, such as is 
described in the last section. In a simple society the con- 
tract is voluntary, and is, like any other contract, dissolved 
at the pleasure of the parties ; or it ceases to be binding 
upon either party, if its conditions are violated by the other 
party. But, civil society being an institution of God, spe- 
cific duties are imposed upon both parties, which remain 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 381 

unchanged even after the other party may, in various re- 
spects, have violated his part of the contract. In civil so- 
ciety we are under obligation to God as well as to man, 
and the former obligation remains even after the other has 
been annulled. In this respect it follows the analogy of the 
other relations established by God ; as that of husband and 
wife, parent and child ; in which the one party is bound to 
act in obedience to the will of God, and according to the 
obligations of the relation, whether the other does so or not. 

2. Civil society being an ordinance of God, it cannot be 
justly established, upon any principles whatsoever, at the 
will of the parties ; but it must be established upon the 
principles which God has intended. If it be established 
upon any other principles, the evidence of his displeasure 
will be seen in the mutual evil which both parties suffer 
in consequence of violating a law of their being. Such is 
the case with marriage. This is a form of society esta- 
blished by God. Men have no right to enter into it as they 
please, but only according to the laws which God has es- 
tablished ; and, if they act otherwise, mutual misery will be 
the result. 

3. If society be an ordinance of God, it follows that every 
man who conforms to the social laws of God has a right to it. 
For if, in the formation of civil society, men are under obli- 
gation to act according to the will of God, they have no 
right to construct it upon such principles as will exclude 
any man who is willing to obey the social laws of his 
Maker. No man can, therefore, justly be excluded from 
society, unless he have committed some overt act by which 
he has forfeited his right. His original right is to be taken 
for granted, the proof of forfeiture rests with those who 
would exclude him. Hence, it is not enough to say, if a 
man does not like this society, he may go to another. So 
long as he violates none of his Maker's social laws, he has 
a right to this society, and he cannot be excluded from it 



3S2 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

without injustice. Any course of legislation, therefore, 
which obliges men to leave a society, unless their forfeiture 
of social right is proved, is oppressive and unjust. 

4. As society is an ordinance of God, it is evidently 
the will of God that its existence be preserved. Hence, 
society has the right to take all means which may be neces- 
sary to prevent those crimes which, if permitted, must de- 
stroy society itself. Hence is derived the power to punish 
criminals, enforce contracts, and to establish such forms of 
government as may best conduce to the wellrbeing of the 
social institution. 

I suppose it to have been from a misconception of these 
principles, that our forefathers erred. They conceived 
that in forming a civil society here in the wilderness, they 
had a right to frame its provisions in such manner as they 
chose. Hence, they made the form of religious belief a 
subject of civil legislation ; and assumed the right of banish- 
ing from their society those who differed from them in the 
mode of worshipping God. Their first assumption I con- 
ceive to be an error. If society be an ordinance of God, 
whenever and wherever men form it, they must form it in 
obedience to his laws. But he has never intended that 
religious belief or religious practice, if they interfere not 
with the rights of others, should be subject to human legis- 
lation. 

Second. Of the nature and limitations of the con- 
tract entered into between the individual and civil society. 

It has been already remarked, that every society is essen- 
tially a mutual compact entered into between every indi- 
vidual and all the rest of those who form the society. As 
all these individuals enter the society upon the same terms, 
that is, put themselves under the power of society in the 
same respects, the power of the society over the individual 
is derived from the concession of every individual, and is 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 383 

no other, and in no wise different from what these indi- 
viduals have made it. And, on the other hand, as every 
member of the society is a party to the contract which the 
society made with the individual, every member of the so- 
ciety is bound faithfully to execute the contract thus entered 
into. 

But, as it was also remarked, this society differs from a 
simple or voluntary society, inasmuch as it is an ordinance 
of God, and is subject to the laws which he has imposed 
upon it. That every man is hound to become a member of 
civil society need not be asserted ; all that I affirm is, that 
if he form a civil society, he is bound to form it according 
to the laws which God has appointed. He cannot form it 
according to any other principles, without violating the 
rights of his fellow-men, and disobeying the laws of his 
God. 

The question, then, which meets us as of the first im- 
portance is this: What are the laws under which God has 
subjected civil society? On this question, I now proceed 
to offer a few suggestions, considering, first, what is essential 
to the existence of society ; and. secondly, what is merely 
accidental. 

I. Of what is essential to the existence of civil society. 

1. As God wills the existence of civil society, it is mani- 
fest that he must forbid whatever would be inconsistent 
with its existence. And, on the other hand, he who chooses 
to enter society, virtually contracts to abstain from what- 
ever is, from the constitution of things, inconsistent with its 
existence. This, I think, is as evident as that a man can- 
not honestly enter into a contract to do any two things, in 
their nature essentially at variance. 

2. Suppose, now, a number of men to meet together to 
form a society, all being perfectly acquainted with the law 



384 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

of reciprocity, and all perfectly inclined to obey it. I think 
it manifest that such persons would have to surrender 
nothing whatever, in order to form a civil society. Every 
one would do just as he pleased, and yet every one would 
enjoy fully all the benefit of the social nature of man ; that 
is, every one would enjoy all the blessings arising both from 
his individual and from his social constitution. This, I 
suppose, would be the most perfect state of human society 
of which we are able to conceive. 

As, therefore, society, in its most perfect state, may exist 
without the individual's surrendering up the right to do any 
thing which is consistent with the law of reciprocity ; the 
existence of society presents no reason why he should sur- 
render any right not inconsistent with this law. Whatever 
other reasons there may be, as of benevolence, mercy, or 
religion, these belong not to this question. As every man 
has originally the right to do as he pleases, provided he 
interferes not with the rights of his neighbors, and as the 
existence of civil society presents no reason why this 
right should be restricted, it remains, notwithstanding the 
existence of such society, just as it was before ■; that is, the 
right vests without change in the individual himself. 

3. Suppose, now, any individual to violate the law of 
reciprocity, as for instance, that A steals the property of B, 
or violates a contract into which they have mutually 
entered. If this be allowed, that is, if every man were to 
steal at will the property of his neighbor, it is manifest that 
the right of property would be at an end, and every man 
would be obliged to retire as far as possible from every 
other man ; that is, society would be at an end. 

4. Again, suppose that B takes the work of redress into 
his own hands, being at once his own legislator, judge, and 
executioner. From the native principles of the human 
heart, it is evident that from being the aggrieved party, he 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 385 

would in turn become the aggressor. This would lead to 
revenge on the part of A, — a revenge to be repeated by the 
other party until it ended either in the destruction of one or 
of both. Hence, every difference would lead to interminable 
war and unbridled ferocity; and society would cease, because 
every man would prefer a quiet solitude to ceaseless hostility. 

To allow one's self, therefore, in any violation of the law 
of reciprocity, or to assume the right of redressing one's own 
wrongs, is to pursue a course inconsistent with the existence 
of society ; for were such a course to be pursued universally, 
society could not exist. 

Again, on the other hand, since in a company of morally 
imperfect beings injury is likely to occur, and since, if injury 
were not prevented, the virtuous would become the prey of 
the vicious, and society would, as before, be destroyed by 
universal violence, it is manifestly necessary that injury be 
prevented, that is, that the virtuous be protected, and that 
wrongs be redressed. But as we have shown, that the right 
of individual self-protection and redress are inconsistent with 
the existence of society; as the individual must not redress 
them, the duty devolves upon the other party, that is, society. 
Society is therefore bound to do for the individual what he 
has relinquished the right to do for himself ; that is, to pro- 
tect him from violation of the law of reciprocity, or to redress 
his wrong if this right be violated. 

Hence we see the nature of the compact entered into 
between the individual and society. It essentially involves 
the following particulars : 

1. Every individual, by entering society, promises that 
he will abstain from every violation of the law of recipro- 
city, which, if universally permitted, would destroy society. 
For, if he be allowed to violate it, the allowance to violate 
it must be extended to all, since all are equals ; and thus 

34 



386 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

society would be destroyed. But as, by the destruction of 
society, he would gain nothing but solitude, which he could 
enjoy without depriving others of what is to them a source 
of happiness ; there can be no reason assigned why he should 
diminish their happiness, to procure what he could equally 
well enjoy by leaving them alone. If he join the society, 
he must conform to whatever is necessary to its existence ; 
if he be unwilling to do so, he must remain alone. 

2. Every individual promises to surrender to society the 
right of self-protection. 

3. And, lastly, every individual promises to surrender to 
society the right to redress his own wrongs. 

And, on the other hand, society promises, 

1. To protect the individual in the enjoyment of all his 
rights ; that is, to enforce upon every individual within cer- 
tain limits obedience to the law of reciprocity. 

2. To redress wrongs whenever they may occur ; either 
by obliging the offender to do justly, or else by inflicting 
such punishment as may be most likely to prevent a repeti- 
tion of the injury, either by the offender or by others. 

It is important here to remark, that this surrender on the 
one part, and this obligation on the other part, are mutual 
and universal ; that is to say, the individual, on his part, 
surrenders wholly and entirely the right either to defend or 
to redress himself; and on the other hand, society guaran- 
tees to defend him, and to do him justice to the utmost, that 
is, in no matter how small a right, and no matter at how 
great an expense. 

Hence we see the anti-social tendency of all those secret 
societies of which the object either avowed or in fact is, to 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 387 

protect the individual members in opposition to the laws, 
that is, in opposition to society. In this case, while the 
individual receives from civil society the same benefits as 
other men, and expects from it the fufilment of its part of 
the contract, he does make on his part the corresponding 
surrender. He expects to be protected and redressed, but 
he reserves also the right of protecting and redressing him- 
self, and it may be in opposition to the just operation of 
those laws which he enforces upon others. 

And hence we see the obligation of every one to exert him- 
self to the uttermost, in order to enforce the execution of 
the laws, no matter in how small a matter, or in the case of 
how obscure an individual. The execution of the laws 
is what we all promise, and we are all bound to fulfil it. 
And if laws are not executed, that is, if individuals are not 
protected, and wrongs are not redressed by society, the indi- 
viduals will redress them themselves, and thus society will be 
dissolved. The occurrence of mobs, that is, of extra legal 
modes of redress for supposed grievances, are among the 
most decisive indications of a state of society verging towards 
dissolution. 

But while this contract is thus universal and obligatory, 
it is to be remarked, that it is so only in respect to those 
things in which the parties have respectively bound them- 
selves. The individual, by entering into society, promises 
to abstain from whatever is inconsistent with the existence 
of society ; but by entering into society he promises nothing 
more. Society promises to restrain and redress whatever 
would be destructive to society, but it promises no more. 
In all other respects, the parties are exactly in the situation 
in which they were before the establishment of society. 
Thus freedom both of person, of intellect, and of con- 
science, remain by the fact of the existence of society un- 
touched. Thus also freedom of property remains as be- 
fore, except simply in so far as a portion of every man's 




388 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

property is pledged to meet the necessary expenses of 
government. So long as he obeys the law of reciprocity, 
society has no further demands upon him, unless his as- 
sistance be demanded in enforcing this obedience upon 
others. 

By this compact, every individual is very greatly the 



1. He promises to obey the law of reciprocity, which is 
the law of his nature, and by the obedience to which alone 
he can be happy. 

2. He surrenders the right of self-protection, which with- 
out society he can exert in but a very imperfect manner, 
and with nothing but the force of his individual arm ; and 
he receives in return the right to wield in his defence the 
whole power of society. 

3. He surrenders the right of redressing his own griev- 
ances, and receives in return the right to have his griev- 
ances redressed, at whatever expense, by the whole power 
of the whole. 

And hence, as God wills the happiness of man, we see 
another reason why society is in obedience to his will ; and 
why the laws necessary to the existence of society may be 
considered, as they are in fact considered in the Scriptures, 
as enacted by His authority. 

And again, we see that, from the very nature of so- 
ciety, the individual is perfectly within its physical power. 
This power of the whole, which they are bound to use only 
for his protection and defence, they may use for his injury 
and oppression. And as the whole power of the society is in 
the hands of the majority, the whole happiness of the indi- 
vidual or of the minority is always in the control of the ma- 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 389 

jority. Hence we see, there is no control over oppression, 
except that which exists in the condititions of the compact 
on which the society is formed, and the feeling of moral 
obligation to observe that compact inviolably. That is to 
say, the real question of civil liberty is not concerning forms 
of government, but concerning the respective limits and 
obligations of the individual and of society. When these 
are correctly adjusted, and inviolably observed, there can be 
no oppression under any form of government. When these 
are not understood or not observed, there will be tyranny 
under any form whatsoever. And to a man of sense it is 
a matter of very small consequence whether oppression pro- 
ceeds from one or from many ; from an hereditary tyrant, or 
from an unprincipled majority. The latter is rather the 
more galling, and surely at least as difficult of remedy. 

And supposing the limits to have been correctly adjusted, 
it is obvious that they will be of no avail, unless there be 
in the community sufficient virtue to resist the temptations 
which continually occur to violate them. In the absence of 
this, the best constitution is valueless, or worse than value- 
less. Hence, we see the necessity of individual virtue, 
to the existence of civil freedom. And hence, whatever 
tends to depress the standard of individual virtue, saps the 
very foundations of liberty. And hence religion, in its 
purest form, and under its most authoritative sanctions, is 
the surest hope of national as well as of individual hap- 
piness. 

Of the accidental modifications of civil society. 

I have thus far treated of what is essential to the social 
compact. Without such a contract as I have suggested, 
society could not exist. I by no means, however, intend to 
assert that these limits are exclusive ; and that men, in form- 
ing society, may not enter into contract in other respects, 
besides those which I have stated. 

34* 



390 OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

Some of the incidental additions to the original forms of 
contract, are the following: 

1. After having adjusted the limits of the respective obliga- 
tions, both of the society and of the individual, men may 
choose whatever form of government they please, for the 
purpose of carrying forward the objects of society. But, 
having adopted a particular form of government, they bind 
themselves to whatever is necessary to the existence of that 
government. Thus, if men choose a republican form of 
government, in which the people are acknowledged to be the 
immediate fountain of all power, they come under obliga- 
tion to educate their children intellectually and morally ; for, 
without intellectual and moral education, such a form of 
government cannot long exist. And, as the intellectual edu- 
cation of the young, can be made properly a subject of social 
enactment, this duty may be enforced by society. And the 
only reason why religious education does not come under 
the same rule, is, that it is not, for reasons which have been 
before given, a subject for social enactment. 

2. I have said that, by the essential principles of the social 
compact, every man is bound to contribute his part to the 
expenses of civil society. But that, beyond this, he is not 
in any respect bound. Still this does not exclude other forms 
of contract. Men may, if they choose, agree to hold their 
whole property subject to the will of the whole, so that they 
shall be obliged to employ it, not each one. for his own good, 
but each one for the benefit of the whole society. I say, 
that such a state of things might exist, but it is manifest, that 
it is not essential to society; and that, being not essential, it 
is by no means to be presumed ; and that it cannot exist 
justly, unless this right has been expressly conceded by the 
individual to society. If society exerts such a power, when 
it has not been expressly conceded to it, it is tyranny. The 
common fact has been, that society has presumed upon such 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 391 

powers, and has exercised them without reflection, and very 
greatly to social and individual injury. 

3. Men have very generally been disposed to take for 
granted these accidental powers, and to question or limit the 
essential powers of society. An instance in point occurs in 
the question of war. The very idea of war supposes the 
society to have the right of determining the moral relations 
in which the individuals of one nation shall stand to the 
individuals of another nation. Now, this power of society over 
the individual has never, that I know of, been questioned. And 
yet, I think it would be very difficult to establish it. The 
moral precept is : " If thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he 
thirst, give him drink." And, I do not see that society has 
a right to abrogate this command, or render void this obli- 
gation ; or that any moral agent has the right to commit to 
other individuals the power of changing his relations to any 
creature of God. Forgiveness and charity to men, are dis- 
positions which we owe to God. And I do not see that 
society has any more right to interfere with the manifesta- 
tion of these dispositions, than with the liberty to inculcate 
them, and to teach them. 

To conclude. Whatever concessions, on the part of the 
individual, and whatever powers on the part of society, are 
necessary to the existence of society, must, by the very fact 
of society, be taken for granted. Whatever is not thus ne- 
cessary, is a matter of concession, and mutual adjustment ; 
and has no right to be presumed, unless it can be shown to 
have actually been surrendered. That is, in general, a man 
is bound by what he has agreed to ; he is not bound by any 
thing else. 

I think no one can reflect upon the above considerations, 
without being led to the conclusion, that the cultivation of 
the moral nature of man is the grand means for the improve- 
ment of society. This alone teaches man, whether as an 



392 MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF 

individual or as a society, to respect the rights of man, as an 
individual or as a society. This teaches every one to ob- 
serve, inviolate, the contract into which, as a member of 
society, he has entered. Now, since, as we have before 
shown, the light of conscience, and the dictates of natural reli- 
gion, are insufficient to exert the requisite moral power over 
man, our only hope is in that revelation of his will, which 
God has made in the Holy Scriptures. In these books, all our 
duties to man are taken under the immediate protection of 
Almighty God. On pain of his eternal displeasure, he com- 
mands us to love every man as ourselves. Here he holds 
forth the strongest inducements to obedience, and here he 
presents the strongest motives, not merely to reciprocity, but 
also to benevolence. Were it not so solemn, it would be 
amusing to hear the levity with which some politicians, 
and, as they would persuade us to believe, statesmen, speak 
of the religion of Jesus Christ ; to observe how complacently 
they talk of using it as an instrument, convenient enough 
for directing the weak, but which a man of sense can well 
enough do without ; and which is a mere appendage to the 
forces that, by his constitution, are destined to act upon man. 
Is it not probable, that they do not yet thoroughly understand 
the subject ? 

SECTION III. 

OF THE MODE IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF SOCIETY 
ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 

We have thus far treated merely of the constitution of a 
society, of the contract entered into between the individual 
and society, and of the obligations hence devolving upon 
each. The obligations of society are to protect the indi- 
vidual from infractions of the law of reciprocity ; and to 
redress his wrongs, if he have been injured. 

But it is manifest that this obligation cannot be discharged 



SOCIETY ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 393 

by the whole of society as a body. If a man steals from 
his neighbor, the whole community cannot leave their 
occupations to detect, to try, and to punish the thief. Or if 
a law is to be enacted respecting the punishment of theft, it 
cannot be done by the whole community, but must of 
necessity be intrusted to delegates. On the principle of 
division of labor, it is manifest that this service will be both 
more cheaply and more perfectly done, by those who devote 
themselves to it, than by those who are, for the greater part 
of the time, engaged in other occupations. 

Now I suppose a government to be that system of delegated 
agencies, by which these obligations of society to the 
individual are fulfilled. 

And moreover, as every society may have various engage- 
ments to form with other independent societies, it is con- 
venient in general, that this business should be transacted by 
this same system of agencies. These two offices of govern- 
ment, though generally united, are in their nature distinct. 
Thus we see in our own country, the state governments are 
to a considerable degree intrusted with the first, while a 
part of the first, and all the latter power vests in the 
general government. 

A government thus understood is naturally divided into 
three parts. 

1. An individual may from ignorance violate the rights of 
his neighbor, and thus innocently expose himself to punish- 
ment. Or if he violate his neighbor's rights maliciously, 
and justly merit punishment, a punishment may be inflicted 
more severe than the nature of the case demands. To avoid 
this, it is necessary that the various forms of violation be as 
clearly as possible defined, and also that the penalty be 
plainly and explicitly attached to each. This is a law. 
This, as we have shown, must be done by delegates. These 



394 MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF 

delegates are called a legislature, and the individual mem- 
bers of it are legislators. 

From what we have said, their power is manifestly limit- 
ed. They have no power except to execute the obligations 
which society has undertaken to fulfil towards the individual. 
This is all that society has conferred, for it is all that society 
had to confer. 



If legislators originate any power in themselves, or 
exercise any power conferred, for any purpose different from 
that for which it was conferred, they violate right, and are 
guilty of tyranny. 

2. But suppose a law to be enacted, that is, a crime to be 
defined, and the penalty to be affixed. It has reference to 
no particular case, for when enacted, no case existed to be 
affected by it. Suppose now an individual to be accused of 
violating this law. Here it is necessary to apply the law to 
this particular case. In order to do this, we must ascertain. 
First, whether the accused did commit the act laid to his 
charge. Secondly, whether the act, if it be proved to have 
been done, is a violation of the law ; that is, whether it come 
within the description of actions, which the law forbids. 
And thirdly, if this be proved, it is necessary to declare the 
punishment which the law assigns to this particular viola- 
tion. This is the judicial branch of the government. 

3. After the law has been thus applied to this particular 
case, it is necessary that it be carried into effect. This 
devolves upon the third, or the executive branch of a 
government. 

Respecting all of these three branches of government, it 
may be remarked in general, that they are essentially 
independent of each other; that each one has its specific 
duties marked out by society, within the sphere of which 



SOCIETY ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 395 

duties it is responsible to society, and to society alone. Nor 
is this independence at all affected by the mode of appoint- 
ment. Society may choose a way of appointing an agent, 
but that is by no means a surrender to another, of the claim 
which it has upon the agent. Thus, society may impose 
upon a legislature or an executive, the duty of appointing a 
judiciary ; but the judiciary is just as much independent of 
the executive, or of the legislature, as though it were 
appointed in some other way. Society, by conferring upon 
one branch the right of appointment, has conferred upon it 
no other right. The judge, although appointed by the 
legislator, is as independent of him, as the legislator would 
be if appointed by the judge. Each, within his own sphere, 
is under obligation to perform precisely those duties assigned 
by society, and no other. And hence arises the propriety of 
establishing the tenure of office, in each several branch inde- 
pendent of the other. 

The two first of these departments are frequently sub- 
divided. 

Thus the legislative department is commonly divided into 
two branches, chosen under dissimilar conditions, for the 
purpose of exerting a check upon each other by representing 
society under different aspects, and thus preventing partial 
and party legislation. 

The judiciary is also generally divided. The judges ex- 
plain and interpret the law, while it is the province of the 
jury to ascertain the facts. 

The executive is generally sole, and executes the law 
by means of subordinate agents. Sometimes, however, a 
council is added, for the sake of advice, without whose con- 
currence the executive cannot act. 

Sometimes the fundamental principles of the social com- 



396 MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF 

pact are expressed, and the respective powers of the different 
branches of the government are denned, and the mode of 
their appointment described in a written document. Such 
is the case in the United States. At other times, these prin- 
ciples and customs have grown up in the progress of society, 
and are the deductions drawn, or principles established, by 
uncontested usage. The latter is the case in Great Britain. 
In either case, such principles and practices are called the 
constitution of a country. 

Nations differ widely in the mode of selection to office, 
and the tenure by which that office is held. Thus, under 
some constitutions, the government is wholly hereditary. In 
others, it is partly hereditary and partly elective. In others, 
it is wholly elective. 

Thus, in Great Britain, the executive and one branch of 
the legislature is hereditary ; the other branch of the legisla- 
ture is elective. The judiciary is appointed by the execu- 
tive, though they hold office, except in the case of the 
chancellor, during good behaviour. 

In the United States, the executive and both branches of 
the legislature, are elective. The judiciary is appointed by 
the executive, by and with the advice and consent of the 
senate. In the state government, the custom is various. 

If it be asked which of these is the preferable form of gov- 
ernment, the answer, I think, must be conditional. The 
best form of government for any people, is the best that its 
present moral condition renders practicable. A people 
may be so entirely surrendered to the influence of passion, 
and so feebly influenced by moral restraint, that a govern- 
ment which relied upon moral restraint, could not exist for a 
day. In this case, a subordinate and inferior principle yet 
remains, the principle of fear ; and the only resort is to a 
government of force, or a military despotism. And such do 



SOCIETY ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 397 

we see to be the fact. An anarchy always ends in this form 
of government. After this has been established, and habits 
of subordination have been formed, while the moral restraints 
are too feeble for self-government, an hereditary government, 
which addresses itself to the imagination, and strengthens itself 
by the influence of domestic connections, may be as good a 
form as a people can sustain. As they advance in intellectual 
and moral cultivation, it may advantageously become more 
and more elective ; and in a suitable moral condition, it may be 
wholly so. For beings, who are willing to govern them- 
selves by moral principle, there can be no doubt that a go- 
vernment relying upon moral principle, is the true form of 
government. There is no reason why a man should be 
oppressed by taxation, and subjected to fear, who is willing 
to govern himself by the law of reciprocity. It is surely 
better for an intelligent and moral being, to do right from his 
own will than to pay another to force him to do right. And 
yet, as it is better that he should do right than wrong, even 
though he be forced to it, it is well that he should pay others 
to force him, if there be no other way of insuring his good 
conduct. God has rendered the blessing of freedom insepa- 
rable from moral restraint in the individual ; and hence it is 
vain for a people to expect to be free, unless they are first 
willing to be virtuous. 

It is on this point that the question of the permanency of 
the form of government of the United States, turns. That 
such a form of government requires, of necessity, a given 
amount of virtue in the people, cannot, I think, be doubted. 
If we possess that required amount of virtue, or if we can 
attain to it, the government will stand ; if not, it will fall. 
Or if we now possess that amount of virtue, and do not 
maintain it, the government will fall. There is no self-sus- 
taining power in any form of social organization. The only 
self-sustaining power is in individual virtue. And the form 
of a government will always adjust itself to the moral condi- 
tion of a people. A virtuous people will, by their own moral 

35 



398 MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS, &c. 

power, frown away oppression, and, under any form of con- 
stitution, become essentially free. A people surrendered up 
to their own licentious passions, must be held in subjection 
by force ; for eveiy one will find that force alone can protect 
him from his neighbors ; and he will submit to be oppressed, 
if he may only be protected. Thus, in the feudal ages, the 
small independent landholders frequently made themselves 
slaves of one powerful chief, to shield themselves from the 
incessant oppression of twenty. 







CHAPTER II 



THE DUTY OF THE OFFICERS OF A 
GOVERNMENT. 



From what has been said, the duties of the officers of a 
government may be stated in a few words. 

It will be remembered that a government derives its autho- 
rity from society, of which it is the agent ; that society de- 
rives its authority from the compact formed by individuals ; 
that society, and the relations between society and indivi- 
duals, are the ordinance of God ; of course the officer of 
a government, as the organ of society, is bound as such by 
the law of God, and is under obligation to administer ac- 
cording to this law. And hence, it makes no difference how 
the other party to the contract may execute their engage- 
ments ; he, as the servant of God, set apart for this very 
thing, is bound, nevertheless, to act precisely according to 
the principles by which God has declared that this relation 
should be governed. 

The officers of a government are Legislative, Judicial, 
and Executive. 

I. Of Legislative officers. 

1. It is the duty of a legislator to understand the social 
principles of man, the nature of the relation which subsists 
between the individual and society, and the mutual obliga- 



400 THE DUTY OF THE 

tions of each. By these are his power and his obligations 
limited ; and unless he thus inform himself, he can never 
know respecting any act, whether it be just or oppressive. 
Without such knowledge he can never act with a clear 
conscience. 

2. It is the duty of a legislator to understand the precise 
nature of the compact which binds together the particular 
society for which he legislates. This involves the general 
conditions of the social compact, and something more. It 
generally specifies conditions which the former does not 
contain, and, besides, establishes the limit of the powers of 
the several branches of the government. He who enters 
upon the duties of a legislator without such knowledge, is 
not only wicked but contemptible. He is the worst of all 
empirics ; he oifers to prescribe for a malady, and knows 
not whether the medicine he uses be a remedy or a poison. 
The injury which he inflicts is not on an individual but on 
an entire community. There is probably no method in 
which mischief is done so recklessly, and on so large a 
scale, as by ignorant and thoughtless and wicked legisla- 
tion. Were these plain considerations duly weighed, there 
would be somewhat fewer candidates for legislative office, 
and a somewhat greater deliberation on the part of the 
people in selecting them. 

3. Having made himself acquainted with his powers and 
his obligations, he is bound to exert that power precisely 
within the limits by which it is restricted, and for the pur- 
poses for which it was conferred, to the best of his knowledge 
and ability, and for the best good of the whole society. He 
is bound impartially to carry into effect the principles of the 
general and the particular compact, just in those respects in 
which the carrying them into effect is committed to him. 
For the action of others he is not responsible, unless he has 
been made so responsible. He is not the organ of a section, 
much less of a party, but of the society at large. And he 



OFFICERS OF A GOVERNMENT. 401 

who uses his power for the benefit of a section, or of a party, 
is false to his duty, to his country, and to his God. He is 
engraving his name on the adamantine pillar of his coun- 
try's history, to be gazed upon forever as an object of 
universal detestation. 

4. It his duty to leave every thing else undone. From 
no plea of present necessity, or of peculiar circumstances, 
may he overstep the limits of his constitutional power, either 
in the act itself, or the 'purpose for which the act is done. 
The moment he does this he is a tyrant. Precisely the 
power committed to him exists, and no other. If he may 
exercise one power not delegated, he may another, and all ; 
thus, on principle, he assumes himself to be the fountain of 
power ; restraint to encroachment ceases, and all liberty is 
henceforth at an end. If the powers of a legislator are in- 
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of society, inconve- 
niences will arise. It is better that these should be endured 
until the necessity of some modification be made apparent, 
than to remedy them on principles which destroy all liberty, 
and thus remove one inconvenience by taking away the 
possibility of ever removing another. 

II. Of Judicial officers. 

1. The judicial officer forms an independent branch of the 
government, or a separate and distinct agent, for executing 
the contract which society has made with the individual. 
As I have said before, it matters not how he is appointed : as 
soon as he is appointed he is the agent of society, and of 
society alone. 

The judge, precisely in the same manner as the legislator, 
is bound by the principles of the social contract ; and by 
those of the particular civil compact of the society in whose 
behalf he acts. This is the limit of his authority ; and it is 
on his own responsibility if he transcend it. 

35* 



402 THE DUTY OF THE 

2. The provisions of this compact, as they are embodied 
in laws, he is bound to enforce. 

And hence we see the relation in which the judge stands 
to the legislator. Both are equally limited by the principles 
of the original compact. The acts of both are valid, in 
so far as they are authorized by that compact. Hence, if 
the legislator violate his trust, and enact laws at variance 
with the constitution, the judge is bound not to enforce 
them. The fact, that the one has violated the constitution, 
imposes upon the other no obligation to do the same. Thus 
the judge, inasmuch as he is obliged to decide upon the con- 
stitutionality of a law before he enforces it, becomes acci- 
dentally, but in fact, a co-ordinate power, without whose 
concurrence the law cannot go into force. 

Hence we see that the duty of a judge is to understand, 

1. The principles of that contract from which he derives 
his power ; 

2. The laws of the community whose agent he is ; 

3. To explain these laws without fear, favor, or affection; 
and show their bearing upon each individual case, without 
bias, either towards the individual, or towards society; 
and, 

4. To pronounce the decision of the law, according to its 
true intent, 

5. As the jury are a part of the judicial agents of the 
government, they are bound in the same manner to decide 
upon the facts, according to their best knowledge and ability, 
with scrupulous and impartial integrity. 

III. Of Executive officers. 



OFFICERS OF A GOVERNMENT. 403 

The executive office is either simple or complex. 

1. Simple; as where his only duty is, to perform what 
either the legislative or judicial branches of the government 
have ordered to be done. 

Such is the case with sheriffs, military officers, &c. 

Here the officer has no right to question respecting the 
goodness or wisdom of the law ; since for these he is not 
responsible. His only duty is to execute it, so long as he 
retains his office. If he believe the action required of him 
to be morally wrong, or at variance with the constitution, he 
should resign. He has no right to hold the office, and refuse 
to perform the duties which others have been empowered to 
require of him. 

2. Complex ; where legislative and executive duties are 
imposed upon the same person ; as where the chief ma- 
gistrate is allowed a vote, on all acts of the other branches 
of the legislature. 

As far as his duties are legislative, he is bound by the 
same principles as any other legislator. 

Sometimes his power is limited to a vote on mere consti- 
tutional questions ; and at others, it extends to all questions 
whatsoever. Sometimes his assent is absolutely necessary to 
the passage of all bills ; at others, it is only conditionally 
necessary, that is, the other branches may, under certain 
circumstances, enact laws without it. 

When this legislative power of the executive has been ex- 
erted within its constitutional limits, he becomes merely an 
executive officer. He has no other deliberative power than 
that conferred upon him by the constitution. He is under 
the same obligations as any other executive officer to execute 



404 THE DUTY OF THE, &c. 

the law, unless it seem to him a violation of moral or con- 
stitutional obligation. In that case it is his duty to resign. 
He has no more right than any other man, to hold the office, 
while he is, from any reason whatever, unable to discharge 
the duties which the office imposes upon him. That 
executive officer is guilty of gross perversion of official and 
moral obligation, who, after the decision of the legislative 
or judicial branch of a government has been obtained, suf- 
fers his own personal views to influence him in the discharge 
of his duty. The exhibition of such a disposition is a mani- 
fest indication of an entire disqualification for office. It 
shows that a man is either destitute of the ability to compre- 
hend the nature of his station, or a fatal want of that self- 
government, so indispensably necessary to him who is called 
to preside over important business. 

And not only is an executive officer bound to exert no other 
power than that committed to him ; he is also bound to exert 
that power for no other purposes than those for which it was 
committed. A power may be conferred for the public good ; 
but this by no means authorizes a man to use it for the gratifi- 
cation of individual love or hatred ; much less for the sake 
of building up one political party, or of crushing another. Po- 
litical corruption is in no respect the less wicked, because it 
is so common. Dishonesty is no better policy in the affairs 
of state than in any other affairs ; though men may persuade 
themselves and others to the contrary. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 

From what has already been stated, it will be seen, that 
the duties of a citizen are of two kinds : first, as an indi- 
vidual ; and second, as a member of society. A few remarks 
on each of these will close this part of the subject. 

First. As an individual. 

Every citizen, as an individual , is bound to observe in 
good faith the contract which he has made with society. 
This obliges him, 

1. To observe the law of reciprocity in all his intercourse 
with others. 

The nature of this law has been already explained. It is 
only necessary to remark, that society furnishes an additional 
reason for observing it, — a reason founded both in voluntary 
compact, and also in the necessity of obedience to our own 
happiness. It may also be added, that the nature of the 
law of reciprocity binds us not merely to avoid those acts 
which are destructive to the existence of society ; but also 
those which would interfere with its happiness. The 
principle is in all cases the same. If we assume the right 
to interfere with the smallest means of happiness possessed 
by our neighbor, the admission of that assumption would 
excuse every form of violation. 



406 THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 

2. To surrender the right of redressing our wrongs 
wholly to society. This has been considered already, in 
treating of the social compact. Aggression and injury in 
no case justify retaliation. If a man's house be attacked, he 
may, so far as society is concerned, repel the robber, be- 
cause here society is unable at the instant to assist him ; 
but he is at liberty to put forth no other effort than that 
necessary to protect himself, or to secure the aggressor for 
the purpose of delivering him over to the judgment of society. 
If, after having secured him, we put him to death, this is 
murder. 

3. To obey all laws made in accordance with the consti- 
tuted powers of society. Hence, we are in no manner 
released from this obligation, by the conviction that the law 
is unwise or inexpedient. We have confided the decision 
of this question to society, and we must abide by that 
decision. To do otherwise, would be to constitute every 
man the judge in his own case ; that is, to allow every man 
to obey or disobey as he pleased, while he expected from 
every other man implicit obedience. Thus, though a man 
were convinced that laws regulating the rate of interest 
were inexpedient, this gives him no right to violate these 
laws. He must obey them, until he is able to convince 
society to think as he does. 

Secondly, the citizen is under obligations as a consti- 
tuent member of society. By these obligations on the other 
hand, he is bound to fulfil the contract which he has made 
with every individual. Hence he is bound, 

1. To use all necessary exertion to secure to every indi- 
vidual, from the highest and most powerful, to the lowest 
and most defenceless, the full benefit of perfect protection in 
the enjoyment of his rights. 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 407 

2. To use all necessary exertion to procure for e very- 
individual just and adequate redress for wrong. 

3. To use all necessary exertion to oarry into effect the 
laws of civil society ; and to detect and punish crime, 
whether committed against the individual or against society. 
Wherever he knows these laws to be violated, he is bound 
to take all proper steps to bring the offenders to justice. 

And here it is to be remarked, that he is to consider, not 
merely his property, but his personal service, pledged to the 
fulfilment of this obligation. He who stands by, and sees a 
mob tear down a house, is a partaker in the guilt. And if 
society knowingly neglects to protect the individual in the 
enjoyment of his rights, every member of that society is, in 
equity, bound in his proportion to make good that loss, how 
great soever it may be. 

4. It is the duty of the citizen to bear cheerfully his burden 
of the public expense. As society cannot be carried on 
without expense, he, by entering into society, obliges him- 
self to bear his proportion of it. And besides this, there are 
but few modes in which we receive back so much for what 
we expend, as when we pay money for the support of civil 
government. The Gospel, I think, teaches us to go farther, 
and be ready to do more than we are compelled to do by 
law. The precept, " If a man compel thee to go a mile, go 
with him twain," refers to labor in the public service, and 
exhorts us to do more than can be in equity demanded of us. 

5. Besides this, I think a citizen is under moral obliga- 
tion to contribute his proportion to every effort which affords 
a reasonable prospect of rendering his fellow-citizens wiser 
and better. From every such successful effort, he receives 
material benefit, both in his person and estate. He ought 
to be willing to assist others in doing that, from which he 
himself derives important advantage. 



408 THE DUTIES OP CITIZENS. 

6. Inasmuch as society enters into a moral obligation to 
fulfil certain duties, which duties are performed by agents 
which the society appoints ; for their faithful discharge of 
those duties, society is morally responsible. As this is the 
case, it is manifestly the duty of every member of society to 
choose such agents as, in his opinion, will truly and faith- 
fully discharge those duties to which he is appointed. He 
who, for the sake of party prejudice or personal feeling, acts 
otherwise, and selects individuals for office without regard 
to these solemn obligations, is using his full amount of 
influence to sap the very foundations of society, and to 
perpetrate the most revolting injustice. 

Thus far we have gone upon the supposition that society 
exerted its power within its constituted limits. This, how- 
ever, unfortunately is not always the case. The question 
then arises, what is the duty of an individual when such 
a contingency shall arise? 

Now there are but three courses of conduct in such a 
case for the individual to pursue : passive obedience, resist- 
ance, and suffering in the cause of right. 

1. Passive obedience, in many cases, would be manifestly 
wrong. We have no right to obey an unrighteous law r 
since we must obey God at all hazards. And, aside from 
this, the yielding to injustice forms a precedent for wrong? 
which may work the most extensive mischief to those who 
shall come after us. It is manifest, therefore, that passive 
obedience cannot be the rule of civil conduct, 

2. Resistance by force. 

Resistance to civil authority by a single individual, would 
be absurd. It can only succeed by the combination of the 
aggrieved against the aggressors, terminating in an appeal 
to physical force ; that is, by civil war. 



THE DUTIES OP CITIZENS. 409 

The objections to this course are the following : 

1. It is, at best, uncertain. It depends mainly on the 
question, which party is, under the present circumstances, 
the stronger. Now, the oppressor is as likely to be the 
stronger as the oppressed, as the history of the world has 
abundantly shown. 

2. It dissolves the social fabric, and thus destroys what- 
ever has thus far been gained in the way of social organ- 
ization. But it should be remembered, that few forms of 
society have existed for any considerable period, in which 
there does not exist much that is worth preserving. 

3. The cause of all oppression is the wickedness of man. 
But civil war is, in its very nature, a most demoralizing 
process. It never fails to render men more wicked. Can it 
then be hoped that a form of government can be created, by 
men already worse than before, better than that which their 
previous but less intense wickedness rendered intolerable ? 

4. Civil war is, of all evils which men inflict upon them- 
selves, the most horrible. It dissolves not only social but 
domestic ties, overturns all the security of property, throws 
back for ages all social improvement, and accustoms men 
to view, without disgust and even with pleasure, all that is 
atrocious and revolting. Napoleon, accustomed as he was 
to bloodshed, turned away with horror from the contempla- 
tion of civil war. This, then, cannot be considered the way 
designed by our Creator for rectifying social abuses. 

3. The third course is that of suffering in the cause of 
right. Here we act as we believe to be right, in defiance 
of oppression, and bear patiently whatever an oppressor 
may inflict upon us. 

The advantages of this course are, 

36 



410 THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 

1. It preserves entire whatever exists that is valuable in 
the present organization. 

2. It presents the best prospect of ultimate correction of 
abuse, by appealing- to the reason and the conscience of 
men. This is surely a more fit tribunal to which to refer 
a moral question, than the tribunal of physical force. 

3. It causes no more suffering than is actually necessary 
to accomplish its object ; for, whenever men are convinced 
of the wickedness of oppression, the suffering, of itself, 
ceases. 

4. Suffering in the cause of right has a manifest tendency 
to induce the injurious to review their conduct, under all 
the most favorable circumstances for conviction. It disarms 
pride and malevolence, and enlists sympathy in favor of the 
sufferer. Hence, its tendency is to make men better. 

5. And experience has shown that the cause of civil 
liberty has always gained more by martyrdom than by war. 
It has rarely happened that, during civil war, the spirit of 
true liberty has not declined. Such was the case, in the 
time of Charles I., in England. How far the love of liberty 
had fallen by civil war is evident from the fact, that Crom- 
well succeeded immediately to unlimited power ; and 
Charles II. returned with acclamation, to inflict upon the 
nation the most odious and heartless tyranny by which it 
was ever disgraced. During the suffering for conscience 
under his reign, the spirit of liberty revived, hurled his 
brother from the throne, and established British freedom 
upon a firm, and, we trust, an immovable foundation. 

6. Every one must be convinced, upon reflection, that 
this is really the course indicated by the highest moral ex- 
cellence. Passive obedience may arise from servile fear; 
resistance, from vain-glory, ambition, or desire of revolu- 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 411 

tion. Suffering for the sake of right, can arise only from a 
love of justice and hatred of oppression. The real spirit of 
liberty can never exist, in any remarkable degree, in any 
nation where there is not this willingness to suffer in the 
cause of justice and liberty. Ever so little of the spirit of 
martyrdom is always a more favorable indication to civil- 
ization, than ever so much dexterity of party management, 
or ever so turbulent protestation of immaculate patriotism. 



DIVISION II. 

THE LAW OF BENEVOLENCE. 



CHAPTER I. 

GENERAL OBLIGATION AND DIVISION OF THE 
SUBJECT. 

We have thus far considered merely the law of reci- 
procity; that is, the law which prevents our interference 
with those means of happiness which belong to our neigh- 
bor, from the fact that they are the gift of God to him. 
But it is manifest that this is not the only law of our pre- 
sent constitution. Besides being obliged to abstain from 
doing wrong to our neighbor, we are also obliged to do him 
good; and a large part of our moral probation actually 
comes under this law. 

The law of benevolence, or the law which places us 
under obligation to be the instruments of happiness to 
others, who have no claim upon us on the ground of reci- 
procity, is manifestly indicated by the circumstances of our 
constitution. 

1. We are created under a constitution in which we are 
of necessity dependent upon the benevolence of others. 

36* 



414 GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 

Thus we are all exposed to sickness, in which we become 
perfectly helpless, and when, were it not for the kindness of 
others, we must perish. We grow old, and by age lose the 
power of supporting ourselves. Were benevolence to be 
withdrawn, many of the old would die of want. The vari- 
ous injuries arising from accident as well as from disease, 
teach us the same lesson. And besides, a world in which 
every individual is subject to death, must abound with 
widows and orphans, who, deprived by the hand of God of 
their only means of support, must frequently either look for 
sustenance and protection to those on whom they have no 
claim by the law of reciprocity, or they must die. Now, as 
we live under a constitution in which these things are of 
daily occurrence, and many of them by necessity belonging 
to it, and as we are all equally liable to be in need of assist- 
ance, it must be the design of our Creator that we should, 
under such circumstances, help each other. 

2. Nor do these remarks apply merely to the necessity of 
physical support. Much of the happiness of man depends 
upon intellectual and moral cultivation. But it is generally 
the fact, that those who are deprived of these means of 
happiness are ignorant of their value ; and would, there- 
fore, remain forever deprived of them, were they not 
awakened to a conviction of their true interests by those 
who have been more fortunate. Now, as we ourselves owe 
our intellectual happiness to the benevolence, either near or 
more remote, of others ; it would seem that an obligation was 
imposed upon us to manifest our gratitude by extending 
the blessings which we enjoy to those who are destitute of 
them. We cannot requite our actual benefactors, but we 
may benefit others less happy than ourselves ; and thus, in 
a more valuable manner, promote the welfare of the whole 
race to which we belong. 

3. This, being manifestly an obligation imposed upon us 
by God, it cannot be affected by any of the actions of men ; 



DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 415 

that is, we are bound by the law of benevolence, irrespective 
of the character of the recipient. It matters not though he 
be ungrateful, or wicked, or injurious ; this does not affect 
the obligation under which we are placed by God, to treat 
our neighbor according to the law of benevolence. Hence, 
in all cases, we are bound to govern, ourselves, not by the 
treatment which we have received at his hands, but accord- 
ing to the law by which God has directed our intercourse 
with him to be governed. 

4. And yet more. It is evident that many of the virtues 
most appropriate to human nature, are called into exercise 
only by the miseries or the vices of others. How could there 
be sympathy and mercy, were there no suffering 1 How 
could there be patience, meekness, and forgiveness, were 
there no injury? Thus we see, that a constitution which 
involves by necessity suffering and the obligation to relieve 
it, is that which alone is adapted to the perfection of our 
moral character in our present state. 

This law of our moral constitution is abundantly set forth 
in the Holy Scriptures. 

It is needless here to speak of the various passages in the 
Old Testament which enforce the necessity of mercy and 
charity. A single text from our Saviour's Sermon on the 
Mount will be sufficient for my purpose. It is found, Luke 
vi. 32 — 36, and Matthew v. 43 — 48. I quote the passage 
from Luke. 

" If ye love them that love you, what thank have ye ; for 
sinners also love those that love them. And if ye do good 
to those that do good to you, what thank have ye ; for sin- 
ners also do even the same. And if ye lend to them of 
whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye ; for sinners 
also lend to sinners to receive as much again. But love ye 
your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing 



416 GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 

again ; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the 
children of the Highest, for he is kind unto the unthankful 
and to the evil. Be ye, therefore, merciful, as your Father in 
heaven is merciful." In Matthew it is said, " Love your 
enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that 
hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and 
persecute you ; that ye may be the children of (that is, that 
ye may imitate) your Father which is in heaven ; for he 
maketh his sun to rise upon the evil and upon the good, 
and sendeth rain upon the just and upon the unjust." 

The meaning of this precept is obvious from the context. 
To be merciful, is to promote the happiness of those who 
have no claim upon us by the law of reciprocity ; and from 
whom we can hope for nothing by way of remuneration. 
We are to be merciful, as our Father who is in heaven is 
merciful. 

1. God is the independent source of happiness to every 
thing that exists. None can possibly repay him, and yet 
his bounty is unceasing. All his perfections are continu- 
ally employed in promoting the happiness of his creation. 
Now, we are commanded to be imitators of him ; that is, to 
employ all our powers, not for our own gratification, but 
for the happiness of others. We are to consider this, not as 
an onerous duty, but as a privilege; as an opportunity 
conferred upon us of attaining to some resemblance to the 
Fountain and Author of all excellence. 

2. This precept teaches us that our obligation is not 
altered by the character of the recipient. God sends rain 
on the just and unjust, and causeth his sun to shine on the 
evil and on the good. " God commendeth his love to us, in 
that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." In 
imitation of this example, we are commanded to do good 
to, and promote the happiness of, the evil and the wicked. 
We are to comfort them when they are afflicted ; to relieve 



DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 417 

them when they are sick ; and specially, by all the means 
in our power, to strive to reclaim them to virtue. We are 
not, however, to give a man the means of breaking the 
laws of God ; as to furnish a drunkard with the means of 
intemperance ; this would be to render ourselves partakers 
of his sin. What is here commanded, is merely the relieving 
his misery as a suffering human creature. 

3. Nor is our obligation altered by the relation in which 
the recipient may stand to us. His being our enemy, in 
no manner releases us from obligation. Every wicked 
man is the enemy of God; yet God bestows even upon such 
the most abundant favors. 

" God so loved the world, that he sent his only begotten 
Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but 
have everlasting life." Jesus Christ spent his life in acts 
of mercy to his bitterest enemies. He died praying for his 
murderers. So we are commanded to love our enemies, to 
overcome evil with good, and to follow the example of St. 
Paul, who declares to the Corinthians, " I desire to spend 
and be spent for you ; though the more abundantly I love 
you, the less I be loved." 

In a word, God teaches us in the Holy Scriptures that all 
our fellow-men are his creatures as well as ourselves ; and 
hence, that we are not only under obligation, under all cir- 
cumstances, to act just as he shall command us; but that 
we are specially under obligation to act thus to our fellow- 
men, who are not only our brethren, but who are also under 
his special protection. He declares that they are all his 
children ; that by showing mercy to them, we manifest our 
love to him, and that this manifestation is the most valuable 
when it is the most evident that we are influenced by no 
other motive than love to him. 

Shakspeare has treated this subject very beautifully in 
the following passages : 



418 GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 

'Tis mightiest in the mightiest ; it becomes 

The throned monarch better than his crown. 

His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, 

The attribute to awe and majesty, 

Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 

But mercy is above the sceptred sway. 

It is enthroned in the heart of kings. 

It is an attribute of God himself; 

And earthly power doth then show likest God's, 

When mercy seasons justice. 

Mer. of Venice, act 4, scene 2, 

Alas, alas, 
Why all the souls that are, were forfeit once ; 
And He that might the advantage best have took, 
Found out the remedy. How would you be, 
If He, who is the top of judgment, should 
But judge you as you are ? 

Measure for Measure, act 2, scene 2. 

The hScriptures enforce this duty upon us for several 
reasons : 

1. From the example of God. He manifests himself to 
us as boundless in benevolence. He has placed us under a 
constitution in which we may, at humble distance, imitate 
him. This has to us all the force of law, for we are surely 
under obligation to be as good as we have the knowledge 
and the ability to be. And as the goodness of God is 
specially seen in mercy to the wicked and injurious, by the 
same principles, we are bound to follow the same example. 

2. We live essentially and absolutely by the bounty and 
forbearance of God. It is meet that we should show the 
same bounty and forbearance to our fellow-men. 

3. Our only hope of salvation is in the forgiveness of 
God — of that God whom we have offended more than we 
can adequately conceive. How suitable is it, then, that we 
forgive the little offences of our fellow-men against us ! Our 
Saviour illustrates this most beautifully in his parable of 
the two servants, Matthew xviii. 23 — 35. 



DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 419 

4. By the example of Christ, God has shown us what is 
the type of virtue, which, in human beings, is most acceptable 
in his sight. This was an example of perfect forbearance, 
meekness, benevolence, and forgiveness. Thus, we are not 
only furnished with the rule, but also with the exemplifica- 
tion of the manner in which the rule is to be kept. 

5. These very virtues, which are called forth by suffering 
from the wickedness and injury of our fellow-men, are those 
which God specially approves, and which he declares essen- 
tial to the character that shall fit us for heaven. Blessed 
are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are 
the meek, blessed are the peace-makers, &c. A thousand 
such passages might easily be quoted. 

6. God has declared that our forgiveness with him de- 
pends upon our forgiveness of others. " If ye forgive not 
men their trespasses, neither will your Father who is in 
heaven forgive you your trespasses." "He shall have judg- 
ment without mercy that showeth no mercy ; but mercy re- 
joiceth against judgment ;" that is, a merciful man rejoices 
or is confident, in the view of the judgment-day. 

If it be asked what is the Christian limit to benevolence, 
I answer that no definite rule is laid down in the Scriptures, 
but that merely the principle is inculcated. All that we 
possess is God's, and we are under obligation to use it all as 
he wills. His will is, that we consider every talent as a 
trust ; and that we seek our happiness from the use of it, 
not in self-gratification, but in ministering to the happiness 
of others. Our doing thus he considers as the evidence of 
our love to him ; and therefore he fixes no definite amount 
which shall be abstracted from our own immediate sources 
of happiness for this purpose, but allows us to show our 
consecration of all to him just as fully as we please. If 
this be a privilege, and one of the greatest privileges, of our 
present state, it would seem that a truly grateful heart would 



420 GENERAL OBLIGATION, &c. 

not ask how little, but rather how much, may I do, to testify 
Hiy love for the God who preserves me, and the Saviour who 
has redeemed me. 

And inasmuch as our love to God is more evidently dis- 
played in kindness and mercy to the wicked and the inju- 
rious than to any others ; it is manifest that we are bound 
by this additional consideration to practise these virtues 
toward them in preference to any others. 

And hence we see that benevolence is a religious act in 
just so far as it is done from love to God. It is lovely, and 
respectable, and virtuous, when done from sympathy and 
natural goodness of disposition. It is pious only when 
done from love to God. 



CHAPTER II. 

OF BENEVOLENCE TO THE UNHAPPY. 

A man may be simply unhappy from either his physical 
or his intellectual condition. We shall consider these sepa- 
rately. 

SECTION I. 

UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 

The occasions of unhappiness of this class are simple 
poverty, or mere want of the necessities and conveniences 
of life ; and sickness and decrepitude, either alone, and when 
combined with poverty. 

1. Of Poverty. Simple poverty, or want, so long as a 
human being has the opportunity of labor sufficiently pro- 
ductive to maintain him, does not render him an object of 
charity. " If a man will not work, neither shall he eat," is 
the language no less of reason than of revelation. If a 
man be indolent, the best discipline to which he can be sub- 
jected is, to suffer the evils of penury. Hence, all that we 
are required to do in such a case is, to provide such a per- 
son with labor, and to pay him accordingly. This is the 
greatest kindness both to him and to society. 

37 



422 UNHAPPINESS FROM 

2. Sometimes, however, from the dispensations of Provi- 
dence, a family is left so destitute that their labor is insuffi- 
cient to maintain themselves. Such is frequently the case 
with widows and orphans. This forms a manifest occa- 
sion for charity. The individuals have become, by the dis- 
pensation of God, unable to help themselves, and it is our 
duty and our privilege to help them. 

3. Sickness. Here the ability to provide for ourselves 
is taken away, and an additional necessity of assistance is 
created. In such cases, the rich stand frequently in need of 
our aid, our sympathy, and our services. If this be the case 
with them, how much more must it be with the poor, from 
whom the affliction which produces suffering, takes away 
the power of providing the means necessary for alleviating 
it. It is here that the benevolence of the Gospel is pe- 
culiarly displayed. Our Saviour declares, "inasmuch as 
ye have done it unto one of the least of these, ye have 
done it unto me." Bishop Wilson, on this passage, has 
the following beautiful remark: "Inasmuch (as often); 
who, then, would miss any occasion? The least; who, 
then, would despise any object ? To me ; so that, in serv- 
ing the poor, we serve Jesus Christ" 

4. Besides sickness, age also frequently brings with it 
decrepitude of body, if not imbecility of mind. This state 
calls for our sympathy and assistance, and all that care and 
attention, which the aged so much need, and which it is so 
suitable for the young and vigorous to bestow. 

The above are, I believe, the principal occasions for the ex- 
ercise of benevolence towards man's physical sufferings. 
We proceed to consider the principles by which our benevo- 
lence should be regulated. These have respect both to the 
recipient and to the benefactor. 

I . Principles which relate to the recipient. 



PHYSICAL CONDITION. 423 

It is a law of our constitution, that every benefit which 
God confers upon us, is the result of labor, and generally of 
labor in advance. That is, a man pays for what he receives, 
not after he has received it, but before. This rule is 
universal, and applies to physical, intellectual, and moral 
benefits, as will be easily seen upon reflection, 

Now, so universal a rule could not have been esta- 
blished, without both a good and a universal reason ; and 
hence we find by experience, that labor, even physical labor, 
is necessary to the healthful condition of man, as a physical, 
an intellectual, and a moral being. And hence, it is evident, 
that the rule is just as applicable to the poor as to the rich. 
Or to state the subject in another form. Labor is either a 
benefit or a curse. If it be a curse, there can be no reason 
why every class of men should not bear that portion of the 
infliction which God assigns to it. If it be a benefit, there can 
be no reason why every man should not enjoy his portion 
of the blessing. 

And hence it will follow, that our benevolence should co- 
operate with this general law of our constitution. 

1. Those who are poor, but yet able to support themselves, 
should be enabled to do so by means of labor ; and on no 
other condition. If they are too indolent to do this, they 
should suffer the consequences. 

2. Those who are unable to support themselves wholly, 
should be assisted only in so far as they are thus unable. 
Because a man cannot do enough to support himself, there is 
no reason why he should do nothing. 

3. Those who are unable to do any thing, should have 
every thing done for them Which their condition requires. 
Such are infants, the sick, the disabled, and the aged. 



424 UNHAPPINESS FROM 

Benevolence is intended to have a moral effect upon 
the recipient, by cultivating kindness, gratitude, and uni- 
versal benevolence, among all the different classes of men. 
That mode of charity is therefore most beneficial to its 
object, which tends, in the highest degree, to cultivate the 
kinder and better feelings of his nature. Hence, it is far bet- 
ter for the needy, for us to administer alms ourselves, than to 
employ others to do it for us. The gratitude of the recipient 
is but feebly exercised by the mere fact of the relief of his 
necessities, unless he also have the opportunity of witnessing 
the temper and spirit from which the charity proceeds. 

II. Principles which relate to the benefactor. 

The Christian religion considers charity as a means of 
moral cultivation, specially to the benefactor. It is always, 
in the New Testament, classed with prayer, and is governed 
essentially by the same rules. This may be seen from our 
Saviour's sermon on the Mount. 

Hence, 1. That method of charity is always the best 
which calls into most active exercise the virtues of self-de- 
nial and personal sacrifice, as they naturally arise from kind- 
ness, sympathy, and charity, or universal love to God and 
man. And, on the contrary, all those modes of benevolence 
must be essentially defective, in which the distresses of 
others are relieved, without the necessary exercise of these 
virtues. 

2. As charity is a religious service, and an important 
means of cultivating love to God, and as it does this in 
proportion as all external and inferior motives are with- 
drawn, it is desirable, also, that, in so far as possible, it be 
done secretly. The doing of it in this manner, abstracts the 
motives derived from love of applause, and leaves us simply 
those motives which are derived from love to God. Those 
modes of benevolence which are in their nature the farthest 



PHYSICAL CONDITION. 425 

removed from human observation, are, cceteris paribus, the 
most favorable to the cultivation of virtue, and are, therefore, 
always to be preferred. 

Hence, in general, those modes of charity are to be pre- 
ferred, which most successfully teach the object to relieve 
himself, and which tend most directly to the moral benefit of 
both parties. And, on the contrary, those modes of charity 
are the worst, which are the farthest removed from such ten- 
dencies. 

These principles may easily be applied to some of the 
ordinary forms of benevolence. 

I. Public provision for the poor by poor laws, will be 
found defective in every respect. 

1. It makes a provision for the poor because he is poor. 
This, as I have said, gives no claim upon charity. 

2. It in no manner teaches the man to help himself; but, 
on the contrary, tends to take from him the natural stimulus 
for doing so. 

3. Hence, its tendency is to multiply paupers, vagrants, 
and idlers. Such have been its effects to an appalling de- 
gree in Great Britain; and such, from the nature of the 
case, must they be every where. It is taking from the indus- 
trious a portion of their earnings, and conferring them, 
without equivalent, upon the idle, 

4. It produces no feeling of gratitude towards the benefac- 
tor, but the contrary. In those countries where poor-rates 
are the highest, the poor will be found the most discon- 
tented and lawless, and the most inveterate against the rich. 

5. It produces no moral intercourse between the parties 

37* 



426 UNHAPPINESS FROM 

concerned, but leaves the distribution of bounty to the hand 
of an official agent. Hence, what is received is claimed, by 
the poor, as a matter of right; and the only feeling elicited 
is that of displeasure, because it is so little. 

6. It produces no feeling of sympathy or of compassion 
in the rich] but, being extorted by force of law, is viewed 
as a mere matter of compulsion. 

Hence, every principle would decide against poor laws, as 
a means of charity. If, however, the government undertake 
the control of the whole capital of society, and manage it as 
they will, and, by this management, make paupers by thou- 
sands, I do think they are under obligation to support 
them. If, however, they insist upon pursuing this course, it 
would be better that every poor-house should be a work- 
house ; and that the poor-rates should always be given as the 
wages of some form of labor. 

I would not, however, be understood to decide against all 
public provision for the necessitous. The aged and infirm, 
the sick, the disabled, and the orphan, in the failure of their 
relatives, should be relieved, and relieved cheerfully and 
bountifully, by the public. I only speak of provision for 
the poor, because they are poor, and do not refer to provi- 
sion made for other reasons. Where the circumstances of 
the recipient render him an object of charity, let him be re- 
lieved freely and tenderly. But, if he be not an object of 
charity, to make charitable provision for him is injurious. 

II. Voluntary associations for purposes of charity. 

Some of the inconveniences arising from poor-laws are 
liable to ensue, from the mode of conducting these institu- 
tions. 

1. They do not make the strongest appeal to the moral 



PHYSICAL CONDITION. 427 

feelings of the recipient. Gratitude is much diminished, 
when we are benefited by a public charity, instead of a pri- 
vate benefactor. 

2. This is specially the case, when a charity is funded ; 
and the almoner is merely the official organ of a distribu- 
tion, in which he can have but a comparatively trifling per- 
sonal interest. 

3. The moral effect upon the giver is much less than it 
would be, if he and the recipient were brought immediately 
into contact. Paying an annual subscription to a charity, 
has a very different effect from visiting and relieving, with 
our own hands, the necessities and distresses of the sick and 
the afflicted. 

I by no means, however, say that such associations are not 
exceedingly valuable. Many kinds of charity cannot well be 
carried on without them. The comparatively poor are thus 
enabled to unite in extensive and important works of charity. 
In many cases, the expenditure of capital, necessary for con- 
ducting a benevolent enterprise, requires a general effort. I, 
however, say that the rich, who are able to labor personally 
in the cause of charity, should never leave the most desira- 
ble part of the work to be done by others. They should be 
their own almoners. If they will not do this, why, then, let 
them furnish funds to be distributed by others, but let them 
remember, that they are losing, by far, the most valuable, 
that is, they are losing the moral benefit which God intended 
they should enjoy. God meant every man to be charitable 
as much as to be prayerful ; and he never intended that the 
one duty, any more than the other, should be done by a deputy. 
The same principles would lead us to conclude, what, I 
believe, experience has always shown to be the fact ; that a 
fund, for the support of the poor of a town, has always 
proved a nuisance instead of a benefit. And, in general, as 
charity is intended to be a means of moral improvement to 



428 UNHAPPINESS FROM 

both parties, and specially to the benefactor, those modes of 
charity which do not have in view the cultivation of moral 
excellence, are, in this respect, essentially defective. 



SECTION II. 

OF UNHAPPINESS FROM INTELLECTUAL CONDITION. 

To an intellectual being, in a cultivated state of society, 
a certain amount of knowledge may be considered a neces- 
sary of life. If he do not possess it, he is shut out from a 
vast source of enjoyment; is liable to become the dupe of 
the designing, and to sink down into a mere animal exist- 
ence. By learning how to read, he is enabled to acquire the 
whole knowledge which is contained within a language. 
By writing, he can act where he cannot be personally pre- 
sent ; and can also benefit others by the communication of 
his own thoughts. By a knowledge of accounts, he is ena- 
bled to be just in his dealings with others, and to be assured 
that others are just in their dealings with him. 

So much as this may be considered necessary; the rest 
is not so. The duty of thus educating a child, belongs, in 
the first instance, to the parent. But since, as so much know- 
ledge as this is indispensable to the child's happiness, if the 
parent be unable to furnish it, the child becomes, in so far, 
an object of charity. And, as it is for the benefit of the 
whole society, that every individual should be thus far in- 
structed, it is properly, also, a subject of social regulation. 
And, hence, provision should be made, at public expense, for 
the education of those who are unable to procure it. 

Nevertheless, this education is a valuable consideration to 
the receiver ; and, hence, our former principle ought not to 
be departed from. While the provision for this degree of 
education is properly made a matter of public enactment, yet 



INTELLECTUAL CONDITION. 429 

every one should contribute to it, in so far as he is able. 
Unless this be done, he will cease to value it, and it will be 
merely a premium for idleness. And, hence, I think it will 
be found, that large permanent funds for the purpose of gene- 
ral education are commonly injurious to the cause of edu- 
cation itself. A small fund, annually appropriated, may be 
useful to stimulate an unlettered people to exertion ; but it is 
probably useful for no other purpose. A better plan, per- 
haps, would be to oblige each district to support schools at 
its own expense. This would produce the greatest possible 
interest in the subject, and the most thorough supervision of 
the schools. It is generally believed, that the school funds 
of some of our older states have been injurious to the cause 
of common education. 

In so far, then, as education is necessary to enable us to 
accomplish the purposes of our existence, and to perform 
our duties to society, the obligation to make a provision 
for the universal enjoyment of it, comes within the law of 
benevolence. Beyond this, it may very properly be left to 
the arrangements of Divine Providence ; that is, every one 
may be left to acquire as much more as his circumstances 
will allow. There is no more reason why all men should 
be educated alike, than why they should all dress alike, or 
live in equally expensive houses, As civilization advances, 
and capital accumulates, and labor becomes more produc- 
tive, it will become possible for every man to acquire 
more and more intellectual cultivation. In this manner the 
condition of all classes is to be improved ; and not by the 
impracticable attempt torender the education of all classes, 
at any one time, alike. 

While I say this, however, I by no means assert that it is 
not a laudable and excellent charity, to assist in the acquisi- 
tion of knowledge any person who gives promise of peculiar 
usefulness. Benevolence is frequently exerted under such 
circumstances with the greatest possible benefit, and pro- 



430 UNHAPPINESS FROM 

duces the most gratifying and the most abundant results. 
There can surely be no more delightful mode of charity, 
than that which raises from the dust modest and despair- 
ing talent ; and enables it to bless and adorn society. Yet, 
on such a subject as this, it is manifest that no general rule 
can be given. The duty must be determined by the re- 
spective condition of the parties. It is however proper to 
add, that aid of this kind should be given with judgment ; 
and never in such a manner as to remove from genius the 
necessity of depending on itself. The early struggle for 
independence, is a natural and a salutary discipline for talent. 
Genius was given, not for the benefit of its possessor, but 
for the benefit of others. And the sooner its possessor is 
taught the necessity of exerting it to practical purpose, the 
better is it for him, and the better for society. The poets 
tell us much of the amount of genius which has been nipped 
in the bud, by the frosts of adversity. This doubtless is 
true ; but let it not be forgotten that, by the law of our na- 
ture, early promise is frequently delusive. The poets do not 
tell us how great an amount of genius is also withered by the 
sun of prosperity. It is probable that a greater proportion 
of talent is destroyed, or rendered valueless, by riches than 
by poverty ; and the rapid mutations of society I think 
demonstrate this to be the fact. 

The same principles will in substance apply to the case 
in which, for a particular object, as for the promotion of re- 
ligion, it is deemed expedient to increase the proportion of 
professionally educated men. 

In this, as in every other instance, if we would be truly 
useful, our charities must be governed by the principles 
which God has marked out in the constitution of man. 

The general principle of God's government is, that for 
all valuable possessions we must render a consideration ; 
and experience has taught that it is impossible to vary from 



INTELLECTUAL CONDITION. 431 

this rule, without the liability of doing injury to the recipient. 
The reason is obvious ; for we can scarcely, in any other 
manner injure another so seriously, as by leading him to 
rely on any one else than himself, or to feel that the public 
are under obligations to take the charge of him. 

Hence charity of this sort should be governed by the fol- 
lowing principles : 

1. The recipient should receive no more than is neces- 
sary, with his own industrious exertions, to accomplish the 
object. 

2. To loan money is better than to give it. 

3. It should be distributed in such manner as most suc- 
cessfully to cultivate the good dispositions of both parties. 

Hence private and personal assistance, when practicable, 
has some advantages over that derived from associations. 
And hence, such supervision is always desirable, as will 
restrict the charity to that class of persons for whom it was 
designed ; and to render it of such a nature that those of 
every other class would be under the least, possible tempta- 
tion to desire it. 

And in arranging the plan of such an association, it 
should always be borne in mind, that the sudden change in 
all the prospects of a young man's life, which is made by 
setting before him the prospect of a professional education, 
is one of the severest trials of human virtue. 

Public provision for scientific education does not come 
under the head of benevolence. Inasmuch, however, as 
the cultivation of science is advantageous to all classes 
of a community ; it is for the interest of the ivhole, 
that it be cultivated. But the means of scientific educa- 



432 UNHAPPINESS FROM, &c. 

tion, as philosophical instruments, libraries and buildings, 
could never be furnished by instructors, without render- 
ing this kind of education so expensive as to restrict it 
entirely to the rich. It is therefore wise for a community 
to make these provisions out of the common stock ; so that 
a fair opportunity of improvement may be open to all. 
When, however, the public fails to discharge this duty, it is 
frequently with great patriotism and benevolence assumed 
by individuals. I know of no more interesting instances of 
expansive benevolence than those in which wealth is appro- 
priated to the noble purpose of diffusing over all coming 
time, the " light of science and the blessings of religion." 
Who can estimate the blessings which the first founders of 
Oxford and Cambridge Universities have conferred upon 
the human race. 



CHAPTER III. 



BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 

We now come to treat of a form of benevolence, in which 
other elements are combined. What is our duty to our fellow- 
men who are wicked 7 

A wicked man is, from the nature of the case, unhappy. 
He is depriving himself of all the pleasures of virtue ; he is 
giving strength to those passions, which, by their ungo- 
vernable power, are already tormenting him with insatiable 
and ungratirled desire ; he is incurring the pains of a guilty 
conscience here, and he is, in the expressive language of the 
Scriptures, " treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath 
and of righteous indignation." It is manifest, then, that no 
one has stronger claims upon our pity, than such a fellow- 
creature as this. 

So far, then, as a wicked man is miserable or unhappy, he 
is entitled to our pity, and of course to our love and benevo- 
lence. But this is not all. He is also wicked, and the pro- 
per feeling with which we should contemplate wickedness, 
is that of disgust or moral indignation. Hence, a complex 
feeling in such a case naturally arises, that of benevolence 
because he is unhappy ; and that of moral indignation be- 
cause he is sinful. These two sentiments, however, in no 
manner conflict with, but on the contrary, if properly un- 
derstood, strengthen each other. 

38 



434 BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 

The fact of a fellow-creature's wickedness, affects not our 
obligation to treat him with the same benevolence as would be 
demanded in any other case. If he is necessitous, or sick, 
or afflicted, or ignorant, our duty to relieve, and sympathise 
with, and assist, and teach him, are the same as though he 
were virtuous. God sends his rain on the evil and on the 
good. 

But especially, as the most alarming source of his misery 
is his moral character, the more we detest his wickedness 
the more strongly would benevolence urge us to make every 
effort in our power to reclaim him. This, surely, is the 
highest exercise of charity ; for virtue is the true solace 
against all the evils incident to his present life, and it is only 
by being virtuous that he can hope for eternal felicity. 

We are bound, then, by the law of benevolence, to labor to 
reclaim the wicked. 

1. By example, by personal kindness, by conversation, and 
by instructing them in the path of duty, and persuading them 
to follow it. 

2. As the most efficacious mode of moral reformation yet 
discovered, is found to be the truths of the Holy Scriptures, 
it is our imperative duty to bring these truths into contact 
with the consciences of men. This duty is, by our Saviour, 
imposed upon all his disciples. " Go ye into all the world, 
and preach the Gospel to every creature" 

3. As all men are our brethren, and as all men equally 
need moral light ; and, as experience has abundantly shown 
that all men will be both wicked and unhappy without it j 
this duty is binding upon every man towards the whole 
human race. The sentiments of Dr. Johnson on this sub- 
ject, in his letter on the translation of the Scriptures into the 
Gaelic language, are so apposite to my purpose, that I beg 



BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 435 

leave to introduce them here, though they have been fre- 
quently published. " If obedience to the will of God be 
necessary to happiness, and knowledge of his will necessary 
to obedience, I know not how he that withholds this know- 
ledge, or delays it, can be said to love his neighbor as him- 
self. He that voluntarily continues in ignorance, is guilty of 
all the crimes which that ignorance produces ; as, to him 
that should extinguish the tapers of a light-house, might be 
justly imputed the calamities of shipwrecks. Christianity is 
the highest perfection of humanity ; and as no man is good, 
but as he wishes the good of others, no man can be good in 
the highest degree, who wishes not to others the largest mea- 
sures of the greatest good." — Life, Anno 1766. 

We see, then, that in so far as wicked men are by their 
wickedness miserable, benevolence renders it our duty to 
reclaim them. And to such benevolence the highest rewards 
are promised. " They that turn many to righteousness shall 
shine as the stars forever and ever." But this is not all. If 
we love our Father in heaven, it must pain us to see his 
children violating his just and holy laws, abusing his good- 
ness, rendering not only themselves but also his other child- 
ren miserable, and exposing themselves and others to his 
eternal displeasure. The love of God would prompt us to 
check these evils, and to teach our brethren to serve, and love, 
and reverence our common Father, and to become his obe- 
dient children both now and forever. 

Nor are either of these sentiments inconsistent with the 
greatest moral aversion to the crime. The more hateful to 
us is the conduct of those whom we love, the more zealous 
will be our endeavors to bring them back to virtue. And 
surely the more we are sensible of the evil of sin against 
God, the more desirous must we be, to teach his creatures 
to love and obey him. 

The perfect exemplification of both of these sentiments 



436 BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 

is found in the character of our Lord and Saviour Jesus 
Christ. While, in all his conduct and teachings, we observe 
the most intense abhorrence of every form of moral evil ; yet 
we always find it combined with a love for the happiness, 
both temporal and spiritual, of man; which, in all its bear- 
ings, transcends the limits of finite comprehension. This is 
the example which God has held forth for our imitation. 
It would be easy to show that the improvement of the moral 
character of our fellow-men, is also the surest method of 
promoting their physical, intellectual, and social happiness. 



CHAPTER IV. 

BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 

The cases to be considered here are three : 

I. Where injury is committed by an individual upon an 
individual. 

II. Where injury is committed by an individual upon 
society. 

III. Where injury is committed by a society upon a society. 

I. Where an injury is committed by an individual upon 
an individual. 

In this case the offender is guilty of wickedness, and of 
violation of our personal rights. 

1. In so far as the action is wicked, it should excite our 
moral detestation, just as in the case in which wrong is done 
to any one else. 

2. In so far as the wicked man is unhappy, he should 
excite our pity, and our active effort to benefit him. 

3. As the cause of this unhappiness is moral wrong, it is 
our duty to reclaim him. 

38* 



438 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD 

4. Inasmuch as the injury is done to us, it is our duty 
to forgive him. On this condition alone can we hope to be 
forgiven. 

5. Yet more, inasmuch as the injury is done to us, it 
gives us an opportunity of exercising special and peculiar 
virtue. It is therefore our special duty, to overcome it by 
good ; that is, the duty of reclaiming him from wrong, rests 
specially upon us ; and it is to be fulfilled by manifesting 
towards him particular kindness, and the most cheerful 
willingness to serve him. u Be not overcome of evil, but 
overcome evil with good" That is ? it is our special duty by 
an exhibition of peculiar benevolence to reclaim the inju- 
rious person to virtue. 

Such is plainly the teaching of the Holy Scriptures. It 
will require but a few words to show, that this is the course 
of conduct indicated by the conditions of our being. 

1. I think that every one must acknowledge this to be 
the course pointed out by the most exalted virtue. Every 
man's conscience testifies, that to reward evil with good is 
noble, while the opposite course is mean. There is nothing 
more strongly indicative of littleness of spirit, than revenge. 

2. This mode of treating injuries has a manifest tendency 
to put an end to injury, and every form of ill will. 

For, 1. No man can long continue to injure another, who 
requites injury with nothing but goodness. 

2. It improves the heart of the offender, and thus not only 
puts an end to the injury at that particular time, but also 
greatly diminishes the probability of its recurrence at any 
subsequent time. Were this course universally pursued, 
there would be done on earth the least possible injury. 



THE INJURIOUS. 439 

3. It affords an opportunity for the exercise of the most 
godlike virtue on the part of the offended. 

In a word, the tendency of this mode of treating an 
injurious person is, to diminish indefinitely the liability to 
injury, and to render all parties both happier and better. 

On the contrary, the tendency of retaliation is exactly the 
reverse. We should consider, 

1. That the offender is a creature of God, and we are 
bound to treat him as God has commanded. Now no treat- 
ment which we have received from another, gives us, by the 
law of God, any right to treat him in any other manner 
than with kindness. That he has violated his duty towards 
us and towards God, affords no reason why we should be 
guilty of the same crimes. 

2. The tendency of retaliation is, to increase, and foster, 
and multiply wrongs, absolutely without end. Such we see 
is its effect among savage nations. 

3. Retaliation renders neither party better, but always 
renders both parties worse. The offended party who re- 
taliates, does a mean action, when he might have done a 
noble one. 

Such then is the Scriptural mode of adjusting individual 
differences. 

II. When the individual has committed an injury against 
society. 

Such is the case when an offender has violated a law of 
society, and comes under its condemnation. In what way 
and on what principles is society bound to treat him? 



440 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD 

1. The crime being one, which, if permitted, would greatly 
injure if not destroy society, it is necessary that it be pre- 
vented. Society has therefore a right to take such measures 
as will insure its prevention. This prevention may always 
be secured by solitary confinement. 

2. But this being done, society is under the same obliga- 
tions to the offender, as the several individuals composing 
society, are under to him. Hence, 

1. They are bound to seek his happiness by reclaiming 
him, that is, to direct all his treatment, while under their care, 
with distinct reference to his moral improvement. This is 
the law of benevolence, and it is obligatory no less on 
societies than on individuals. Every one must see, that the 
tendency of a system of prison discipline of this kind must 
be, to diminish crime ; while that of any other system 
must be, and always has been, to increase it. 

Nor is this chimerical. The whole history of prisons has 
tended to establish precisely this result. Prisons which have 
been conducted on the principle of retaliation, have every 
where multiplied felons. While those which have been 
conducted on the principle of rendering a prison a school of 
moral reformation, have thus far succeeded, beyond even 
the anticipations of their friends. Such a prison is also the 
greatest terror to a wicked man ; and it ceases not to be so, 
until he becomes at least comparatively virtuous. The 
whole experience of John Howard is summed up by himself 
in a single sentence : " It is in vain to punish the wicked 
unless you seek to reclaim them." 

By what I have said above, I would not be understood to 
deny the right of society to punish murder by death. This 
right I think, however, is to be established, not by the prin- 
ciples of natural law, but by the command of God to Noah. 



THE INJURIOUS. 441 

The precept in this case seems to me to have been" given to 
the whole human race, and to be still obligatory. 

III. Where one society violates the rights of another 
soeiety. The principles of the Gospel already explained 
apply equally to this as to the preceding cases. 

1. The individual has, by the law of God, no right to 
return evil for evil, but is bound to conduct towards every 
other individual, of what nation soever, upon the principle 
of charity. 

2. The individual has no right to authorize society to do 
any thing contrary to the law of God. That is to say, men 
connected in societies are under the same moral law as 
individuals. What is forbidden to the one is forbidden also 
to the other. 

3. Hence I think we must conclude, that an injury is to 
be treated in the same manner, that is, that we are under 
obligation to forgive the offending party, and to strive to ren- 
der him both better and happier. 

4. Hence it would seem that all wars are contrary to the 
revealed will of God, and that the individual has no right 
to commit to society, nor society to commit to government, 
the power to declare war. 

Such, I must confess, seems to me to be the will of our 
Creator, and hence that, to all arguments brought in favor 
of war, it would be a sufficient answer, that God has for- 
bidden it, and that no consequences can possibly be con- 
ceived to arise from keeping his law, so terrible as those 
which must arise from violating it. God commands us to 
love every man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as our- 
selves ; and neither the act of society nor of government 
can render it our duty to violate this command. 



442 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD 

But let us look at the arguments offered in support of war. 

The miseries of war are acknowledged. Its expense at 
last begins to be estimated. Its effects upon the physical, 
intellectual, and moral condition of a nation, are deplored. 
It is granted to be a most calamitous remedy for evils, and 
the most awful scourge that can be inflicted upon the 
human race. It will be granted, then, that the resort to it, 
if not necessary, must be intensely wicked ; and that if it 
be not in the highest degree useful, it ought to be universally 
abolished. 

It is also granted, that the universal abolition of war would 
be one of the greatest blessings that could be conferred upon 
the human race. As to the general principle then, there is 
no dispute. The only question which arises is, whether it 
be not necessary for one nation to act upon the principle of 
offence and defence so long as other nations continue to do 
the same ? 

I answer, first. It is granted that it would be better for 
man in general if wars were abolished, and all means both 
of offence and defence abandoned. Now, this seems to me 
to admit, that this is the law under which God has created 
man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at 
an end ; for God never places men under circumstances in 
which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate 
his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who lives among 
a community of thieves to steal ; or for one who lives among 
a community of liars to lie? On the contrary, do not honesty 
and veracity, under these very circumstances, give him ad- 
ditional and peculiar advantages over his companions ? 

Secondly. Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means 
both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all power of in- 
flicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely upon 
the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect which 



THE INJURIOUS. 443 

such a course of conduct would produce upon the con- 
sciences of men. How would such a nation procure redress 
of grievances ? and how would it be protected from foreign 
aggression ? 

1. Of redress of grievances. Under this head would be 
comprehended violation of treaties, spoliation of property, 
and ill-treatment of its citizens. 

I reply, 1. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon 
the justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its con- 
duct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the oc- 
currence of injury. The moral sentiment of every human 
community, would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon 
the just, the kind, and the merciful. Thus, by this course, 
the probabilities of aggression are rendered as few as the na- 
ture of man will permit. 

2. But suppose injury to be done. I reply, the proper ap- 
peal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physi- 
cal force, but to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be 
set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of love ; and in this 
manner, if in any, will the consciences of men be aroused to 
justice. 

3. But suppose this method to fail. Why, then, let us suf- 
fer the injury. This is the preferable evil of the two. Be- 
cause they have injured us a little, it does not follow that we 
should injure ourselves much. But it will be said, what is 
then to become of our national honor ? I answer, first, if 
we have acted justly, we surely are not dishonored. The 
dishonor rests upon those who have done wickedly. I 
answer again, national honor is displayed in forbearance, in 
forgiveness, in requiting faithlessness with fidelity, and griev- 
ances with kindness and good will. These virtues are surely 
as delightful and as honorable in nations as in individuals. 



444 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD 

But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and con- 
tinued aggression ? I answer, first, not instruments of de- 
struction, but the moral principle which God has placed in 
the bosom of every man. I think that obedience to the law 
of God, on the part of the injured, is the surest preventive 
against the repetition of injury. I answer, secondly, suppose 
that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not 
prevent the repetition of injury, will acting upon the principle 
of retaliation prevent it ? This is really the true question. 
The evil tempers of the human heart are allowed to exist, 
and we are inquiring in what manner shall we surfer the 
least injury from them; whether by obeying the law of 
benevolence or that of retaliation? It is not necessary, 
therefore, to show, that, by adopting the law of benevolence, 
we shall not suffer at all ; but that, by adopting it, we shall 
suffer less than by the opposite course : and that a nation 
would actually thus surfer less upon the whole than by any 
other course, cannot, I think, be doubted by any one who will 
calmly reflect upon the subject. 

II. How would such a nation be protected from exter- 
nal attack and entire subjugation ? I answer, By adopting 
the law of benevolence, a nation would render such an event 
in the highest degree improbable. The causes of national 
war are, most commonly, the love of plunder and the love of 
glory. The first of these is rarely, if ever, sufficient to stimu- 
late men to the ferocity necessary to war, unless when as- 
sisted by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our 
conduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the 
second cause is taken away. There is not a nation in 
Europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, just, 
forgiving, and defenceless people. 

But suppose such a case really should occur, what are we 
then to do? I answer, suffer injury with forgiveness and 
love, looking up to God, who, in his holy habitation, is the 
Judge of the whole earth. And if it be said, we shall then all 



THE INJURIOUS. 445 

be subjected and enslaved, I answer again, have wars pre- 
vented men from being subjected and enslaved? Is there a 
nation on the continent of Europe that has not been overrun by 
foreign troops several times, even within the present century. 
And still more, is it not most commonly the case, that the 
very means by which we repel a despotism from abroad, 
only establishes over us a military despotism at home. 
Since, then, the principle of retaliation will not, with any 
certainty, save a country from conquest, the real question, as 
before, is, by obedience to which law will a nation be most 
likely to escape it, by the law of retaliation or by that of be- 
nevolence? It seems to me, that a man who will calmly 
reflect, can have but little doubt on this matter. 

But I go still farther. The Scriptures teach us that God 
has created men, both as individuals and as societies, under 
the law of benevolence ; and that he intends this law to be 
obeyed. Societies have never yet thought of obeying it in 
their dealings with each other ; and statesmen would gene- 
rally consider the allusion to it as puerile. But this alters 
not the law of God, nor the punishments which he inflicts 
upon nations for the violation of it. This punishment I sup- 
pose to be war. I believe aggression from a foreign nation,to 
be the intimation from God that we are disobeying thelaw of 
benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations 
their duty, in this respect, to each other. So that aggression 
seems to me, to be in no manner a call to retaliation and inju- 
ry, but rather a call to special kindness and good will. And 
still further, the requiting evil with good, tends just as 
strongly to the cessation of all injury in nations as in indi- 
viduals. Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary 
expenditure, and the awful waste of human life, which the 
wars of the last hundred years have occasioned, and then I 
will ask him whether it be not self-evident, that the one hun- 
dredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed in the 
honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would 

39 



446 OUR DUTY TO BRUTES. 

long: before this time, have banished wars from the earth, 
and rendered the civilized world like the Garden of Eden. 

If this be true, it will follow, that the cultivation of a mili- 
tary spirit, is the cultivation of a great curse to a community j 
and that all means, both of offence and defence, are worse 
than useless, inasmuch as they aggravate the very source of 
the evil, the corrupt passions of the human heart, by the 
manner in which they ineffectually attempt to check the evil 
itself. 

I am aware that all this may be called visionary, romantic, 
and chimerical. This, however, neither makes it so, nor 
shows it to be so. The time to apply these epithets will be, 
when the justness of their application has been proved. And 
if it be said, these principles may all be very true, but you 
can never induce nations to act upon them ; I answer this 
concession admits that such is the law of God. If this be 
the case, that nation will be the happiest and the wisest, 
which is the first to obey it. And if it be said, it would be 
wisest and best to obey the law of benevolence, but men will 
never obey it ; I answer, here is manifestly the end of the 
argument. If we show men what is wisest and best, and 
according to the will of their Creator, we can do no more. 
If they disobey it, this is a matter to be settled between them 
and their God. It remains, however, to be seen, whether 
God will or will not cause his laws to be obeyed; and 
whether omniscience and omnipotence have not the means 
of teaching his creatures submission to his will. 

Note. — I should be guilty of injustice to one class of my fel- 
low-creatures, if I should close this treatise upon human duty, 
without a single remark upon our obligations to brutes. 

Brutes are sensitive beings, capable of, probably, as great 
degrees of physical pleasure and pain, as ourselves. They 
are endowed with instinct, which is, probably, a form of intel- 



V OUR DUTY TO BRUTES. 447 

lect inwior to our own, -but- whicfly being generically unlike 
to ours, w>3 are unable to understand They differ from us 
chiefly in being destitute of any moral faculty. 

We do not stand to them in the relation of equality. "Our 
right is paramount, and must extinguish theirs." We have, 
therefore, a right to use them to promote our comfort ; and 
may innocently take their life, if our necessities demand it. 
This right over them is given us by the revealed will of God. 
But inasmuch as they, like ourselves, are the creatures of 
God, we have no right to use them in any other manner than 
that which God has permitted. They, as much as ourselves, 
are under his protection. 

We may, therefore, use them, 1. For our necessities. We 
are designed to subsist upon animal food, and we may inno- 
cently slay them for this purpose. 

2. We may use them for labor, or for innocent physical 
recreation, as when we employ the horse for draft or for the 
saddle. 

3. But while we so use them, we are bound to treat them 
kindly, to furnish them with sufficient food, and with conve- 
nient shelter. He who cannot feed a brute well, ought not 
to own one. And when we put them to death, it should be 
with the least possible pain. 

4. We are forbidden to treat them unkindly on any pretence, 
or for any reason. There can be no clearer indication of a 
degraded and ferocious temper, than cruelty to animals. 
Hunting, in many cases, and horse-racing, seem to me liable 
to censure in this respect. Why should a man, for the sake 
of showing his skill in marksmanship, shoot down a poor 
animal which he does not need for food ? Why should not 
the brute that is harming no living thing, be permitted to 
enjoy the happiness of its physical nature unmolested? 



. 



448 OUR DUTY TO BRUTES. 

"There they are privileged; and he that hurts oj^harms 
them there, is guilty of a wrong." 

5. Hence, all amusements which consist in inflicting pain 
upon animals, such as bull-baiting, cock-fighting, &c., are 
purely wicked. God never gave us power over animals for 
such purposes. I can scarcely conceive of a more revolting 
exhibition of human nature, than is seen when men assemble 
to witness the misery which brutes inflict upon each other. 
Surely nothing can tend more directly, to harden men in 
worse than brutal ferocity. 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township. PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



